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Soviet Bloc and Neutral/Nonaligned Country Statements at the CSCE Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) (CDE-VII & CDE-VIII)

10 September – 18 October 1985
5 November – 20 December 1985

Volume I

25X1

Reference Aid

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CR 86-10190
February 1986
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FOREWORD

This reference aid contains a chronological history and index of topics discussed during the Seventh and Eighth Rounds of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) which commenced in Stockholm on 10 September and recessed on 20 December 1985. It is indexed according to subjects and countries. In the case of the Soviet Union the individual delegate speaking, if identified, is also specified. Furthermore, the forum in which the statement(s) occurred is noted.

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The conference record has been retained in straight chronological order. The index, located at the beginning, is designed to guide the user to pages for specific topics, countries, and in the case of the Soviet Union, personalities. By using the type of entry key located at the front of the index, users can determine whether the references are from cables reporting on plenary, post-plenary, or working group meetings and limit their searches by these types of references when desired. Users interested in statements by a particular country are directed to the country index where each country has its own subject index. In the case of the Soviet Union, an additional letter code will identify the individual delegate who made the statement, if noted in the text. Each Soviet delegate who spoke is also included in the main subject index.

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Statements by the following countries are indexed: Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Finland, German Democratic Republic (GDR), Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and Yugoslavia. Please note that there is also a separate entry for the "East" and one for the NNA. In these sections are found statements which were attributed to the East or NNA in general but to no country in particular. In addition,

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when a delegate from one country speaks on behalf of one or more countries, his statements are cited in each of the various countries' indexes.

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All statements made by participating countries during plenary and working group AB meetings are summarized in the "Statement Summaries" section of this reference aid.

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Two items of note which might otherwise be overlooked are brought to the user's attention: "weekly wrap-up" cables summarizing developments in all CDE forums are included chronologically and can be located by referring to the subject index; a group of miscellaneous cables are referenced in the subject index as "miscellaneous cables" and cover such topics as delegation personnel changes, analyses of delegation and group positions or motives at CDE, and procedural issues and similar subjects.

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CSCE

CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE-
AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

STOCKHOLM 1984

8 November 1985 */

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

(as communicated by Delegations)

*/ The previous edition was printed on 12 September 1985

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STATEMENT SUMMARIES

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SUMMARY OF
PLENARY STATEMENTS

10 September 1985

FRG

- Reviews FRG position regarding CDE issues, including structural parameters, oog concept; observation; annual exchange of information.
- Requests Soviet elaboration on current policy regarding CDE issues.

DENMARK

- Calls for informal work and drafting process to begin.
- Stresses that agreement must apply only to CDE zone; backbone must be concrete measures.
- Outlines four areas of special concern: notification; constraints; NUF reaffirmation linked with concrete CSBMs; working structure.

USSR

- Asserts that intensification of arms race and state of relations in Europe necessitates conference "get down" to concrete negotiations.
- Claims that WTO proposals are designed to create an atmosphere of confidence.
- Summarizes proposals offered by socialist countries.
- Emphasizes the role of European nations in current negotiations.
- Criticizes attempts to artificially delay negotiations.
- Reaffirms Soviet policy regarding CDE.

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UNITED STATES

- Acknowledges the need for purposeful and decisive negotiations.
- Reaffirms President's support of conference.
- Criticizes East for action taken during CDE VI which "brought to the fore" differences that divide the conference.
- Pledges to hold to certain criteria summed up in the Madrid Mandate.
- Discusses outstanding issues between the East and West.
- Notes US interest in views of NNA nations.
- Calls for suggestions regarding working structure.

20 September 1985

GDR

- Endorses tripartite negotiations for establishment of CWFZ in Central Europe.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Contends that establishment of CWFZ in Central Europe would make agreement on worldwide CW ban easier.

USSR

- Declares that USSR would guarantee status of CWFZ in Central Europe if US did likewise.

FRG

- Responds to CWFZ proposal; declares subject is not appropriate for CDE forum.
- Reaffirms FRG commitment to worldwide ban on chemical weapons.
- Criticizes regional ban proposal.

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ROMANIA

- Notes emergence of common ground.
- Urges informal working arrangements.
- Advocates elaboration of NUF commitment; concrete CSBMs; constraints; verification.

27 September 1985

GDR

- Criticizes West for delay in moving conference to informal structure.
- Contends that NATO must be willing to compromise on SC.1.
- Urges delegations to show flexibility.

FRANCE

- Reaffirms France's position on informal working group structure.
- Rejects GDR's claim that one group of countries is responsible for delay.

4 October 1985

USSR

- Focuses on Gorbachev initiative on arms control.
- Calls for an agreement that includes a non-use of force proposal; military CSBMs; and an annual calendar.
- Endorses NWFZ; CWFZ in Central Europe.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Assesses CDE against events having an impact on arms control process.
- Acknowledges support for new Soviet peace initiative.
- States that an agreement on both political and military aspects of security is essential.

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HUNGARY

- Argues for complementary negotiations on political and military measures.
- Contends that focal point will be NUF agreement.
- Outlines criteria for basis of NUF agreement.
- Proposes that conference move to informal working arrangements ASAP.

11 October 1985

USSR

- Reaffirms Gorbachev's acceptance of an exchange of annual forecasts.
- Calls for inclusion of air and naval maneuvers in the exchange of annual forecasts.
- Criticizes US for trying to exclude air and naval maneuvers from exchange of annual forecasts.

18 October 1985

UNITED STATES

- Expresses US readiness for substantive negotiation.
- Contends that the product of the conference's work must have military significance.
- Welcomes Gorbachev's statement declaring USSR acceptance of mutual exchanges of annual plans.
- Stresses that any agreement must be verifiable.
- Acknowledges US willingness to address questions that are raised by others, but are not part of the mandate.
- Reviews the fundamental concerns of the US delegation.

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USSR

- States that the impact of major international events has been positively affected by recent Soviet-French summit.
- Declares a need for Europe to play an indispensable role in CDE process.
- Praises Finnish Ambassador for his role in moving the conference to the exploration and drafting phase.
- Criticizes US & NATO for attempts to narrow the scope and capacity of the conference.
- Addresses the need for the principle of no use or threat of force.

CANADA

- Urges conference move into drafting phase.

LUXEMBOURG

- Refers to the agreement on informal working arrangements as a turning point.

5 November 1985

FRG

- Outlines key areas of common ground needing detailed discussion if drafting is to begin this year.

NORWAY

- Stresses substantive areas which need to be resolved if drafting is to begin.
- Expresses support for exchange of annual calendars; adequate verification and exchange of information; observation; reaffirmation of non-use of force.
- Makes several procedural points.

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FRANCE

- Stresses the need for further negotiations before the drafting phase can begin.
- Elaborates on French position regarding 1986 work schedule.
- Concludes that distinction necessary between areas where agreement in principle has been expressed and those areas where this has not been possible.

BULGARIA

- Declares that an elaboration of non-use of force is the most important work of the conference.
- Suggests that drafting process begin as soon as possible.

USSR

- Responds to FRG statement.
- Criticizes FRG for failing to mention NUF and constraints.
- Charges NATO with trying to conduct one-way negotiations.

11 November 1985

UNITED STATES

- Reaffirms commitment of US President and Congress to conference.
- Asks East to explain its policy regarding an annual forecast or calendar.
- Contends that discussion of independent air and naval activities is not within Madrid Mandate.
- Explains that certain air and naval activities are covered by functional approach, which meet the criteria of the Mandate.
- Stresses that the conference should enact a set of CSBMs that establish a "system of cooperative security" for Europe.
- Pledges US will use "best efforts" to achieve a meaningful and verifiable agreement.

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15 November 1985

CYPRUS

- Introduces SC.7 on behalf of Cyprus, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, Luxembourg, Finland, Yugoslavia, Malta (NNA).

ROMANIA

- Reviews Romania's policy on constraint measures.
- Asserts that adequate verification must be provided for each measure agreed upon.

ITALY

- Outlines questions that need to be resolved in each area of negotiations before drafting can begin.

18 November 1985

UNITED STATES

- Praises NNA for work on SC.7.
- Asserts that SC.1 still the best basis for a verifiable, militarily significant set of CSBMs.
- Advises conference on US objectives at the Geneva Summit.
- Contends that goals of conference, US objectives at Geneva are similar.
- Suggests that Summit could act as a catalyst for work of conference.

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22 November 1985

UNITED STATES

- Reviews joint statement issued at conclusion of Geneva Summit.
- Concludes that Summit provided a political impulse to conference.
- Stresses the need to identify common ground and set aside areas where there is no convergence.
- Pledges US cooperation with USSR "in the spirit of Geneva."

USSR

- Discusses the importance of Geneva Summit to US-USSR relations.
- Cites Soviet efforts to find solutions to problems that exist between US and USSR.

MALTA

- Notes recent meeting of Mediterranean economic experts of the NNA in Valetta.
- Claims that this process parallels CDE conference.
- Expresses Malta's desire to merge Mediterranean process with European process.
- Praises US-USSR for recent summit.

FRG

- Assesses role of CDE within overall CSCE process.
- Links security issues with human contact issues.
- Examines NATO proposals which venture beyond traditional military concepts.
- Calls for a start to the drafting process.

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29 November 1985

POLAND

- Reviews impact of Geneva summit on CDE.
- Attacks West for contention that Eastern proposals are not militarily significant.
- Emphasizes the need for independent air and naval thresholds.

SPAIN

- Summarizes progress of CDE so far.

NETHERLANDS

- Blames East for lack of progress at CDE.
- Accuses East of attempting to redefine the Madrid Mandate through inclusion of independent air and naval activity.
- Criticizes East for failure to discuss inspection.
- Outlines five remedies for current stalemate.

USSR

- Rejects Netherland's claim that independent air and naval activities are excluded by Mandate.
- Claims West still has not defined position on NUF.
- Charges SDI is responsible for lack of arms control progress.
- Quotes Gorbachev's speech to Supreme Soviet.

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6 December 1985

CYPRUS

- Concludes US-Soviet Summit statement gives equal footing to NUF and CSBMs.
- Raises several arguments for giving NUF its CDE dimension.
- Urges conference to adopt 1986 working calendar that will permit the conference to end before the preparatory meeting in Vienna.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Stresses that drafting phase cannot begin until issues of independent naval/air activity and NUF are resolved.

MALTA

- Discusses need to include all types of military activity in notification proposal.
- Argues that air and naval activity have functional link to activities in Europe.
- Hints that Malta may offer threshold parameters for consideration, in the near future.

USSR

- Uses Madrid Mandate to argue for notification of air/naval activities.
- Criticizes West's proposals on oog and amphibious activity.
- Questions West regarding definition of independent activity; amphibious activity; notification.

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13 December 1985

HUNGARY

- Reflects work of conference up to present.
- Notes the impact of Geneva Summit on negotiations.
- Expresses a hope for the early and successful completion of the conference's work.
- Describes common grounds shared by delegations.
- Calls on the conference to begin the drafting phase.
- Reminds the conference that its deadline is drawing near.

20 December 1985

UNITED STATES

- Reflects upon progress made during CDE VIII.
- Discusses the role of Geneva Summit in helping to accelerate the pace of the conference.
- Praises NNA proposal.
- Notes those areas in which common ground has been achieved and those where discussions need to continue.
- Reviews basic elements of a final agreement.
- Argues that final agreement needs to be militarily significant.
- Proposes lowering notification parameters to a meaningful degree.
- Emphasizes the need for a means of verification.
- Urges delegations to cooperate with coordinators to expand common ground.
- Suggests that the working schedule be more flexible.

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SUMMARY OF
WORKING GROUP AB STATEMENTS

16 September 1985

ITALY

- Urges conference to enter drafting phase

POLAND

- Agrees with Italian ambassador on need for drafting phase.

UNITED KINGDOM

- Argues that delegations need a better understanding of the issues before discussions can intensify.
- Questions the East regarding its proposal on notification of land forces.

UNITED STATES

- Explains out-of-garrison concept

USSR

- Criticizes US position on NUF.
- Proposes conference consider a ban on the threat of use or use of force in any form.

23 September 1985

UNITED STATES

- Outlines measures which should compromise the basis of a verification regime.
- Draws a distinction between observation and verification.
- Challenges the East to explain how a numerical threshold for notification would be verified.

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GDR

- Stresses importance of NTM.
- Attacks concept of structural parameter for notification.

USSR

- Asks for explanation of how a structural parameter would be verified.

UNITED STATES

- Responds to USSR request regarding the use of a structural parameter with Central Guardian as an example.

HUNGARY

- Criticizes SC.1 approach, including oog concept.
- Endorses numerical parameter over structural parameter.
- Defends East's distinction between movement and maneuvers.

BULGARIA

- Defends East's distinction between movements and maneuvers.

30 September 1985

UNITED KINGDOM

- Analyzes WTO proposal for notification.
- Stresses the need for precise data.

USSR

- Criticizes US statement on constraints.
- Debates merits of structural parameter vs. numerical parameter for notification with FRG delegate.

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FRG

- Demonstrates comparability in combat strength of Soviet MRD and divisions of the FRG.

11 November 1985

USSR

- Accuses West of stalling on the issues of NUF and independent air and naval activities.

EAST

- Attacks the West for distorting the October 14 Gentlemen's Agreement by rejecting ceilings.
- Attempts to have FRG define specific types of force to be banned.

HUNGARY

- Argues that NUF reaffirmation meets the verifiability criterion of the Madrid Mandate.

25 November 1985

BULGARIA

- Notes impact of Geneva Summit on CDE.
- Examines role of NNA in CDE.
- Looks at the debate over an NUF treaty.
- Stresses the need for inclusion of independent air and naval activity in notification measures.
- Criticizes West for only wanting to "take" and not "give" during negotiating process.
- Calls for discussion of all questions in substance.
- Suggests the conference consider how to better coordinate its efforts.

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16 December 1985

UNITED STATES

- Accuses USSR of trying to reinterpret the Madrid Mandate.
- Claims the USSR is trying to alter the zone of application.
- Looks at the debate over independent air and naval activities.
- Explains US policy on notification.
- Reviews what delegations have in common.
- Urges members to agree on working calendar for 1986.

YUGOSLAVIA

- Stresses the responsibility of states to refrain from the threat or use of force.
- Expresses Yugoslavia's views on a non-use of force treaty.
- Urges conference adopt a declaration on non-use of force before the end of the first stage of CDE.
- Asserts that elaboration of NUF would not weaken the already existing obligation of nations.
- Addresses the advantages of an elaboration.
- Outlines measures that should be included in a declaration.
- Advocates the inclusion of a statement against state supportd terrorism be a part of the declaration.
- Claims that the rights of migrant workers should be looked at if human rights are to be discussed.

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MAIN SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

p - plenary meeting

a - working group A

b - working group B

c - working group AB

d - post-plenary or other informal conversations

e - NATO caucus

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AUSTRIA SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

p - plenary meeting

a - working group A

b - working group B

c - working group AB

d - post-plenary or other informal conversations

e - NATO caucus

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Number of regiments or brigades: 263p, 373p

Number of troops participating: 263p, 373p

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BULGARIA SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

p - plenary meeting

a - working group A

b - working group B

c - working group AB

d - post-plenary or other informal conversations

e - NATO caucus

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HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

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VERIFICATION:

General references to: 179a

Verification by cadres: 120c

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CYPRUS SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

p - plenary meeting

a - working group A

b - working group B

c - working group AB

d - post-plenary or other informal conversations

e - NATO caucus

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COMPLIANCE: see also MEASURE 5 390p

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CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES 123a, 473c

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Of ground forces: 34d, 116d

MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 116d, 386p

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MOBILIZATION: 117d, 256p

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Politically binding reaffirmation of NUF: 278p, 380p

Reaffirmation of NUF: 117d, 494p, 508p, 510p

NOTIFICATIONS: see also PRENOTIFICATION; PRIOR NOTIFICATION

General references to: 117d, 263p, 272p, 373p, 387p

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Duration of the activity: 263p, 373p

Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 257p, 263p 373p

Names of participating states: 263p, 373p

Purpose of the activity: 263p, 373p

Type of forces involved: 257p, 263p, 373p

Number of main battle tanks or armored carriers: 263p, 373p

Number of regiments or brigades: 263p, 373p

Number of troops participating: 263p, 373p

Number of naval vessels involved: 263p, 373p

Number of military aircraft involved: 263p, 373p

Transfer/movement of troops, naval vessels or aircraft: 263p, 373p

Information to be included: 257p, 263p, 373p

NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

General references to: 268p, 274p, 375p

Duration of observers' stay: 268p, 375p

Host country responsibilities: 268p, 375p

Invitaitons of observers: 258p, 268p, 375p, 389p

Logistical arrangement of observers: 277p, 375p

Personnel matters (numbers, protection, immunities): 115d, 268p, 375p

Scope of observation: 115d, 258p, 268p, 375p, 387p

OOG: see OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES

OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES (including discussion of differences): 117p, 256p

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PRENOTIFICATION: 35d, 256p

PRIOR NOTIFICATION: 263p, 372p, 385p, 387p

SC.3: 114d, 256p, 385p

SC.7: 253d, 262p, 368p, 370p, 385p, 440a/b/c, 494p, 506p, 509p, 510p, 511p

SOLEMN DECLARATION: 473c, 494p, 505p, 506p

STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS: 116d, 256p

THRESHOLDS: see MANPOWER THRESHOLDS; STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS

UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES: 509p

VERIFICATION: see also MEASURE 5

General references to: 115d, 259p

ZONAL CONSTRAINTS: see CDE ZONE

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

p - plenary meeting

a - working group A

b - working group B

c - working group AB

d - post-plenary or other informal conversations

e - NATO caucus

ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 306b

CDE VII:

General references to: 168p

Structural Issues: 169p

CDE VIII:

General references to: 520p

CHEMICAL WEAPONS FREE ZONE: 82p, 155p, 167p, 495p, 519p

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 82p, 168p, 169p, 519p, 522p

CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 127a,

CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES

EQUAL SECURITY: 306b

EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS:

General references to: 306b

FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

FINAL DOCUMENT: 520p

HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 154p, 166p, 168p, 521p

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HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 228b, 306b, 495p, 520p, 521p

MADRID MANDATE: 521p,

MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of differences):

General references to: 168p

Of naval forces: 520p

Of air forces: 520p

MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 56b,

MILITARIZATION OF SPACE: 167p

NON-USE-OF-FORCE:

General references to: 495p, 518p, 521p

Politically binding reaffirmation of NUF: 521p

NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY:

NOTIFICATIONS: see also PRENOTIFICATION; PRIOR NOTIFICATION

Information to be included: 228b

NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE

NUF TREATY: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

General references to: 227b

Scope of observation: 227b, 306b

PRIOR NOTIFICATION: 168p, 227b

SC.1 (also SC.1/amplified): 228b

SC.6: 177a

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SC.7: 520p

SOLEMN DECLARATION: 521p

STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS: 56b

THRESHOLDS: see EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS; MANPOWER THRESHOLDS;
STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS.

TRANSFER/MOVEMENT OF TROOPS: 56b

UNILATERAI ADVANTAGES: 169p

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EAST SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

p - plenary meeting

a - working group A

b - working group B

c - working group AB

d - post-plenary or other informal conversations

e - NATO caucus

ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 24b

CDE VI:

Structural issues: 200d

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 206d, 439a/b/c

CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 200d, 206d, 392c

CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES

DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS: 206d

EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance):

Annual forecasts of military activities: 206d, 392c

FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 24b

HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 24b, 392a/b/c, 439a/b/c

NON-USE-OF-FORCE:

General references to: 393c

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Reaffirmation of NUF: 393c

NOTIFICATIONS:

General references to: 392a/b/c

Number of troops participating: 24b

NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

General references to: 392c

SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 120c

SC.7: 471c

VERIFICATION:

General references to: 190e, 206d

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FINLAND SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

p - plenary meeting

a - working group A

b - working group B

c - working group AB

d - post-plenary or other informal conversations

e - NATO caucus

ALERTS: 258p, 260p

AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES: 257p, 372p

CDE VI:

Structural Issues: 150p

CDE ZONE: see also ZONAL CONSTRAINTS 35d

COMMUNICATIONS: see DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 114d, 253p, 263p

CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 35d, 114d, 116d, 258p, 273p, 377p

CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES

DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS: 259p, 276p, 380p

EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance):

Military calendars: 260p, 374p

Annual forecasts of military activities: 34d, 267p, 374p

EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION:

General references to: 117d

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FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 254p, 278p

HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

INSPECTIONS:

Areas of inspection: 115d

MADRID MANDATE: 263p, 372p

MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXCERCISES (including discussion of differences):

General references to: 34d, 116d, 117d, 256p, 263p, 273p, 372p

Of ground forces: 34d, 116d

MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 116d

MOBILIZATION: 117d, 256p

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS: see also VERIFICATION

NON-USE-OF-FORCE:

General references to: 117d, 260p, 278p, 380p

Politically binding reaffirmation of NUF: 278p, 380p

Reaffirmation of NUF: 117d

NOTIFICATIONS: see also PRENOTIFICATON AND PRIOR NOTIFICATION

General references to: 117d, 263p, 272p, 373p

Designation of the activity: 117d, 263p, 373p

Duration of the activity: 263p, 373p

Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 257p, 263p, 373p

Names of the participating states: 263p, 373p

Purpose of the activity: 263d, 373p

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Type of forces involved: 257p, 263p, 373p

Number of main battle tanks or armored carriers: 263p, 373p

Number of regiments or brigades: 263p, 373p

Number of troops participating: 263p, 373p

Number of naval vessels involved: 263p, 373p

Number of military aircraft involved: 263p, 373p

Transfer/movement of troops, naval vessels, or aircraft: 263p, 373p

Information to be included: 257p, 263p, 373p

NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

General references to: 268p, 274p, 375p

Duration of observers' stay: 268p, 375p

Host country responsibilities: 268p, 375p

Invitations of observers: 258p, 268p, 375p

Logistical arrangements for observers: 271p, 375p

Personnel matters (numbers, protection, and immunities): 115d, 268p, 375p

Scope of observation: 115d, 258p, 268p, 375p

OOG: see OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES: 256p

OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES (including discussion of differences): 117p

PRENOTIFICATION: 35d, 256p

PRIOR NOTIFICATION: 263p, 372p

SC.3: 114d, 256p

SC.7: 253d, 262p, 370p, 440a/b/c

STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS: 116d, 256d

THRESHOLDS: MANPOWER THRESHOLDS; STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS.

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VERIFICATION:

General references to: 115d, 259p, 474c

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GDR SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

p - plenary meeting

a - working group A

b - working group B

c - working group AB

d - post-plenary or other informal conversations

e - NATO caucus

CDE VII:
Structural Issues: 138p

CHEMICAL WEAPONS FREE ZONE: 82p

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 101p, 180a

CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 180a

CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES

CWFZ: see CHEMICAL WEAPONS FREE ZONE

EQUAL SECURITY: 102p

INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 180a

MADRID MANDATE: 101p

MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of differences):

General references to: 121b, 180a

MANPOWER THRESHOLDS AND PARAMETERS: 24b

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS: 119c, 124a

NFU: see NON FIRST USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS)

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NON-FIRST-USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS): 100p, 101p, 102p

NON-USE-OF-FORCE:

General references to: 19a, 57a, 223a

NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY: 19a

NOTIFICATIONS:

General references to: 24b, 120b

Number of troops participating: 24b

Transfer/movement of troops, naval vessels or aircraft: 24b

NTM: see NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE CORRIDOR: 101p, 103p

NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE: 57a, 100p, 101p, 103p

NWFC: see NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE CORRIDOR

NWFZ: see NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE

NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE

NUF TREATY: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY

NWFC: see NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE CORRIDOR

NWFZ: see NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE

OOG: see OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES

OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES (including discussion of differences): 138p

SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 100p, 121b, 124a, 138p

SC.4: 100p, 102p

SC.6: 223a

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STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS: 24b, 119c, 138p

THRESHOLDS: see STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS

TRANSFER/MOVEMENT OF TROOPS: 24b, 119c

VERIFICATION:

General references to: 24b, 119c

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HUNGARY SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

p - plenary meeting

a - working group A

b - working group B

c - working group AB

d - post-plenary or other informal conversations

e - NATO caucus

ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 246d

CDE VII:

General references to: 246d

CDE VIII:

General references to: 547p, 548p, 552p

Structural Issues: 155p, 162p, 246d, 248d

CDE Zone: 247d

CHEMICAL WEAPONS FREE ZONE: 155p, 162p, 163p

COMPLIANCE: 247d, 248d, 393c

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 158p, 161p, 246d, 247d, 549p, 550p

CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 181a

CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES

EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION:

General references to: 393c

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FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

FINAL DOCUMENT: 549p

HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 121b, 125a, 157p, 158p, 160p, 224a, 246d

HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 246d

INSPECTIONS:

General references to: 246d, 248d

MADRID MANDATE: 158p, 246d, 393c, 549p

MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of differences):

General references to: 161p

Of ground forces: 181a

Of naval forces: 551p

Of air forces: 551p

MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 120c, 125a, 181a

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS: 247d

NON-USE-OF-FORCE:

General references to: 158p, 159p, 160p

Reaffirmation of NUF: 155p, 160p, 161p, 224a

NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY: 155p, 159p

NOTIFICATIONS:

Information to be included: 121b

NTM: see NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE

NUF TREATY: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

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General references to: 249d

OOG: see OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES

OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES (including discussion of differences): 120c, 121b

SC.1: 246d

SC.4: 163p, 164p

SC.6: 160p, 161p

SC.7: 550p, 552p

STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS: 120c

THRESHOLDS: see MANPOWER THRESHOLDS; STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS

VERIFICATION:

General references to: 247d, 249d

Verification by cadres: 247d

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MALTA SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

p - plenary meeting

a - working group A

b - working group B

c - working group AB

d - post-plenary or other informal conversations

e - NATO caucus

ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 497p, 503p

ALERTS: 258p, 260p

AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES: 257p, 372p

CDE VII:

Structural Issues: 50p

CDE ZONE: 502p

COMMUNICATIONS: see DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 114d, 253p, 263p, 473c, 497p, 498p

CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 35d, 114d, 116d, 258p, 273p, 377p

DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS: 259p, 276p, 380p

EQUAL SECURITY: 473c

EXHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance):

Military calendars: 260p, 374p

Annual forecasts of military activities: 34d, 267p, 374p

EXHANGE MILITARY INFORMATION:

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General references to: 117d

FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 254p, 278p, 434p, 437p, 500p

HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 231d, 442c, 473c, 495p

INSPECTIONS:

Areas of inspection: 115d

KRASNOYARSK RADAR: 263p, 372p

MADRID MANDATE: 501p

MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of differences):

General references to: 34d, 116d, 117d, 256p, 263p, 273p, 372p

Of ground forces: 34d, 116d

MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 116d, 495p, 501p

MOBILIZATION: 117d, 256p

NON-USE-OF-FORCE:

General references to: 117d, 260p, 278p, 380p

Politically binding reaffirmation of NUF: 278p, 380p

Reaffirmation of NUF: 117d

NOTIFICATIONS: see also PRENOTIFICATION; PRIOR NOTIFICATION

General references to: 117d, 263p, 272p, 373p

Designation of the activity: 117d, 263p, 373p

Duration of the activity: 263p, 373p

Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 257p, 263p, 373p

Names of participating states: 263p, 373p

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Purpose of the acitivity: 263p, 373p

Type of forces involved: 257p, 263p, 373p

Number of naval vessels involved: 495p, 497p

Number of military aircraft involved: 495p, 497p

Information to be included: 257p, 263p, 373p

NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

General references to: 268p, 274p, 375p

Duration of observers' stay: 268p, 375p

Host country responsibilities: 268p, 375p

Invitations of observers: 258p, 268p, 375p

Logistical arrangements for observers: 271p, 375p

Personnel matters (numbers, protection, immunities): 115d, 268p, 375p

Scope of observation: 115d, 258p, 268p, 375p

OOG: see OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES

OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES (including discussion of differences): 117p

PRENOTIFICATION: 35d, 256p

PRIOR NOTIFICATION: 263p, 372p

SC.3: 114d, 256p

SC.5: 442c

SC.5: 253d, 262p, 370p, 440a/b/c, 501p

STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS: 116d, 256p, 495p, 501p

THRESHOLDS: see MANPOWER THRESHOLDS; STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS

VERIFICATION:

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General references to: 115d, 259p

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NNA SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

p - plenary meeting

a - working group A

b - working group B

c - working group AB

d - post-plenary or other informal conversations

e - NATO caucus

ALERTS: 257p, 260p

AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES: 256p, 372p

CDE VII:

Structural Issues: 150p

CDE ZONE: see ZONAL CONSTRAINTS 35d

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 114d, 253p, 263p

CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 35d, 114d, 116d, 257p, 273p, 377p

CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES

DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS: 259p, 276p, 380p

EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance):

Annual forecasts of military activities: 34d, 35d, 267p, 374p

Military calendars: 259p, 374p

EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION:

General references to: 117d

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FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 254p, 259p, 278p

HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

INSPECTIONS:

Areas of inspection: 115d

MADRID MANDATE: 263p, 372p

MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of differences):

General references to: 34d, 116d, 117d, 256p, 263p, 273p, 372p

Of ground forces: 34d, 116d

MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 116d

MEASURE 5: see also VERIFICATION

MOBILIZATION: 117d, 256p

NON-USE-OF-FORCE:

General references to: 117a, 260p, 278p, 380p, 473c

Politically binding reaffirmation of NUF: 278p, 380p

Reaffirmation of NUF: 117d

NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY:

NOTIFICATIONS: see also PRENOTIFICATION; PRIOR NOTIFICATION

General references to: 117d, 263p, 272p, 373p

Designation of the activity: 117d, 263p, 373p

Duration of the activity: 263p, 373p

Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 257p, 263p, 373p

Purpose of the activity: 263p, 373p

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Names of participating states: 263p, 373p

Number of main battle tanks or armored carriers: 263p, 373p

Number of regiments or brigades: 263p, 373p

Number of troops participating: 263p, 373p

Number of naval vessels involved: 263p, 373p

Number of military aircraft involved: 263p, 373p

Information to be included: 257p, 263p, 373p

Transfer/movement of troops, naval vessels or aircraft: 263p, 373p

Type of forces involved: 257p, 263p, 373p

NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

General references to: 268p, 274p, 375p

Duration of observers' stay: 268p, 375p

Host country responsibilities: 268p, 375p

Invitations of observers: 257p, 268p, 375p

Logistical arrangements for observers: 271p, 375p

Personnel matters (Numbers, protection, immunities): 115d, 268p, 375p

Scope of observation: 115d, 258p, 268p, 375p

OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES (including discussion of differences): 117d

PRENOTIFICATION: 35d, 256p

PRIOR NOTIFICATION: 263p, 372p

SC.3: 114d, 256p

SC.7: 253d, 262p, 370p, 440a/b/c

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STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS: 116d, 256p

THRESHOLDS: see EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS; STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS

VERIFICATION: see also MEASURE 5; NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

General references to: 115d, 259p

ZONAL CONSTRAINTS: see also CDE Zone

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25X1

POLAND SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

p - plenary meeting

a - working group A

b - working group B

c - working group AB

d - post-plenary or other informal conversations

e - NATO caucus

ALERTS: 24b, 126b

CDE VI:

Structural Issues: 302a

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY MEASURES: 174b, 465p, 468p,

CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 61a

CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES

DISARMAMENT: 467p

FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 176a, 468p

HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 24b, 465p

MADRID MANDATE: 467p,

MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of differences):

General references to: 61a, 175b

MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 61a

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MEASURE 2: 61a

MOBILIZATION: 24b

NON-USE-OF-FORCE:

General references to: 176a, 465p, 468p

NOTIFICATIONS: see also PRIOR NOTIFICATION

General references to: 24b, 174b, 465p

Designation of the activity: 24b

Information to be included: 175b

NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

Duration of observers' stay: 305b

Host country responsibilities: 305b

Invitations of observers: 126b, 305b

Logistical arrangements for observers: 305b

Scope of observation: 126b, 305b

OOG: see OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES

OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES (including discussion of differences): 222b

PRIOR NOTIFICATION: 61a

SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 61a, 222b

SC.4: 468p

SC.7: 468p

THRESHOLDS: see MANPOWER THRESHOLDS

TRANSFER/MOVEMENT OF TROOPS: 61a

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25X1

ROMANIA SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

p - plenary meeting

a - working group A

b - working group B

c - working group AB

d - post-plenary or other informal conversations

e - NATO caucus

CDE VII:

Structural Issues: 83p

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 63a, 67a, 83p

CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 65a, 83p, 127a, 182a, 310b, 368p

CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES

DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS: 83p, 225a, 368p

EXHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance):

Military calendars: 83p, 368p

FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 63a, 65a, 66a

HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

MADRID MANDATE: 64a

MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of differences):

General references to: 127a, 368p

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MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 182a, 368p

MEASURE 5: see also VERIFICATION; 226a

MEASURE 6: 225a

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS: see also VERIFICATION; 368p

NON-USE-OF-FORCE:

General references to: 57a, 64a

Reaffirmation of NUF: 63a, 83p

NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY: 471c

NOTIFICATIONS:

General references to: 83p, 124a, 174b

Duration of the activity: 174b

Information to be included: 174b

NTM: see NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

Invitations of observers: 471c

PRIOR NOTIFICATION: 174b

SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 226a

SC.2: 182a

SC.3: 127a, 226a

THRESHOLDS: see MANPOWER THRESHOLDS

VERIFICATION: see also MEASURE 5; NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

General references to: 83p, 226a, 368p

Verification by cadres: 369p

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25X1

SWEDEN SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

p - plenary meeting

a - working group A

b - working group B

c - working group AB

d - post-plenary or other informal conversations

e - NATO caucus

ALERTS: 258p, 260p

AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES: 257p, 372p

CDE VII:

Structural Issues: 150p

CDE ZONE: see also ZONAL CONSTRAINTS; 35d

COMMUNICATIONS: see DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 114d, 253p, 263p

CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 35d, 114d, 116d, 258p, 273p, 377p

CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES

DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS: 259p, 276p, 380p

EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS (Of Activities Notifiable in Advance):

Military calendars: 260p, 374p

Annual forecasts of military activities: 34d, 267p, 374p, 441a/b/c

EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION:

General references to: 117d

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FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 254p, 278p

HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 121b

INSPECTIONS:

Areas of inspection: 115d

MADRID MANDATE: 263p, 372p

MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of differences):

General references to: 34d, 116d, 117d, 256p, 263p, 273p, 372p

Of ground forces: 34d, 116d

MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 59b, 116d

MOBILIZATION: 117d, 256p

NON-USE-OF-FORCE:

General references to: 117d, 260p, 278p, 380p

Politically binding reaffirmation of NUF: 278p, 380p

Reaffirmation of NUF: 117d

NOTIFICATIONS: see also PRENOTIFICATION; PRIOR NOTIFICATION

General references to: 117d, 263p, 272p, 373p

Designation of the activity: 117d, 121b, 263p, 373p

Duration of the activity: 263p, 373p

Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 257p, 263p, 373p

Names of participating states: 263p, 373p

Purpose of the activity: 263p, 373p

Types of forces involved: 257p, 263p, 373p

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Number of main battle tanks or armored carriers: 263p, 373p

Number of regiments or brigades: 263p, 373p

Number of troops participating: 263p, 373p

Number of naval vessels involved: 263p, 373p

Number of military aircraft involved: 263p, 373p

Transfer/movement of troops, naval vessels or aircraft: 263p, 373p

Information to be included: 257p, 263p, 373p

NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

General references to: 59b, 268p, 274p, 375p

Duration of observers' stay: 268p, 375p

Host country responsibilities: 268p, 375p

Invitations of observers: 258p, 268p, 375p

Logistical arrangements for observers: 271p, 375p

Personnel Matters (numbers, protection, immunities): 115d, 268p, 375p

Scope of observation: 59b, 115d, 121b, 258p, 268p, 375p

OOG: see OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES

OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES (including discussion of differences): 117p, 121b, 256p

PRENOTIFICATION: 35d, 256p

PRIOR NOTIFICATION: 263p, 372p

SC.3: 114d, 256p

SC.7: 253c, 262p, 370p, 440a/b/c

STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS: 59b, 116d, 256p

THRESHOLDS: see MANPOWER THRESHOLDS; STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS

VERIFICATION:

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General references to: 59b, 115d, 259p

Verification by cadres: 121b

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25X1

SWITZERLAND SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

p - plenary meeting

a - working group A

b - working group B

c - working group AB

d - post-plenary or other informal conversations

e - NATO caucus

ALERTS: 258p, 260p

AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES: 257p, 372p

CDE VI:

Expressions of dissatisfaction: 150p

CDE ZONE: see also ZONAL CONSTRAINTS; 35d

COMMUNICATIONS: see DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS

COMPLIANCE: 441a/b/c

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 114d, 253p, 263p

CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 35d, 114d, 116d, 128a, 258p, 273p, 377p

CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES

DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS: 259p, 276p, 380p

EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS (Of Activities Notifiable in Advance):

Military calendars: 260p, 374p

Annual forecasts of military activities: 34d, 267p, 374p

EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION:

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General references to: 117d, 441a/b/c

FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 254p, 278p

HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 125a, 473c

INSPECTIONS:

Areas of inspection: 115d.

Timing of inspections: 263p, 372p

MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of differences):

General references to: 34d, 116d, 117d, 128a, 256p, 263p, 273p, 372p

Of ground forces: 34d, 116d

MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 62a, 116d

MOBILIZATION: 117d, 256p

NON-USE-OF-FORCE:

General references to: 117d, 260p, 278p, 380p

Politically binding reaffirmation of NUF: 278p, 380p

Reaffirmation of NUF: 117d.

NOTIFICATIONS:

General references to: 117d, 263p, 272p, 373p

Designation of the activity: 117d, 263p, 373p

Duration of the activity: 263p, 373p

Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 257p, 263p 373p

Names of participating states: 263p, 373p

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Purpose of the activity: 263p, 373p

Type of forces involved: 257p, 263p, 373p

Number of main battle tanks or armored carriers: 263p, 373p

Number of regiments or brigades: 263p, 373p

Number of troops participating: 263p, 373p

Number of naval vessels involved: 263p, 373p

Number of military aircraft involved: 263p, 373p

Transfer/movement of troops, naval vessels or aircraft: 263p, 373p

Information to be included: 223b, 257p

NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

General references to: 268p, 274p, 375p

Duration of observers' stay: 268p, 375p

Host country responsibilities: 268p, 375p

Invitations of observers: 258p, 268p, 375p

Logistical arrangements for observers: 271p, 375p

Personnel matters (numbers, protection, immunities): 115d, 268p, 375p

Scope of observation: 115d, 258p, 268p, 375p

OOG: see OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES

OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES (including discussion of differences): 117p, 256p

PRENOTIFICATION: 35d, 256p

PRIOR NOTIFICATION: 263p, 372p

SC.3: 114d, 256p

SC.6: 253d, 262p, 370p, 440a/b/c

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SC.7: 473c

STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS: 46d, 256p

VERIFICATION:

General references to: 115d, 125a, 259p

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25X1

USSR SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

p - plenary meeting

a - working group A

b - working group B

c - working group AB

d - post-plenary or other informal conversations

e - NATO caucus

Speaker Key

A - Grinevskiy

B - Rakhmaninov

C - Rozanov

D - Solomenko

E - Tatarnikov

ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 22c/e, 56b/e, 85d/e, 86d/e, 88d/e, 213p/a 217p/a, 296c/e, 472c/e, 513p/e, 514p/e.

AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES: 472c/e, 495p/e, 515p/e.

CDE-VII:

General references to: 17p/a, 289p/a.

Structural issues: 19a/c, 150d/a, 245d/a, 289p/a, 294p/a.

CDE ZONE: see also ZONAL CONSTRAINTS 86d/e, 87d/c, 89d/d, 126b/d,

CHEMICAL WEAPONS FREE ZONE: 11p/a, 16p/a, 82p/a, 154p/a.

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 11p/a, 13p/a, 18p/a, 58a/c, 68b, 82p/a, 154p/a, 177a, 213p/a, 215p/a, 218p/a, 225a/b, 290p/a, 294p/a, 302a/b, 392c/a, 434p/a, 439a/b/c.

CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 173c/a, 331p/a.

CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES

DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS: 303a/e.

EQUAL SECURITY: 214p/a.

EQUALITY OF RIGHTS: 513p/e.

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EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS: 87d/e.

EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance):

Military Calenders: 154p/a, 331p/a.

Annual Forecasts of Military Activities: 22c/e, 150d/a, 153p/a, 213p/a, 217p/a, 331p/a.

EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION: see also MEASURE 1

General references to: 58a/c, 125a/c, 303a/e.

FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

GRINEVSKIY, O.A.: 11p, 16p, 82p, 150d, 153p, 154p, 173c, 190e, 212p, 217p, 245d, 288p, 289p, 295p, 331p, 392c, 433p, 465p.

HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 12p/a, 16p/a, 58a/c, 89d/d, 126b/d, 212p/a, 219p/a, 302a/b 513p/e, 514p/e.

HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 22c/e, 56b/e, 58a/c, 85d/e, 89d/d, 153p/a, 212p/a, 215p/a, 217p/a, 219p/a, 290p/a, 297c/e, 392c/a, 306b/e, 439a/b/c, 465p/a, 513p/e, 516p/e.

INSPECTIONS:

General references to: 471c/e.

MADRID MANDATE: 13p/a, 24b/e, 88d/d, 89d/d, 214p/a, 218p/a, 296c/e, 306b/e, 465p/a, 472c/d, 495p/e, 513p/e, 514p/e.

MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of differences):

General references to: 12p/a, 16p/a, 154p/a, 173c/a, 175b/e, 183a/e, 213p/a, 215p/a, 297c/e, 306b/e, 514p/e.

Of ground forces: 12p/a, 16p/a, 213p/a.

Of naval forces: 12p/a, 16p/a, 213p/a, 219p/a, 514p/e.

Of air forces: 12p/a, 16p/a, 213p/a, 219p/a, 514p/e.

MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 56b/e, 58a/c, 122b/e, 173c/a, 175b/e,

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223ab/e, 282p/a.

MEASURE 1: see also EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION

MEASURE 2: see also EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS 150d/a.

MEASURE 3: see also NOTIFICATIONS 87d/e, 8d/d.

MEASURE 5: see also COMPLIANCE; VERIFICATION

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS: see also VERIFICATION 119c/e.

NFU: see NON FIRST USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS)

NON-FIRST-USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS): 11p/a, 16p/a.

NON-USE-OF-FORCE:

General references to: 11p/a, 12p/a, 17p/a, 57a/b, 123a/b, 177a/b, 224a/b, 282p/a, 290p/a, 331p/a, 392c/a, 434p/a, 466p/a.

Legally binding reaffirmation of NUF: 55c/b, 154p/a.

Politically binding reaffirmation of NUF: 300a/b.

Reaffirmation of NUF: 302a/b.

NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY: 19a/b, 55c/b, 290p/a.

NOTIFICATIONS: see also MEASURE 3; PRIOR NOTIFICATION

General references to: 12p/a, 21a/c, 87d/e, 214p/a, 514p/e, 516p/e.

Designation of the activity: 214p/a.

Duration of the activity: 214p/a.

Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 214p/a.

Type of forces involved: 56b/e, 86d/e.

Number of regiments or brigades: 175b/e, 513b/e.

Number of troops participating: 303a/b.

Number of naval vesssels involved: 85d/e, 87d/c, 88d/d, 215p/a, 218p/a, 303a/b, 472c/d, 495p/e, 515p/e.

Number of military aircraft involved: 85d/e, 215p/a, 303a/b, 472c/d, 496p/e, 515p/e.

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Transfer/movement of troops, naval vessels or aircraft: 12p/a, 85d/e.

Information to be included: 56b/e, 86d/e, 87d/c, 88d/d, 175b/e, 215p/a.

NTM: see NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS 119c/e.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE: 11p/a, 16p/a, 154p/a.

NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE

NUF TREATY: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY

NWFZ: see NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

General references to: 59b/d, 68b, 84d/c, 126b/e.

Duration of observers' stay: 306b/e.

Host country responsibilities: 68b.

Invitations of observers: 12p/a, 16p/a, 24b/e, 68b, 472c/e.

Scope of observation: 72b, 184d/c, 441a/b/c, 472c/e, 498p/e.

OOG: see OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES:

OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES (including discussion of differences): 58a/c, 214p/a, 218p/a, 219p/a, 297c/e, 303a/e, 439a/b/c, 495p/e, 514p/e.

PRIOR NOTIFICATION: 214p/a, 219p/a.

RAKHMANINOV, Yu.N.: 19a, 55c, 57a, 123a, 225a.

ROZANOV, I.S.: 19a, 21a, 58a, 84d, 86d, 87d, 125a.

SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 73b, 85d/e, 122b/e, 310b/e, 439a/b/c, 514p/e.

SC.6: 19a/b, 57a/b, 123a/b.

SDI: see STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

SOLOMENKO, V.I.: 59b, 84d, 88d, 89d, 126b, 472c.

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: 466p.

STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS: 21a/c, 58a/c, 119c/e, 122b/e, 173c/e, 282p/a, 439a/b/c, 515p/e.

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TATARNIKOV, V.M.: 22c, 23b, 56b, 62a, 84d, 119c, 122b, 126b, 173c, 183a, 223b, 471c, 495p, 513p.

THRESHOLDS: see EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS; MANPOWER THRESHOLDS; STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS.

TRANSFER/MOVEMENT OF TROOPS: 12p/a, 58a/c, 213p/a, 217p/a, 297c/e, 305b/e, 306b/e.

UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES: 12p/a, 17p/a, 173c/e, 214p/a, 218p/a, 290p/a.

VERIFICATION: see also MEASURE 5; NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

General references to: 59b/d, 119c/e, 125a/c, 190d/a, 439a/b/c.

Verification by cadres: 73b, 84d/e.

ZONAL CONSTRAINTS: see also CDE ZONE

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YUGOSLAVIA SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

p - plenary meeting

a - working group A

b - working group B

c - working group AB

d - post-plenary or other informal conversations

e - NATO caucus

ALERTS: 258p, 260p

AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES: 257p, 372p

CDE VI:

Expressions of dissatisfaction: 150p

CDE ZONE: 35d

COMMUNICATIONS: see DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 114d, 253p, 263p, 573c

CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 35d, 114d, 116d, 258p, 273p, 377p, 575c

CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES

DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS: 259p, 276p, 380p

DISARMAMENT: 573c

EQUALITY OF RIGHTS: 179a

EXHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance):

Military calendars: 260p, 374p

Annual forecasts of military activities: 34d, 267p, 374p

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EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION:

General references to: 117d

FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 254p, 278p

HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

INSPECTIONS:

General references to: 178a

Areas of inspection: 115d

MADRID MANDATE: 263p, 372p, 572c

MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of differences):

General references to: 34d, 116d, 117d, 256p, 263p, 273p, 372p

Of ground forces: 34d, 116d

MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 116d

MOBILIZATION: 117d, 256p

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS: see also NON-INTERFERENCE WITH (NTM); VERIFICATION

NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS (NTM): 178a, 179a

NON-USE-OF-FORCE:

General references to: 117d, 260p, 278p, 380p

Politically binding reaffirmation of NUF: 278p, 380p, 572c

Reaffirmation of NUF: 117d

NOTIFICATIONS: see also PRENOTIFICATION; PRIOR NOTIFICATION

General references to: 117d, 263p, 272p, 373p

Designation of the activity: 117d, 263p, 373p

Duration of the activity: 263p, 373p

Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 257p, 263p,

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373p

Names of participating states: 263p, 373p

Purpose of the activity: 263p, 373p

Type of forces involved: 257p, 263p, 373p

Number of main battle tanks or armored carriers: 263p, 373p

Number of regiments or brigades: 263p, 373p

Number of troops participating: 263p, 373p

Number of naval vessels involved: 263p, 373p

Number of military aircraft involved: 263p, 373p

Transfer/movement of troops, naval vessels or aircraft: 263p, 373p

Information to be included: 257p

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

General references to: 268p, 274p, 375p

Duration of observers' stay: 268p, 375p

Host country responsibilities: 268p, 375p

Invitations of observers: 258p, 268p, 375p

Logistical arrangements for observers: 271p, 375p

Personnel matters (numbers, protection, immunities): 115d, 268p, 375p

Scope of observation: 115d, 258p, 268p, 375p

OOG: see OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES:

OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES (including discussion of differences): 117p, 122b, 298c

PRENOTIFICATION: 35d, 256p

PRIOR NOTIFICATION: 263p, 372p

SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 179a

SC.3: 114d, 256p

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SC.7: 253d, 262p, 370p, 440a/b/c, 574c

STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS: 116d, 256p

THRESHOLDS: see MANPOWER THRESHOLDS; STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS

VERIFICATION:

General references to: 115d, 178a, 259p

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SESSION CABLES

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06900
SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1985
REF: STOCKHOLM 6852
1. CDE VII -
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
-
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: U.S. AND SOVIET SPEECHES OPENING THE SEVENTH SESSION OF CDE OFFERED CONTRASTING VIEWS ON WHAT MUST BE DONE IN ORDER TO MOVE INTO INTENSIFIED NEGOTIATIONS. AMBASSADOR GOODBY OUTLINED SPECIFIC AREAS WHICH MUST BE ADDRESSED BY THE EAST. DENMARK AND THE FRG ALSO PLACED THE BURDEN ON THE EAST TO CONTRIBUTE MORE TO THE DISCUSSION ON CONCRETE CSBM'S. NOTING THE TIME WAS "RIPE" FOR NEGOTIATION, AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY'S LOW KEY STATEMENT REITERATED THE EAST'S APPROACH FOR AN AGREEMENT BASED ON A COMBINATION OF "POLITICAL" AND "MILITARY" MEASURES. END SUMMARY.
4. AMBASSADOR GOODBY STRESSED THE NEED TO MAKE USE OF THE LIMITED TIME BEFORE THE VIENNA CSCE REVIEW MEETING. HE BRIEFLY OUTLINED MAJOR PROBLEMS FROM NATO'S PERSPECTIVE WITH THE WARSAW PACT CDE PROPOSALS, SUMMARIZED THE WESTERN POSITION, AND SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED OUTSTANDING ISSUES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST (REFTEL). WHILE GRINEVSKY ACCUSED THE WEST OF "MARKING TIME", HE AVOIDED POLEMICS IN ARGUING FOR THE ADOPTION OF "BROAD SCALE" POLITICAL PROPOSALS SIDE BY SIDE WITH MAJOR "MILITARY" MEASURES. (COMPLETE TEXT SENT SEPTEL.)
-
5. AMBASSADOR CITRON (FRG) PLACED THE BURDEN ON THE EAST TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO CONCRETE CSBM'S BY ELABORATING ITS POSITION ON THE FOLLOWING ISSUES: THE STRUCTURAL PARAMETER FOR NOTIFICATION; ACCEPTANCE OF THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT FOR DEFINING MILITARY ACTIVITY; USE OF EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS FOR NOTIFICATION; MANDATORY NOTIFICATION AND FURNISHING OF INFORMATION; MANDATORY OBSERVATION WITH "CONCRETE MODALITIES," INCLUDING OBSERVATION FOR THE ENTIRE DURATION OF THE ACTIVITY, AS WELL AS EQUAL PARTICIPATION OF ALL 35 CSCE PARTICIPANTS; VERIFICATION PROVISIONS WHICH GO BEYOND CONSULTATIONS AND NTM'S (IMPLYING INSPECTION); AND AGREEMENT ON AN ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND AN EXPRESSION OF AGREEMENT ON ANNUAL CALENDARS. THE FRG NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT, TO DATE, ELABORATED IN SUFFICIENT DETAIL THEIR POSITION ON THE ABOVE ISSUES. FOR EXAMPLE, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS INSIST ON LINKING VERIFICATION TO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS, THEY HAVE NOT EVEN SPECIFIED VERIFICATION PROVISIONS FOR THEIR OWN PROPOSALS.
6. AMBASSADOR MELLBIN (DENMARK) STATED THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD QUICKLY TURN TO INFORMAL WORK AND TO DRAFTING. IN ORDER TO DO THIS, HE SAID, THE SHARED

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COMMITMENT REFLECTED IN THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT MUST BE FULFILLED, I.E., ANY AGREEMENT MUST APPLY ONLY TO THE CDE ZONE; IT MUST BE BINDING; AND IT MUST INCLUDE ADEQUATE VERIFICATION. THE BACKBONE OF AN AGREEMENT, ACCORDING TO MELLBIN, MUST BE CONCRETE MEASURES. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE REVIEWED FOUR AREAS WHICH ARE OF SPECIAL CONCERN: (1) A NOTIFICATION/OBSERVATION REGIME WHICH INCLUDES EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND WHICH SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASES THE NUMBER OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES NOTIFIED; (2) CONSTRAINTS, WHICH DENMARK WILL LOOK AT WITH AN "OPEN MIND;" (3) A NUF REAFFIRMATION LINKED TO CONCRETE CSBM'S; AND (4) THE WORKING STRUCTURE. ON THE LAST POINT, MELLBIN ARGUED THAT AN INFORMAL ARRANGEMENT OF THE CURRENT WORKING STRUCTURE WOULD BE THE BEST COURSE.
GOODBY
END OF MESSAGE

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 06852
SUBJECT: U.S. PLENARY STATEMENT, SEPTEMBER 10, 1985
1. CDE VII - 002
2. THE FULL TEXT OF THE U.S. PLENARY STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR JAMES E. GOODBY ON SEPTEMBER 10, 1985 FOLLOWS:
3. BEGIN TEXT:
MR. CHAIRMAN:

IN A PLENARY MEETING ON OCTOBER 11 1984, I QUOTED FROM THE WRITINGS OF ONE OF THE FIRST AMERICAN DIPLOMATS, WHO SAID: "...WASTING TIME MUST BE THE GREATEST PRODIGALITY, SINCE LOST TIME IS NEVER FOUND AGAIN; AND WHAT WE CALL TIME ENOUGH ALWAYS PROVES LITTLE ENOUGH." IF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN'S WORDS WERE APT A YEAR AGO, HOW MUCH MORE POWERFULLY THEY MUST SPEAK TO US TODAY, AS WE CONSIDER HOW MUCH WORK MUST NOW BE COMPRESSED INTO THE LIMITED TIME AVAILABLE BEFORE THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING. THE PREPARATORY PHASE OF THAT REVIEW MEETING BEGINS ONE YEAR FROM THIS MONTH, AND IT WILL NOT WAIT FOR US TO PRODUCE A CONSENSUS AGREEMENT. IF WE ARE NOT ALREADY AT A CRITICAL JUNCTURE IN OUR AFFAIRS, THEREFORE, IT WILL CERTAINLY BE UPON US VERY SOON.

AS THE WEEKS AND MONTHS GIVEN TO US SPEED BY WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARDS AGREEMENT, THE CHANCES OF A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME MUST BECOME LESS AND LESS. NOW AGAIN, IN THIS SEVENTH SESSION, WE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE INTO THE PHASE OF PURPOSEFUL AND DECISIVE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HAS ELUDED THIS CONFERENCE FOR SO LONG. MY DELEGATION WILL DO ALL WITHIN ITS POWER TO HELP THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION

AS PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID YESTERDAY, IN AGAIN EXPRESSING HIS SUPPORT FOR THIS CONFERENCE: "THE ISSUES BEFORE THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ARE IMPORTANT AND COMPLEX; THEY AFFECT DIRECTLY THE VITAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE THIRTY-FIVE PARTICIPATING NATIONS. IF THESE ISSUES ARE TO BE RESOLVED AND A MEANINGFUL AGREEMENT ACHIEVED IN TIME FOR THE VIENNA CSCE REVIEW MEETING IN L986, SERIOUS AND DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS ON CONCRETE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES MUST BEGIN VERY SOON."

IN OUR LAST PLENARY MEETING, ON JULY 5, I VENTURED THE OPINION THAT EVENTS OF THE SESSION THEN ENDING HAD SERVED TO DEFINE MORE CLEARLY AND WITH SOME DEGREE OF FINALITY THE REMAINING TASKS OF THIS CONFERENCE. THE FOCUS OF OUR WORK IS WHERE IT SHOULD BE: WE ARE DEBATING HOW TO EXPAND AND IMPROVE UPON THE SIMPLE IDEAS ABOUT HOW TO REDUCE THE RISK OF WAR WHICH WERE OUTLINED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT A DECADE AGO. WE

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ARE AGREED THAT SUCH STEPS SHOULD GIVE CONCRETE EXPRESSION TO THE BASIC PRINCIPLE THAT NATIONS MUST REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE. AND WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING IN EXTENSO HOW THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE MIGHT FIGURE IN A DOCUMENT TO BE AGREED BY THIS CONFERENCE.

■BUT I THINK ALL OF US MUST ALSO AGREE ON ANOTHER POINT, WHICH IS THAT VERY SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES STILL DIVIDE US IN OUR APPROACH TO THE PURPOSES AND THE METHODS OF STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND REDUCING THE RISK OF WAR. OUR COLLEAGUES IN THE EASTERN DELEGATIONS SOMETIMES SPEAK OF "LAYING THE CARDS ON THE TABLE"; EVEN THOUGH THEY HAVEN'T LAID DOWN VERY MUCH OF THEIR OWN HANDS, THEY DID BEGIN TO CLARIFY THEIR THINKING DURING THE LAST SESSION. WE CAN EVALUATE THIS IN A POSITIVE LIGHT, IF NOT WITH TOTAL SATISFACTION, WHILE REGRETTING THAT THE CONFERENCE IS NOT NOTICEABLY CLOSER TO AN AGREEMENT AS A RESULT. JUST CONSIDER SOME OF THE DIFFERENCES OF VIEW WHICH HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO THE FORE BY THE PRESENTATIONS LAST SESSION BY DELEGATIONS REPRESENTING COUNTRIES ADHERING TO THE WARSAW TREATY, INCLUDING THE TABLING OF THEIR WORKING DOCUMENTS:

■- ISSUES AGREED UPON BY ALL THIRTY-FIVE PARTICIPATING STATES DURING THREE YEARS OF NEGOTIATING A MANDATE IN MADRID HAVE BEEN CHALLENGED;

■- MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH THE EASTERN DELEGATIONS PROPOSED SHOULD BE NOTIFIED ARE OF SUCH A LARGE SCALE THAT THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES WOULD HARDLY EVER NEED TO NOTIFY THEM;

■- CERTAIN TYPES OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE INHERENTLY DIFFICULT TO VERIFY ARE PROPOSED FOR NOTIFICATION BY EASTERN DELEGATIONS, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME THEY GIVE LITTLE EVIDENCE OF READINESS TO ACCEPT VERIFICATION MEASURES IN WHICH ALL THIRTY-FIVE PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES COULD HAVE CONFIDENCE;

■ - FINALLY, EASTERN DELEGATIONS SEEM DETERMINED TO BLOCK MEANINGFUL ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE SOME OF THE ISSUES I HAVE JUST MENTIONED, HOLDING SUCH ATTEMPTS HOSTAGE TO MOVEMENT TOWARD THEIR VIEWS ON AN ELABORATION OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE WHICH WOULD REVISE THE ABSOLUTE OBLIGATION WE HAVE ALL UNDERTAKEN.

■ SOME OF OUR EASTERN COLLEAGUES TELL US THAT ALL OF THIS REPRESENTS AN ACCOMMODATION: THEIR LARGE-SCALE POLITICAL MEASURE BALANCED AGAINST CONCRETE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. NO ONE CAN BE DELUDED BY THIS. THE DEAL THEY ARE OFFERING IS ALL ON THEIR TERMS: NON-USE OF FORCE AS DEFINED BY THEM AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES TAILORED TO THEIR SPECIFICATIONS. SOMETIMES OUR COLLEAGUES WHO OFFER SUCH ACCOMMODATING PROPOSALS EVEN SEEM TO BE SURPRISED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD IN VIEW THE WEST'S PROPOSALS

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WHEN HE OFFERED TO DISCUSS NON-USE OF FORCE IN THE CONTEXT OF A NEGOTIATION ON CONCRETE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES.

■ MY PURPOSE IN DESCRIBING THE HARSH REALITIES OF THE CURRENT NEGOTIATING SITUATION IS TO LAY THE BASIS FOR A REALISTIC AND SYSTEMATIC ATTEMPT TO BRIDGE OUR DIFFERENCES. MY DELEGATION IS PREPARED TO WORK IN THIS DIRECTION AS VIGOROUSLY AND CREATIVELY AS ANYONE ELSE, BUT WE WILL CONTINUE TO HOLD TO CERTAIN CRITERIA WHICH, TO ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES, HAVE ALREADY BEEN SUMMED UP IN THE MANDATE OF MADRID. IN A NUTSHELL:

■ -- WE BELIEVE THAT MEASURES AGREED TO HERE MUST BE A SIGNIFICANT QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT ON THOSE CONTAINED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

■ -- WE BELIEVE THAT AN AGREEMENT MUST TRULY ENHANCE THE PRESENT AND PROSPECTIVE SECURITY SITUATION AMONG OUR NATIONS.

■ -- WE BELIEVE THAT AN AGREEMENT MUST BE VERIFIABLE AND MUST CONTAIN PROVISIONS FOR VERIFICATION.

■ -- WE BELIEVE THAT AN AGREEMENT MUST BE EQUITABLE IN ITS EFFECT ON ALL PARTICIPATING STATES.

AND I HOPE IT IS ALSO EVIDENT THAT WE WILL NOT ACCEPT ANY ATTEMPT TO RE-INTERPRET THE MANDATE.

DESPITE THE DIFFERENCES WHICH CURRENTLY LOOM SO LARGE, I AGREE WITH MY DISTINGUISHED SOVIET COLLEAGUE, AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY, WHO WROTE RECENTLY: "AS DEBATE HAS SHOWN, THE CONFERENCE HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR PROGRESS AND COULD ACHIEVE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ACCORDS." INDEED, MY DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT IT IS NOW POSSIBLE TO DEFINE THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IN RELATIVELY SPECIFIC TERMS. AMONG THOSE ISSUES ARE THE FOLLOWING:

FIRST, THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION: THE SPONSORS OF SC.L BELIEVE THAT THE THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION CONTAINED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT SHOULD BE BOTH LOWERED AND MADE MORE VERIFIABLE. DESPITE AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY'S CHARACTERIZATION OF WESTERN PROPOSALS IN A RECENT ISSUE OF "PRAVDA" AS "AT BEST A MODEST IMPROVEMENT IN THE HELSINKI MEASURES," IT SEEMS TO US THAT IT IS, IN FACT, THE EASTERN COUNTRIES WHICH CONSIDER THAT A VERY SLIGHT ADJUSTMENT IN THE NUMBERICAL THRESHOLD IS ADEQUATE.

EXPERIENCE WITH THE HELSINKI NOTIFICATION MEASURES HAS SHOWN THAT A NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD SUBSTANTIALLY LOWER THAN 25,000 TROOPS IS NEEDED TO ESTABLISH A PATTERN OF ROUTINE MILITARY BEHAVIOR, AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN THE PREDICTABILITY OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL OF A THRESHOLD AT 20,000 WOULD NOT INCREASE THE NUMBER OF NOTIFICATIONS ABOVE CURRENT PRACTICE, UNDER WHICH THE WARSAW PACT, FOR EXAMPLE, USUALLY NOTIFIES TWO OR THREE

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MANEUVERS ANNUALLY AND NATO NOTIFIES BETWEEN FIVE AND EIGHT. MOST SMALLER STATES ARE REQUIRED TO NOTIFY NONE OF THEIR MILITARY ACTIVITIES UNDER THE CURRENT REGIME AND WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO NOTIFY ANY UNDER THE EASTERN PROPOSAL.

THE EAST SUGGESTS THAT SMALLER SCALE ACTIVITIES POSE NO THREAT TO OTHER STATES AND THUS SHOULD NOT BE NOTIFIED. WE DISAGREE. NOTIFICATIONS ARE AT THE HEART OF THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING PROCESS AND SHOULD BE INCREASED IN NUMBER. FURTHERMORE, SMALLER-SCALE ACTIVITIES CERTAINLY CAN BE POLITICALLY INTIMIDATING.

IN ADDITION TO THE INADEQUACY OF THE CURRENT NUMERICAL LEVEL FOR NOTIFICATION, THE L6 SPONSORS OF SC-L BELIEVE THAT THE BASIC CONCEPT OF A NUMERICAL LEVEL IS ESSENTIALLY FLAWED BECAUSE GROSS NUMBERS ALONE, AS A DETERMINANT OF THE ACTUAL SIZE OF A MILITARY ACTIVITY, ARE PRACTICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO VERIFY AND ARE NOT RELIABLE INDICATORS OF THE CHARACTER OF AN ACTIVITY.

■FOR THESE REASONS, THE SPONSORS OF SC.L HAVE PROPOSED A STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION BASED ON ONE GROUND FORCE DIVISION -- THAT IS, THE MOST COMMON COMBAT UNIT IN MOST EUROPEAN STATES CAPABLE OF SUSTAINED INDEPENDENT COMBAT OPERATIONS. NOTIFICATION AT THE DIVISION LEVEL WOULD REQUIRE NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANTLY MORE ACTIVITIES THAN THE CURRENT THRESHOLD. THIS WOULD ALLOW PARTICIPATING STATES TO DETERMINE THE NORMAL PATTERN OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES OVER A PERIOD OF TIME. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT RATHER THAN OPPOSING THIS INCREASE IN THE MANDATORY NOTIFICATIONS, CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS SHOULD WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE THAT MILITARY ACTIVITIES ARE PART OF A NORMAL PATTERN AND ARE NON-THREATENING. THE STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD WOULD ALSO BE FAR EASIER TO VERIFY THAN THE NUMERICAL; IT IS POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE THAT A DIVISION IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION IS AWAY FROM ITS NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATION WITH A MUCH HIGHER DEGREE OF CERTAINTY THAN IT IS TO DETERMINE THAT A SPECIFIC NUMBER OF TROOPS HAVE TAKEN THE FIELD.

■SECOND, TYPES OF EXERCISES TO BE NOTIFIED: THE EAST WANTS TO CONTINUE THE FINAL ACT'S DEFINITIONS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, I.E., MOVEMENTS AND MANEUVERS; THE SPONSORS OF SC.L MAINTAIN THAT ONE ALL-EMBRACING DEFINITION -- "OUT-OF-GARRISON" -- IS PREFERABLE BECAUSE OF ITS INCLUSIVENESS AND VERIFIABILITY. BECAUSE OF THE WIDE VARIETY OF POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE, THE LIMITING DEFINITION PROPOSED BY THE EAST UNNECESSARILY COMPLICATES THE QUESTIONS OF WHETHER A PARTICULAR ACTIVITY SHOULD OR COULD BE DEFINED IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT REQUIRED NOTIFICATION. VERIFYING WHETHER AN ACTIVITY IS A MOVEMENT, MANEUVER

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OR SOME OTHER KIND OF EXERCISE COULD BE NEXT TO IMPOSSIBLE AND SHOULD NOT BE NECESSARY. THESE DIFFICULTIES ARE AVOIDED, AND THE QUESTION OF DEFINITION AND VERIFIABILITY GREATLY SIMPLIFIED, BY USING THE CONCEPT THAT ALL ACTIVITIES WHICH SURPASS THE DETERMINED THRESHOLD AND TAKE PLACE OUT GARRISON MUST BE NOTIFIED.

■ THIRD, INVITATION OF OBSERVERS: THE SPONSORS OF SC.L BELIEVE THAT CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REQUIRES MANDATORY INVITATION OF OBSERVERS FROM ALL PARTICIPATING STATES TO ALL NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES. THE DESIRABILITY OF THIS PROVISION SEEMS TO US TO BE SELF-EVIDENT. CAN WE NOT AGREE THAT PARTICIPATION IN AN OBSERVATION REGIME IS NOT A PENALTY BUT RATHER A POSITIVE ACT OF COOPERATION? NEVERTHELESS, THE EAST CURRENTLY HOLDS THAT ONLY OBSERVERS FROM SELECTED COUNTRIES NEED BE INVITED, ON SOME UNSPECIFIED BASIS. WE HAVE HEARD NO CONVINCING ARGUMENTS FOR THIS VIEW.

■ FOURTH, AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: THE EAST WANTS TO INCLUDE AIR AND NAVAL OPERATIONS WHETHER OR NOT THESE ARE PART OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES. THE SIXTEEN SPONSORS OF SC.L MAINTAIN THAT THE HEART OF ANY REALISTIC CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME MUST BE LAND-BASED ACTIVITIES; THAT IS, THOSE ACTIVITIES WHICH POSE THE MOST SUBSTANTIAL THREAT TO STABILITY AND PEACE ON THE CONTINENT. AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES WHICH, AS PART OF A COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS, ARE INTEGRALLY RELATED TO NOTIFIABLE LAND ACTIVITIES CLEARLY DO REPRESENT SIGNIFICANT FACTORS IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN EUROPE. IN SUCH CASES, INFORMATION ON THEM SHOULD BE GIVEN AS PART OF THE NOTIFICATION OF THE OVERALL ACTIVITY. A FURTHER CONSIDERATION FOR THE PRACTICALITY OF A NOTIFICATION REGIME IS THAT INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES WOULD REQUIRE MASSIVE VERIFICATION MEASURES. AND, OF COURSE, INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES PER SE ARE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF OUR MANDATE AND COULD CALL INTO QUESTION THE CAREFULLY FORMULATED CONCEPT OF "THE WHOLE OF EUROPE" AS THE AREA OF APPLICATION FOR MEASURES ENACTED BY THIS CONFERENCE

■ FIFTH, VERIFICATION: THE SPONSORS OF SC.L BELIEVE THAT OBSERVATION ASSOCIATED WITH NOTIFIED MILITARY ACTIVITIES IS BY ITSELF NOT AN ADEQUATE FORM OF VERIFICATION. IT MUST BE SUPPLEMENTED WITH PROVISIONS FOR INSPECTION IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES. THE EAST SEEMS TO THINK THAT "NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS," AUGMENTED BY "CONSULTATION," SHOULD BE ADEQUATE. BUT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES AND
CANNOT BE AN ADEQUATE FORM OF VERIFICATION FOR OUR CONFERENCE. RELIANCE ON SUCH MEANS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY DISCRIMINATING AGAINST SMALLER

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PARTICIPATING STATES, MOST ESPECIALLY THOSE WHICH DO NOT BELONG TO MILITARY ALLIANCES. CONSULTATIONS WOULD CONTRIBUTE LITTLE TO THE ABILITY TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE. THE INEVITABLE TIME DELAY IN CONVOKING AND EXECUTING A CONSULTATIVE PROCESS WOULD INEVITABLY RUN COUNTER TO THE ESSENTIAL NEED FOR RAPID CLARIFICATION OF AMBIGUOUS AND POTENTIALLY THREATENING AND DESTABILIZING ACTIVITIES.

- SIXTH, INFORMATION EXCHANGE: THE SIXTEEN SPONSORS OF SC.L CONSIDER THAT AN ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON THE STRUCTURE AND LOCATION OF GROUND FORCES AND LAND-BASED AIR FORCES IS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE PROCESS OF UNDERSTANDING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS. THE EASTERN DELEGATIONS, WITHOUT ADVANCING ANY PROOF, CLAIM SUCH AN EXCHANGE CONSTITUTES "ESPIONAGE" AND THEY OFFER TO PROVIDE ONLY A VERY LIMITED AMOUNT OF INFORMATION IN CONNECTION WITH NOFIFICATION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.
- THE VERY CONCEPT OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING SHOULD ENCOURAGE STATES TO SEEK GREATER COOPERATION AND OPENNESS IN RELATIONS WITH OTHERS RATHER THAN SEEKING TO LIMIT INFORMATION AND UNDERSTANDING AMONG STATES. THE OLD EASTERN CHESTNUT THAT MORE OPENNESS GENERATES SUSPICION IS NOT BORNE OUT BY THE FACTS. IN ANY CASE, MEANS NEED TO BE DEVELOPED TO REMOVE UNJUSTIFIED SUSPICIONS. IN ADDITION, A PRELIMINARY EXCHANGE OF BASIS INFORMATION SEEMS TO US TO BE ESSENTIAL IF PARTICIPATING STATES ARE LATER TO JUDGE WHETHER THE NORMAL MILITARY SITUATION HAS CHANGED OR IS GOING TO CHANGE. FOR EXAMPLE, SOME UNDERSTANDING OF THE NORMAL LOCATION OF FORCES SEEMS REQUIRED IF STATES ARE TO BE ABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER FORCES HAVE MOVED FROM THEIR NORMAL LOCATIONS TO ENGAGE IN AN ACTIVITY.
- SEVENTH, CONSTRAINTS: AS WE HAVE DONE IN THE PAST, THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO DISCUSS THE PROPOSALS ON CONSTRAINTS WHICH ARE OFFERED TO US. OUR OWN WORK HAS CONVINCED US OF THE COMPLEXITY OF THE SUBJECT. WE DO BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT SC.L, PARTICULARLY MEASURE II, CAN HAVE A CONSIDERABLE CONSTRAINING EFFECT. FOR ITS PART, THE EAST WANTS TO IMPOSE A CONSTRAINING CEILING OF 40,000 MEN ON ANY LAND-FORCE MANEUVER ON THE THEORY THAT THIS WOULD INHIBIT SURPRISE ATTACK. THE SPONSORS OF SC.L BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THIS PARTICULAR CONSTRAINT WOULD HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT ON NATO EXERCISE PATTERNS WITHOUT SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTING WARSAW PACT PRACTICE. IN OTHER WORDS, THIS PROPOSAL CLEARLY DOES NOT AFFECT THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL PARTICIPATING STATES EQUALLY. IT ALSO DOES LITTLE OR NOTHING TO DEAL WITH THE USE OF FORCE FOR POLITICAL INTIMIDATION.
- THIS PARTIAL LIST OF ISSUES IS A FORMIDABLE AGENDA

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FOR THE REMAINING MONTHS BEFORE VIENNA. IT DEMONSTRATES DEEP PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST -- AND SOME DIFFERENCES INVOLVE SERIOUS QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE -- BUT THERE IS PRESENTLY NO REASON TO THINK THAT THEY CANNOT BE RECONCILED. IF ARTIFICIAL AND ARBITRARY BARRIERS BLOCKING PROGRESS IN RESOLVING THESE ISSUES CAN BE REMOVED, THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE DOES HAVE JUST ENOUGH TIME TO ENACT A SET OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH WILL CREATE A MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT AGREEMENT.

■ THE POSITIONS OF THE SIXTEEN SPONSORS OF SC.L AND THOSE OF THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES, OF COURSE, BY NO MEANS DEFINE THE TOTALITY OF THE ISSUES BEFORE THIS CONFERENCE. THE UNITED STATES LOOKS FORWARD TO HEARING MORE ABOUT THE VIEWS OF THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES. THESE DELEGATIONS ALREADY HAVE PLAYED A MAJOR AND A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN ENSURING THAT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE HAS PURSUED ITS PROPER PATH TOWARD SERIOUS, REALISTIC NEGOTIATIONS. WE WELCOME THEIR FURTHER CONTRIBUTION TO DEVELOP, REFINE, AND IMPROVE UPON THE IDEAS FOR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES NOW BEFORE THE CONFERENCE.

■ MR. CHAIRMAN, THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE HAS BEEN IN SESSION NOW FOR MORE THAN EIGHTEEN MONTHS; MUST LESS TIME THAN THAT REMAINS BEFORE THE PROGRESS OF OUR WORK WILL BE EVALUATED IN THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING. IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE ONE POINT THAT I MADE IN MY REMARKS HERE LAST JULY 5: "IT IS AND ALWAYS HAS BEEN OUR AIM TO ENTER INTO INTENSE AND DECISIVE NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT DELAY... MY DELEGATION -- AND I
AM SURE I SPEAK FOR OTHERS -- IS OPEN TO SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW OUR WORKING STRUCTURE COULD MORE EFFECTIVELY SUPPORT OUR WORK. IF WE CAN USE THE EXISTING WORKING STRUCTURE IN SOME INFORMAL WAY, FOR EXAMPLE, AND WE ARE ABLE TO FIND MORE COMMON GROUND, THIS WOULD MOST CERTAINLY ASSIST US ALL IN EFFECTING A TRANSITION TO A MORE DECISIVE PHASE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS."

■THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES ALWAYS HAVE ACTED CONSTRUCTIVELY TO ADVANCE DISCUSSIONS; WE ARE PREPARED TO JOIN OTHERS IN EXPLORING WAYS TO MOVE AHEAD. WE MUST USE THE TIME REMAINING WISELY AND EFFICIENTLY FOR, AS BENJAMIN FRANKLIN ADVISED, "SO BY DILIGENCE SHALL WE DO MORE WITH LESS PERPLEXITY."

■THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

GOODBY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06862
SUBJECT: OPENING ROUND VII CDE
1. CDE VII - 003
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. ROUND VII CDE OPENED TODAY, SEPTEMBER 10, WITH PLENARY STATEMENTS BY FRG, DENMARK, U.S., AND SOVIET UNION. U.S. AND SOVIET TEXTS FOLLOW SEPTEL.
4. THE TONE OF SOVIET SPEECH WAS MODERATE, LOOKING TOWARDS PROGRESS TOWARD NEGOTIATION IN THE NEAR FUTURE. SPEAKING TO THE PRESS FOLLOWING PLENARY, SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY SAID THAT WE SHOULD KNOW "BEFORE LONG" WHETHER CDE WILL BE ABLE TO NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT. ASKED WHETHER THE GENEVA REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING WILL HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON CDE, GRINEVSKY SAID YES, IT SHOULD.
5. FULLER REPORT FOLLOWS SEPTEL.
GOODBY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 06871
SUBJECT: STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR OLEG A. GRINEVSKY,
- HEAD OF USSR DELEGATION, AT OPENING OF CDE
- CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER 10, 1985
1. CDE VII - 006
2. THE FULL TEXT OF STATEMENT DELIVERED BY THE HEAD OF THE USSR DELEGATION ON SEPTEMBER 10, 1985, FOLLOWS.
BEGIN TEXT:
MR. CHAIRMAN,
- TODAY WE BEGIN ANOTHER ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS IN THE CAPITAL OF HOSPITABLE SWEDEN. DESPITE THE SUMMER RECESS, OUR WORK, IN FACT, CONTINUED. QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE
-
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WERE DISCUSSED DURING THE ANNIVERSARY MEETING OF THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN HELSINKI ON THE OCCASION OF THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF THE FINAL ACT AND WERE THE SUBJECT OF INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS AT DIFFERENT LEVELS. TO ALL APPEARANCES, BOTH FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE PLACE OF THE CONFERENCE IN THE DEVELOPING CHAIN OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE WORK DONE AT IT, THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE HAS BECOME RIPE FOR GETTING DOWN TO CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS, FOR WORK AT A BUSINESSLIKE PACE.
- THIS TASK IS DICTATED, IN THE FIRST PLACE, BY THE DANGEROUS CHARACTER OF THE PREVAILING INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. THE TRUTH SHOULD BE FACED SQUARELY: THE SITUATION HAS NOT IMPROVED IN RECENT MONTHS. THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU, MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, HAS SHOWN IN HIS REPLIES TO "TIME" THAT THE ARMS RACE IS INTENSIFYING AND THE WAR THREAT IS NOT SUBSIDING. THE SITUATION REMAINS COMPLEX, EXPLOSIVE, AND TENDS TO FURTHER DETERIORATE AT THAT. "THEREFORE," STRESSED MIKHAI GORBACHEV, "WE MUST MUSTER THE POLITICAL RESOLVE AND STOP THE UNFOLDING THREATENING PROCESS. WE MUST PUT AN END TO THE ARMS RACE, BEGIN DISARMAMENT AND START IMPROVING RELATIONS."
- THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE CAN AND MUST MAKE ITS CONTRIBUTION TO STRAIGHTENING OUT RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES AND CREATING AN ATMOSPHERE OF CONFIDENCE. THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND OF THE OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WHICH COMBINE POLITICAL INITIATIVES AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE MILITARY FIELD ARE DESIGNED FOR THIS PURPOSE. THEY INCLUDE THE NO-FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, CONCLUSION OF A TREATY ON THE NON-USE OF MILITARY FORCE, RIDDING EUROPE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THE NO-INCREASE AND REDUCTION OF MILITARY SPENDING AND PROMOTION OF THE CREATION OF NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES IN YARIOUS PARTS OF EUROPE. THEY LEAD TO THE SOLUTION OF THE KEY PROBLEMS OF CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING IN

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THEIR BROAD UNDERSTANDING. IT IS HERE THAT LIES THE POTENTIAL FOR A LONG-TERM INFLUENCE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN EUROPE, AND NOT ONLY IN EUROPE FOR THAT MATTER.

- THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES INTRODUCED ALSO PROPOSALS ON MAJOR MEASURES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND TO ACHIEVE MILITARY DETENTE IN EUROPE. THEY INCLUDE PROPOSALS ON THE LIMITATION OF THE SCALE OF MILITARY MANEUVERS, NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MANEUVERS OF GROUND TROOPS, AIR AND NAVAL FORCES, OF MAJOR MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXISTING PRACTICE OF INVITING OBSERVERS.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

- A TURN FOR THE BETTER IS POSSIBLE IN EUROPE WHERE DETENTE WAS BORN AND WHERE IT HAS DEEP ROOTS. SUFFICIENT FORCE, EXPERIENCE AND POLITICAL REALISM EXIST HERE SUBJECT: STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR OLEG A. GRINEVSKY, CAPABLE OF BRINGING ABOUT THIS TURN.

- EUROPE CAN AND MUST PLAY A SUBSTANTIAL AND INDISPENSABLE ROLE IN THE ACTIVE SEARCH FOR WAYS THAT LEAD TO BRINGING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BACK TO THE TRACK OF DETENTE.

- DURING THE MEETING IN HELSINKI THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE CSCE PARTICIPATING STATES REAFFIRMED THE VIABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT. ON THE WHOLE IT HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT SENTIMENTS ARE GROWING IN THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN FAVOR OF ACCELERATING THE WORK OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND ACHIEVING AT IT SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS BEFORE THE ALL-EUROPEAN MEETING IN VIENNA.

- THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE HAS BEEN FIRMLY WOVEN INTO THE FABRIC OF THE STOCKHOLM NEGOTIATIONS. NOT ONLY NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES BUT ALSO A NUMBER OF NATO STATES FAVOR SOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION. THERE IS ALSO A CERTAIN ECHOING OF IDEAS REGARDING CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE MILITARY FIELD. A TREND ON THE PART OF THE MAJORITY OF THE PARTICIPANTS IS CLEARLY EMERGING TO GETTING DOWN TO ELABORATION OF AGREEMENTS WHICH WOULD CONCLUDE THE FIRST STAGE OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE.

- UNFORTUNATELY, THERE ALSO EVOLVES ANOTHER TREND AT THE CONFERENCE: TO DELAY ARTIFICIALLY THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS EXPRESSED IN THE DESIRE TO PUT OFF NEGOTIATION OF AGREEMENTS ALTHOUGH TIME ALLOCATED TO THE CONFERENCE IS IRREVOCABLY CONTRACTING LIKE BALZAC'S SHAGREEN LEATHER. THEREFORE WHEN THE SAME POSITIONS ARE BEING STUBBORNLY PUT FORWARD DESIGNED TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE KNOWN IN ADVANCE TO BE UNACCEPTABLE TO OTHER COUNTRIES, THIS MEANS NONE OTHER BUT ATTEMPTS TO SLOW DOWN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO MAKE CONFERENCE MARK

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TIME.
- THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION REGARDING THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WAS SET FORTH BY THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR, EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE, IN CLEAR-CUT TERMS, "IT IS TIME TO COME DOWN, WITHOUT PUTTING IT OFF TILL TOMORROW, TO THE NEGOTIATION OF THE FIRST AGREEMENTS ON LARGE-SCALE MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES BOTH IN THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY FIELDS."
- THE SOVIET DELEGATION IS PREPARED TOGETHER WITH ALL THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TO START NEGOTIATING CONCRETE TEXTS OF A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE OF THE MADRID MEETING. THE EXISTING WORKING STRUCTURE OF THE CONFERENCE CAN BE USED FOR THESE PURPOSES.
- WE BELIEVE THAT NO MATTER HOW COMPLEX THE ISSUES UNDER DISCUSSION IN STOCKHOLM ARE THEY CAN BE SUCCESS-FULLY TACKLED. PROGRESS IN STOCKHOLM WOULD HAVE A POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE INTERNA-TIONAL CLIMATE AS WELL. INDEED, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION DEPENDS TO A GREAT EXTENT ON THE STATE OF RELATIONS IN EUROPE. THEREFORE WE CANNOT LOSE A SINGLE POSSIBILITY, A SINGLE CHANCE TO SOLVE THE TASKS FACING THE CONFERENCE.
END TEXT.
GOODBY
END OF MESSAGE

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Unofficial translation

S T A T E M E N T

by Oleg A. GRINEVSKY,
Ambassador at Large,
Head of the USSR Delegation
to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-
Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe

Stockholm, September 10, 1985

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Mr. Chairman,

Today we begin another round of negotiations in the capital of hospitable Sweden. Despite the summer recess, our work, in fact, continued. Questions relating to the Stockholm Conference were discussed during the anniversary meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs in Helsinki on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Final Act and were the subject of intensive consultations at different levels. To all appearences, both from the point of view of the place of the Conference in the developing chain of current international relations and from the point of view of the work done to it, the Stockholm Conference has become ripe for getting down to substantive negotiations, for work at a business-like pace.

This task is dictated, in the first place, by the dangerous character of the prevailing international situation. The truth should faced squarely: the situation has not improved in recent months. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev has shown in his replies to Time that the arms race is intensifying and the war threat is not subsiding. The situation remains complex, explosive, it tends to further deteriorate at that. "Therefore", stressed Mikhail Gorbachev, "we must muster the political resolve and stop the unfolding threatening process. We must put an end to the arms race, begin disarmament and start improving relations."

The Stockholm Conference can and must make its contribution to straightening out relations between states and creating an atmosphere of confidence. The proposals of the Soviet Union and of the other socialist countries which combine political initiatives

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and confidence-building measures in the military field are designed for this purpose. They include the no-first-use of nuclear weapons, conclusion of a treaty on the non-use of military force, ridding Europe of chemical weapons, the no-increase and reduction of military spending and promotion of the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of Europe. They lead to the solution of the key problems of confidence and security building in their broad understanding. It is here that lies the potential for a long-term influence on the development of international relations in Europe, and not only in Europe for that matter.

The socialist countries introduced also proposals on major measures to reduce the risk of military confrontation and to achieve military detente in Europe. They include proposals on the limitation of the scale of military manoeuvres, notification of major manoeuvres of ground troops, air and naval forces, of major movements and transfers, and the development of the existing practice of inviting observers.

Mr. Chairman,

A turn for the better is possible in Europe where detente was born and where it has deep roots. Sufficient force, experience and political realism exist here capable of bringing about this turn.

Europe can and must play a substantial and indispensable role in the active search for ways that lead to bringing international relations back to the track of detente.

During the meeting in Helsinki the ministers of foreign affairs of the CSCE participating states reaffirmed the viability of the principles of the Final Act. On the whole it has demonstrated that sentiments are growing in the overwhelming majority of European

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countries in favour of accelerating the work of the Stockholm Conference and achieving at it substantive results before the All-European meeting in Vienna.

The proposal of the socialist countries on the non-use of force has been firmly woven into the fabric of the Stockholm negotiations. Not only neutral and non-aligned countries but also a number of NATO states favour solution of this question. There is also a certain echoing of ideas regarding confidence-building measures in the military field. A trend on the part of the majority of the participants is clearly emerging to getting down to elaboration of agreements which would conclude the first stage of the Stockholm Conference.

Unfortunately, there also evolves another trend at the Conference: to delay artificially the negotiations. It is expressed in the desire to put off negotiation of agreements although time allocated to the Conference is irrevocably contracting like Balsac's shagreen leather. Therefore when the same positions are being stubbornly put forward designed to obtain unilateral advantages, although they are known in advance to be unacceptable to other countries, this means none other but attempts to slow down the negotiations and to make Conference mark time.

The position of the Soviet Union regarding the Stockholm Conference was set forth by the Minister for foreign affairs of the USSR, Eduard Shevardnadze in clear-cut terms, "It is time to come down, without putting it off till tomorrow, to the negotiation of the first agreements on large-scale mutually complementary confidence-building measures both in the political and military fields."

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The Soviet delegation is prepared together with all the participants in the negotiations to start negotiating concrete texts of a set of mutually complementary confidence-and security-building measures in accordance with the mandate of the Madrid Meeting. The existing working structure of the Conference can be used for these purposes.

We believe that no matter how complex the issues under discussion in Stockholm are they can be successfully tackled. Progress in Stockholm would have a positive influence on the improvement of the international climate as well. Indeed, the development of the international situation depends to a great extent on the state of relations in Europe. Therefore we cannot lose a single possibility, a single chance to solve the tasks facing the Conference.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07048
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES DURING THE WEEK 9-13 SEPTEMBER, 1985
1. CDE VII - 013.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. WORKING GROUPS A AND B HELD REGULAR MEETINGS DURING THE WEEK OF 9-13 SEPTEMBER; WORKING GROUP AB HELD ITS FIRST MEETING SEPTEMBER 16 (TO BE REPORTED SEPTEL). OF NOTE, THE USSR STATED THAT IT DID NOT/NOT REJECT THE STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD, AS STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS WOULD BE IDENTIFIED IN MANEUVER NOTIFICATIONS, SUCH NOTIFICATIONS BEING TRIGGERED BY THE NUMERICAL THRESHOLD. ALSO OF INTEREST WAS IMPLICIT SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF ANNUAL FORECASTS, IF LINKED WITH WESTERN AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE (INDEPENDENT) AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE IN SUCH FORECASTS. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A BRIEF RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, NNA DELEGATIONS WERE SILENT IN WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES THIS WEEK. WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES ARE SUMMARIZED BELOW. END SUMMARY.
4. WORKING GROUP A: NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF) -- SEPTEMBER 10, 1985. NOTHING NEW WAS RAISED ON NUF IN THE FIRST WG/A MEETING DEVOTED TO "POLITICAL MEASURES" THIS ROUND, WHICH WAS BRIEF AND BLAND. ONLY THE GDR AND USSR SPOKE, FOCUSING ON THEIR WELL-KNOWN NUF POSITIONS. GDR (GEORGI) URGED CDE DISCUSSION OF "EVERYTHING THAT A NUF AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE," TO BE "SET DOWN IN WRITING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE." IN HIS VIEW, A NUF TREATY WOULD INCLUDE A PROHIBITION OF BOTH THE THREAT AND THE USE OF FORCE. HE EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE 9/10/85 FRG PLENARY STATEMENT BECAUSE IT DID NOT ADDRESS NUF, "THE HEART OF POLITICAL DISCUSSION" AT THE CDE, AND STATED HIS HOPE THAT THIS DID NOT SIGNAL AN INTENTION TO MAKE A NUF AGREEMENT A "MERE APPENDIX" TO THE CDE'S WORK. -THE USSR (RAKHAMINOV) INSISTED THAT THE SOVIET NUF TREATY PROPOSAL (SC.6) WAS NOT A COPY OF PAST NUF AGREEMENTS BECAUSE IT PROVIDED "GUARANTEES OF AN ORGANIZATIONAL AND MATERIAL NATURE."
5. WORKING GROUP A: INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, COMMUNICATION -- SEPTEMBER 12, 1985.
SPEAKERS AT FIRST MEETING THIS ROUND INCLUDED FRG (KOLBECK) ON COMMUNICATIONS AND VERIFICATION, U.S. (HANSEN) ON VERIFICATION AND USSR (ROZANOV) ON THE STRUCTURE THRESHOLD PROPOSAL. UK (FREEMAN), NORWAY (ENGH), FRANCE (MERIC), U.S. (HANSEN) AND BELGIUM (LE BLANC) RESPONDED TO USSR, AND USSR (ROZANOV) PROVIDED BRIEF CLARIFICATION. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST WAS USSR STATEMENT THAT USSR DOES NOT/NOT REJECT THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH.
FRG (KOLBECK) SAID THAT SC.1/MEASURE 6 ON

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COMMUNICATIONS WAS NOT INTENDED TO REPLACE OTHER MEASURES BUT RATHER TO PROMOTE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS TO FACILITATE THE QUICK AND DIRECT PASSING OF INFORMATION AND THUS THE ADMINISTRATION OF ADOPTED CSBMS. COMMUNICATION SHOULD BE IN ADDITION TO REGULARLY AVAILABLE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS. OBSERVATION CONTRIBUTES TO VERIFICATION BUT, AS IT RELATES ONLY TO NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES, IS NOT VALID FOR DECIDING WHETHER ALL NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED. HE NOTED THAT COMMUNICATION ALONE CANNOT REMOVE DOUBTS; IT IS UNSUITABLE AS A MEANS OF VERIFICATION.
U.S. (HANSEN) WELCOMED COMMON GROUND ON THE IMPORTANCE OF VERIFICATION, NOTING THE 6/29 USSR STATEMENT (TATARNIKOV) THAT "NO ONE WAS MORE INTERESTED IN VERIFICATION THAN THE USSR." HANSEN, STRESSING THE VALUE OF A STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD TO FACILITATE VERIFICATION, CHALLENGED THOSE FAVORING A NUMERICAL THRESHOLD TO SHOW HOW SUCH A THRESHOLD COULD BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIED. AS TO THE USSR ASSERTION THAT DISCUSSING VERIFICATION PRIOR TO AGREEMENT ON THE
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR NST DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, CSCE, PREL, CDE
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES DURING THE
MEASURES THEMSELVES PUT THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE, HANSEN CONTENDED THAT IT RATHER PUT THE HORSE WITH THE CART WHERE IT BELONGED. HE REJECTED THE ASSERTION THAT U.S. AND CANADIAN FORCES WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO INSPECTION UNDER THE TERMS OF SC.1/MEASURE 5, STATING THAT U.S. AND CANADIAN FORCES PARTICIPATING IN AN EXERCISE IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION WOULD BE SUBJECT TO INSPECTION ON THE SAME BASIS AS ANY OTHER FORCES PERMANENTLY GARRISIONED IN EUROPE. HANSEN POINTED OUT THAT NATO'S PROPOSAL (SC.1/MEASURE 5) WAS DESIGNED TO FACILITATE VERIFICATION WHILE RESPECTING SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND EQUALITY AMONG PARTICIPATING STATES, AND EXPRESSED INTEREST IN HEARING VIEWS OF OTHERS ON HOW TO MEET THESE CRITERIA. SC.1/MEASURE 1 PROPOSAL ON EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WAS NOT "LEGALIZED ESPIONAGE" AS ASSERTED BY THE USSR, BUT RATHER COULD BE MORE APTLY CHARACTERIZED AS "LEGALIZED CONFIDENCE BUILDING." COMMUNICATION IS IMPORTANT BUT DOES NOT REPLACE CLARIFICATION, AND CLARIFICATION IS NOT VERIFICATION. CONSULTATIONS DO NOT CONSTITUTE VERIFICATION EITHER. TAKING DRUZHBA-85 AS AN EXAMPLE, HE NOTED THAT THIS EXERICSE HAD NOT BEEN NOTIFIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FINAL ACT. HANSEN THUS ASSUMED THERE WAS NOT A REQUIREMENT TO DO SO. NONETHELESS, HAD SUCH AN EXERCISE HAD SOME SORT OF THREATENING CHARACTER, AND HE

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DID NOT ASSERT THAT IT DID, HE ASKED IF IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPROPRIATE TO ALLOW ON-SITE VIEWING OF THESE ACTIVITIES. HE CONCLUDED BY CALLING ON ALL TO CONSIDER WHAT IS ADEQUATE VERIFICATION FOR EACH OF US HAD WE SUSPECTED THAT AN EXERCISE, SUCH AS DRUZHBA-85, NOT BEEN IN CONFORMITY WITH AGREEMENTS.

USSR (ROZANOV) CONTENDED THAT THE APPLICATION OF ONLY A STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD, IN POLITICAL/MORAL TERMS, TENDS TO CONCEAL FROM THE BROAD PUBLIC (THE PROVERBIAL "MAN IN THE STREET") WHAT IS ACTUALLY GOING ON. NUMBERS CAN BE UNDERSTOOD IN TERMS OF GAUGING A THREAT, WHEREAS A STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD MIGHT NOT BE UNDERSTOOD. ROZANOV SAID THE USSR DOES NOT/NOT REJECT THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH. THE "NUMERICAL/STRUCTURAL" APPROACH IS TO BE CONSIDERED, HE SAID, BECAUSE IN NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS (TRIGGERED BY NUMERICAL PARAMETERS) THE PARTICIPATING UNITS AND ELEMENTS WOULD BE IDENTIFIED.

NORWAY (ENGH), FRANCE (MERIC), AND BELGIUM (LE BLANC) TOOK ISSUE WITH USSR CHARACTERIZATION OF THE "MAN IN THE STREET," ASSERTING THAT "THE MAN IN THE STREET" UNDERSTANDS THE SIGNFICANCE OF THE DIVISION STRUCTURE.

U.S. (HANSEN) TOOK NOTE OF THE TWO DIMENSIONAL APPROACH OUTLINED BY THE USSR. USSR (ROZANOV) NOTED THAT HE HAD CONFINED HIS COMMENTS TO THE "POLITICAL/MORAL" ASPECTS OF THE "STRUCTURAL/NUMERICAL" APPROACH AND HAD NOT ADDRESSED THE "MILITARY/TECHNICAL" ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION.

6. WORKING GROUP A: CONSTRAINTS -- SEPTEMBER 12, 1985. ISSUES RAISED DURING THE FIRST MEETING THIS ROUND ON CONSTRAINTS INCLUDED PARAMETERS OF MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS, NATO EXERCISES (AUTUMN FORGE, FRG'S "TRUTZIGE SACHSEN" AND UK'S "BRAVE DEFENDER"), AND ANNUAL FORECASTS. SPEAKERS INCLUDED BULGARIAN MILREP (STOYANOV), FRG (METSCHER), UK (MACKLEY), ITALY (BLAIS) AND USSR (TATARNIKOV).

BULGARIAN MILREP (STOYANOV) CALLED FOR A CEILING ON THE SCALE OF MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS IN EUROPE. HE DESCRIBED IN SOME DETAIL TWO NATO EXERCISES HE CHARACTERIZED AS THREATENING: (1) FRG'S 1985 "TRUTZIGE SACHSEN", INVOLVING 60,000 TROOPS AND 10,000 MILITARY VEHICLES "IN IMMEDIATE PROXIMITY OF OTHER BORDERS", AND (2) UK'S "BRAVE DEFENDER" WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS THE "LARGEST EXERCISE OF ITS KIND SINCE WW II." BULGARIAN MILREP NOTED THAT THE WP'S 40,000-MAN CEILING PROPOSAL HAD BEEN OBJECTED TO BY SOME ON GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD IMPEDE REGULAR COMBAT

FROM USDEL CDE
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TRAINING. HE ASKED IF THESE PARTICIPANTS WOULD ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF A CEILING ON MILITARY MANEUVERS IN EUROPE, AND WHAT CEILING, IN THEIR VIEW, WOULD PERMIT THIS NECESSARY TRAINING.

IN RESPONSE TO BULGARIAN STATEMENT, FRG (METSCHER) REJECTED BULGARIA'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE FRG'S DEFENSIVE EXERCISE AS THREATENING, NOTING THAT THERE ARE MANY DIVISIONS STATIONED ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE LOWER SAXONY BORDER. UK (MACKLEY) ALSO RESPONDED COOLLY TO BULGARIA'S ASSERTION THAT "BRAVE DEFENDER" WAS THREATENING, NOTING THAT AN INVITATION TO OBSERVE HAD BEEN SENT TO SOFIA WELL AHEAD OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT DEADLINE AND THAT THE BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT, APPARENTLY CONVINCED THAT BRAVE DEFENDER DID NOT THREATEN ITS SECURITY, HAD DECLINED TO SEND AN OBSERVER.

THE FRG (METSCHER) AND ITALY (BLAIS) DELIVERED PREPARED STATEMENTS ON ANNUAL FORECASTS. THE FRG ARGUED THAT CONFIDENCE WOULD BE ENHANCED IF STATES COULD COMPARE PLANNED MILITARY ACTIVITIES FOR THE UPCOMING YEAR WITH A "MATRIX" OR PATTERN OF PAST ACTIVITIES WHICH AN ANNUAL CALENDER WOULD PROVIDE. HE ASKED WHY WAS IT DIFFICULT TO REACH AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON THE VALUE OF ANNUAL FORECASTS, GIVEN THE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON THE VALUE OF INDIVIDUAL NOTIFICATIONS.

THE USSR (TATARNIKOV), IMPLICITLY ACCEPTING THE VALUE OF SUCH A "MATRIX", SAID THAT IT WOULD BE LOGICAL TO PROVIDE IN AN ANNUAL FORECAST AN ACCOUNT OF THOSE MANEUVERS PLANNED IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE. HE ASKED THE FRG REP WHETHER HE INTENDED TO INCLUDE (INDEPENDENT) AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE IN AN ANNUAL FORECAST. FRG (METSCHER) RESPONSED BY NOTING THAT WORKING GROUP A IS SEEKING AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE THAT NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN AN ANNUAL FORECAST; THE QUESTION OF WHAT SHOULD BE NOTIFIABLE WAS BEING DISCUSSED IN WORKING GROUP B. (COMMENT: THIS IS THE CLOSEST THE SOVIET UNION HAS COME TO PUBLICLY ACCEPTING THE PRINCIPLE OF ANNUAL FORECASTS; IN THE PAST THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS CATEGORICALLY REJECTED NATO'S MEASURE ONE (ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION) WHILE REMAINING SILENT ON MEASURE 2 (ANNUAL FORECASTS). HERE TATARNIKOV SEEMS TO BE LINKING EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF ANNUAL FORECASTS WITH WESTERN AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE (INDEPENDENT) AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE IN SUCH FORECASTS. END COMMENT.)

7. WORKING GROUP B: OBSERVATIONS -- SEPTEMBER 12, 1985. SPEAKERS AT FIRST MEETING THIS ROUND INCLUDED NETHERLANDS (VAN DER GRAAF), BELGIUM (LE BLANC) AND THE USSR (TATARNIKOV). DISCUSSION WAS A REPEAT OF WELL-KNOWN POSITIONS.

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NETHERLANDS (VAN DER GRAAF) NOTED THAT THE USSR STATED ON JULY 4 THAT UNDER THE NEW PROVISIONS THE OBSERVATION REGIME WILL COVER THE USSR TO THE URALS, RESULTING IN AN INCREASED NUMBER OF NOTIFICATIONS, AND THUS AN INCREASED NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS; VAN DER GRAFF SAID THIS WILL ONLY BE TRUE IF THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD IS SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER THAN 20,000 AS PROPOSED BY THE WARSAW PACT. HE NOTED AN APPARENT TENDENCY TO ACCEPT THE IMPORTANCE OF GIVING OBSERVERS THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT DURING THE WHOLE COURSE OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY. RESPONDING TO POLAND'S JULY 4 STATEMENT THAT THE TYPES OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION MUST BE RESOLVED PRIOR TO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION ON AN OBSERVATION REGIME, VAN DER GRAAF SAID NATO HAS EMPHASIZED LAND-BASED ACTIVITIES BECAUSE THEY POSE THE MOST SUBSTANTIAL THREAT TO SECURITY IN EUROPE. AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF NOTIFIABLE LAND ACTIVITIES WILL BE A PART OF THESE NOTIFICATIONS AND THUS SUBJECT TO
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR NST DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, CSCE, PREL, CDE
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES DURING THE OBSERVATION. AS FOR INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES, THEY ARE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE MANDATE, ARE NOT NOTIFIABLE, AND THUS NOT SUBJECT TO OBSERVATION. INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES ABOVE EUROPEAN TERRITORY "ARE NOT AGAINST THE MANDATE," BUT POSE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS. VERIFICATION WOULD BE DIFFICULT; EASTERN SUGGESTIONS ARE NOT REALISTIC. HE QUESTIONED EASTERN LOGIC IN PROPOSING AN INTRUSIVE REGIME CONCERNING AIR ACTIVITIES WHEN THE EAST HAS DEMONSTRATED A CERTAIN RELUCTANCE TO ACCEPT MORE INTRUSIVE MEASURES CONCERNING LAND ACTIVITIES. IT IS MORE REALISTIC TO ADDRESS THE BASIS OF A MANDATORY OBSERVATION REGIME RATHER THAN DEFINE OBSERVABLE ACTIVITIES FIRST. (BEGIN COMMENT: DUTCH MILREPS COMMENT THAT INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES "ARE NOT AGAINST THE MANDATE" IS CLEARLY AHEAD OF THE NATO CAUCUS POSITION, AND RAISED A FEW NATO EYEBROWS AROUND THE TABLE. END COMMENT.)
BELGIUM (LE BLANC) DREW ATTENTION TO THE TERMS OF THE MANDATE. IN THE CASE OF OBSERVATION, HE NOTED, THE WARSAW PACT HAS NOT RECOGNIZED THE OBLIGATORY NATURE GIVEN TO OBSERVATION, AND SWEDEN IS HESITANT, AT THE LEAST. THESE ATTITUDES, HE ASSERTED, DO NOT RECONCILE WITH THE MANDATE QUALIFICATION OF "POLITICALLY BINDING." WE MUST RECOGNIZE AND APPLY THE OBLIGATORY REQUIREMENT TO OBSERVATION.
USSR (TATARNIKOV), TOOK ISSUE WITH BELGIUM'S ASSERTION

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THAT SOME POSITIONS ARE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE. THE USSR DOES NOT INTEND TO DEPART FROM THE MANDATE, BUT BELIEVES IT SHOULD BE APPLIED ON THE BASIS OF THE CONTENT/CONTEXT OF THE MEASURES. AS TO THE OBLIGATORY NATURE OF INVITING OBSERVERS, TATARNIKOV RECALLED THAT NATO ITSELF HAS NOT ANSWERED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER IT IS PREPARED, ON AN OBLIGATORY BASIS, TO INVITE OBSERVERS TO NAVAL AND AIR MANEUVERS. IT HAS NOT REPLIED AS TO WHETHER SUCH AN OBSERVATION SHOULD BE BINDING. THE USSR, HE STATED, IS UNABLE TO AGREE THAT OBSERVERS SHOULD BE INVITED TO ALL MANEUVERS (SUCH AS THOSE AT A STRENGTH OF 6,000) OR TO MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES. TATARNIKOV SAID THAT THE ACTIVITIES OBSERVERS GET INVITED TO FIRST MUST BE ASCERTAINED AND THEN THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR OBSERVERS CAN BE DETERMINED.

8. WORKING GROUP B: NOTIFICATIONS -- SEPTEMBER 13, 1985. WHILE MEETING ON NOTIFICATIONS COVERED LITTLE GROUND, IT WAS RICH IN SUBSTANCE AND PARTICIPANTS. SPEAKERS INCLUDED POLAND (STANIEWSKI), NORWAY (ENGH), GDR (GEORGI), FRG (METSCHER), CZECHOSLOVAKIA (MOHYLA), BELGIUM (LE BLANC), U.S. (HANSEN), USSR (TATARNIKOV), AND YUGOSLAVIA (MIHAILOVIC).

WTO SPEAKERS (POLAND, GDR, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND USSR) STRESSED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THEIR PROPOSAL TO SET THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD AT 20,000, AND REITERATED THE NEED TO NOTIFY INDEPENDENT ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE. THEY ARGUED THAT NOTIFICATION OF SUCH ACTIVITIES IS CONSISTENT WITH THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, AS WELL AS WITH THE MADRID MANDATE. POLISH REP ARGUED AGAINST NOTIFICATION OF MOBILIZATION AND "ALERT" ACTIVITIES, AS THEY ARE NOT RELATED TO MANEUVERS AND TRANSFERS AND ARE NOT THREATENING. "OCEAN SAFARI" WAS RAISED BY POLAND AS AN EXAMPLE OF AN INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITY THAT SHOULD BE NOTIFIED BECAUSE THE SCALE OF ACTIVITY COULD BE SEEN AS A THREAT TO EUROPE. GDR STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF A NUMERICAL THRESHOLD TO TRIGGER NOTIFICATION, AND ASSERTED THAT NATO'S STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD PROPOSAL WOULD NOT ASSIST VERIFICATION, INASMUCH AS VERIFICATION DOESN'T DEPEND UPON THE PARAMETERS, BUT RATHER UPON THE CONTENTS OF THE NOTIFICATION. SPECIFIC INFORMATION NECESSARY FOR VERIFICATION WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE CONTENT OF THE

FROM USDEL CDE
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SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES DURING THE

NOTIFICATION. HE ASSERTED THAT NATO'S PROPOSAL IS A CONFUSING CONGLOMERATE OF STRUCTURAL AND NUMERICAL

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PARAMETERS AND IS BOTH AN UNREALISTIC AND IMPRACTICAL APPROACH. IF, IN DISCUSSING NATO'S STRUCTURAL PROPOSAL, THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF AN FRG OR U.S. DIVISION WERE IDENTIFIED AS A BASIS, THIS WOULD PROVIDE A FRUITFUL BASIS FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS. USSR REP (TATARNIKOV) IN ADDITION, ASKED IF THE EXERCISE ABLE ARCHER 1984, WHICH WAS PART OF "AUTUMN FORGE", AND INVOLVED THE COMMAND AND OPERATIONAL STAFF OF NATO, BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR, AND 15,000 MEN, WOULD BE NOTIFIABLE UNDER THE NATO PROPOSAL.

NATO SPEAKERS (NORWAY, BELGIUM, FRG, U.S.) COVERED A VARIETY OF ISSUES, INCLUDING NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD AND WHAT WOULD BE NOTIFIED. NORWAY, BELGIUM AND THE U.S. ARGUED THAT THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD OF 20,000 PROPOSED BY THE WARSAW PACT WAS TOO HIGH AND DID NOT REPRESENT A MARKED IMPROVEMENT OVER THE THRESHOLD ESTABLISHED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. NORWEGIAN REP POINTED OUT THAT SUCH A THRESHOLD WOULD LEAVE CONSIDERABLE PORTIONS OF NORWAY'S MILITARY ACTIVITY UNNOTIFIABLE, WOULD THEREFORE LIMIT NORWEGIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE CSBMS REGIME, CONTRIBUTE LITTLE TO CONFIDENCE BUILDING AND BE OF LITTLE MILITARY SIGNFICANCE. THE NOTIFICATION OF SMALL ACTIVITIES, HE STATED, CONTRIBUTES TO CONFIDENCE BECAUSE SUCH ACTIVITIES ARE OF RELEVANCE IN THE DAY-TO-DAY SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS IN EUROPE. BELGIAN REP QUERIED HOW MANY ADDITIONAL ACTIVITIES OF THE WTO COUNTRIES WOULD BE NOTIFIED UNDER THE NEW PARAMETERS PROPOSED BY WTO, NOTING THAT MANY ACTIVITIES INVOLVING 20,000 OR MORE MEN HAD BEEN VOLUNTARILY NOTIFIED. U.S. REP HANSEN EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT OUR EVALUATION OF THE CBMS SINCE HELSINKI WAS WORTH MORE THAN SIMPLY LOWERING THE THRESHOLD BY 500 MEN PER YEAR FOR EACH OF THE TEN YEARS OF THIS EXPERIENCE.

NORWAY, FRG, AND U.S. ARGUED THAT IT WAS CLEAR IN THE FINAL ACT, AS WELL AS IN THE MADRID MANDATE, THAT INDEPENDENT ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE WERE NOT TO BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION REGIME. SUCH ACTIVITIES WOULD ONLY BE NOTIFIED AS A PART OF A NOTIFIABLE LAND ACTIVITY. REGARDING THE FINAL ACT, U.S. REP (HANSEN) NOTED THAT IN MADRID WE HAD DECIDED TO DISCUSS CSBMS, NOT JUST CBMS. THIS NEW ELEMENT -- THAT OF SECURITY -- REQUIRES INCREASED ATTENTION TO THE NEED FOR CLEARLY DEFINED SUBSTANCE AND DEVELOPING AGREED PROCEDURES FOR VERIFICATION AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION.

HANSEN SAID THE ISSUES OF OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION COULD BE DEALT WITH MORE METHODICALLY IF ALL RELATED PROPOSALS WERE PUT DOWN IN WRITING. AS FOR REFERENCES TO THE EXERCISE "OCEAN SAFARI", IT WAS ADDRESSED BY THE U.S. EARLIER THIS YEAR. DRAWING ON SEVERAL ARTICLES

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FROM THE WESTERN PRESS ABOUT WARSAW PACT EXERCISES (ZAPAD 84, DRUZHBA 85), HANSEN POINTED OUT THAT THESE ARTICLES CONTAINED MORE INFORMATION ON THE EXERCISES THAN THE OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION. ONE ARTICLE INDICATED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE COMMAND AND STAFF ELEMENTS -- THE NERVOUS SYSTEM OF THE ARMED FORCES -- HAD BEEN MOBILIZED. RECALLING EXCHANGES WITH YUGOSLAVIA ON THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT, HANSEN POINTED OUT THAT THE LIST OF MILITARY
ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE TO BE NOTIFIED WOULD HAVE TO BE MUCH LONGER THAN THAT PROPOSED BY YUGOSLAVIA, AND THAT AGREED DEFINITIONS OF ALL THESE ACTIVITIES MIGHT BE HARD TO REACH. HOWEVER, ALL OF THESE ACTIVITIES WERE CAPTURED BY THE OUT-OF-GARRISON APPROACH -- THE SIMPLEST, MOST COMPLETE APPROACH WHICH REQUIRES NOTHING MORE THAN KNOWING WHAT A GARRISON IS. AS TO THE QUESTION POSED BY THE USSR, HANSEN RESPONDED THAT NATO WOULD NOTIFY COMMAND EXERCISES THAT EXCEEDED THE AGREED THRESHOLD -- AT SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER LEVELS THAN 20,000.
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR NST DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, CSCE, PREL, CDE
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES DURING THE GOODBY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06938
SUBJECT: BONN BRAINSTORMING SESSION
1. CDE VII - 004
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: CDE AMBASSADORS MET IN BONN ON 4-5 SEPTEMBER IN A PRE-ROUND INFORMAL "BRAINSTORMING" SESSION. FOLLOWING A DISCUSSION OF SUMMER CONTACTS, WHICH INCLUDED A LENGTHY DESCRIPTION OF AMBASSADOR GOODBY'S MEETINGS EARLIER THAT WEEK IN MOSCOW WITH AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY, NATO AMBASSADORS WERE ENGAGED IN A HEALTHY EXCHANGE ON 1) LONG-TERM CDE STRATEGY. THERE WAS CONSENSUS THAT THE CSCE BALANCE MUST BE MAINTAINED AND THAT THE PROCESS ITSELF HAS SERVED WESTERN INTERESTS WELL IN SPITE OF SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO "MILITARIZE" THE PROCESS. THOUGH IT IS DIFFICULT TO DEFINE WHAT IN THE END WOULD BE CONSIDERED A "GOOD" RESULT, THE AIM SHOULD BE TO SECURE THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS FROM ALL OUR MEASURES, I.E., SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT OF CBMS CONTAINED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. 2) TACTICS FOR ROUNDS 7 AND 8. THERE WAS CONSENSUS THAT THE ALLIES, WHILE SUPPORTING A POSITIVE SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND, SHOULD KEEP THEIR OWN PROPOSALS IN THE FOREGROUND. WESTERN IDEAS SHOULD BE PROMOTED AS EFFICIENTLY AS POSSIBLE. AFTER THE TABLING OF THE NNA PAPERS, THE WEST SHOULD POCKET WHAT SUITS THE ALLIED INTERESTS AND GENTLY DEFLECT OTHER LESS ACCEPTABLE ISSUES. THERE SHOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE THE QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF ALLIED INTERVENTIONS. THE ALLIES FELT IT WOULD BE IN THEIR INTEREST TO START DRAFTING BEFORE THE END OF THIS YEAR. SOME PARTNERS ARGUED THAT A POSSIBLE REGROUPING OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN PACKAGE IN THE COURSE OF DRAFTING WOULD HELP TO ACHIEVE SUBSTANTIAL RESULTS. ALLIES FELT THAT EFFORTS SHOULD BE CONTINUED TO INFLUENCE THE WORK OF THE NNA. SOME FELT THAT WORK ON CONSTRAINTS IN NATO SHOULD BE INTENSIFIED. IT WAS RECOGNIZED THAT THE TASK OF STOCKHOLM IS TO NEGOTIATE A SET OF CONCRETE CSBMS, THAT ACCORDINGLY STOCKHOLM SHOULD NOT BECOME A NUF CONFERENCE BUT THAT NUF HAS AN INTERMEDIATE ROLE TO PLAY IN ACHIEVING ALLIED OBJECTIVES. RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROMOTING NUF SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE SOVIET UNION, BEING IN STOCKHOLM THE "DEMANDEUR" ON NUF. SOME ALLIES, HOWEVER, POINTED TO THE FACT THAT NUF ORIGINALLY WAS A WESTERN IDEA AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO MONOPOLISE THIS SUBJECT. IN ASSESSING THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF A SEQUENTIAL VERSUS A PARALLEL APPROACH ON NUF, OPINION WAS DIVIDED. SOME ALLIES FELT THAT SOME KIND OF PARALLEL APPROACH IS UNAVOIDABLE--THE MORE SO AFTER THE TABLING OF A NNA-NUF TEXT. DESPITE CONTINUING DIFFERENCES ON THIS SUBJECT THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT

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THAT: THERE IS NO NECESSITY AT THIS STAGE FOR THE ALLIES TO TABLE A NUF TEXT; INTERNAL DELIBERATIONS ON POSSIBLE NUF ELEMENTS MAY HOWEVER BE USEFUL BUT SHOULD NOT YET BE FORMALIZED; IN THE LIKELY EVENT OF A NNA-NUF PAPER THE ALLIES SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO COMMENT. SOME PARTNERS SUGGESTED THAT A NNA PAPER ON NUF SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED, WHILE OTHER ALLIES WARNED AGAINST ASKING THE NNA TO TABLE NUF LANGUAGE. SEVERAL ALLIES STRESSED THAT NUF MIGHT ULTIMATELY BE AN IMPORTANT LEVER FOR ACHIEVING CONCRETE CSBMS. 3) PROCEDURAL ISSUES. ALLIES FAVORED EARLY DRAFTING AND DISCUSSED POSSIBLE STRUCTURES FOR IT. THE DISCUSSION LED BY THE U.S. FINALLY CENTERED ON TWO POSSIBLE MODELS, BOTH BUILDING UPON THE EXISTING WORKING STRUCTURE WITH THE AIM OF PROVIDING BEST NEGOTIATING CHANCES FOR THE WESTERN MEASURES. ONE MODEL WOULD USE THE "AB" MEETING--FIRST IN INFORMAL TALKS--TO DEAL WITH: NUF; NOTIFICATION, INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, COMMUNICATION; OBSERVATION; CALENDARS, CONSTRAINTS. THE OTHER MODEL WOULD USE THE EXISTING FIVE CLUSTERS FOR DRAFTING (THE FRENCH PROPOSAL). IT WAS CONSIDERED SIGNIFICANT BY ALL ALLIES THAT A "GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT" COULD POSSIBLY BE REACHED WITH THE SOVIETS, BASED UPON AMBASSADOR GOODBY'S EARLIER DISCUSSIONS WITH GRINEVSKY: ONLY NUF WOULD BE DEALT WITH IN DRAFTING AND NO OTHER DECLARATORY PROPOSALS; HOWEVER, THE LATTER MAY BE RAISED IN FORMAL SESSIONS. A CERTAIN RELATIONSHIP WOULD BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN NOTIFICATION, INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION (A "NOTIFICATION-REGIME"). AS TO NNA-COORDINATORS AND THEIR ROLE IT WAS FELT THAT THE NNA MIGHT BE READY FOR SUCH A TASK ONLY AFTER HAVING TABLED THEIR PROPOSALS. IT WAS FURTHER FELT THAT TWO OR MORE NNA-COORDINATORS WOULD BE PREFERABLE IN ORDER NOT TO PUT TOO MUCH RESPONSIBILITY ON ONE'S SIOULDERS. WHILE PURSUING THEIR EFFORTS TOWARD AN EARLY UNDERSTANDING ON A DRAFTING STRUCTURE IN STOCKHOLM ALLIES COULD SIGNAL TO OTHER PARTICIPANTS THEIR READINESS FOR DRAFTING IF ALL OTHER PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE IN THE SAME POSITION. 4) SOME DELEGATIONS (FR AND U.S.) FAVORED THE PROPOSAL OF A CUT-OFF DATE IN MID-JULY; THIS MIGHT INDUCE THE EAST TO AGREE TO SOME RESULT WELL IN TIME BEFORE VIENNA AND PREVENT THE SOVIET UNION FROM DRAGGING THE CDE INTO AN OVERLAP WITH THE VIENNA MEETING. AN EXTENSION BEYOND JULY COULD BE POSSIBLE IF POLITICAL AGREEMENT EXISTED BEFORE MID-JULY ON SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS AND IF THERE WAS CONSENSUS ON SUCH AN EXTENSION. MOST DELEGATIONS HOWEVER LEANED TOWARD THE OTHER PROPOSAL OF A WORK PROGRAM WHICH WOULD MAKE FULLER USE OF THE REMAINING TIME UP TO THE VIENNA MEETING. THEY ARGUED THAT IT WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO AIM AT AN ARTIFICIAL CUT-OFF DATE IN JULY WHICH IS NOT IN LINE WITH THE

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DECISIONS OF THE HELSINKI PREPARATORY MEETING. THE WEST MIGHT HAVE TO PAY A POLITICAL PRICE FOR SETTING TOO EARLY A DATE. WHILE A POSSIBLE INFORMAL TARGET DATE IN MID-JULY MAY BE USEFUL FOR INTERNAL PURPOSES IT COULD BE MISUNDERSTOOD BY PUBLIC OPINION. DURING THE DISCUSSION OF THE TWO PROPOSALS A TENDENCY TOWARD WORK SESSIONS OF ABOUT SIX WEEKS AND INTERSESSIONAL PERIODS OF ABOUT THREE WEEKS DEVELOPED. THE VIEW WAS EXPRESSED THAT ALLIES SHOULD TRY TO NARROW DOWN THEIR DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE NEXT WEEKS. END SUMMARY.

4. ON SEPTEMBER 4 & 5, 1985 AT THE PALAIS SCHAUMBURG IN PONN, CDE NATO AMBASSADORS AND DELEGATES MET TO DISCUSS THE FUTURE PROGRAM, TACTICS, AND STRATEGY FOR THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE) AS THE 35-NATION SESSION ENTERS ITS FINAL YEAR. (REPRESENTING '"F UNITED STATES AT THIS SESSION WERE U.S. CDE AMBASSADOR JAMES GOODBY, DCD LYNN HANSEN, STATE DEPARTMENT P-M MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS DIRECTOR JENNONE WALKER, AND SECDEF REPRESENTATIVE HARLAN STRAUSS.) THE AGENDA WAS DIVIDED INTO FOUR SECTIONS: CONTACTS AND CONSULTATIONS DURING THE RECESS, LONG-TERM STRATEGY, TACTICS FOR THE 7TH AND 8TH ROUNDS, AND THE WORK PROGRAM FOR 1986.

5. CONTACTS AND CONSULTATIONS: AMBASSADOR GOODBY REPORTED ON HIS MEETINGS EARLIER IN THE WEEK IN MOSCOW WITH AMBASSADOR OLEG GRINEVSKY. THREE BASIC AREAS WERE DISCUSSED: CSBMS, NUF, AND THE WORK STRUCTURE. WITH GENERAL TATARNIKOV, GRINEVSKY HAD ATTEMPTED TO DEFINE THE TYPES OF FORCES AND ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED IN A CSBMS REGIME WHICH WAS A REITERATION OF PREVIOUS POSITIONS. ON NUF AMBASSADOR GOODBY PRESENTED THE U.S. VIEW THAT A CDE NUF MEASURE CANNOT GO BEYOND THE U.N. CHARTER OR THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. ON WORKING STRUCTURE HE SAID AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY APPEARED ANXIOUS TO BEGIN DRAFTING INDICATING THAT THE EXISTING WORKING STRUCTURE WAS SUITABLE FOR SUCH AN EXERCISE. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR ALSO APPEARED TO AGREE THAT NUF COULD BE THE ONLY SOVIET DECLARATORY MEASURE PRESENTED, BUT THAT WESTERN PROPOSALS ON VERIFICATION AND INFORMATION WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED IN THE CONTEXT OF A NOTIFICATION REGIME. ON CONSTRAINTS, AMBASSADOR GOODBY SAID THAT NATO WAS NOT THE DEMANDEUR, BUT THAT ANNUAL FORECASTS WOULD BE FURTHER DISCUSSED IN TERMS OF THEIR CONSTRAINING EFFECT IN THE CONSTRAINTS WORKING SUBGROUP. GRINEVSKY POSED NO OBJECTION, NOTING THAT HE COULD CONSIDER FORECASTS AS EXTENDED NOTIFICATION. GRINEVSKY EMPHASIZED THAT "WE ARE MASTERS OF OUR OWN AGENDA," AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY TO ACCEPT VIRTUALLY ANY ARRANGEMENT THAT WOULD BRING ABOUT EARLY DRAFTING, BUT THAT VERIFICATION WOULD HAVE TO BE LINKED TO NOTIFICATION. FRENCH AMBASSADOR GASCHIGNARD ALSO MET

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WITH GRINEVSKY DURING THE SUMMER, AND THE LATTER INDICATED HE UNDERSTOOD WESTERN RESERVATIONS ABOUT A NUF TREATY BUT THAT THE PRINCIPLE NEEDS DEVELOPMENT. HE ALSO STATED THAT THE USSR COULD NOT SUPPORT AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WHICH IS NOT COUPLED TO NOTIFICATION. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT AN AGREEMENT ON OBSERVATION COULD ONLY OCCUR AFTER AGREEMENT ON A NOTIFICATION REGIME. ON THE ISSUE OF CONFERENCE SUSPENSION, GRINEVSKY FELT THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD GO ON AS LONG AS POSSIBLE BUT THAT HE MIGHT AGREE TO A TARGET DATE. BELGIAN AMBASSADOR STANDAERT REPORTED THERE IS LITTLE AGREEMENT WITHIN THE NNA TO DATE ON BASIC ISSUES. HE SAID THE SWISS FELT THAT THERE WAS NOT YET ENOUGH COMMON GROUND TO BEGIN DRAFTING, THOUGH IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO BEGIN INFORMAL DRAFTING DISCUSSIONS WITHOUT NEUTRAL COORDINATORS UNDER THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY. THE SWISS, STANDAERT REPORTED, CONTINUE TO OPPOSE CONSTRAINTS. DUTCH AMBASSADOR BUWALDA THEN REVIEWED HIS MEETINGS WITH THE AUSTRIANS. THEY ARE CONSIDERING VERIFICATION ISSUES SUCH AS CONSULTATION, INSPECTION BY INVITATION, AND THE POSSIBILITY, TOO, OF ESTABLISHING A POOL OF INSPECTORS AS WELL AS THE POSSIBLE ROLE OF NTMS WHICH THE AUSTRIANS FEEL SHOULD BE AT THE DISPOSAL OF ALL PARTICIPATING NATIONS. VIENNA IS INTERESTED IN A SATELLITE IN THE LONG-RUN BUT THE AUSTRIANS ARE BEGINNING TO REALIZE THE DIFFICULTIES OF SUCH A VENTURE. THE AUSTRIANS, BUWALDA REPORTED, REJECT A TREATY ON NUF AND BELIEVE THE EAST WILL NOT BE HAPPY WITH THE NNA APPROACH TO NUF. VIENNA DOES NOT SUPPORT SWISS ATTEMPTS TO LINK HUMAN RIGHTS TO CDE REGARDING THIS AS UNREALISTIC. AUSTRIA FAVORS A "MODERATE" CONSTRAINT WHICH WOULD LIMIT THE SIZE OF EXERCISES. FINALLY, THE AUSTRIANS BELIEVE THAT CDE CANNOT LEAD AN INDEPENDENT LIFE AND, IN SPITE OF SOVIET DESIRES OTHERWISE, CDE MUST CONCLUDE BY NOVEMBER 1986. NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR MEVIK THEN REVIEWED HIS MEETINGS WITH THE SWEDES AND FINNS DURING THE RECESS. HE TOO FELT THAT NNA PROGRESS WAS SLOW. HE SAID THE NNA CONSTRAINT MAY INCLUDE A LIMITATION OF 5 EXERCISES PER YEAR AND 5 DIVISIONS PER EXERCISE.

6. LONG-TERM STRATEGY. ITALIAN AMBASSADOR CIARRAPICO BEGAN THE SESSION BY STRESSING THE NEED TO ESTABLISH WHAT WOULD BE A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME FOR THIS PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE. HE SURMISED THAT IN THE END WE MAY HAVE TO ACCEPT ONLY A PORTION OF EACH OF OUR MEASURES. GREEK AMBASSADOR PAPADAKIS AGREED. NORWAY'S AMBASSADOR MEVIK OPINED THAT THE TACTICAL HANDLING OF NUF AND CONSTRAINTS WILL BE THE KEY TO ANY OUTCOME. A PERIOD OF CONTINUED INFORMAL DISCUSSION PRIOR TO DRAFTING IS STILL REQUIRED IN ORDER TO HAVE A BETTER IDEA OF SOVIET INTENT. OSLO IS OF THE FIRM VIEW THAT WE MUST ACHIEVE THE BEST

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POSSIBLE RESULT PRIOR TO VIENNA. FINALLY MEVIK SAID THAT HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO OPPOSE ANY FIXED DATE FOR SUSPENDING THE CDE PRIOR TO VIENNA. BELGIAN AMBASSADOR STANDAERT EMPHASIZED THE MODEST DEMANDS OF THE MADRID MANDATE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION TO PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL. WE MUST THEREFORE CONTINUE TO INSIST ON ALL THE PROVISIONS OF THE NATO PACKAGE. IT IS NOT THE ROLE OF THE NATO CAUCUS, HE SAID, TO FORMULATE COMPROMISES. UK AMBASSADOR EDES CONTINUED THAT ARGUMENT, EMPHASIZING THAT A BAD OR A FLAWED AGREEMENT MAY BE A BAD PRECEDENT. WE MUST CONSTANTLY ASK IF THE PRICE IS WORTH PAYING, AVOIDING THE IDEA THAT AN AGREEMENT IN CDE WILL HELP IN OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CSCE PROCESS. FRANCE'S D'ABOVILLE INTERJECTED THAT THE CSCE BALANCE PROBLEM NEEDS TO BE EVALUATED AND HE WARNED AGAINST THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE CDE THROUGH A CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM. PORTUGAL'S AMBASSADOR CUTILEIRO RETURNED TO THE EARLIER THEME: EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH EDES AND D'ABOVILLE STRESSING THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO PROGRESS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS SPHERE AND URGING THAT NOTIFICATION BE THE SINE QUO NON OF AN AGREEMENT IN CDE. SPAIN'S AMBASSADOR THEN SAID WE SHOULD NOT COMPROMISE ON CONCEPTS ONLY COMPROMISE ON PARAMETERS. AMBASSADOR GOODBY CONCURRED WITH THE EMPHASIS BEING PLACED ON THE WIDER CSCE PROCESS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF BALANCE. WE NEED, GOODBY SAID, TO SERIOUSLY CONSIDER WHETHER WE WANT TO PROCEED IN CDE IF THERE ARE NO IMPROVEMENTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS. RESPONDING TO BELGIUM'S ASSERTION THAT OUR PROPOSALS ARE MODERATE, MEVIK (NORWAY) ARGUED THAT WE ARE ASKING THE SOVIET UNION TO DO SOMETHING THEY'VE NEVER AGREED TO PREVIOUSLY, I.E., ON-SITE INSPECTIONS AND AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, WHICH THE SOVIETS CONSIDER AS LEGALIZED ESPIONAGE. CANADA'S DELWORTH AGREED THAT THE CDE IS PART OF THE LARGER CSCE PROCESS, BUT ARGUED THAT THE CDE IS OUR CONFERENCE, NOT THE SOVIET'S. WE NEED, HE ASSERTED, TO OBTAIN A PACKAGE OF IDEAS/CONCEPTS AND NOT BE WEDDED TO SPECIFIC TEXT. BUT THE REALITY IS POLITICAL AND, IN THE END, THE IMPACT OF STOCKHOLM WILL BE POLITICAL.

7. TACTICS FOR ROUNDS 7 AND 8: AMBASSADOR EDES (UK) BEGAN THIS SESSION WITH THE COMMENT THAT WE PROBABLY CANNOT CONTINUE THE ILLUSTRATIVE PAPER PROCESS FOR THE MOMENT. WE MUST GO ON THE OFFENSIVE VIS-A-VIS SOVIET PROPOSALS AND TRY TO WIN THE INTELLECTUAL DEBATE. ALLIED ARGUMENTS ARE GOOD AND WE SHOULD CONTINUE PURSUING THEM. ONCE THE NNA PRESENT THEIR PROPOSALS WE SHOULD POCKET WHAT WE LIKE AND DEFLATE THE UNWANTED ELEMENTS. AMBASSADOR GOODBY AGREED WITH EDES, SAYING THAT WE NEED TO ENSURE THAT THE NNAS INCORPORATE OUR VIEWS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. MEVIK INTRODUCED ELEMENTS OF

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AN APPROACH DEVELOPED IN OSLO, CONSISTING OF TWO PROCEDURAL AND TWO SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES. TAKING THE SUBSTANTIVE FIRST, MEVIK ARGUED THAT WE MUST ADOPT THE PARALLEL APPROACH TO NEGOTIATING ON NUF AND THEREFORE THE ALLIANCE MUST DETERMINE THE ACCEPTABLE ELEMENTS OF A NUF TEXT EVEN THOUGH IT NEED NOT BE TABLED. SECONDLY, NATO MUST SPEED UP ITS WORK ON CONSTRAINTS WITH A VIEW TO AGREEING ON TEXTS WHICH WOULD CONTAIN A COMMON POSITION WHICH NEED NOT BE TABLED. PROCEDURALLY, WE SHOULD MAKE PREPARATIONS FOR DRAFTING USING THE CURRENT WORK STRUCTURE. MOREOVER, WE SHOULD PROMOTE OUR PACKAGE BY RESHAPING IT TO MAKE IT MORE FLEXIBLE. INFORMATION, VERIFICATION AND COMMUNICATIONS COULD BE DISCUSSED WITH OBSERVATION. BUWALDA (NL), SAID IT WOULD BE A GREAT MISTAKE TO CHANGE OUR CURRENT COURSE AND THUS HE OPPOSED THE IDEA OF RESHAPING THE PACKAGE AT THE PRESENT. THE SOVIETS ARE DEMANDEURS ON NUF SO THE WEST SHOULD NOT DRAFT LANGUAGE. CANADA'S DELWORTH EXPLAINED THAT, IN FACT, THE ONLY AREA WHERE WE HAVE LEVERAGE IS NUF. NUF, HOWEVER, SHOULD NOT BE EQUATED WITH OTHER MEASURES. CANADA'S PAPER CONTAINING POSSIBLE ELEMENTS OF A NUF AGREEMENT WAS SENT TO ALLIED CAPITALS IN EARLY SUMMER AND SHOULD BE CLOSELY EXAMINED. BUERSTEDDE (FRG) POINTED OUT THAT ONCE THE NNA PRESENTS THEIR NUF TEXT THERE WILL BE NO WAY FOR THE WEST TO AVOID PARALLEL DISCUSSIONS. SO FAR, BELGIAN AMBASSADOR STANDAERT SAID, THE SOVIETS HAVE GIVEN NO SIGNAL THAT THEY ARE TREATING OUR SIX MEASURES SERIOUSLY. THE SOVIET UNION IS INTERESTED IN CDE TO BE USED AS A FORUM TO PROPOGATE THEIR VIEWS ON NUF AND RELATED SUBJECTS IN AND BEYOND CDE. PORTUGAL AGREED AND ARGUED THAT IT IS NOT UP TO THE ALLIES TO PROVIDE TEXTS ON EITHER NUF OR CONSTRAINTS. AMBASSADOR GOODBY EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT WE WOULD NEED A WESTERN NUF TEXT BUT TENDED TO AGREE THAT SOME KIND OF UNDERSTANDING COULD BE USEFUL. THE SOVIETS, GOODBY EXPLAINED, WILL WANT TO MOVE FORWARD ON "NO FIRST USE" AND THEREFORE WE MUST INSURE THAT THERE IS NO REFERENCE MADE TO NUCLEAR ISSUES, WEAPONS OR MILITARY FORCES. THUS, IT WILL PROBABLY BE DISADVANTAGEOUS TO CONSIDER USING THE BONN OR LISBON TEXTS IN CDE. TURKISH AMBASSADOR OZGUL ARGUED THAT NUF SHOULD BE A MEANS OF OBTAINING OUR PROPOSALS NOT AN END IN ITSELF. AMBASSADOR EDES THEN DISCUSSED THE SEQUENTIAL VERSUS PARALLEL APPROACH ON NUF AND CONCLUDED THAT THE PARALLEL APPROACH WILL PRODUCE ABSOLUTELY NOTHING. D'ABOVILLE (FRANCE) TOOK THE SAME VIEW.

8. PROCEDURAL ISSUES, (SECOND DAY): AMBASSADOR GOODBY INITIATED THE DISCUSSION BY STATING THAT HE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH EARLY DRAFTING EVEN IN THE SEVENTH SESSION UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS. THE SOVIETS, HE SAID, SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TAKE THE HIGH GROUND ON DRAFTING AND THAT

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WE NEED TO ESTABLISH PROCEDURES THAT ARE IN OUR BEST INTEREST. HE AGAIN DESCRIBED HIS CONVERSATION EARLIER IN THE WEEK WITH AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY IN WHICH HE EMPHASIZED THAT ALL WESTERN PROPOSALS MUST BE DISCUSSED IN WHATEVER ARRANGEMENT EVENTUALLY WAS AGREED. HE OUTLINED TWO POSSIBLE MODELS FOR DRAFTING, ONE WOULD UTILIZE WORKING GROUP AB AND THE OTHER, THE FRENCH MODEL, WOULD UTILIZE THE CURRENT STRUCTURE WITH FIVE SUBGROUPS. THE AB MODEL WOULD BE BASED ON A SERIATIM DISCUSSION OF EACH OF THE FIVE CLUSTERS. NOTIFICATION, ON THE ONE HAND AND VERIFICATION/INFORMATION/ COMMUNICATION, ON THE OTHER MIGHT BE DISCUSSED IN GROUP AB ON THE SAME DAY. ALL OTHERS WOULD BE DISCUSSED SEQUENTIALLY ON SUCCEEDING MONDAYS EXCEPT THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE OBLIGED TO LIMIT THEIR DISCUSSION TO NUF. HOWEVER, HE EXPLAINED THE FRENCH MODEL HAD BEEN THE BASIS FOR EXPLORING THIS MATTER WITH GRINEVSKY. (COMMENT: IN NATO CAUCUS, SEPT 10, IT APPEARED THAT THE AB WAS NO LONGER A SUBJECT FOR SERIOUS CONSIDERATION.) FOR THEIR PART, THE SOVIETS APPEARED TO HAVE NO DIFFICULTY WITH THE FRENCH STRUCTURE. THEY SEEMED TO INDICATE A WILLINGNESS TO LIMIT THEIR POLITICAL PROPOSALS TO NUF IN SUCH A WORKING STRUCTURE AND THAT VERIFICATION WOULD NEED TO BE DISCUSSED IN CONNECTION WITH NOTIFICATION. THE UNDERSTANDING THAT WOULD EMERGE WOULD BE: WE WOULD AGREE TO ENTER INTO AN INTERMEDIATE EXERCISE DESIGNED TO DEFINE AREAS FOR MORE DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS. THIS MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT INVOLVE THE USE OF NEUTRAL COORDINATORS. GRINEVSKY, GOODBY REPORTED, WANTED TO PRESS THE COORDINATOR'S DUTY UPON THE NNA AT THE OUTSET. WE WOULD PROCEED SERIATIM THROUGH THE VARIOUS SUBJECT AREAS.

9. CONSIDERABLE TIME WAS THEN SPENT ON THE ISSUE OF DRAFTING AND DRAFTING STRUCTURE. DUTCH AMBASSADOR BUWALDA AGREED WITH AMBASSADOR GOODBY ON EARLY DRAFTING, BUT FELT IT MIGHT BE MORE USEFUL TO DRAFT ONE ISSUE AT A TIME, AND SUGGESTED A THIRD MODEL IN WICH INITIAL DRAFTING WOULD BE LIMITED TO NOTIFICATION MOVING TO OTHER MEASURES AS CONSENSUS DEVELOPED. CANADA'S DELWORTH SAID THE SOONER WE MOVE TO DRAFTING THE BETTER. HOWEVER, HE VOICED SKEPTICISM ABOUT SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO DROP THEIR NON-FLYERS AND THUS EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT WE MIGHT FIND OURSELVES IN DRAFTING AREAS WHICH WE DO NOT WANT TO GET INTO. WE NEED TO DEFINE WHAT WE WANT TO DRAFT, HE SAID; A PATTERN NEEDS DEFINITION. CITRON (FRG) SAID DRAFTING SHOULD PROBABLY BEGIN IN THE EIGHTH SESSION. MEVIK (NORWAY) FELT IT IS IMPORTANT TO GIVE THE SOVIETS THE SIGNAL THAT WE ARE READY TO DRAFT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BUT WE WOULD NEED SOME WEEKS TO ORGANIZE. HE EXPRESSED STRONG AFFINITY FOR THE AB MODEL DESCRIBED BY AMBASSADOR GOODBY. THE

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UK QUESTIONED THAT APPROACH AND DISCUSSED THE DIFFICULTY IN MOVING FROM AB TO FORMAL DRAFTING WHILE MAINTAINING THE EXISTING WORKING STRUCTURE. ITALY AGREED THAT DRAFTING SHOULD OCCUR SOON, AS DID TURKEY WHO CAUTIONED THAT WE SHOULD WAIT FOR THE NNA TO TABLE THEIR PAPERS. THE SPANISH AMBASSADOR THOUGHT WE COULD BEGIN DRAFTING ON NUF IF IT WOULD LEAD TO CONCRETE DISCUSSION IN OTHER AREAS, BUT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO DRAFT AT THE BEGINNING OF THE EIGHTH SESSION. AMBASSADOR CITRON THEN CAUTIONED THAT THE NNAS MAY NOT BE READY TO DRAFT. MEVIK AGREED THAT WE OUGHT TO WAIT FOR THE NNA'S PAPERS.

10. WORK PROGRAM FOR 1986: THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR, AFTER PASSING OUT A DETAILED PROPOSAL, DISCUSSED THEIR PROPOSED 18 JULY CUTOFF DATE, WHICH, HE SAID, COULD BE EXTENDED. AMBASSADOR GOODBY AGREED WITH THE FRENCH AND SAID THAT A TARGET DATE WOULD BE USEFUL; CERTAINLY WE MUST CONCLUDE BEFORE THE 23 SEPTEMBER PREPARATORY CONFERENCE. CANADA, NETHERLANDS, UK, AND NORWAY DISAGREED, ARGUING THAT IT WOULD BE SUICIDAL TO FIX A CUTOFF DATE AND NOT WORK ALL THE WAY UP TO VIENNA, IF NECESSARY. THEY AGREED THAT THE SOVIETS WILL ONLY MAKE THEIR COMPROMISES IN THE END. THE GERMANS PROPOSED AN AGENDA WHICH CONCLUDED AT THE END OF OCTOBER, BUT INCLUDED 8 AND 9 WEEK WORK SESSIONS WHICH WERE CONSIDERED TOO LENGTHY BY SOME DELEGATIONS. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE NATO CAUCUS WILL TRY TO NARROW THEIR DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE NEXT WEEKS.

GOODBY

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06957
SUBJECT: CDE: NNA CONSTRAINTS MEASURE
1. CDE VII - 008.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: INFORMAL CONTACTS WITH DIFFERENT NNA DELEGATIONS INDICATE THAT THEY HAVE NOT YET REACHED COMPLETE AGREEMENT ON A SERIES OF PAPERS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE A COMPREHENSIVE ELABORATION OF SC.3. THEY HAD HOPED TO BE ABLE TO TABLE THESE PAPERS EARLY IN THE ROUND AS A PACKAGE, RATHER THAN INDIVIDUALLY. HOWEVER, WHILE SOME OF THESE PAPERS ARE READY TO TABLE, E.G. ON NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION, SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES REMAIN ON SOME OTHER ISSUES, E.G. NUF. THE EVER OPTIMISTIC SWEDES STILL CONTEND THAT AN NNA PACKAGE WILL BE READY IN A COUPLE OF WEEKS; MOST OF THEIR COLLEAGUES ARE NOT AS SANGUINE. ACCORDINGLY, WE WOULD BE SURPRISED IF AN NNA PACKAGE IS TABLED BEFORE THE END OF THIS ROUND. U.S. DEL HAS OBTAINED SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON THE CONSTRAINTS PROPOSAL TO BE INCLUDED AS A PART OF THE NNA PACKAGE. END SUMMARY.
4. IN A MEETING BETWEEN U.S. DEPUTY REP AND AUSTRIAN CDE AMBASSADOR LOIBL (PLEASE PROTECT), U.S. DEPUTY WAS ALLOWED TO TAKE NOTES ON A DRAFT NNA DOCUMENT OUTLINING THE CONSTRAINTS MEASURE ENVISAGED BY THE NNA GROUP. ALTHOUGH DEBATE CONTINUES BETWEEN THE NNA ON THE PARAMETERS OF THE PROPOSAL (SEE PARA 4 OF THE CABLE), IT NOW APPEARS THAT THEY WILL PROPOSE A CONSTRAINTS MEASURE FOLLOWING THE GENERAL OUTLINE DETAILED BELOW:
-- IN THE CDE ZONE, NO MILITARY MANEUVERS WILL BE PERMITTED WHICH EXCEED MORE THAN FIVE DIVISIONS IN SIZE;
-- IN THE CDE ZONE, STATES WILL NEITHER PERMIT, NOR PARTICIPATE IN, NOR CONDUCT, MORE THAN A TOTAL OF FIVE MILITARY MANEUVERS PER YEAR WHICH EXCEED A STRENGTH OF TWO DIVISIONS, I.E. BETWEEN TWO AND FIVE DIVISIONS. NO MORE THAN TWO MANEUVERS INVOLVING FROM TWO TO FIVE DIVISIONS EACH COULD BE CONDUCTED CONCURRENTLY, AND THE TWO WOULD COUNT AGAINST THE TOTAL OF FIVE ALLOWED;
-
-- NO MORE THAN FIVE MANEUVERS SMALLER THAN TWO DIVISIONS CAN OCCUR PER YEAR IF THEY ARE NOT/NOT PRENOTIFIED IN THE ANNUAL CALANDAR. THERE ARE NO RESTRICTIONS ON THE NUMBER OF MANEUVERS PER YEAR BELOW THE TWO-DIVISION LEVEL, IF PRE-ANNOUNCED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. (COMMENT: THE PROVISION FOR FIVE UNANNOUNCED MANEUVERS IS DESIGNED TO COVER NATO'S REQUIREMENT FOR ALERT ACTIVITIES. END COMMENT).
5. ACCORDING TO LOIBL (AGAIN PROTECT), THE YUGOSLAVS ARE CURRENTLY ARGUING FOR CHANGES IN THE PARAMETERS OF THIS NNA CONSTRAINT PROPOSAL TO THE EFFECT THAT IF TWO LARGER-SCALE MANEUVERS (TWO-FIVE DIVISIONS) ARE ALLOWED

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TO BE CONDUCTED CONCURRENTLY (SO THAT UP TO TEN DIVISIONS COULD BE EXERCISING AT ONE TIME), THEY WANT THE CEILING LOWERED TO FOUR DIVISIONS (SO THAT PERMITTED LARGE-SCALE MANEUVERS WOULD HAVE A CEILING OF FOUR VICE FIVE DIVISIONS AND, IF TWO EXERCISES ARE CONDUCTED CONCURRENTLY, NO MORE THAN EIGHT DIVISIONS COULD BE EXERCISING AT ANY ONE TIME). AT THE SAME TIME, THE REAL YUGOSLAV PREFERENCE IS NOT/NOT TO ALLOW THE CONDUCT OF TWO LARGER-SCALE MANEUVERS CONCURRENTLY; IF SUCH A PROHIBITION WERE ACCEPTED, THE YUGOSLAVS WOULD BE WILLING TO SET THE CEILING FOR THE SINGLE LARGER-SCALE MANEUVERS ALLOWED (NO MORE THAN FIVE) AT SIX RATHER THAN FIVE DIVISIONS.

6. ACTION REQUEST: EVEN THE NNA CANNOT PREDICT WHEN THEY WILL COMPLETE THEIR WORK SUFFICIENTLY TO ALLOW THEM TO TABLE A COMPREHENSIVE ELABORATION OF SC.3, INCLUDING THEIR CONSTRAINTS PROPOSAL. AFTER IT APPEARS, IT CAN BE ANTICIPATED THAT THE CDE NATO CAUCUS FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR NST DEL.
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, PREL, CDE
SUBJECT: CDE: NNA CONSTRAINTS MEASURE
WILL WANT TO REFER IT TO THE NATO CSBMS WORKING GROUP FOR STUDY AND EVALUATION. IN ANY EVENT, U.S. DEL WOULD LIKE TO BE WELL-PREPARED TO DISCUSS SUCH A PROPOSAL AND, THEREFORE, REQUESTS WASHINGTON TO PROVIDE DETAILED REACTION TO THE SPECIFICS OF THE DEVELOPING NNA CONSTRAINT.
GOODBY
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S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 06870
SUBJECT: REPORT TO NATO CAUCUS ON FUTURE WORKING
- STRUCTURE
REF: A) STATE 73637, B) STATE 181941
1. CDE VII - 007
2. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT
-
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR GOODBY REPORTED TO THE SEPTEMBER 10 NATO CAUCUS ON HIS RECENT MEETING WITH SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY IN MOSCOW. GOODBY SAID HE KNEW HIS COLLEAGUES RECOGNIZED THAT IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH GRINEVSKY IN MOSCOW, HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO DRAW OUT GRINEVSKY REGARDING THE LATTER'S READINESS TO ACCEPT CERTAIN CONDITIONS FOR DRAFTING WHICH WERE IMPORTANT TO THE U.S. AND, GOODBY BELIEVED, TO ALL THE ALLIES (REF A). GOODBY INDICATED THAT GRINEVSKY APPEARED TO AGREE TO U.S. CONDITIONS TO ENABLE THE CONFERENCE TO PROCEED TO MORE INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS, E.G., ALL NATO MEASURES WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN AN INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE BASED ON THE PRESENT FIVE CLUSTER GROUPS, WHILE THE SOVIETS WOULD DROP ALL OF THEIR POLITICAL MEASURES BUT NUF. THE CAUCUS APPEARED TO EMBRACE THIS APPROACH IF POSSIBLE, BUT SOME DELEGATIONS WERE SKEPTICAL OF GRINEVSKY'S APPARENT COOPERATIVENESS AND BELIEVED ANY AGREEMENT ON STRUCTURE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE SOME WRITTEN FORM TO PREVENT SOVIET BACKSLIDING. END SUMMARY.
4. MOSCOW MEETING: IN THE COURSE OF THE NATO CAUCUS DISCUSSION ON WORKING STRUCTURE, AMBASSADOR GOODBY REPORTED ON HIS SEPTEMBER 2-3 MOSCOW MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY, IN WHICH HE HAD INDICATED TO GRINEVSKY WHAT CONDITIONS MUST BE MET BEFORE THE CONFERENCE COULD MOVE INTO MORE INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS (REF A). (BONN SEPT. 4-5 BRAINSTORMING SESSION, WHICH DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE, IS REPORTED SEPTEL.)
GOODBY REPORTED THAT HE TRIED TO DRAW OUT GRINEVSKY ON WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE AN ACCEPTABLE STRUCTURE FOR DRAFTING, BUT HE OFFERED NO DEALS AND MADE NO COMMITMENTS. IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT GRINEVSKY WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT ALL OF OUR BASIC CONDITIONS ON DRAFTING. GOODBY INDICATED THAT GRINEVSKY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ALL NATO MEASURES (1-5) WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE DRAFTING PROCESS AND THAT THERE MUST BE NO POSTPONEMENT OF DISCUSSION ON VERIFICATION, I.E., IT MUST BE ADDRESSED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE OTHER MEASURES. GRINEVSKY ALSO UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE MUST BE A DIFFERENCE IN THE APPROACH TO DRAFTING ON NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF) AS OPPOSED TO COMPLEX CSBM'S, I.E., THE WEST WOULD BE UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE PROPOSED NUF LANGUAGE AT AN EARLY STAGE OF THE DRAFTING PROCESS.

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GOODBY INDICATED THAT, BASED ON HIS DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW, HE DID NOT NOW FEEL ANY "PRENEGOTIATION" (E.G, ALTERING SC.1 MEASURES 1 OR 5) WOULD BE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO GET THE SOVIETS TO ABANDON THEIR POLITICAL NON-STARTERS. GRINEVSKY APPEARED WILLING TO DROP ALL POLITICAL MEASURES FOR DRAFTING PURPOSES EXCEPT NUF, WITHOUT THE WEST HAVING TO DROP ANYTHING. GOODBY ALSO CONCLUDED FROM HIS MOSCOW CONVERSATIONS THAT NATO NEED NOT COMMIT ITSELF TO CONSTRAINTS IN ORDER TO PROCEED TO DRAFTING. (GOODBY EMPHASIZED THROUGHOUT THE CAUCUS DISCUSSION THAT WHAT GRINEVSKY SEEMED TO ACKNOWLEDGE IN MOSCOW IS NOT NECESSARILY THE SAME THING WE WILL HEAR FROM HIM IN STOCKHOLM FOR A VARIETY OF POSSIBLE REASONS: (1) GRINEVSKY WAS TRYING TO LEAD GOODBY ON IN MOSCOW; (2) HE HAD MISUNDERSTOOD U.S. CONDITIONS; (3) HE HAD CONSULTED WITH HIS AUTHORITIES WHO WERE UNPREPARED TO ACCEPT U.S. CONDITIONS.)

5. TURNING TO THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR DRAFTING, GOODBY TOLD THE CAUCUS THAT IN MOSCOW HE HAD USED THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS -- KEEPING THE EXISTING FIVE-CLUSTER FORMAT -- AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE AND WAS INCLINED TO VIEW THIS AS THE MOST SUITABLE TRANSITIONAL FORMULA. IN THE POLITICAL WORKING GROUP, THE SOVIETS WOULD ONLY DISCUSS NUF. HE HAD PERCEIVED NO SOVIET PROBLEMS WITH THE PRESENT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07029
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, SEPTEMBER 12, 1985
REF: STOCKHOLM 5870
1. CDE VII - 010
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
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3. SUMMARY: AT SEPTEMBER 12 NATO CAUCUS, AMBASSADOR GOODBY REPORTED ON HIS MORNING MEETING WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY ON INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE. GOODBY INDICATED THAT GRINEVSKY COULD AGREE TO: 1) USE THE EXISTING WORKING STRUCTURE FOR INTENSIFIED INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS; AND 2) HAVE AN INITIAL EXPLORATORY PHASE BEFORE DRAFTING, WITH A ROTATING CHAIR FOR NOW AND NNA COORDINATORS WHEN DRAFTING ACTUALLY BEGINS. IN ORDER TO AGREE TO THIS ARRANGEMENT, HOWEVER, GRINEVSKY INDICATED THAT THE OBJECTIVES OF THE EXPLORATION SHOULD BE DESCRIBED IN VERY GENERAL TERMS SO AS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO REFLECT THE CONNECTION BETWEEN VERIFICATION/ INFORMATION AND NOTIFICATION REGIME. CAUCUS REACTION WAS GENERALLY FAVORABLE TO ALL GRINEVSKY'S POINTS, BUT THERE WAS MUCH DISCUSSION AND SOME QUESTIONS REGARDING THE STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES. THE U.S. ARGUED THAT DELEGATES SHOULD REFLECT ON THIS QUESTION AND CONTACT THEIR CAPITALS. THE UK AGREED, AND PLEADED FOR NO DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT OUTSIDE THE CAUCUS FOR THE TIME BEING. NORWAY ENCOURAGED GOODBY TO SEEK OUT GRINEVSKY FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION AND INDICATED IT COULD NOT BE SILENT IF APPROACHED BY OTHER DELEGATIONS. AMBASSADOR GOODBY INDICATED THAT HE WOULD TAKE NO ACTION, BUT WOULD WAIT FOR GRINEVSKY TO GET BACK TO HIM. END SUMMARY.
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4. THE MAIN AGENDA ITEM IN NATO CAUCUS ON SEPTEMBER 12 WAS A CONTINUATION OF TUESDAY'S DISCUSSION ON WORKING STRUCTURE REPORTED REFTEL. AMBASSADOR GOODBY REPORTED ON HIS MORNING (SEPTEMBER 12) MEETING WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY (SCHEDULED AT GRINEVSKY'S REQUEST) ON DRAFTING STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURES. GOODBY TOLD THE CAUCUS THAT GRINEVSKY HAD INDICATED HE WAS PREPARED TO USE THE EXISTING STRUCTURE OF FIVE CLUSTERS, AND TO ENTER INTO AN INITIAL EXPLORATORY PHASE AS A PRELUDE TO DRAFTING. HE WOULD LIKE TO INDICATE A TARGET DATE FOR WHEN THE DRAFTING PHASE MIGHT BE REACHED. GRINEVSKY HAD BEEN PREPARED TO CONTINUE WITH ROTATING CHAIRMEN FOR THESE INFORMAL GROUPS IN THE EXPLORATORY PHASE, BUT WOULD WANT SOME REFERENCE TO COORDINATORS TAKING OVER WHEN DRAFTING BEGINS. GRINEVSKY HAD OFFERED NO FIRM VIEW ON HOW MANY COORDINATORS HE CONTEMPLATED. WHILE PREPARED TO MAINTAIN FIVE SEPARATE CLUSTERS, GOODBY SAID, GRINEVSKY WAS UNSPECIFIC ON HOW TO DESCRIBE THE RELATION BETWEEN THE NOTIFICATION CLUSTER, AND THE

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INFORMATION/VERIFICATION CLUSTERS. WHILE HE SEEMED PREPARED TO SPEAK ON VERIFICATION IN A SEPARATE MEETING, HE INSISTED IN REFERRING TO VERIFICATION AND INFORMATION AS "NOTIFICATION." GOODBY ALSO HIGHLIGHTED A POTENTIAL PROBLEM IN THAT GRINEVSKY PREFERRED THAT ANNUAL CALENDARS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED UNDER NOTIFICATION AS THE NNA HAVE PROPOSED. GOODBY REPORTED THAT HE HAD TOLD THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR THAT IF GRINEVSKY REMAINED IMPRECISE ON KEY SUBSTANTIVE POINTS OR WISHED TO CHANGE THE EXISTING WORKING STRUCTURE THERE WOULD BE NO POINT IN PURSUING THIS DISCUSSION. GRINEVSKY INDICATED THAT HE WOULD GET BACK TO GOODBY ON THESE MATTERS. IN SUBSEQUENT CAUCUS DISCUSSION, GOODBY INDICATED THAT GRINEVSKY'S PRIMARY REQUIREMENTS FOR AGREEING TO U.S. CONDITIONS SEEMED TO BE DESCRIPTIONS OF THE FIVE CLUSTERS AND A GENERAL REFERENCE, AT LEAST, TO SUBSEQUENT DRAFTING OF AN AGREEMENT.

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5. LIVELY CAUCUS DISCUSSION FOLLOWED THE GOODBY READOUT. MOST DELEGATIONS SEEMED ENCOURAGED BY THE REPORT, ESPECIALLY THE GERMANS, BUT THE CAUCUS THEN MOVED INTO A DISCUSSION OF THE PROS AND CONS OF THE ARRANGEMENT REPORTED BY GOODBY. NORWAY THOUGHT A SINGLE WORKING GROUP WOULD BE PREFERABLE USING AB AS DID THE NETHERLANDS; HOWEVER, BOTH SAID THEY WOULD NOT STAND IN

FROM USDEL CDE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, SEPTEMBER 12, 1985

THE WAY OF A CONSENSUS FOR FIVE CLUSTERS. AMBASSADOR GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, AND NOTIFICATION MEASURES AND CALLED FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION FROM GRINEVSKY. AMBASSADOR CITRON (FRG) NOTED THAT THIS FORMULA WOULD PRESERVE ALL SIX NATO PROPOSALS AND EMPHASIZE THEIR INTERRELATIONSHIP, WHILE GETTING THE SOVIET NON-STARTERS OFF THE TABLE AND COMMITTING THE SOVIETS TO NEGOTIATE IN AREAS OF INTEREST TO NATO. HE SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD HAVE NO PROBLEM IN MAKING THE LINK BETWEEN VERIFICATION/INFORMATIONS AND NOTIFICATION MORE VISIBLE IN THE CLUSTERS BECAUSE IT IS ALREADY ESTABLISHED IN SC.1. THE CAUCUS (PARTICULARLY THE FRENCH, WHO HAD PROPOSED THE IDEA) SEEMED PLEASED THAT GRINEVSKY WOULD AGREE TO AN EXPLORATORY PHASE AS A "SOFT TRANSITION" TO DRAFTING. THERE WAS ALSO GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THERE SHOULD BE A ROTATING CHAIRMAN FOR THE EXPLORATORY PHASE AND THAT A WRITTEN UNDERSTANDING WOULD BE NECESSARY BECAUSE WE WERE DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS. THE DUTCH (BUWALDA) EXPRESSED THEIR INTEREST IN FORMING ONE DRAFTING GROUP, VIZ., ON NOTIFICATION, WHERE "THERE IS SOME CONSENSUS" AND TO MOVE INTO FIVE GROUPS IS A

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CONCESSION TO THE SOVIETS. FRANCE AND UK SUGGESTED THIS SHOULD NOT BE FOR THE CONFERENCE RECORD AND SHOULD BE A NON-PAPER OF SOME KIND. GOODBY INDICATED IT COULD BE DONE ALONG THE LINES OF THE DECEMBER 1984 AGREEMENT ON WORKING STRUCTURE, WITH THE NNA COORDINATING AN OFF-THE-RECORD AGREEMENT.

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6. DISCUSSION OF APPROPRIATE TITLES FOR THE FIVE CLUSTERS QUICKLY BECAME BOGGED DOWN IN CONFUSED DISCUSSION ABOUT WHAT WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN EACH GROUP, WHETHER THERE WERE PRESENTLY TITLES FOR EACH GROUP, WHAT SOVIET OBJECTIVES MIGHT BE, ETC. CAUCUS DISCUSSION BECAME SOMEWHAT ACRIMONIOUS WHEN EDES (UK), IN RESPONSE TO THE CHAIRMAN'S (PORTUGAL) SUMMING UP, ASKED THAT THIS ISSUE ONLY BE DISCUSSED WITHIN THE CAUCUS UNTIL A NATO POSITION HAD BEEN AGREED. WHEN THE CHAIR RESISTED THIS SUGGESTION, GOODBY SUPPORTED THE UK, SUGGESTING THAT WE SHOULD REFLECT ON THE ISSUE AND REPORT TO CAPITALS BEFORE DISCUSSING IT OUTSIDE THE CAUCUS. GOODBY ALSO DISCOURAGED A REQUEST FROM MEVIK (NORWAY) THAT THE CAUCUS ASK GOODBY TO SEEK OUT GRINEVSKY FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION. CITRON (FRG) EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT WE WERE LETTING "A CHANCE SLIP BY" FOR PROGRESS AND SAID HE DIDN'T UNDERSTAND FEARS ABOUT DESCRIBING THE CONTENT OF INDIVIDUAL CLUSTERS. THE UK RESPONDED THAT THEY WERE NOT AFRAID OF HEADINGS AND PERHAPS COULD SEE SOME ADVANTAGES IN THEM (PRINCIPALLY IN KEEPING THE SOVIETS FROM RESURFACING THE NON-STARTERS IN GROUP A (TUESDAY)), BUT ARGUED THAT THE BALL WAS IN GRINEVSKY'S COURT AND THAT DELEGATIONS SHOULD SHOW "PRUDENCE AND RETICENCE" CONCERNING THIS ISSUE OUTSIDE THE CAUCUS. CITRON INTERJECTED THAT ANY FINAL ARRANGEMENT OUGHT TO INCLUDE BOTH TRANSITORY AND DRAFTING PRECONDITIONS. "WE ARE THE WINNERS IN A DEAL WHERE A NOTIFICATION REGIME IS LINKED TO INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION; IN ESSENCE GRINEVSKY HAS AGREED TO ALL OUR MEASURES." MOREOVER, CITRON ARGUED THAT CONSTRAINTS SHOULD BE PART OF A NOTIFICATION REGIME AS GRINEVSKY PROPOSED. ANSTIS (CANADA) RESPONDED THAT GRINEVSKY IS GETTING TOO MUCH. THE SOVIETS GET THEIR NON-STARTERS, AS WELL AS THE POSSIBILITY THAT ONCE DRAFTING BEGINS THERE WOULD BE NO IMPROVEMENT OVER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, WHICH IS COUNTER TO THE MANDATE. IF ANY HEADINGS CHANGE THEN WE HAVE MAJOR PROBLEMS. GOODBY THEN SAID THAT THE U.S. IS NO MORE INTERESTED THAN ANY OTHER NATION IN AN AGREEMENT AND THERE IS REALLY NO RUSH. THOUGH THERE ARE SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES, A "GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT" IN WRITING MIGHT ENCOURAGE CONSENSUS. EDES (UK) CONCLUDED THAT STRUCTURE MAY INEVITABLY DICTATE THE CONTENT OF A FINAL AGREEMENT; THE MORE YOU BIND YOURSELVES UP, HE SAID, THE MORE YOU TIE YOUR HANDS. DISCUSSION CLOSED WITH MEVIK (NORWAY) INDICATING HE WOULD NOT AGREE TO SILENCE OUTSIDE THE CAUCUS, ALTHOUGH HE WOULD NOT INDICATE IN TALKING WITH OTHERS THAT HE HAD ANY FIXED POSITION.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07077
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, SEPTEMBER 16, 1985
REF: STOCKHOLM 7029
1. CDE VII - 012
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
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3. SUMMARY: AT THE SEPTEMBER 16 NATO CAUCUS AMBASSADOR GOODBY REPORTED ON A FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF GRINEVSKY'S PROPOSAL OF THE SAME DATE FOR AN INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE LEADING TO DRAFTING. KEY POINTS OF THE PROPOSAL ARE: 1) TO MAINTAIN PRESENT CLUSTER STRUCTURE; 2) SOVIETS WOULD ONLY DISCUSS NUF; 3) SOVIETS AGREE TO DISCUSS VERIFICATION/INFORMATION IN A SEPARATE CLUSTER AS LONG AS IT IS CLEARLY INDICATED IN THE GROUP'S DESCRIPTIVE TITLE THAT IT IS IN RELATION TO NOTIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS; 4) RETAINED CONTRAINTS/ANNUAL CALENDAR IN A SEPARATE CLUSTER; 5) TO INDICATE THAT THIS INITIAL EXPLORATORY PHASE WOULD PROCEED TO DRAFTING AT SOME SPECIFIED POINT; AND 6) A CLAUSE SAYING THAT NEITHER EXPLORATION NOR DRAFTING WOULD COMMIT PARTICIPANTS TO ACCEPTANCE OF ALL ELEMENTS CITED ABOVE. SUBSTANTIVE CAUCUS DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSAL WAS PUT OFF UNTIL SEPTEMBER 17, BUT NORWAY, THE FRG, AND ITALY EXPRESSED INITIAL ENTHUSIASM FOR THE PROPOSAL. END SUMMARY.
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4. AT A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE NATO CAUCUS SEPTEMBER 16, AMBASSADOR GOODBY REPORTED ON THE WORKING STRUCTURE PROPOSAL ELABORATED TO HIM BY GRINEVSKY THAT AFTERNOON. THE GOODBY-GRINEVSKY MEETING WAS A FOLLOW-UP TO THEIR SEPTEMBER 12 MEETING REPORTED REFTEL. GOODBY TOLD THE CAUCUS THAT GRINEVSKY IS NOW PREPARED TO DISCUSS VERIFICATION AND INFORMATION TOGETHER IN THE PRESENT SINGLE CLUSTER, SUBJECT TO AN UNDERSTANDING THAT THE DISCUSSION WOULD BE IN RELATION TO A NOTIFICATION "ARRANGEMENT" OR WORD OF LIKE NATURE. (GRINEVSKY STATED SOVIET DISLIKE OF THE WORD REGIME, PREFERRING ANOTHER DESCRIPTIVE TERM.) GOODBY EMPHASIZED TO GRINEVSKY THAT VERIFICATION MUST APPLY TO A REGIME AND NOT JUST TO INDIVIDUAL NOTIFICATIONS. GRINEVSKY, GOODBY INDICATED, ALSO BACKED OFF HIS EARLIER PROPOSAL TO MOVE ANNUAL CALENDAR TO THE NOTIFICATION CLUSTER AND IS NOW PREPARED TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE EXPLICITLY IN THE EXISTING CONSTRAINTS/ANNUAL CALENDER CLUSTER. GRINEVSKY FURTHER CONFIRMED THAT HE WOULD CONFINE HIMSELF TO DISCUSSIONS OF NUF IN WORKING GROUP A1. HE PROPOSED, AS WELL, A CLAUSE SAYING THAT NOTHING WOULD COMMIT ANY PARTICIPANT TO ACCEPTANCE OF ALL ELEMENTS CITED ABOVE. GRINEVSKY ALSO INDICATED THAT CLUSTER SUBJECTS SHOULD BE CLEARLY DEFINED AND WITH REFERENCES TO DISCUSSIONS ON CONSTRAINTS/ANNUAL FORECASTS, NOTIFICATION, AND OBSERVATION, IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT DISCUSSION OF THESE ISSUES IS IN THE CONTEXT

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OF "CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES." ADDITIONALLY, GOODBY TOLD THE CAUCUS, GRINEVSKY CONFIRMED HIS ACCEPTANCE OF AN INFORMAL EXPLORATORY PHASE PRIOR TO DRAFTING USING THE EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS AND EMPLOYING A ROTATING CHAIR-MANSHIP. GOODBY NOTED THAT SOME DESCRIPTIONS FOR THE FIVE CLUSTERS WERE STILL CRITICAL TO GRINEVSKY, WHO WANTED THE DESCRIPTIONS DECIDED ON FOR THE EXPLORATORY PHASE AND CARRIED FORWARD INTO THE DRAFTING PHASE. GOODBY INFORMED THE CAUCUS THAT HE HAD GIVEN A NEGATIVE RESPONSE TO GRINEVSKY'S PROPOSAL REFERENCE A TARGET DATE FOR DRAFTING IN ANY UNDERSTANDING. GRINEVSKY HAD ALSO SOUGHT A REFERENCE TO NNA COORDINATORS TAKING OVER IN THE DRAFTING PHASE (GRINEVSKY WAS PREPARED TO DEFER THE

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QUESTIONS OF HOW MANY COORDINATORS OR WHAT THEIR PRECISE ROLE WOULD BE UNTIL LATER). GOODBY STRESSED THAT HE HAD INDICATED TO GRINEVSKY THAT HE WOULD REPORT THE PROPOSAL TO THE NATO CAUCUS FOR CONSIDERATION WHERE HE EXPECTED THERE WOULD BE MANY QUESTIONS; HE REPORTED THAT GRINEVSKY HAD SEEMED EAGER TO MOVE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

5. IN REPONSE TO QUESTIONS FROM THE CAUCUS, AMBASSADOR GOODBY INDICATED THAT GRINEVSKY WOULD BE SEEKING A TITLE FOR WORKING GROUP A (WEDNESDAY), FOR EXAMPLE, ALONG THE LINES OF "INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/COMMUNICATION IN

FROM USDEL CDE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL

SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, SEPTEMBER 16, 1985

RELATION TO A NOTIFICATION ARRANGEMENT." NORWAY, THE FRG, AND ITALY EXPRESSED THE MOST IMMEDIATE INTEREST IN GRINEVSKY'S PROPOSAL. BOTH MEVIK (NORWAY) AND CITRON (FRG) COMMENTED THAT THE FEELING AT THE BONN MEETING HAD BEEN THAT WE SHOULD MOVE TO DRAFTING. MEVIK SAID WE SHOULD NOT BE AFRAID TO DRAFT AND ASKED WHY WE COULD NOT INCLUDE A REFERENCE TO A TARGET DATE FOR DRAFTING IN THE UNDERSTANDING AS GRINEVSKY HAD PROPOSED FOR PUBLIC RELATIONS REASONS. THE FRG NOTED THAT ALL THE NATO PROPOSALS WERE ON THE AGENDA IN THE GRINEVSKY PROPOSAL, AND COMMENTED THAT, WHILE ONE SHOULD BE CAUTIOUS AND "TEST THE WATER," IT APPEARS THERE ARE "NO SHARKS" IN THIS ARRANGEMENT (GRINEVSKY HAD PREVIEWED HIS PROPOSAL FOR CITRON OVER LUNCH THE SAME DAY). ITALIAN AMBASSADOR CIARRAPICO COMMENTED THAT THE MECHANISM AND SIGNAL FOR A TRANSITION FROM AN EXPLORATORY PHASE TO A DRAFTING STAGE WAS STILL UNCLEAR. ADDITIONAL SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT ON THE PROPOSAL WAS DEFERRED UNTIL THE REGULARLY SCHEDULED CAUCUS MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 17.

GOODBY

END OF MESSAGE

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 07134
SUBJECT: WORKING GROUP A STATEMENT, SEPTEMBER 17, 1985
1. CDE VII - 017
2. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT ON NON-USE OF FORCE WAS DELIVERED BY U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JON GUNDERSEN IN WORKING GROUP A ON SEPTEMBER 17.
BEGIN TEXT:
-
MR. CHAIRMAN:

SEVERAL EASTERN DELEGATIONS CONTINUE TO ASSERT THAT THE UNITED STATES IS UNWILLING TO ADDRESS PROPOSALS FOR A REAFFIRMATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE. MOST RECENTLY, YESTERDAY IN WORKING GROUP AB, THE DISTINGUISHED SOVIET DELEGATE, AMBASSADOR RAKHMANINOV, ACCUSED THE U.S. DELEGATION OF SUPPORTING A POSITION ON NON-USE OF FORCE WHICH IS, IN HIS WORDS, AND I QUOTE, "A STEP BACKWARDS FROM (PRESIDENT REAGAN'S) STRASBOURG SPEECH." IN THE SAME INTERVENTION, HE SAID THAT THE U.S. POSITION REPRESENTED A "BRAKE ON THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE." A REVIEW OF THE RECORD OF THIS CONFERENCE, HOWEVER, CLEARLY DOES NOT SUPPORT THIS ALLEGATION.

AS AMBASSADOR GOODBY INDICATED IN THE PLENARY ON SEPTEMBER 10, 1985, "THERE SHOULD BE NO QUESTION REMAINING THAT THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS A REAFFIRMATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE. WE HAVE ALREADY DONE SO; WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO."

MY DELEGATION HAS REGULARLY ADDRESSED THIS ISSUE BOTH IN THIS WORKING GROUP AND IN PLENARY SESSION IN TERMS CONSISTENT WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT TO THE IRISH PARLIAMENT IN JUNE OF 1984, AND WITH HIS MORE RECENT REAFFIRMATION BEFORE THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. IN STRASBOURG THE PRESIDENT ASSERTED THAT "THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON NON-USE OF FORCE IN THE CONTEXT OF SOVIET AGREEMENT TO CONCRETE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES."

CONSEQUENTLY, MY DELEGATION TAKES ISSUE WITH THE ALLEGATION MADE YESTERDAY BY THE DISTINGUISHED SOVIET DELEGATE THAT THE U.S. IS ONLY CONSIDERING PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED AS IF NO OTHER PROPOSALS EXISTED. MY SOVIET COLLEAGUE EXPRESSED IT IN TERMS OF AN EQUATION WITH THE WESTERN PROPOSALS ON ONE SIDE AND ZERO ON THE OTHER. IT SHOULD BE CLEAR FROM WHAT I SAY TODAY THAT THIS IS NOT THE CASE. IN FACT, IT WOULD BE
-
MORE ACCURATE TO SAY THAT, IN SHARP CONTRAST TO THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE'S WILLINGNESS TO ADDRESS SOVIET PROPOSALS ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE, WE SADLY NOTE THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS FAILED TO ADDRESS OUR DETAILED PROPOSALS ON INFORMATION, NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION WHICH COULD GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THAT PRINCIPLE. IN FACT THE DEAL WHICH THE EAST IS

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OFFERING IS ALL ON THEIR TERMS: NON-USE OF FORCE, AS DEFINED BY THEM, AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES TAILORED TO THEIR SPECIFICATIONS OR, AS AMBASSADOR GOODBY EXPRESSED IT ON JULY 5, THE EAST IS SAYING "WE'LL COMBINE OUR NON-USE OF FORCE PROPOSAL WITH OUR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, AND THAT SHOULD SATISFY YOU."

FOR ITS PART, THE UNITED STATES REMAINS PREPARED TO DISCUSS A REAFFIRMATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGREEMENT ON CONCRETE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH WILL GIVE TANGIBLE, VERIFIABLE PROOF OF A NATION'S PEACEFUL INTENTIONS. SUCH DYNAMIC AND CONCRETE MEASURES HAVE BEEN PROPOSED BY THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED AND SHOULD BE SEEN AS THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE OBLIGATION NOT TO THREATEN OR USE FORCE. THEY OFFER THE BEST METHOD OF GIVING "EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS."

FROM USDEL CDE
USIA FOR IP/PFE
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: WORKING GROUP A STATEMENT, SEPTEMBER 17, 1985

IN HIS STATEMENT YESTERDAY THE DISTINGUISHED SOVIET DELEGATE SAID THAT "THE TIME IS RIPE TO SPECIFY THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE AS AN ACTIVE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL LIFE APPLICABLE TO EUROPE." HE THEN EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT THIS IS SEEN BY SOME DELEGATIONS AS AN ATTEMPT TO REVISE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL NON-USE OF FORCE OBLIGATIONS. THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION IS CONCERNED THAT AN AGREEMENT ALONG THE LINES OF THE SOVIET SC.6 PROPOSAL WOULD UNDERMINE THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER'S ARTICLE 2(4) WHICH SERVES AS THE LEGAL FOUNDATION OF THE MODERN STATE SYSTEM.

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MR. CHAIRMAN,

WE ALL HAVE A VITAL INTEREST IN ENSURING THAT NO NEW FORMULATIONS REGARDING THE NON-USE OF FORCE MODIFY OR REDUCE THE SCOPE OF THE UN CHARTER'S UNIVERSAL, ADMIRABLY FORMULATED AND LEGALLY BINDING NON-USE OF FORCE COMMITMENT.

THE CRUCIAL CHARACTERISTIC OF ARTICLE 2(4) IS ITS CONSTITUTIONAL BREADTH -- THAT IS, ITS UNIVERSALITY -- AND ITS APPLICABILITY TO ALL FORMS OF THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE. SOVIET PROPOSALS TO REFORMULATE THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE BY SPECIFYING LOCATIONS -- FOR EXAMPLE, ON LAND, ON THE SEA, IN SPACE -- OR TO SPECIFY TYPES OF WEAPONS -- FOR EXAMPLE, CONVENTIONAL OR NUCLEAR -- WOULD UNDERMINE THE PRINCIPLE, EVEN IF THE SPECIFICATIONS ARE STATED AS MERE EXAMPLES. THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NON-USE OF FORCE IS COMPARABLE TO ONE WHICH WOULD

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REFORMULATE THE U.S. CONSTITUTION'S FIRST AMENDMENT TO PROHIBIT ABRIDGMENT OF FREEDOM NOT OF "THE PRESS," BUT OF "RADIO AND TELEVISION, NEWS BROADCASTS AND NEWSPAPERS, AND OTHER MAGAZINES SOLD ON THE STREET, IN SUPERMARKETS AND ELSEWHERE AND OTHER TYPES OF NEWS AND COMMENTARY." WHAT IS LEFT OUT -- FOR EXAMPLE, IN THIS CASE, WEEKLY JOURNALS LIKE "TIME" OR "NEWSWEEK," CAN BE CENSORED, BY IMPLICATION.

IN THE CSCE CONTEXT, THE LANGUAGE OF ARTICLE 2(4), WHICH IS LEGALLY BINDING UNDER THE CHARTER, IS MADE POLITICALLY BINDING BY THE FINAL ACT AS THE SECOND OF THE SEVEN PRINCIPLES. IT IS WHOLLY INAPPROPRIATE -- AND INDEED UNNECESSARY TO SINGLE OUT ONE OF THE SEVEN PRINCIPLES AND MAKE IT THE CORE OF A TREATY WHICH WOULD HAVE AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT EFFECT ON THE UN CHARTER FROM THAT OF THE FINAL ACT.

IN CONTRAST TO THIS APPROACH, THE U.S. DELEGATION ENVISAGES A COMBINATION OF THE STATIC OBLIGATION NOT TO USE FORCE WITH CONCRETE, DYNAMIC OBLIGATIONS TO REDUCE
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THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFLICT EITHER THROUGH SURPRISE ATTACK OR MISCALCULATION, THUS PRODUCING WHAT HAS COME TO BE IDENTIFIED IN OUR DELIBERATIONS AS AN "ORGANIC FUSION" OF THE TWO.

MY DELEGATION CONTINUES TO FAVOR SUCH AN ORGANIC FUSION IN THE FORM OF A SINGLE POLITICALLY BINDING DOCUMENT OF INDEFINITE DURATION, WHICH WOULD:

A) BE PRECISE AND UNAMBIGUOUS IN ITS LANGUAGE;

B) USE THE LANGUAGE OF THE UN CHARTER AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE;

C) DEAL WITH THE THREAT, AS WELL THE USE, OF FORCE;

WE ARE PLEASED TO NOTE IN THIS REGARD THAT THERE SEEMS TO BE GROWING ACCEPTANCE IN THIS WORKING GROUP THAT THE THREAT, AS WELL AS THE USE, OF FORCE HAS TO BE DEALT WITH IN ANY NUF COMMITMENT;

D) APPLY EQUALLY TO ALL CSCE PARTICIPATING STATES

FROM USDEL CDE
USIA FOR IP/PFE
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: WORKING GROUP A STATEMENT, SEPTEMBER 17, 1985

IN THEIR MUTUAL, AS WELL AS THEIR INTERNATIONAL, RELATIONS;

E) TAKE INTO ACCOUNT, AS NOTED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, THAT "ALL THE PRINCIPLES SET FORTH (IN THE FINAL ACT) ARE OF PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE AND MUST BE EQUALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OTHERS;"

F) BE REVIEWED PERIODICALLY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE HELSINKI REVIEW PROCESS TO ENSURE ACCOUNTABILITY, AND EXERT PRESSURE FOR COMPLIANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION.

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MR. CHAIRMAN,
ALL PROVISIONS AGREED TO IN ANY POLITICALLY BINDING DOCUMENT, OF COURSE, SHOULD BE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE MADRID MANDATE AND SHOULD INHIBIT IN A REAL SENSE THE
-
USE OR THE THREAT OF USE OF FORCE. THESE PROVISIONS WOULD BE ORGANICALLY RELATED TO THE SPECIFIC CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES THAT WOULD CONSTITUTE THE OPERATIONAL HEART OF A CDE AGREEMENT. IN OUR VIEW SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD REAFFIRM THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE IN THE CONTEXT OF CONCRETE AND DYNAMIC OBLIGATIONS WHICH CONSTITUTE REAL BARRIERS AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE.
THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.
END TEXT
HANSEN
END OF MESSAGE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07076
SUBJECT: NON-PAPER ON CDE WORKING STRUCTURE
L. C-ENTIRE TEXT.
2. CDE VII - 015
3. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A NON-PAPER DISTRIBUTED BY AMBASSADOR GOODBY IN THE NATO CAUCUS TODAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1985. THE NON-PAPER REPRESENTS OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOVIET POSITION ON A FORMULA FOR MOVING TO A MORE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE IN CDE. THE NON-PAPER HAS NO STATUS AND IS ONLY INTENDED TO FACILITATE DISCUSSION. FULL REPORT OF NATO CAUCUS OF SEPTEMBER 17 FOLLOWS SEPTEL.
4. BEGIN TEXT:
(L) THE EXISTING WORKING STRUCTURE WILL BE USED AS A MEANS?OF UNDERTAKING AN INFORMAL EXPLORATION OF TOPICS WHICH MIGHT FIGURE IN THE PROCESS OF DRAFTING AGREED LANGUAGE FOR POSSIBLE INCLUSION IN A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT.
(2) DURING THE EXPLORATORY DISCUSSIONS THE INFORMAL MEETINGS OF THE WORKING GROUPS WILL BE CHAIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXISTING PROCEDURES; DURING THE PROCESS OF DRAFTING, AND AT A TIME AND IN A MANNER TO BE AGREED, INFORMAL MEETINGS WILL BE CHAIRED BY COORDINATORS DRAWN FROM THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES.
(3) IN SUCH INFORMAL MEETINGS OF THE WORKING GROUPS THE FOLLOWING TOPICS WILL BE TAKEN UP:
WORKING GROUP A
TUESDAY NON-USE OF FORCE
WEDNESDAY EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION, COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION, AND DEVELOPMENT OF MEANS OF COMMUNICATION IN RELATION TO NOTIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS
THURSDAY CONSTRAINING MEASURES; ANNUAL FORECASTS OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES
WORKING GROUP B
TUESDAY NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES
THURSDAY OBSERVATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES
(4.) BOTH IN THE EXPLORATION OF THESE TOPICS AND IN SUBSEQUENT DRAFTING OF LANGUAGE FOR A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT ALL WORK WILL BE CONSIDERED PRELIMINARY AND WILL NOT IMPLY FINAL AGREEMENT ON ALL THE ELEMENTS DISCUSSED.
(5.) (THE QUESTION OF WHEN THE PROCESSES DESCRIBED ABOVE SHOULD COMMENCE IS LEFT OPEN BUT IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY SHOULD BEGIN AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME.)
END TEXT
GOODBY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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SUBJECT: NGOS ATTENDANCE AT BUDAPEST FORUM
REF: STATE 281611

1. C-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN CONNECTION WITH REFTEL, US CDE DELEGATE FINERTY, STAFF MEMBER OF THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, APPROACHED HUNGARIAN DEPUTY HEAD OF DELEGATION KORMENDY, AND EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT ANNOUNCED DECISION BY HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT TO REFUSE VISAS TO NGOS WITHOUT PRIOR INVITATION FROM A HUNGARIAN ORGANIZATION WOULD HAVE SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS ON CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC OPINION VIS-A-VIS THE BUDAPEST CULTURAL FORUM AND THE CSCE PROCESS. FINERTY MENTIONED THAT HE WAS AWARE OF AT LEAST ONE CODEL THAT WAS BEING PLANNED FOR THE BCF, AND THAT REFUSAL TO ADMIT NGOS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY CAUSE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS TO RECONSIDER THE VISIT TO BUDAPEST.

3. KORMENDY PROFESSED IGNORANCE OF HIS GOVERNMENT'S DECISION, BUT APPEARED CONCERNED. HE SAID TMAT HE HAD INTENDED TO CONTACT BCF SECRETARIAT BY TELEPHONE ON OTHER MATTERS AND WOULD CHECK ON NGO PROCEDURES.

4. THE FOLLOWING DAY, KORMENDY APPROACHED FINERTY AND WENT INTO A RATHER LENGTHY EXPOSITION OF PROCEDURE, AS HE ALLEGEDLY UNDERSTOOD IT FROM BCF SECRETARIAT, FOR NGO ACCESS TO THE CONFERENCE. HE CONTENDED THAT MADRID PROCEDURES, LETTER FROM SPONSORING DELEGATION, CREDENTIALS THROUGH SECRETARIAT, ETC. WOULD BASICALLY APPLY. (FINERTY AND KORMENDY WERE ON THEIR NATIONAL DELEGATIONS AT MADRID REVIEW CONFERENCE). WHEN FINERTY PRESSED ON ENTRY VISA ISSUE SPECIFICALLY, KORMENDY STATED THAT AS FAR AS HE KNEW, VISAS WOULD BE ISSUED TO INDIVIDUALS "WHO HAD NOT COMMITTED CRIMES AGAINST THE HUNGARIAN STATE" ETC, ETC. HE EMPHASIZED THAT POLITICAL DEMONSTRATIONS BY "FOREIGN TOURISTS" ARE NOT PERMITTED BY HUNGARIAN LAW, BUT THOUGHT THAT VISITORS WOULD BE PERMITTED TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS TO INDIVIDUAL DELEGATIONS.

5. (BEGIN COMMENT. KORMENDY IS A CSCE VETERAN WHO ATTEMPTS TO PRESENT THE MODERATE, QUASI/INDEPENDENT IMAGE OF HIS COUNTRY/DELEGATION. UNFORTUNATELY, HIS PAST "OPENNESS" ON WARSAW PACT POSITIONS AT CDE HAVE BEEN SPICED WITH A GOOD DEAL OF MISINFORMATION. THE VALUE OF HIS EXCHANGE WITH FINERTY, IF ANY, WAS PROBABLY MORE IN CONVEYING CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC DISPLEASURE WITH BUDAPEST'S DECISION, RATHER THAN ANY BLAND ASSURANCES GAINED FROM A PERIPHERAL PLAYER THAT ALL WILL BE WELL WITH NGOS AT THE BCF. END COMMENT.)

END

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07094
SUBJECT: CDE WEEKLY WRAP-UP, SEPTEMBER 10 - 17, 1985
REF: (A) STOCKHOLM 957, (B) STATE 73637
1. CDE VII - 014
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. BEGIN SUMMARY. THE FOCUS OF CONFERENCE ATTENTION SO FAR HAS BEEN ON PROCEDURE RATHER THAN SUBSTANCE. GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE CDE BEAST, HOWEVER, EVEN SEEMINGLY BENIGN PROCEDURAL SUGGESTIONS MAY HAVE LONG-TERM SUBSTANTIVE IMPLICATIONS. THE NATO CAUCUS DISCUSSED, WITH THE NORMAL DOSE OF CONTRETEMPS AND CONSENSUS, USING THE EXISTING WORKING STRUCTURE AS A MEANS OF UNDERTAKING AN INFORMAL EXPLORATION OF TOPICS WHICH MIGHT FIGURE IN THE PROCESS OF EVENTUAL DRAFTING. THE NNA, IN THE MEANTIME, HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO GET THEIR COLLECTIVE ACT TOGETHER REGARDING THE SERIES OF PAPERS THEY HAD HOPED TO TABLE AS A PACKAGE EARLY THIS ROUND. THEY REMAIN, HOWEVER, VERY INTERESTED OBSERVERS OF U.S.-SOVIET DIALOGUE ON WORKING STRUCTURE AND WILL, NO DOUBT, HAVE MUCH TO SAY ON THE MATTER AS THE ROUND PROGRESSES. WHILE THE CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS PLAYED THE PROCEDURAL GAME IN PRIVATE, THEY, INCLUDING THE SOVIETS, REMAINED ON THEIR BEST BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC. MOSCOW'S MUTED MESSAGE IN STOCKHOLM, HOWEVER, IS LARGELY INTENDED FOR EUROPEAN RATHER THAN AMERICAN EARS. END SUMMARY.
4. THE MOOD: THE SEVENTH ROUND OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE OPENED IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF QUIET EXPECTANCY AS THE MAJOR PLAYERS JOCKEYED FOR POSITION FOR THE LONG ANTICIPATED STRETCH RUN. WHILE ALL DELEGATIONS PUBLICLY PROFESSED THEIR DESIRE TO BEGIN DRAFTING ON A MEANINGFUL AGREEMENT, EAST AND WEST OFFERED DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ON HOW TO GET THERE AND WHAT TO DO ONCE WE ARE THERE. THUS, THE FOCUS OF CONFERENCE ATTENTION THIS FALL HAS BEEN ON TACTICS RATHER THAN SUBSTANCE. GIVEN CDE EXPERIENCE, HOWEVER, EVEN SEEMINGLY MODEST PROCEDURAL SUGGESTIONS HAVE LONG-TERM SUBSTANTIVE IMPLICATIONS. ACCORDINGLY, CORRIDOR AND CAUCUS CONVERSATION HAS CONCENTRATED ON THE PROCEDURAL GAME AND HOW TO PLAY IT -- AND WIN IT.
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5. BENIGN INTENT? IN THE MEANTIME, ALL PLAYERS ARE ON THEIR BEST BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC. EVEN THE NORMALLY CHURLISH SOVIET AMBASSADOR OPENED THE ROUND WITH AN UNCHARACTERISTICALLY BUSINESSLIKE PLENARY STATEMENT WHICH, FOR THE FIRST TIME, DID NOT BLAME THE U.S. FOR ALL THE ILLS OF THE WORLD. THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS "RIPE" FOR GETTING DOWN TO CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS, ACCORDING TO GRINEVSKY, AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO DO ITS PART. FROM AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE, HOWEVER, THE INTENT OF GRINEVSKY'S SOOTHING LANGUAGE IS FAR FROM BENIGN. HIS IS A MESSAGE WE HAVE HEARD AT THE TENTH

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ANNIVERSARY OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT THIS AUGUST AND ONE WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY WE WILL HEAR IN GENEVA IN NOVEMBER. IT IS A MESSAGE INTENDED FOR EUROPEAN RATHER THAN AMERICAN EARS: "THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES FAVOR ACCELERATING THE WORK OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE;" THESE COUNTRIES FAVOR "MILITARY DETENTE IN EUROPE," ACCORDING TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR. ON THE OTHER HAND, "CERTAIN DELEGATIONS SEEK TO ARTIFICIALLY DELAY THE NEGOTIATIONS" BY "HOLDING STUBBORNLY" TO POSITIONS WHICH WILL GAIN THEM "UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES."

6. FROM WHENCE THE THREAT TO PEACE? IF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE SHOULD FAIL TO RESOLVE EAST-WEST DIFFERENCES, ACCORDING TO THIS LOGIC, IT WILL NOT BE THE FAULT OF THE SOVIET UNION OR EVEN THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES INVOLVED. WE HAVE PUT FORWARD REASONABLE PROPOSALS; WE HAVE EXPRESSED A WILLINGNESS IO NEGOTIATE, MOSCOW PROFESSES. THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, SHARING "OUR COMMON HOME," SEE THE IMPERATIVE TO "GET DOWN TO BUSINESS" IN STOCKHOLM. TO PUT A POINT ON THIS MUTED (BY SOVIET STANDARDS) MESSAGE IN STOCKHOLM, MOSCOW RADIO WORLD SERVICE DECLARED UPON THE OPENING OF THE SEVENTH ROUND: "THE UNITED STATES HAS FOLLOWED A FOOT-DRAGGING TACTIC" IN STOCKHOLM WHILE THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT HAS BECOME A "STOREHOUSE FOR

FROM USDEL CDE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE WEEKLY WRAP-UP, SEPTEMBER 10 - 17, 1985

AMERICAN CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS." MOSCOW'S INTENT, THEREFORE, MAY BE TO PREPARE THE PROPAGANDA GROUND FOR FAILURE RATHER THAN FOR SUCCESS.

7. THE ALLIES AND FUTURE WORKING STRUCTURE: THE NATO CAUCUS FOCUSED ON THE "HOW AND WHEN" OF "GETTING DOWN TO BUSINESS" DURING THE FIRST WEEK -- ON WESTERN TERMS. BOTH IN MOSCOW ON SEPTEMBER 2 AND 3, AND IN STOCKHOLM MORE RECENTLY, GRINEVSKY HAS STRESSED SOVIET DESIRE TO GET DOWN TO WORK. IN RESPONSE, AMBASSADOR GOODBY TRIED TO DRAW OUT GRINEVSKY ON WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE AN ACCEPTABLE STRUCTURE FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. BASED ON THESE DISCUSSIONS, GOODBY REPORTED TO THE CAUCUS THAT THE SOVIETS APPEARED READY TO ACCEPT KEY U.S. CONDITIONS TO ENABLE THE CONFERENCE TO PROCEED TO MORE INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS, E.G., ALL NATO MEASURES WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN AN INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE BASED ON THE PRESENT FIVE CLUSTER GROUPS, WHILE THE SOVIETS WOULD DROP ALL THEIR "POLITICAL MEASURES" EXCEPT NUF. GRINEVSKY, NEEDLESS TO SAY, WAS NOT WITHOUT HIS CONDITIONS. HE INDICATED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE CLUSTERS WOULD HAVE TO BE DESCRIBED BY HEADINGS REFLECTING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE VERIFICATION/INFORMATION CLUSTER AND A NOTIFICATION ARRANGEMENT, AND THERE SHOULD BE REFERENCE TO A TARGET DRAFTING DATE

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AS PART OF ANY UNDERSTANDING. (NOTE. WE ARE CAREFUL HERE TO DISTINGUISH AN INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE FROM AN ACTUAL DRAFTING STRUCTURE. IN OTHER WORDS, THE EXISTING WORKING STRUCTURE WOULD BE USED AS A MEANS OF UNDERTAKING AN INFORMAL EXPLORATION OF TOPICS WHICH MIGHT FIGURE IN THE EVENTUAL DRAFTING PROCESS. GIVEN EXISTING SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES, WE SERIOUSLY DOUBT THIS INFORMAL WORKING ARRANGEMENT, WHICH ITSELF MAY TAKE SOME TIME TO EMERGE, WILL EVOLVE TO DRAFTING BEFORE THE NEXT ROUND AT THE EARLIEST.)

8. CONCORD AND CONTRETEMPS: THE CAUCUS REACTED FAVORABLY TO U.S.-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS. WHILE MOST OF OUR ALLIES WANT TO BEGIN DRAFTING SOONER RATHER THAN LATER, THEY REALIZE THAT CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED EVEN IN FORMULATING AN INFORMAL ARRANGEMENT WHICH WILL LEAD TO EVENTUAL DRAFTING. THE QUESTION REMAINS HOW BEST TO POSITION OURSELVES FOR DRAFTING AND HOW FAST TO GET THERE. HERE, THE ALLIES DISPLAYED THEIR NORMAL CENTRI-

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FUGAL PROCLIVITIES. THE FRG CALLED FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION; WE CANNOT LET THIS "CHANCE SLIP BY," PLEADED AMBASSADOR CITRON. THE FRENCH ADVOCATED A MORE REGAL PACE, NOTING THAT USING THE EXISTING WORKING STRUCTURE ON A MORE INFORMAL BASIS WOULD PROVIDE A "SOFT TRANSITION" TO EVENTUAL DRAFTING. THE DUTCH DOUBTED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD ACCEPT THE FIVE CLUSTER APPROACH OR THE U.S. CONDITIONS WITHOUT BACK-PEDALING. DOUBTING, OF COURSE, IS A PROFESSIONAL VIRTUE AMONG DIPLOMATS. IN THIS CASE, IT MIGHT BE WARRANTED. IF, IN FACT, THE SOVIETS ACCEPT THE KEY U.S. CONDITIONS FOR DRAFTING OUTLINED IN REF B, THEY HAVE MADE IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS WHICH SHOULD BE ENSHRINED IN WRITING (OR, WHAT THE ITALIANS CALL A "GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT) TO PREVENT SOVIET BACKSLIDING. CONSIDERING THE "GENTLEMEN" WITH WHOM WE ARE DEALING, THE ITALIAN IDEA STRIKES US AS EMINENTLY LOGICAL.

9. THE NNA: IF THE FRENCH HAVE ADOPTED A REGAL PACE ON DRAFTING, THE NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED SEEM TO BE FOLLOWING IN GLACIAL PACE ON ELABORATING THEIR PROPOSALS, SC.3. AS ALWAYS, THERE IS MORE MOTION THAN MOVEMENT IN THE NEUTRAL CAMP.

10. DESPITE AMBITIOUS PLANS FORMULATED AT THE BRIONI MEETING IN EARLY SEPTEMBER, THE NNA APPEAR NO CLOSER TO TABLING A SERIES OF PAPERS AS A COMPREHENSIVE PACKAGE THAN THEY WERE AT THE END OF LAST ROUND. AT THE BRIONI MEETING, THE NNA DECIDED TO TABLE THEIR MEASURES EARLY IN THE ROUND AS A PACKAGE, RATHER THAN INDIVIDUALLY. HOWEVER, WHILE SOME OF THESE PAPERS ARE READY TO TABLE, E.G., ON OBSERVATION, SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES REMAIN ON OTHER MAJOR ISSUES. ON NUF, THE SWISS AND THE CYPRIOTS

FROM USDEL CDE

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TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE WEEKLY WRAP-UP, SEPTEMBER 10 - 17, 1985
ARE AT LOGGERHEADS OVER THE INCLUSION OF A REFERENCE TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUF COMMITMENT; YUGOSLAVIA, MOREOVER, INSISTS ON A REFERENCE TO TERRORISM IN A NUF TEXT. ON NOTIFICATION, THE NNA, WHILE REJECTING THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT, STILL ARE UNABLE TO AGREE ON REQUIRED DEFINITIONS FOR MANEUVERS, MOVEMENTS, ALERTS, ETC. ON VERIFICATION, THE NNA ARE STILL WRESTLING WITH THE
-
QUESTION OF HOW TO RECONCILE THE CONCEPTS OF CONSULTATIONS AND OBSERVATION ON REQUEST. SURPRISINGLY, THE NNA HAVE COME A LONG WAY ON AGREEING TO A CONSTRAINTS PROPOSAL TIED TO THE ANNUAL CALENDAR (SEE REF STOCKHOLM 957).
11. WHILE THE SWEDES, IN THEIR INIMITABLE POLLYANNA FASHION, CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT THE NNA PACKAGE WILL BE READY IN A COUPLE OF WEEKS, MOST OF THEIR COLLEAGUES ARE NOT AS SANGUINE. THUS, THE NNA NOW DEMONSTRATE MORE BRAVADO THAN BELIEF WHEN THEY ASSERT THAT A PACKAGE WILL WILL BE READY THIS ROUND. WE WOULD NOT TAKE THE BET AT EVEN ODDS. WHILE THE NNA TRY TO GET THEIR COLLECTIVE ACT TOGETHER, WE INTEND, IN OUR STATEMENTS AND OUR CONTACTS, TO TRY TO BRING THE NNA CLOSER TO OUR THINKING ON SUCH KEY CONCEPTS AS OUT-OF-GARRISON, THE STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD, AND ON-SITE INSPECTION.
GOODBY
END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07257
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF 16-20 SEPTEMBER 1985
REF: STOCKHOLM 7134
1. CDE VII - 021.
2. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT).
3. SUMMARY. DURING THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 16-20 THERE WERE: A MEETING OF WORKING GROUP AB; THREE MEETINGS OF WORKING GROUP A; AND TWO MEETINGS OF WORKING GROUP B. U.S. SPOKE IN WG/AB, IN WG/B (OBSERVATIONS), AND WG/A (POLITICAL). EAST AND WEST ACCUSED EACH OTHER OF NOT BEING CONSISTENT WITH THE MADRID CDE MANDATE AND EAST ADDITIONALLY ACCUSED THE WEST OF TABLING PROPOSALS THAT WOULD "VIOLATE" THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THE NNA WERE VIRTUALLY SILENT. MEETINGS WERE, ON THE WHOLE, BUSINESSLIKE, SUBSTANTIVE, BUT COVERED NO REAL NEW GROUND. END SUMMARY.
4. WORKING GROUP AB -- MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1985. IN AB STATEMENTS WERE MADE BY ITALY, POLAND, THE UK, U.S. AND USSR.
ITALY (AMBASSADOR CIARRAPICO) GAVE A GENERAL STATEMENT, URGING THE CONFERENCE TO ENTER THE DRAFTING PHASE.
POLAND (AMBASSADOR KONÁRSKI), PICKING UP ON THE ITALIAN STATEMENT, ALSO CALLED FOR A "PASSAGE TO DRAFTING" THROUGH AGREEMENT ON AN ACCEPTABLE INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE, AND STRESSED THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE (I.E. THIS SESSION).
UK (AMBASSADOR EDES) ARGUED THAT A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF PROPOSALS IS NEEDED BEFORE INTENSIFING AND ACCELERATING DISCUSSION. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE QUERIED THE EAST ON ITS NOTIFICATION OF LAND FORCES PROPOSAL, WGB-1, TO WIT:
-- HOW WOULD THEIR NUMERICAL THRESHOLDS BE VERIFIED?
-- WHAT IS THE LOWEST NUMERICAL LEVEL OF WTO GROUND FORCES IN JOINT MANEUVERS LIKELY TO BE NOTIFIED UNDER THEIR GROUND FORCE NOTIFICATION (WGB-1)?
-- IF GROUND ELEMENTS CANNOT BE FORECAST, WHAT IS THE RATIONALE FOR THE OVERALL FIGURE OF 20,000 IN WGB-1? ON WHAT BASIS WAS THE NUMERICAL FIGURE OF 20,000 CHOSEN?
-- IF THERE IS NOT PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE 20,000 FIGURE FOR GROUND FORCE NOTIFICATION, COULD THE SPONSORS OF WGB-1 EXPLAIN THEIR HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE OF JOINT MANEUVERS?
EDES CONTRASTED THE EAST'S PROPOSED IMPROVEMENT IN THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD AS "MINISCULE" COMPARED TO THE NATO'S SC.1'S STRUCTURAL PARAMETER APPROACH. THE OUT-OF-GARRISON APPROACH OF SC.1, HE SAID, AVOIDS QUESTIONS OF DEFINING TYPES OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES, SUCH AS THE "OUTDATED" DISTINCTION BETWEEN MANEUVERS AND MOVEMENTS.
U.S. (BLANK) EXPLAINED THE "OUT-OF-GARRISON" CONCEPT.

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THE SOVIET UNION (RAKHMANINOV) CHARGED THAT THE U.S. POSITION ON NON-USE OF FORCE, AS REFLECTED IN STATEMENTS BY THE U.S. DELEGATION, REPRESENTS "A STEP BACKWARDS FROM (PRESIDENT REAGAN'S) STRASBOURG SPEECH" AND "A BRAKE ON THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE." HE FURTHER CRITICIZED THE U.S. POSITION AS REPRESENTING AN EQUATION WITH ZERO ON ONE SIDE AND ALL OF THE NATO PROPOSALS ON THE OTHER. HE SAID THAT THE TIME IS RIPE TO CONCRETIZE THE NUF PRINCIPLE AS AN ACTIVE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL LIFE APPLICABLE TO EUROPE, SUPPORTED A NUF TREATY AND URGED THE CONFERENCE TO CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING IDEAS:

-- A BAN ON THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF FORCE IN ANY

FROM USDEL CDE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, CSCE, PREL, CDE
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF 16-20

FORM, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, MILITARY, POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC;

-- A PROVISION REGARDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES.

5. WORKING GROUP B: NOTIFICATIONS -- TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1985.

CANADA, FRG, BULGARIA, FRANCE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, UNITED KINGDOM, BELGIUM AND THE USSR SPOKE.

NATO SPEAKERS DEFENDED SC.1/AMPLIFIED PROPOSALS AND CRITICIZED WTO PROPOSALS FOR BEING INCONSISTENT WITH THE MADRID MANDATE AND NOT FAR-REACHING ENOUGH. IN ADDITION, CANADA (NAMIESNIOWSKI) SAID THAT WTO PROPOSALS (WGB.1-4) CREATE MORE PROBLEMS THAN THEY SOLVE (IN PROPOSING NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES OVER EUROPEAN TERRITORY).

FRG (WEIGEL) EFFECTIVELY DREW ON FACTS AND FIGURES TO DEMONSTRATE THE MINIMAL IMPACT THE WTO PROPOSED THRESHOLD WOULD HAVE ON THE NOTIFICATION REGIME AS PRACTICED SINCE 1975.

FOLLOWING UP ON AN EARLIER POLISH STATEMENT LAST ROUND FRANCE (MERIC) ASKED WHETHER THE EAST WAS SUGGESTING TWO TYPES OF NOTIFICATION, ONE FOR SMALL AND ONE FOR LARGE SCALE ACTIVITIES?

WTO SPEAKERS COLLECTIVELY SANG THE SAME TUNE ABOUT THEIR PROPOSALS, AND ALSO CONTENDED THAT NATO PROPOSALS ARE NOT IN KEEPING WITH THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, BECAUSE NUMERICAL PARAMETERS, AND THE CALL FOR NOTIFYING "MOVEMENTS" OR "MANEUVERS," ARE NOT MAINTAINED. FOR THE SECOND WEEK RUNNING SILENCE WAS THE ORDER OF THE DAY FOR THE NNA.

BULGARIA STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING THE FINAL ACT INTACT BY RETAINING THE DISTINCTIONS CONTAINED THEREIN, SUCH AS THE CALL FOR NUMERICAL PARAMETERS AND NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS AND MANEUVERS. HE SAID IT

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WAS UP TO THE PROPONENTS OF NEW IDEAS TO CONVINCE US OF THEIR ADVANTAGES. HE FAULTED THE OUT-OF-GARRISON APPROACH WHICH HE BELIEVES IS MORE CONCERNED WITH WHEN TROOPS LEAVE, RATHER THAN WHY.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA SAID THE WTO NUMERICAL PARAMETER PROPOSAL "IS SUFFICIENT TO DO WHAT IS EXPECTED." HE REJECTED AS UNACCEPTABLE THE ARGUMENT THAT BECAUSE OF DIFFERENT MANNING PRACTICES A WTO DIVISION MIGHT BE COMPARABLE TO NATO DIVISIONS CITING A NUMBER OF FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE COMBAT STRENGTH OF AN ORGANIZATION, E.G., MILITARY MATERIEL, TRAINING OF PERSONNEL, IF IT IS A REGULAR ARMY, THE QUALITY OF MATERIEL, RATES OF MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT OF WEAPONS, OPERATING CONDITIONS, QUALITY OF COMMAND AND STAFF ELEMENTS, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, AND PRINCIPLES OF MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE, HE ASSERTED, FOR THINGS WITH NO COMMON MEASURE TO BE USED AS A BASIS FOR COMPARISON.

IN FOLLOW-UP, UK (BACK) STATED THAT THE CZECH COMMENTS COULD BE AN ARGUMENT FOR, RATHER THAN AGAINST, THE STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD. THE NUMBERS ARE NOT THREATENING, WHAT MAKES UP THOSE NUMBERS IS -- INCLUDING THE ELEMENTS IDENTIFIED BY CZECHOSLOVAKIA. A DIVISION, A STRUCTURAL UNIT, POSES MORE OF A THREAT THAN NUMBERS ALONE.

BELGIUM (LE BLANC) REJECTED A BULGARIAN ASSERTION THAT THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT WAS AIMED SIMPLY AT DETERMINING THE FACT OF BEING OUT-OF-GARRISON. SC.1 IS INTERRELATED AND OTHER SECTIONS, SUCH AS THOSE ON OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION, PROVIDE THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE OUT-OF-GARRISON APPROACH.

FROM USDEL CDE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, CSCE, PREL, CDE

SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF 16-20

USSR (TATARNIKOV) ARGUED AGAIN FOR INCLUSION OF NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND SEA ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE, ASSERTING THAT IOWA TYPE VESSELS WITH CRUISE MISSILES THAT CAN FLY OVER EUROPEAN TERRITORY ARE PERHAPS EVEN MORE DANGEROUS THAN TEN DIVISIONS OUT-OF-GARRISON. HE RESPONDED TO UK'S (EDES) 9/16 QUESTION ON WHAT THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF A JOINT MANEUVER AT A LEVEL OF 20,000 MIGHT BE: A SCENARIO MIGHT INCLUDE 13-15,000 LAND FORCES, 1,000 ARMY AIR FORCE, AND MAYBE 2-3,000 AMPHIBIOUS TROOPS, DEPENDING ON THE LOCATION. THE NOTIFICATION WOULD CONTAIN ALL INFORMATION AND SHOW COMPONENTS OF FORCES PARTICIPATING IN THE MANEUVER. IF ONLY 6,000 LAND FORCES WERE PARTICIPATING, IT WOULDN'T BE A LAND FORCE MANEUVER, BUT SOMETHING ELSE. THE PARAMETER OF 20,000 WAS CHOSEN, HE SAID, AS IT IS THE

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NUMBER OF MEN THAT PROVIDES THE OPTIMUM SELECTION OF VARIOUS COMPONENTS WHICH ALLOW CONDUCT OF A MILITARY ACTIVITY. A PRESENT DAY MILITARY TANK DIVISION IS NOT AN ENTIRELY VIABLE UNIT ALONE TO CARRY OUT A MILITARY ACTIVITY. IT NEEDS BACKUPS SUCH AS ENGINEERS, ARMY AVIATION, ARMY AIR FORCE, AND ARTILLERY AND IF YOU COUNT IT ALL UP, ITS ABOUT 20,000 MEN. IT REPRESENTS A CONGLOMERATE OF MILITARY COMPONENTS WHICH IS DANGEROUS AND REPRESENTS A THREAT.

6. WORKING GROUP A: POLITICAL ISSUES -- TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1985.

THE U.S., USSR, CYPRUS, DENMARK, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, ROMANIA, AND THE GDR SPOKE, FOCUSING PRIMARILY ON NON-USE OF FORCE.

U.S. (GUNDERSEN, SEE REFTEL) REBUTTED SOVIET ALLEGATIONS (WORKING GROUP AB, SEPTEMBER 16) THAT THE U.S. POSITION IN STOCKHOLM IS A STEP BACKWARD FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STRASBOURG SPEECH. IN "PRELIMINARY" RESPONSE, USSR (RAKHMANINOV) SAID THAT THE U.S. STATEMENT DID NOT ALLAY ITS CONCERNS AND IF THE U.S. CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL (SC.6) UNDERMINES THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE, THEN THE SOVIET UNION IS LEFT WITH THE NATO CSBM PACKAGE ON THE ONE HAND, AND NOTHING ON THE OTHER. U.S. (GUNDERSEN) RESPONDED TO "PRELIMINARY" SOVIET COMMENTS BY NOTING THAT THE U.S. HAD COMMENTED EXPANSIVELY ON NUF WHILE THE SOVIETS HAD NOT EXPRESSED THE SUBSTANCE OF SUCH KEY QUESTIONS AS EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION (INSPECTION). WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS A PROPOSAL, E.G., SC.6, DOES NOT, HOWEVER, MEAN ACCEPTANCE OF SAID PROPOSAL; EACH PROPOSAL SHOULD BE JUDGED BY ITS MERITS AND ITS CONSISTENCY WITH THE MADRID MANDATE. CYPRUS (PAPADOPOULOS) REITERATED ITS POSITION, I.E. THE NUF PRINCIPLE SHOULD BE ELABORATED AND GIVEN A "EUROPEAN DIMENSION" AND ARGUING ON LEGAL GROUNDS, DENMARK (ROSENTHAL) QUESTIONED THE WTO (SC.6) PHRASE THAT A NUF TREATY WOULD BE "BINDING TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT." CONCRETE CSBM'S CANNOT BE LESS POLITICALLY BINDING THAN A NUF TEXT, HE STATED. CZECHOSLOVAKIA (BUCHLOVSKY) CONTENDED THAT AGREEMENT HAS ALREADY BEEN REACHED ON THE NEED TO REACH A NUF AGREEMENT. ROMANIA (BUHOARA) REITERATED ITS NUF POSITION, AND GDR (GEORGI), OUT OF SYNC WITH THE OTHER SPEAKERS, CALLED FOR COMMON LANGUAGE REGARDING THE NEED, URGENCY AND FEASIBILITY OF CREATING NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES IN EUROPE.

7. WORKING GROUP A: INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, COMMUNICATION -- WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18.

STATEMENTS MADE BY THE UK ON INFORMATION, AND THE USSR ON INFORMATION AND THE NEED TO WORK WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, ELICITED COMMENTS FROM ITALY, THE FRG, TURKEY AND BULGARIA.

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UK (FREEMAN) STATED THAT THE DEGREE TO WHICH WE AGREE TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION AND PROVIDE FOR VERIFICATION FROM USDEL CDE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, CSCE, PREL, CDE
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF 16-20 WILL DETERMINE THE VALUE AND THE QUALITY OF THE MEASURES AND THE ACCEPTABLITY OR UNACCEPTABILITY OF THAT SET OF MEASURES. THE RISK OF MISCALCULATION AND THE DANGER OF SURPRISE ATTACK IN EUROPE WILL BE DIMINISHED IN DIRECT PROPORTION TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH KNOWLEDGE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY IN EUROPE IS MADE GENERALLY AVAILABLE. NATO'S PROPOSALS, WHICH CALL FOR A PARTIAL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION RELATED DIRECTLY TO REQUIREMENTS OF THE CSCE REGIME AS A WHOLE, ARE BALANCED. THEY WOULD MAXIMIZE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION TO ENABLE US TO AGREE ON A SET OF QUALITATIVELY NEW CSBMS WHILE NOT UNDERMINING LEGITIMATE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN EACH PARTICIPATING STATE.
USSR (ROZANOV) SAID THE USSR FAVORS EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF AGREED CSBMS. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WTO PROPOSALS WOULD PROVIDE FOR SUCH AN INCREASED EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION INCLUDING, FOR EXAMPLE, ON INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. ROZANOV CAUTIONED AGAINST "VIOLATING" THE CODE OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THE APPLICATION OF STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS WOULD "CUT ACROSS THE LOGIC AND LETTER" OF THE FINAL ACT, INASMUCH AS THE FA CALLS FOR NUMERICAL PARAMETERS. WHILE WE CAN DISCUSS SUPPLEMENTING THE NUMERICAL APPROACH WITH THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH, HE SAID, WE CANNOT DISCUSS SUBSTITUTING ONE FOR THE OTHER. THE CONCEPT OF OUT-OF-GARRISON DOES NOT ENCOMPASS THE CONCEPT OF TRANSFERS AND MOVEMENTS AS OUTLINED IN THE FINAL ACT. WHILE THE USSR IS NOT OPPOSED TO DISCUSSING THE TERM "OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITIES", THIS NEW TERM "ELIMINATES THE LOGICAL MATTERS ENSHRINED IN THE FINAL ACT." ROZANOV SAID THAT THE FINAL ACT CONCEPTS CAN EXIST SIDE BY SIDE WITH THE NEW CONCEPTS, AND WHILE THE USSR CAN CONSIDER OUT-OF-GARRISON ALONG WITH MOVEMENTS, SUBSTITUTING ONE FOR THE OTHER IS TANTAMOUNT TO CHANGING THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FINAL ACT. UK AND FRG BOTH ARGUED THAT NATO PROPOSALS WERE DESIGNED TO BUILD ON THE FINAL ACT IN KEEPING WITH THE MADRID MANDATE.
8. WORKING GROUP B: OBSERVATIONS -- SEPTEMBER 19, 1985.
REPRESENTATIVES OF ITALY, SWEDEN, DENMARK, U.S., USSR, ITALY, NETHERLANDS, TURKEY, YUGOSLAVIA, AND THE FRG SPOKE. OF NOTE WAS THE USSR EXPLANATION OF THE OBSERVATION REGIME FOR THE "KAVKAZ 85" EXERCISE, WHICH ELICITED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS.

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ITALY (DI GIOVANNI) STRESSED THE NEED FOR MANDATORY OBSERVATION AND TOOK ISSUE WITH WTO CONTENTIONS THAT AN OBSERVATION REGIME CANNOT BE DISCUSSED UNTIL THE ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED HAVE BEEN DETERMINED. SWEDEN (JOHANSSON) REITERATED SUPPORT "IN PRINCIPLE" FOR OBSERVATION OF ALL NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES. EXCEPTIONS MUST BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED AND IN SWEDEN'S VIEW THE MOBILIZATION PHASE OF AN ACTIVITY SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO OBSERVATION. "OBSERVATION BY CHALLENGE" WOULD NOT BE A ROUTINE PRACTICE TO ASCERTAIN DAY-TO-DAY COMPLIANCE WITH NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES, BUT RATHER A REQUEST MADE BY A STATE WHICH HAD INDICATION OF A GRAVE BREACH OF AN AGREEMENT. SWEDEN FAVORS A COMBINATION OF STRUCTURAL AND NUMERICAL PARAMETERS BECAUSE IT BELIEVES THAT THEY WILL SERVE THE PURPOSE OF VERIFICATION BETTER THAN PLAIN NUMERICAL ONES.
DENMARK (HOWARD) SUPPORTED THE MANDATORY OBSERVATION OF ALL NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES. IT CAN BE ARGUED, HE SAID, THAT A MAJOR NAVAL BUILDUP IN ONE AREA COULD BE INTERPRETED AS AFFECTING THE SECURITY OF EUROPE, BUT IT IS NOT IN THE MANDATE. WE MIGHT, HOWEVER, AGREE THAT OBSERVERS CAN BE INVITED TO ALL NOTIFIED LAND ACTIVITIES. HE PROPOSED FOLLOWING THE IRISH SUGGESTION TO DEVELOP A STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE FOR OBSERVERS.
FROM USDEL CDE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, CSCE, PREL, CDE
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF 16-20
U.S. (BLANK) STATED THAT THE SC.1 OBSERVATION PROPOSAL WAS NOT DESIGNED TO COMPLICATE AND CAUSE UNDUE DISRUPTION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES. EVEN IF OBSERVERS CANNOT SEE EVERY ASPECT OF THE EXERCISE, THE MORE THEY SEE, THE MORE IT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO CONFIDENCE. THE HOST COUNTRY SHOULD FACILITATE THE OBSERVER'S TASK BY PROVIDING AN OVERVIEW BRIEFING, COMPLEMENTED BY PERIODIC UPDATES OR SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEFINGS, AND THE PROVISION OF MAPS OR "TIME-LINES" WOULD ALSO HELP. THERE IS NO PRICE TAG UPON IMPROVING UPON THE HELSINKI REGIME, HE SAID.
USSR REP (SOLOMENKO), ASSISTED OBSERVERS AT THE "KAVKAZ 85" EXERCISE IN THE TRANSCAUCASUS, AND GAVE A DETAILED EXPLANATION OF THE OBSERVER REGIME AT THAT EXERCISE. HE OBSERVED THAT INITIAL COMMENTS FROM NATO PARTICIPANTS (ITALY, TURKEY AND GREECE) WERE POSITIVE. HE THEN CONTENDED THAT NATO SEEMED TO CONFUSE OBSERVATION WITH VERIFICATION. OBSERVATION, HE NOTED, IS NOT VERIFICATION AND ATTEMPTS TO TRANSFORM THE ROLE OF OBSERVERS INTO THAT OF "INSPECTORS" OR "VERIFIERS" IS UNACCEPTABLE. USSR STATEMENT ELCITED A NUMBER OF COMMENTS. FRANCE (MERIC) AGREED THAT OBSERVATION IS NOT INSPECTION, AND NOTED THAT THE TWO ISSUES WERE

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DEALT WITH SEPARATELY IN THE NATO PACKAGE. BUT NATO HAS PROVIDED FOR INSPECTION/VERIFICATION ELSEWHERE, WHICH THE WTO HAS NOT. WITH REGARD TO THE KAVKAZ EXERCISE, HE ASKED IF OBSERVERS WITNESSED TROOPS LEAVING FOR THEIR PEACETIME LOCATIONS AFTER THE ACTIVITY WAS FINISHED. ITALY (DI GIOVANNI) SAID THAT WHILE ITALY WAS IMPRESSED BY THE OBSERVATION REGIME AT "KAVKAZ 85" THERE IS ALWAYS ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT. IT APPEARED, FOR INSTANCE, ONLY 1/4 OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF TROOPS INVOLVED IN THE EXERCISE WERE OBSERVED DURING THE ACTIVITIES. ALSO, HE NOTED, THE TOTAL TIME OF OBSERVATION OVER A PERIOD OF SEVERAL DAYS WAS ONLY FIVE HOURS AND TWO MINUTES. TURKEY (BOLUKBASI) SAID TURKEY WILL CONSIDER THE USSR REMARKS, COMPARE THEM TO THEIR OWN EXPERIENCE AS OBSERVERS AT THE EXERCISE, AND OFFER SOME IDEAS TAKING THE KAVKAZ EXERCISE AS A MODEL ON HOW AN OBSERVATION REGIME COULD BE IMPROVED USING THE SC.1 PROPOSALS. FRG REP ALSO RAISED A SERIES OF QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE KAVKAZ ACTIVITY.

9. WORKING GROUP A: CONSTRAINTS/ANNUAL FORECASTS -- SEPTEMBER 19, 1985.

DENMARK, POLAND, THE NETHERLANDS, SWITZERLAND, AND THE USSR SPOKE.

DENMARK (ROSENTHAL) TOOK ISSUE WITH THE EARLIER BULGARIAN INTERPRETATION OF THE DANISH OPENING PLENARY STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT DENMARK WAS READY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE START OF DISCUSSIONS REGARDING CONSTRAINTS. DENMARK BELIEVES THAT SUCH MEASURES MUST CORRESPOND TO THE MADRID MANDATE IN TERMS OF BALANCE, RECIPROCITY AND EQUAL RESPECT FOR THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS. WHILE CEILINGS ON THE SCALE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES ARE THE MOST TYPICAL TYPE OF CONSTRAINT BEING PROPOSED, HE SAID, IT DOES NOT NECESSARILY FOLLOW THAT A CEILING IS THE TYPE OF CONSTRAINT MEASURE WHICH IS MOST NEEDED.

ROSENTHAL NOTED THAT SOME HAVE SAID THAT NATO EXERCISES, ESPECIALLY AUTUMN FORGE, ARE SO LARGE THAT THEY COULD SERVE AS A BUILD-UP FOR SURPRISE ATTACK AND, THUS, EVOKE WARSAW PACT ANXIETY. THEY CONCLUDE THAT THE SIZE OF THESE EXERCISES SHOULD BE LIMITED TO A LEVEL WHERE THEY COULD NOT CAUSE ANXIETY. WP COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN INVITED REPEATEDLY TO SEND OBSERVERS TO THESE EXERCISES AND HAVE REPEATEDLY REFUSED; DENMARK CONCLUDED THAT THIS INDICATES THAT THE WP KNOWS THAT AUTUMN FORGE EXERCISES AND OTHERS WILL NEVER BE USED AS A COVER FOR SURPRISE ATTACK PREPARATIONS. IF THESE EXERCISES ARE NOT THREATENING, THE ARGUMENT FOR A

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CEILING ON SIZE IS NOT VALID. HOSTILITIES MAY ORIGINATE IN OTHER WAYS, HOWEVER, BY MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISCALCULATION WHICH, DEVELOPING AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF A SERIOUS POLITICAL CRISIS, COULD RESULT IN "ENTANGLEMENTS" WHERE NO ONE COULD BACK AWAY FROM MILITARY CONFRONTATION. THIS IS A MORE SERIOUS RISK THAN THAT OF SURPRISE ATTACK. TO AVOID THIS KIND OF A SITUATION, THE HIGHEST PRIORITY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE SC.1 PHILOSOPHY OF OPENNESS, STATIC INFORMATION, ANNUAL FORECASTS, NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION, VERIFICATION AND COMMUNICATIONS.

WITH REGARD TO POSSIBLE ARGUMENTS THAT A LARGE-SCALE EXERCISE COULD, ITSELF, CONTRIBUTE TO A CRISIS, HE SAID SUCH REASONING IS PUTTING THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE. SERIOUS CRISES ARISE OUT OF OBJECTIVE POLITICAL CONTRADICTIONS, NOT OUT OF CONTINGENT PHENOMENA SUCH AS PRE-PLANNED MILITARY ACTIVITIES. EXERCISES THAT MIGHT BE CONSIDERED THREATENING SHOULD BE OBSERVED, OR INSPECTED. A FAR-REACHING SYSTEM OF OBSERVATION COUPLED WITH ON-SITE INSPECTION COULD BE USED FOR OBTAINING A CLEAR PICTURE OF THE NON-THREATENING CHARACTER OF THESE EXERCISES.

POLAND (STANIEWISKI) SAID THAT THE WTO CEILING PROPOSAL SEEKS WAYS TO INCREASE THE SECURITY OF STATES BY LIMITING THE SCALE OF "EVERGROWING" EXERCISES IN EUROPE; THIS CANNOT BE SEEN AS AN ATTEMPT TO IMPAIR ANYONE'S SECURITY INTERESTS. THE WTO CEILING WOULD NOT LIMIT THE STATES' FREEDOM TO CHOSE THE COMPONENTS OF THOSE FORCES PARTICIPATING IN EXERCISES, INCLUDING THE TRANSFER OF FORCES FROM OUTSIDE ZONE, NOR WOULD IT LIMIT THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATIONS.

HE REJECTED NATO STATEMENTS THAT SC.1'S MEASURE TWO IS A CONSTRAINT; IT SIMPLY LENGTHENS THE PERIOD OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION TO ALMOST A YEAR FOR MANEUVERS.

NETHERLANDS (VAN DER GRAAF) CRITICIZED THE WARSAW PACT'S 40,000 TROOP CEILING ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS:

-- OVER THE PAST 10 YEARS THE WARSAW PACT HAS NOTIFIED ONLY 6 MANEUVERS OVER 40,000 WHILE NATO HAS NOTIFIED 24; THEREFORE, THE WARSAW PACT CEILING VIOLATES THE MANDATE'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUAL RESPECT FOR THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL, FOR BALANCE AND RECIPROCITY;

-- IT DEPARTS FROM THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT WHICH NATO CONSIDERS TO BE A KEY ELEMENT OF ANY CDE AGREEMENT;

-- IT WOULD POSE VERIFICATION PROBLEMS SINCE IT IS BASED ON A NUMERICAL, NOT STRUCTURAL, PARAMETER; ADEQUATE VERIFICATION WOULD HAVE TO BE MORE INTRUSIVE THAN SC.1'S MEASURE FIVE (ON-SITE INSPECTIONS);

SWITZERLAND (SCHARLI), TAKING UP THE POLISH MILREP'S REFERENCE TO STATES BEING FREE TO CHOOSE THE COMPONENTS OF FORCES CONDUCTING MILITARY TRAINING EXERCISES, NOTED THAT TRAINING TODAY MUST ENSURE THAT TROOPS ARE CAPABLE

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OF USING THE ENTIRE ARSENAL AT THEIR DISPOSAL. GIVEN THE NEED FOR DIVISIONS -- NOT COMPONENTS WHICH HAVE NO CAPABILITY FOR CONDUCTING UNIFIED BATTLE -- TO BE ABLE TO CONDUCT A BATTLE IN A STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT AREA, IT IS NECESSARY TO DEVISE A PARAMETER FOR A CEILING WHICH WOULD ALLOW FOR MORE THAN ONE ARMY CORPS TO PARTICIPATE IN ONE SET OF MANEUVERS. THIS WOULD BE GREATER THAN 40,000 IN SWITZERLAND'S CASE.
USSR (TATARNIKOV) PRESENTED A LONG, RAMBLING DENUNCIATION OF LARGE-SCALE NATO MANEUVERS. HE ASSERTED THAT THERE IS A BALANCE IN FORCES IN EUROPE AND DISMISSED NATO CLAIMS THAT GEOGRAPHICAL ASYMMETRY IMPOSES THE NEED FOR LARGER EXERCISES; HE ARGUED THAT IF THERE IS ANY IMBALANCE IT IS IN NATO'S FAVOR (LARGER POPULATION, GREATER MILITARY AND ECONOMIC POTENTIAL, SUPERIOR AVAILABILITY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND
FROM USDEL CDE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, CSCE, PREL, CDE
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TRANSPORTATION). TATARNIKOV QUOTED SCHLESINGER AS HAVING SAID THAT, USING AN AIR BRIDGE, THE U.S. COULD TRANSFER TROOPS TO EUROPE MORE RAPIDLY THAN THE SOVIET UNION COULD "IN SOME INSTANCES." HE ALSO QUOTED A STATEMENT BY GENERAL ROGERS IN A 1971 (SIC) NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE SAYING THAT GEOGRAPHICAL FACTORS ARE NOT IMPORTANT IN ENSURING STATES' SECURITY. REJECTING THE NATO CLAIM THAT LARGE EXERCISES ARE CONDUCTED FOR TRAINING PURPOSES, HE SAID THEIR MAIN AIM WAS A "SHOW OF FORCE" AND THAT THIS FORCED THE OTHER SIDE TO TAKE COUNTERMEASURES.
HANSEN
END OF MESSAGE

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Romanian Delegation SECRET September 17,1985
Working Group A

Mr.Chairman,

On several occasions, including in its intervention on the 12 March and 25 June, as well as in the Aide-Mémoire circulated at the beginning of the last session, the Romanian Delegation outlined a number of tentative ideas which could serve to the reaffirmation and the development of the principle of non-use or threat of force, in a declaration, as an integral part of the agreement to be reached at the Stockholm Conference.

Today we would like to briefly underline some of these ideas.

Mr.Chairman,

First of all, the Romanian Delegation considers that the reaffirmation and the strengthening of the obligation to refrain from threat or use of force should be done in conformity with the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, to which all States represented around this table have subscribed.

In the opinion of the Romanian Delegation this implies, inter alia, that the reaffirmation and the development of this basic principle provides for:

-the obligation of non-use of force as well as of the threat of force, both components being extremely important for the strengthening of the confidence and security in Europe and of direct relevance for the CSBMs to be agreed upon to this effect;

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-the respect of this principle in the mutual relations of the participating States as well as in their international relations in general;

-the concrete and substantial content of this principle and not its mere reaffirmation in general and declaratory terms or the selection of some of its components.

Besides the relevant proisions contained in the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the "Declaration on the fundamental principles of international law concerning the friendly relations and the cooperation among States in conformity with the UN Charter", which constitute what one could name the "common ground", in the process of working-out the proposed declaration it should also be used to the maximum possible extend the ideas contained in the proposals put forward at our Conference , as well as in the discussions which have taken place on this subject. In particular we have in mind a number of ideas which, in a form or another, are contained in the working documents SC/2, SC/3,SC/4 and SC/6.

Secondly, as far as the content of the proposed declaration is concerned we think that, taking into consideration the paramount importance of this principle, its simple restatement in general terms would not respond even to the most modest requirements in this field.

In the opinion of the Romanian Delegation, in order "to give expression" to this obligation- as requested by the Mandate of the Conference- it is also necessary to specify in the document the concrete acts of manifestation of force or threat of force from which, according to this principle, the participating States are obliged to refrain. Concrete provisions in this respect are to be found especially in the content of the principle concerning

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"Refraining from the threat or use of force " and in the section "Matters related to giving effect to certain of the above principles" from the Helsinki Final Act.

We would like to mention, for instance, some of these concrete acts which the participating States should refrain from, in order to respect the obligation not to use or threat of force.

-any acts constituting a threat of force or direct or indirect use of force against another participating States;

-any manifestation of force for the purpose inducing another participating State to renounce the full exercise of its soverreign rights;

-any act of reprisal of force;

-any use of armed forces inconsistent with the purpose and principles of the UN Charter and the Declaration of Principles containe in the Final Act, in particular from invasion of or attack on its teritory;

-any threat or use of force as a means of settling disputes, or questions likely to give rise to disputes;

-any action which might aggravate the situation to such a degree as to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and there by make a paceful settlement of dispute more difficult;

-any action which could hinder the peaceful settlement of disputes between the participating States;

-propaganda for wars of aggression or for any threat or use of force inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations and with the "Declaration on Principles" contained in the Final Act, against another participating State.

The Romanian Delegation considers that in the declaration should also be embodied the positive actions to which,

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in conformity with the principle of the non-use of force, the participating States have to contribute.

For exemple, we would like to mention some such positive actions, as contained in the Final Act:

-to take effective measures which by their scope and by their nature constitute steps towards the ultimate achivement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control;

-to promote, by all means, which each of them considers appropriate, a climate of confidence and respect among peoples;

-to make every efforts to settle exclusively by peaceful means any dispute between them;

At the same time,in the opinion of the Romanian Delegation, besides the reaffirmation and the strengthening of the elements contained in the international documents already mentioned , it would also be important that the Stockholm Conference makes a step forward, by inshrining other concrete provisions of paramount importance for enhacing confidence and security in Europe.-

The Romanian Delegation has already presented several ideas which, by their very nature, would not rise particular problems. Among such ideas we would mention:

-the cooperation of the participating States in the concret implementation of the measures of confidence and security to be agreed upon, for the prevention, clarification and peaceful settlement of any issue or situation of crises which might appear;

-the display of the greatest moderation and selfrestraint in crisis situations in order to prevent the escalation of such critical moments into an armed conflict;

-refraining, especially in crisis situations, from military

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activities which engender the risk of a surprise attack and working-out practical measures to this aim;

-the cooperation of States for reducing the risk of an armed conflict in Europe, by miscalculation or accident;

Mr.Chairman,

Finaly, as it is outlined in the Romanian Aide-Mémoire, at the same time the future agreement should contain substantial and balaced concrete CSBMs which would "give effect" to the undertaking of participating States to refrain from use or threat of force and to their obligations which derive from this fundamental principle.

As the Romanian Delegation has stated at the previous round, we hope that during the curent session all delegations will make more concrete their points of view as to how they conceive the content of the reaffirmation and development of this principle, which ideas should be included in the document in order to be able to procede in this field, as well as in the others, to the following stage of our work, the draffing stage.

The Romanian Delegation is ready to continue to bring its contribution to this commun endeavour.

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Thank you Mr Chairman,

Mr Chairman,

In the course of the active discussion on the question of the invitation of observers which went on in this working group in the last session,a variety of approaches were expressed to the implementation of this classic Helsinki Confidence Building measure in the future,after the Stockholm Conference adopted new CSBMs. Our delegation has already aduced approximate scenarios in order to illustrate the presence of observers in military manoeuvres and has described the possible procedures for the work undertaken at those manoeuvres. In order to give you some illustrations of these scenarios we would like to tell you something about the practice of receiving foreign observers in accordance with the Final Act as it took place in a recent exercise in the transcaucasian military district known as Caucasus '85. As was known from notifications and from Press reports the manoeuvre of forces in the transcaucasus military district which was known as Caucasus '85 took place in the period from 15 to 21 July this year. The total number of troops involved in this manoeuvre was about 25,000 men. The area in which the manoeuvre took place was part of the territory of the Georgian and ~~Asabagani~~ Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic which of course is in this region of Transcaucasus. In accordance with the provision of the Final Act the Soviet side on the 24th June sent appropriate notifications to the states' participants in the CSCE process. The invitations were sent to observers from Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy, Spain, Cyprus, Malta, Portugal and Turkey. Spain,Cyprus, Malta and Portugal did not send observers for various reasons. The total number of foreign

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observers at the manoeuvre then was 19. Although the manoeuvre took place in the Transcaucasus, that is to say the Non- European part of the Soviet territory,the States invited,in addition to the States of the Warsaw Treaty, also included States from a fairly extensive region of Southern and South Eastern Europe. The programme for the stay of the foreign observers in the USSR including the days of their arrival and departure were scheduled for the period from 16 to 22 July, that is to say throughout almost the whole period of the manoeuvre. The observers were present in the area of the manoeuvre, and were able to observe the actions of the forces throughout the entire active phase of the manoeuvre. It so happens that I was present at that manoeuvre together with the observers and I was able to follow the actions of the forces to be present with the observers,to observe what they saw,and to hear what the foreign observers heard. I think it would be useful if I were to share with my distinguished colleagues/some of my impressions and experiences with the hosting,the receiving of observers at this particular manoeuvre. From Moscow,where the observers first arrived,they were flown to the South to the area of the manoeuvre. After that they moved around in busses throughout the whole period of the manoeuvre. On the first day the observers arrived at the manoeuvre they were introduced to the officers commanding the manoeuvre/headed by the Commanding Officer of the District who aquainted the observers of the aims and intentions of the manoeuvre Caucasus '85. Informed them of the programme for their stay, for their prescence at the manoeuvre, introduced the other Generals and the officers who were part of the staff commanding the manoeuvre. On that same day, the invited observers had an opportunity to view the area of the company defence strong point and its main elements and to talk to

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the men. After that the observers followed the actions by the forces,by the troops in the course of which the Western forces consisting of motorised rifle and tank regiments effected a break through in the forward defence area of the Eastern forces and carried the battle deep into the defence. Since the attack was carried on with the support of aviation forces, the observers had an opportunity to see the activity of fighters, fighter bombers, and supporting helicopter gun ships in carrying out their missions in the course of the attack. The observers were given the opportunity to observe a broad panorama of activities of the forces in the main types of combat. Among other things they were able to observe in detail the second echelon of the Western forces going into combat, the counter attack by the Eastern forces and also actions in the course of the attack by formations and units in the Western rear.In the days following the observers proceding to a new observation area having been briefed and acquainted with the outline of the combat activities in the combat area, had an opportunity to follow the further course of the manoeuvre. In particular they observed the defence of a mountain pass,the actions of a flanking detachment, consisting of motorised infantry battalion,/the landing of airborne troops, the actions of units in the mountains, and at the same time the action of aviation supporting both sides. In the course of this exercise they carried on visual observation of the actions of the fighters, fighter bombers and helicopter gun ships and their interaction with the ground forces. In the course of the action at the manoeuvre the observers in each fresh area of observation were able to follow what was going on, to follow the actions of the Eastern forces/ in defending a river barrier.In the Western forces, air dropping men from helicopters in order to cease the bridge-head, the forced crossing of a water-barrier,

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with /the Western forces of the placing of pontoons, the crossing of the river barrier, was effective simultaneously in a number of different places by bridge, by water-crossing of motorised infantry ~~xxxxx~~ combat vehicles, and tank units which went along the bottom of the river. All this took place in the plain view of the observers. The same day, on /instruction of the commander of the manoeuvre, the active combat activities came to a close. On the 21st July the forces were returned to their permanent locations. Thus the foreign observers had an opportunity to observe all the main ~~xxxxx~~ and most important actions of the forces in the discharge of their ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ tasks. The opportunity given to the observers continuously to update their awareness of the situation, to have contacts with the commanding officer of the district who was also the commander of the manoeuvre as well other participants in the manoeuvre and the information which they received, that is to say that the observers received at their daily briefings, as well as their conversations the talks and/replies they received to their questions. All of this enabled the observers to judge/themselves for the non-threatening character of this typical district manoeuvre and gave them an opportunity to assess the approximate scale/of the and level manoeuvre. In the course of the conversations which I had with the representatives of Italy, Turkey and Greece who were present at the manoeuvre, those representatives, those observers expressed a positive appraisal of the programme for their stay during the manoeuvres which was laid on for them. They all declared that they were able to form a sufficiently full and objective idea of the course of the manoeuvre/to convince themselves that it was indeed and non-threatening/ Perhaps the most important question concerning in nature the activity of observers both of land forces and of other types of armed forces and which was of interest to me in the course of this particular manoeuvre was the question what can an observer

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see in the course of the manoeuvre to which he has been invited? The statements by a number of representatives of countries that have sponsored document SC1 at earlier sessions and indeed the initial statements by the representatives of this group of countries at this present session have shown that some of them continue to confuse the concepts of observation and verification. The Final Act does indeed include a confidence building measure the exchange of observers. We are concerned here with the development of that measure not with transforming it into a measure of verification. The observers task if it is to be considered in terms of the Final Act, or as defined in the Final Act includes determining whether or not the character which they are witnessing is or is not threatening. And for that you do not need, you don't absolutely have to have the observers at the garrison gates in order to verify which units, which formations are coming out to engage in the manoeuvre as indicated in the notification. Nor do they need to travel all over the area of the manoeuvres in order to see what particular activities are going on in this or that place. Since to the extent that a manoeuvre is a complex and dynamic process simultaneously involving many hundreds of thousands of people as well as large quantities of military material. Observers of course are not in a position to observe everything that goes on and all the missions that are accomplished in the course of the manoeuvre. The Caucasus '85 manoeuvre although took place in very fine weather, nevertheless was on such a scale and involved also aviation of various sorts so that it was virtually impossible to take the observers up in helicopters because this would have interfered with the work of the aviation participating in the manoeuvre. The organisers of the manoeuvre, the representatives of the inviting State managed to ensure that the foreign observers could see the main

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stages of the manoeuvre, that they could understand it and convince themselves of its genuine nature. In inviting observers we did everything we possibly could to enable them to carry out the task which was designed for them by the Final Act. In our working group we have more than once had examples aduced of the invitation of observers to manoeuvres in various States. There is no question that the experience which has been accumulated in this regard will facilitate our quest for mutually acceptable provisions which will determine this measure in future. I should think that success will be possible here if we carefully observe the fundamental principles which are supposed to govern the elaboration of confidence and security building measures. First and foremost the principle of no detriment to the security of the States issuing the invitations to observers. In the statements made today by representatives of those countries that have sponsored SC1 we have seen that as in the past voices are raised calling for considering only those aspects of the duties of observers that are proposed by SC1, that is to say that they should observe only land activities and ground activities although it's clear from the various explanations given amplifying SC1 that both observers are to be not so much observers as to be inspectors of military manoeuvres, that intention is still invisible. There is no question that the transformation of the practice of observers of observation into verification cannot be regarded as acceptable.

Thank you Mr Chairman

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07213
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUSES, SEPTEMBER 17-20, 1985
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 7077, B) STOCKHOLM 7076
1. CDE VII - 018
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
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3. BEGIN SUMMARY. FOR FOUR DAYS NATO CAUCUS DISCUSSION THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 17-20 CENTERED ON GRINEVSKY'S PROPOSAL ON INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE (REF A) AS OUTLINED IN A NON-PAPER AMBASSADOR GOODBY PREPARED FOR THE CAUCUS AND DISTRIBUTED ON SEPTEMBER 17 (REF B). HE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT IT HAD NO OFFICIAL STATUS AND THAT IF THE CAUCUS DID NOT LIKE THE APPROACH, THE PAPER COULD BE SCRAPPED. THROUGHOUT FIVE DAYS OF DISCUSSION DELEGATION POSITIONS REMAINED GENERALLY CONSISTENT. THE NETHERLANDS, CANADA, FRG, ITALY AND NORWAY, WERE MOST ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE PROPOSAL AND PUSHED FOR EARLY CAUCUS ACTION TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING, OR AS DELWORTH (CANADA) PUT IT, "WE SHOULD TAKE THIS DEAL AND RUN." THESE SAME COUNTRIES WERE ALSO THE MOST EAGER TO GET TO DRAFTING QUICKLY AND WANTED A SINGLE ARRANGEMENT NOW TO COVER BOTH THE EXPLORATORY AND DRAFTING PHASES. THE UK AND PORTUGAL TOOK A MORE CAUTIOUS APPROACH. PORTUGAL STRESSED GRINEVSKY'S CLEAR DESIRE TO REACH A QUICK AGREEMENT AND SUGGESTED THAT A LITTLE FOOT-DRAGGING MAY YIELD A RESULT MORE TO OUR LIKING. EDES (UK) SUMMED UP THE VERY CAUTIOUS BRITISH POSITION, STATING THAT LONDON ALSO WANTED TO MOVE THINGS ALONG BUT IS CONCERNED THAT "HOW WE DO IT DOES NOT PREJUDICE THE ALLIED POSITION OR PACKAGE." THE CAUCUS THEN WENT INTO AN EXTENDED DISCUSSION ON WHETHER TO ACCEPT CLUSTER DESCRIPTIONS AS PROPOSED BY GRINEVSKY AND REFLECTED IN THE NON-PAPER DISTRIBUTED BY AMBASSADOR GOODBY. END SUMMARY.
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4. SEPTEMBER 17 NATO CAUCUS CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF GRINEVSKY PROPOSAL ON WORKING STRUCTURE REPORTED REF A. AT THE REQUEST OF SEVERAL DELEGATIONS, AMBASSADOR GOODBY HAD PUT DOWN THE MAIN POINTS OF GRINEVSKY'S PROPOSAL IN A NON-PAPER WHICH HE DISTRIBUTED TO THE CAUCUS (TEXT REF B). GOODBY STRESSED THAT THE PAPER WAS SECRET, SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED OUTSIDE THE CAUCUS, DID NOT REPRESENT WHAT HE UNDERSTOOD GRINEVSKY WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT, AND DID NOT REPRESENT A U.S. POSITION. MOST DELEGATIONS VIEWED THE PROPOSAL FAVORABLY BECAUSE IT CONCEPTUALLY RETAINS ALL SIX NATO MEASURES WHILE DROPPING THE SOVIET NON-STARTERS. THE FRG, NORWAY, DENMARK, AND CANADA (WHICH INDICATED WE WERE ON THE VERGE OF A "SIGNIFICANT BREAKTHROUGH" AND ADVISED THAT WE "TAKE THIS DEAL AND RUN") WERE AMONG THE MOST ENTHUSIASTIC. GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE), WITH THE SUPPORT OF DENMARK, COMMENTED THAT AN ARRANGEMENT ON WORKING STRUCIURE SHOULD NOT APPEAR TO BE

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A NATO-WARSAW PACT AGREEMENT BUT RATHER AN NNA INITIATIVE WITH THE LATTER FULFILLING THE SAME ROLE AS IN DECEMBER 1984, IN MOVING TO WORKING GROUPS. THE UK AND PORTUGAL WERE MORE CAUTIOUS: THE UK FEARING THAT THE DESCRIPTIONS FOR CLUSTERS COULD FORCE US TO DROP STATIC INFORMATION WHILE FORMALIZING CONSTRAINTS AS ONE OF THE DRAFTING ELEMENTS AND THAT THE SOVIETS ARE ORCHESTRATING THE PROCEEDINGS TO ENSURE THAT THOSE MEASURES THAT NATO WANTS WILL ULTIMATELY BE DROPPED; AND PORTUGAL ARGUING THAT ACCEPTANCE OF THE GRINEVSKY PROPOSAL WOULD BE A CONCESSION MADE BY THE WEST AND WONDERING IF SOME TACTICAL NATO FOOT-DRAGGING WOULDN'T YIELD SOME SOVIET CONCESSIONS. IN CONNECTION WITH EDES' COMMENTS, GENERAL CONCERN WAS EXPRESSED ABOUT THE DESCRIPTION OF THE VERIFICATION/INFORMATION CLUSTER. MOST DELEGATIONS WERE UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE PHRASE "NOTIFICATION ARRANGEMENT" AND WANTED A RETURN TO THE WORD "REGIME" OR ANOTHER PHRASE, WHICH WOULD BE PROPOSED TO GRINEVSKY ALONG WITH OTHER SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS TO BE DISCUSSED.

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5. THE FRG, DENMARK, THE NETHERLANDS, AND NORWAY LED THOSE PRESSING FOR A SHORT EXPLORATORY PHASE AND EARLY DRAFTING, EVEN AS SOON AS THE START OF THE NEXT ROUND.

FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR US CD DELEGATION
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUSES, SEPTEMBER 17-20, 1985

CITRON (FRG), MEVIK (NORWAY), AND OTHERS RECALLED THE SENSE OF THE BONN MEETING IN FAVOR OF EARLY DRAFTING, WHILE OTHERS EMPHASIZED THAT THE MEETING WAS INFORMAL AND DID NOT COMMIT GOVERNMENTS. NORWAY SAID THAT IT IS SAFE TO START DRAFTING NUF NOW AND FAVORED GRINEVSKY'S PROPOSAL TO SET A TIME BY WHICH DRAFTING SHOULD BEGIN. HE INDICATED THAT FOR PUBLIC OPINION REASONS NORWAY WOULD WANT A SENTENCE IN ANY UNDERSTANDING TO THE EFFECT THAT "AFTER THE EXPLORATORY PERIOD WE ARE PREPARED TO MOVE TO DRAFTING IN THE NEXT SESSION." THE NETHERLANDS ALSO SOUGHT A PUBLIC COMMITMENT TO DRAFTING BY THE NEXT ROUND. EDES CAUTIONED THAT THERE WERE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH USING THIS STRUCTURE FOR DRAFTING IF IT LOCKED US INTO A SCHEDULE FOR ONLY ONE SESSION PER WEEK ON SUCH IMPORTANT AND COMPLEX ISSUES AS NOTIFICATION. AMBASSADOR GOODBY CAUTIONED THE CAUCUS THAT WE SHOULDN'T GO TO GRINEVSKY OR THE NNA ON THIS UNTIL CAPITALS HAD BEEN CONSULTED, AND FURTHER WARNED THAT THE NNA MAY HAVE PROBLEMS OF THEIR OWN WITH THE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT. HE ALSO ASKED THE CAUCUS TO GIVE HIM ALTERNATIVES TO THE GRINEVSKY PROPOSAL SO THAT HE COULD HAVE IDEAS TO PASS ON DURING HIS DEBRIEFING IN WASHINGTON. NONE WERE OFFERED. INTERESTED AMBASSADORS AGREED TO MEET SEPTEMBER 18 TO

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CONSIDER MODIFICATIONS AIMED AT IMPROVING THE PROPOSAL.

6. CAUCUS DISCUSSION ON IMPROVEMENTS TO THE GOODBY NON-PAPER WAS RENEWED ON SEPTEMBER 18. BEFORE TURNING TO THIS SUBJECT, HOWEVER, AMBASSADOR STANDAERT (BELGIUM) REPORTED ON A MESSAGE A GDR REPRESENTATIVE HAD PASSED TO THE BELGIAN MFA IN BRUSSELS TO THE EFFECT THAT: 1) THERE WERE POLITICAL REASONS TO REACH A CDE AGREEMENT BEFORE THE VIENNA MEETING; 2) THE CONFERENCE SHOULD THEN ADJOURN BEFORE VIENNA; AND 3) THE VIENNA MEETING WOULD DECIDE ON A NEW CDE MANDATE. THE GDR REPRESENTATIVE HAD ALSO INDICATED THAT THERE WERE FOUR POSSIBLE POINTS TO BE CONTAINED IN A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT: 1) NON-USE OF FORCE; 2) NOTIFICATION; 3) OBSERVATION; AND 4) CONSTRAINTS. BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) REPORTED ON A CONTACT WITH AMBASSADOR BUHRING (GDR) WHO ALSO TOLD HIM THAT HE WOULD WAANT TO ADJOURN, AT THE LATEST, WHEN THE VIENNA MEETING STARTED, BUT ALSO DURING THE PREPARATORY MEETING IN SEPTEMBER. CONTINUING WITH CONTACTS, CITRON (FRG) REPORTED THAT HE HAD HAD LUNCH WITH ROZANOV (USSR) WHO HAD SUGGESTED THAT ANY MODIFICATIONS TO THE GRINEVSKY PROPOSAL THE WEST WANTED TO SUGGEST WOULD BE EASIER FOR THE SOVIETS TO RECEIVE THROUGH THE NEUTRAL/NONALIGNED.

7. THE MAJOR QUESTIONS ADDRESSED IN THE SEPTEMBER 18 DISCUSSIONS CONCERNED AN INFORMAL PERIOD PRIOR TO DRAFTING AND WHERE, WHEN, AND HOW TO BEGIN DRAFTING. THE DUTCH, NORWAY, ITALY, CANADA AND FRG WANTED THE CAUCUS TO DECIDE NOW ON A STRUCTURE NOT ONLY FOR THE PROPOSED EXPLORATORY PHASE, BUT ALSO FOR A SUBSEQUENT DRAFTING PHASE AS WELL. THIS WOULD INCLUDE CARRYING FORWARD INTO DRAFTING THE DESCRIPTIONS OF TOPICS GRINEVSKY HAS PROPOSED FOR THE INFORMAL CLUSTER GROUPS. THE NETHERLANDS AND NORWAY ALSO SOUGHT CAUCUS AGREEMENT ON A DEFINITE DATE FOR THE START OF DRAFTING (MEVIK PROPOSED THE BEGINNING OF THE EIGHTH ROUND AT THE LATEST). CITRON (FRG) NOTED THAT THIS WOULD AVOID ANOTHER LONG CAUCUS DEBATE ON WHEN TO GO INTO A DRAFTING PHASE. FRANCE AND THE UK LED THE OPPOSITION TO BOTH OF THESE PROPOSALS. FAVEAU (FRANCE) EXPLAINED THAT FRANCE'S SO-CALLED "SOFT TRANSITION" TO DRAFTING ONLY CONTEMPLATED DECIDING ON TOPICS FOR THE INFORMAL, EXPLORATORY PHASE. FRANCE WOULD NOT AGREE TO A FIRM DECISION ON DESCRIPTIONS OF DRAFTING CLUSTERS NOW, BECAUSE THE EAST MAY CHANGE ITS POSITIONS IN THE EXPLORATORY PHASE. EDES (UK) AGREED AND COMMENTED THAT THE CAUCUS DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO TAKE A STEP THAT WOULD "PREJUDGE" A NATO POSITION NOW BEING DEVELOPED BY FORCING NATO TO DRAFT ON "CONSTRAINTS." CITRON AND MEVIK EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT NO PROGRESS WOULD BE MADE IN THE EXPLORATORY PHASE; HANSEN (U.S.) DISAGREED AND INDICATED THAT GETTING AWAY

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FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR US CD DELEGATION
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUSES, SEPTEMBER 17-20, 1985

FROM PREPARED TEXTS AND DEVELOPING AN INFORMAL QUESTION AND ANSWER DISCUSSION WOULD BE A POSITIVE STEP. FRANCE AND THE UK OBJECTED TO ANY FIXED DATE FOR THE BEGINNING OF DRAFTING. CITRON (FRG), BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS), AND MEVIK (NORWAY) THEN OBSERVED THAT THE CAUCUS WAS BACK-TRACKING FROM THE POSITION TAKEN AT THE BONN BRAINSTORM-ING SESSION TO START DRAFTING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND FEARED WE WOULD BE PERCEIVED BY THE PUBLIC AS BEING "AFRAID" OF DRAFTING. STANDAERT (BELGIUM) INTERJECTED THAT WE ARE IN A DELICATE NEGOTIATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND NOT WITH PUBLIC OPINION. EDES RESPONDED THAT THE BONN MEETING WAS INFORMAL AND DID NOT COMMIT GOVERN-MENTS, AND CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL) NOTED THAT NO TIMETABLES HAD BEEN FIXED FOR DRAFTING BY NATO.

8. ON OTHER ISSUES, EDES EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT USING THE PRESENT WORKING GROUP SCHEDULE WOULD LIMIT THE DRAFTING PHASE TO ONLY ONE SESSION A WEEK ON EACH TOPIC, WHICH COULD HAMPER PROGRESS ON SUCH COMPLICATED MATTERS AS NOTIFICATION. MEVIK OBSERVED THAT THE NNA COORDI-NATORS WOULD BE ABLE TO SET THE SCHEDULES FOR THE DRAFT-ING SESSIONS. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH HANSEN'S OBSERVATION THAT EVENTUAL ARRANGEMENTS MUST ENSURE FLEXIBILITY FOR THE NNA COORDINATORS SO THAT THEY CAN SWITCH THE FOCUS OF DISCUSSION TO ANOTHER TOPIC IF IT IS CLEAR THAT DRAFTING POSSIBLITIES ON ANY ONE TOPIC HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED. HE ALSO REMARKED THAT THIS FACTOR WOULD ARGUE FOR HAVING ONLY TWO NNA COORDINATORS FOR GROUPS A AND B RESPECTIVELY. STANDAERT (BELGIUM) STATED THAT BRUSSELS WANTED A REFERENCE IN ANY AGREEMENT ON WORKING STRUCTURE TO THE FACT THAT ALL OF ITS PROVISIONS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE MADRID MANDATE.

9. EDES (UK) REITERATED HIS CONCERN THAT GRINEVSKY'S PROPOSED DESCRIPTION FOR GROUP A (WEDNESDAYS) "EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION, COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF MEANS OF COMMUNICATION IN RELATION TO NOTIFICATIONS ARRANGEMENTS" COULD FORCE NATO TO DROP THE STATIC INFORMATION MEASURE. (COMMENT: SEVERAL BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH MEMBERS OF EASTERN DELEGATIONS HAVE BOLSTERED EDES' ARGUMENTS SINCE EASTERN DELEGATES PERCEIVE THAT THE SUGGESTED ARRANGEMENT MEANS DROPPING MEASURES 1 AND 5 OF THE NATO PACKAGE AS SEPARATE MEASURES. END COMMENT.) HE ALSO CONTINUED TO EXPRESS CONCERN THAT GRINEVSKY'S SUGGESTIONS "PREJUDGED" NATO TO DRAFT ON CONSTRAINTS. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH EDES' THOUGHTS ON "NOTIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS" AND MOST

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PREFERRED A RETURN TO "NOTIFICATION REGIME" AS AN OVERALL CONCEPT AND PROCESS THAT COULD BEGIN WITH STATIC INFORMATION. NORWAY SUGGESTED USING A REFERENCE TO THE LANGUAGE OF THE MANDATE MAKING THIS DESCRIPTION INFORMATION/VERIFICATION "IN THE CONTEXT OF A MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY SET OF CONCRETE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES."

10. DELEGATIONS FURTHER EXPLORED IDEAS AND DISCUSSED ALTERNATE FORMULATIONS FOR THE INFORMAL STRUCTURE IN THE SEPTEMBER 19 CAUCUS. GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) AND BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) REPORTED ON CONTACTS WITH GRINEVSKY CONFIRMING THE CONTENTS OF THE GOODBY NON-PAPER, BUT ADDED THE POINT THAT GRINEVSKY WANTED A FIXED DATE FOR DRAFTING, OR AT LEAST REFERENCE TO A TIME PERIOD WHEN DRAFTING WOULD BEGIN. BASIC POSITIONS REMAINED UNCHANGED AS THE NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, AND FRG LED THE CHARGE FOR AN EARLY CAUCUS POSITION TO TAKE BACK TO GRINEVSKY (CITRON NOTING THAT GRINEVSKY WOULD HAVE THE PROPAGANDA EDGE IF WE APPEARED TO STALL), WHILE THE U.S., UK, AND PORTUGAL REMAINED CAUTIOUS, AND ASKED THAT TIME BE TAKEN FOR CAREFUL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTACTS WITH CAPITALS. CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL) NOTED THAT IF GRINEVSKY IS SO EAGER FOR AN AGREEMENT HE SHOULD BE MADE TO "PAY THE PRICE" (OF FURTHER CONCESSIONS). HANSEN (U.S.) INDICATED HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS PROPOSAL YET, BUT WAS LESS "EUPHORIC" THAN SOME DELEGATIONS ABOUT THE PAPER AS IT STANDS. HE CAUTIONED THAT AN ARRANGEMENT AGREED NOW

FROM USDEL CDE
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TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUSES, SEPTEMBER 17-20, 1985

WITHOUT APPROPRIATE CAVEATS WOULD STRONGLY INFLUENCE THE END-GAME STRUCTURE. HE ALSO NOTED POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH GIVING NUF EQUAL STATUS TO CSBM'S AND OBSERVED THAT THE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT COULD PUT US IN A BAD POSITION ON CONSTRAINTS.

11. CAUCUS TURNED ITS ATTENTION TO GOODBY NON-PAPER AND HOW TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF WHEN TO START DRAFTING. DISCUSSION CENTERED ON THE ADDITION OF A SENTENCE TO THE END OF PARA 2 OF THE GOODBY PAPER THAT "THIS PROCESS SHOULD START . . . ." TWO BASIC ALTERNATIVES WERE OFFERED TO COMPLETE THE SENTENCE. NORWAY, FRG, ITALY, CANADA, NETHERLANDS, AND SPAIN, WHILE PREFERRING AN EARLY TARGET DATE, SAID THEY COULD SUPPORT LANGUAGE ALONG THE LINES OF "AS SOON AS POSSIBLE," TO INDICATE THAT IT IS NOT NATO THAT IS AVOIDING DRAFTING. FRANCE BALKED AT THIS FORMULATION FOR SEVERAL REASONS: 1) IT COULD FORCE US TO DRAFTING BEFORE WE ARE READY; 2) A FIXED DATE WOULD RESULT IN THE EAST DOING NOTHING IN THE EXPLORATORY

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PHASE; AND 3) IT COULD SHORT-CIRCUIT THE ANTICIPATED NNA PAPERS, WHICH COULD BE HELPFUL TO THE ALLIANCE'S POSITION. DELWORTH (CANADA) DISAGREED, INDICATING THAT HE EXPECTED NOTHING POSITIVE IN THE NNA PAPERS, AND FELT THAT THOSE PAPERS MIGHT ACTUALLY REDUCE THE USEFULNESS OF NNA COORDINATORS BY LOCKING THEM INTO POSITIONS. THE U.S. AND PORTUGAL, HOWEVER, SUPPORTED FRANCE. HANSEN SUGGESTED DRAFTING SHOULD BEGIN ONLY "AS SOON AS WARRANTED." IN ALL, SEVEN SUGGESTIONS WERE PUT ON THE TABLE FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION BUT ALL WERE PERMUTATIONS ON EITHER "AS SOON AS POSSIBLE," OR "AS SOON AS WARRANTED." IT WAS AGREED TO RETURN TO THIS TOPIC AT A LATER DATE.

12. THE CAUCUS THEN FOCUSED ON PARA 3 OF THE NON-PAPER, TURNING FIRST TO THE DESCRIPTION GRINEVSKY PROPOSED FOR GROUP A, "EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION/COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION, AND DEVELOPMENT OF MEANS OF COMMUNICATION IN THE CONTEXT OF A NOTIFICATION ARRANGEMENT." THERE CONTINUED TO BE GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT "NOTIFICATION ARRANGEMENT" HAD TO BE CHANGED. THE UK EXPRESSED INTEREST IN MEVIK'S (NORWAY) SUGGESTION "IN THE CONTEXT OF A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLIMENTARY CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES" AS UNASSAILABLE LANGUAGE FROM THE MADRID MANDATE. THERE WAS WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER A COUNTER-PROPOSAL TO GRINEVSKY ALONG THESE LINES, BUT THE FRG, FRANCE, CANADA, AND THE NETHERLANDS NOTED THAT THE RELATION OF INFORMATION/VERIFICATION TO NOTIFICATION WAS THE CORE OF THE ARRANGEMENT TO GRINEVSKY AND HE WAS CERTAIN TO REJECT THIS FORMULATION. ACCORDINGLY, DELWORTH SAID THE CAUCUS SHOULD BE PREPARED WITH A QUICK FALLBACK POSITION FOR WHEN THIS FAILS. HANSEN (U.S.) CAUTIONED THAT OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO PROTECT OUR FOUR ELEMENTS: INFORMATION; VERIFICATION, NOTIFICATION, AND OBSERVATION. THE SOVIETS ARE TRYING TO LIMIT FUTURE CSBM'S ONLY TO NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION, WHILE IMPOSING NON-USE OF FORCE AND CONSTRAINTS ON THE WEST. "NOTIFICATION ARRANGEMENT" COULD THREATEN INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION AND WE MUST USE CAUTION; NEVERTHELESS, HANSEN NOTED, THE GRINEVSKY "DEAL" LIES IN TREATING "INFORMATION/VERIFICATION" IN THE GENERAL CONTEXT OF NOTIFICATION. MOST DELEGATIONS SUPPORTED RETURNING TO "NOTIFICATION REGIME," BUT EDES (UK) DOUBTED THAT WOULD SATISFY THE UK. TURNING TO CONSTRAINTS, EDES INDICATED THAT THE DESCRIPTION OF GROUP A, "CONSTRAINING MEASURES; ANNUAL FORECASTS OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES," COULD COMMIT NATO TO DRAFT ON CONSTRAINTS WHICH (IN THE ABSENCE OF A NATO CONSTRAINTS MEASURE) WOULD FORCE US TO DRAFT ON A FUTURE NNA CONSTRAINTS MEASURE OR THE EAST'S PRESENT PROPOSAL. TO SHIFT THE FOCUS TOWARD OUR ANNUAL CALENDAR MEASURE, EDES INFORMALLY SUGGESTED AN ALTERNATIVE DESCRIPTION, "CONSTRAINING ASPECTS OF A SET OF

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CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES INCLUDING
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ANNUAL FORECASTS." FRANCE, DENMARK, AND THE NETHERLANDS CONTENDED THAT THE PROPOSAL, AS OUTLINED IN THE NON-
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR US CD DELEGATION
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUSES, SEPTEMBER 17-20, 1985
PAPER, DID NOT IN FACT COMMIT US TO DRAFT ON CONSTRAINTS AND CITED PARA 4 LANGUAGE THAT "ALL WORK WILL BE PRELIMINARY AND WILL NOT IMPLY FINAL AGREEMENT ON ALL THE ELEMENTS DISCUSSED," AND PARA 1, THAT "THE EXISTING WORKING STRUCTURE WILL BE USED AS A MEANS OF UNDERTAKING AN INFORMAL EXPLORATION OF TOPICS WHICH MIGHT (EMPHASIZED) FIGURE IN THE PROCESS OF DRAFTING . . . ." DENMARK ALSO NOTED THAT EDES' FORMULATION COULD BE A PROBLEM WITH THE NNA BECAUSE IT DOESN'T REFER TO CONSTRAINING MEASURES. BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) SUGGESTED AS AN ALTERNATIVE DESCRIPTION "ANNUAL FORECASTS AND OTHER CONSTRAINING MEASURES."

13. BUWALDA REPORTED THAT THE GOODBY "NON-PAPER" HAD BEEN LEAKED BY AN UNNAMED PERSON OR PERSONS WITHIN THE CAUCUS TO THE NNA, AND THAT NNA ALREADY PERCEIVED THAT EAST AND WEST WERE COOKING UP A DEAL AND LEAVING THEM OUT. (COMMENT: SUBSEQUENT NNA CONTACTS HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THE NNA KNOW OF BOTH THE EXISTENCE AND THE CONTENTS OF THE NON-PAPER. END COMMENT.)
-
14. THE CAUCUS MET BRIEFLY ON SEPTEMBER 20 TO COMPLETE ITS EXPLORATION OF POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS TO THE NON-PAPER. THE UK INDICATED THAT BETTER WORDING WAS NEEDED FOR GROUP A (TUESDAY) "NON-USE OF FORCE," AND SUGGESTED AS AN ALTERNATIVE "THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE IN THE CONTEXT OF A SET OF CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES." PICKING UP ON AN ITALIAN REACTION THAT THE DESCRIPTIONS SHOULD BE KEPT SIMPLE AND UNQUALIFIED, EDES INDICATED HE COULD CONSIDER THE SIMPLE "NON-USE OF FORCE" DESCRIPTION, IF THE CAUCUS ALSO AGREED TO DROP GRINEVSKY'S PROPOSED REFERENCE TO "NOTIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS" IN THE INFORMATION/VERIFICATION GROUP. HANSEN (U.S.) NOTED A REFERENCE ONLY TO "NON-USE OF FORCE" FOR THIS CLUSTER WOULD MEAN SC.6 TO THE EAST, I.E., IT WOULD INCLUDE NON-FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE ANTICIPATED THAT WASHINGTON WOULD FAVOR A LIMITATION ON THE BREADTH OF THE TOPIC AND EXPRESSED GENERAL SUPPORT FOR EDES' ALTERNATIVE. CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL) REPEATED HIS VIEW THAT THIS WAS GRINEVSKY'S PROPOSAL AND, IF HE IS IN SUCH A HURRY TO HAVE AN AGREEMENT, WE CAN PRESSURE HIM TO GIVE US MORE. THIS COMMENT SET OFF A DISCUSSION AS TO WHETHER THE NON-PAPER

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WAS SOLELY A REFLECTION OF GRINEVSKY'S POSITION OR THE RESULT OF A NEGOTIATING HISTORY BETWEEN GOODBY AND GRINEVSKY. EDES (UK) NOTED THAT GOODBY HAD NOT BEEN NEGOTIATING ON BEHALF OF THE CAUCUS IN HIS CONVERSATIONS IN MOSCOW, AND HAD HIMSELF INDICATED THAT THE NON-PAPER WAS ONLY GRINEVSKY'S LATEST SUGGESTIONS. HANSEN (U.S.) ADDED THAT GOODBY HAD GONE TO MOSCOW AT GRINEVSKY'S INVITATION AND HAD INITIATED NONE OF THE MEETINGS HERE IN STOCKHOLM WITH GRINEVSKY. HE REMINDED THE CAUCUS THAT THE PAPER HAD NO STATUS OTHER THAN FOR CAUCUS CONSIDERATION AND DID NOT REFLECT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT POSITION. DELWORTH (CANADA) DISAGREED, SAYING THAT THE PAPER WAS PRODUCED FROM AN IMPORTANT CONTACT AND HAD MORE STATUS THAN A NON-PAPER. WHILE CLEARLY UNCONVINCED ON THIS POINT, CITRON (FRG) INDICATED THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO TRY CAUCUS COUNTERSUGGESTIONS ON GRINEVSKY, BUT THAT IT WAS IN OUR INTEREST TO DO SO QUICKLY. EDES REPLIED THAT THE UK WAS ALSO ANXIOUS TO MOVE THINGS, BUT WAS CONCERNED THAT "WE DO NOT PREJUDICE THE ALLIES' POSITION OR PACKAGE."

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15. BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) CLOSED THE DISCUSSION BY SUGGESTING THREE ADDITIONAL CHANGES FOR CAUCUS CONSIDERATION. FIRST (IN REPONSE TO BELGIUM'S DESIRE TO REFERENCE THE MADRID MANDATE IN ANY UNDERSTANDING), HE WOULD CHANGE PARA. 1 TO READ "THE EXISTING WORKING STRUCTURE WILL BE USED AS A MEANS OF UNDERTAKING AN INFORMAL EXPLORATION OF TOPICS WHICH MIGHT FIGURE IN THE PROCESS OF DRAFTING AGREED LANGUAGE FOR POSSIBLE INCLUSION, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE, IN A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT." SECOND, HE WOULD INCLUDE THE GENERAL REFERENCE FROM THE

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SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUSES, SEPTEMBER 17-20, 1985

MANDATE FOR THE NECESSITY OF ADEQUATE VERIFICATION FOR EACH MEASURE AS PART OF THE TEXT. THIRD, HE WOULD CHANGE PARA 4 TO READ "BOTH IN THE EXPLORATION OF THESE TOPICS AND IN SUBSEQUENT DRAFTING OF LANGUAGE FOR A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT ALL WORK AND ALL AGREED TEXTS WILL BE CONSIDERED PROVISIONAL AND WILL NOT PREJUDICE AGREEMENT ON ALL THE ELEMENTS DISCUSSED."

16. THE CAUCUS WILL RECONVENE AT ITS REGULAR MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 24.

HANSEN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07240
SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STATEMENTS, SEPTEMBER 20, 1985
1. CDE VII - 019
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE SEPTEMBER 20 PLENARY SESSION, THE EAST (GDR, CSSR, USSR) ENDORSED THE INVITATION EXTENDED TO CHANCELLOR KOHL BY THE GDR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA FOR NEGOTIATION OF A CHEMICAL WEAPONS-FREE ZONE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IN RESPONSE, CITRON (FRG) NOTED THAT THIS PROPOSAL WAS DIRECTED TO HIS GOVERNMENT AND IS NOT AN ISSUE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. HE ALSO STRESSED THE FRG'S COMMITMENT TO A WORLDWIDE, VERIFIABLE BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS. ROMANIA REVIEWED ITS VIEW OF EMERGING COMMON GROUND IN THE CONTEXT OF MOVING TO INFORMAL WORKING ARRANGEMENTS WHICH COULD BE USED AS A BASIS FOR DRAFTING. END SUMMARY.
-
4. IN A CLEARLY COORDINATED APPROACH, AMBASSADORS BUHRING (GDR), REZNIK (CSSR), AND GRINEVSKY (USSR) ENDORSED TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE FRG, GDR, AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A CHEMICAL WEAPONS-FREE ZONE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. BUHRING AND REZNIK CITED LETTERS WRITTEN BY THEIR GOVERNMENTS INVITING THE FRG TO BEGIN SUCH NEGOTIATIONS. PERFUNCTORILY LINKING THIS PROPOSAL TO CDE, BUHRING CLAIMED SUCH NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE A "PRACTICAL DEMONSTRATION" OF CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING "AT THE DIVIDING LINE" BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. REZNIK CHIMED IN THAT ESTABLISHMENT OF A CENTRAL EUROPEAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS-FREE ZONE WOULD MAKE IT EASIER TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A COMPREHENSIVE WORLDWIDE CW BAN. IN HIS SHORT STATEMENT, AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY CLAIMED THE SOVIET UNION WOULD GUARANTEE THE STATUS OF SUCH A ZONE IF THE U.S. WOULD DO LIKEWISE. (COMMENT: WHILE, IN OUR VIEW, THE INTENT OF THE EASTERN INTERVENTIONS WAS MERELY TO NOTE FOR THE STOCKHOLM RECORD THE GDR/CZECHOSLOVAKIA CW INITIATIVE AND WAS NOT TO RELAY ANY SIGNALS, THE EFFECT OF THESE STATEMENTS COULD MAKE IT EVEN MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE EAST TO BRING UP THEIR CW PROPOSAL IN FUTURE STOCKHOLM NEGOTIATIONS. EVEN THE CZECH AMBASSADOR HAS ACKNOWLEDGED TO US THAT HIS INTERVENTION CONFIRMED THAT THE MAIN VENUE OF EASTERN CW EFFORTS HAD SHIFTED FROM STOCKHOLM. END COMMENT.)
5. IN HIS RIGHT OF REPLY, AMBASSADOR CITRON (FRG) POINTEDLY OBSERVED THAT THIS PROPOSAL WAS DIRECTED TO THE FRG GOVERNMENT AND IS, THEREFORE, NOT AN APPROPRIATE SUBJECT FOR THIS FORUM. HE THEN ELABORATED THE FRG'S COMMITMENT TO A WORLDWIDE, VERIFIABLE BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS. ANYTHING LESS, HE SAID, WOULD ONLY CREATE THE ILLUSION OF SECURITY; FOR EXAMPLE, A REGIONAL BAN WOULD NOT PREVENT CHEMICAL WEAPONS FROM BEING RAPIDLY REINTRODUCED INTO THE ZONE FROM OUTSIDE.

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6. AMBASSADOR CETERCHI OFFERED THE THIRD ITERATION OF ROMANIAN "EMERGING COMMON GROUND." THIS TIME, HOWEVER, HE REVIEWED EACH AREA IN THE CONTEXT OF MOVING INTO INFORMAL WORKING ARRANGEMENTS. CETERCHI CALLED FOR A MOVEMENT TO INFORMAL WORKING ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD ULTIMATELY FACILITATE THE TRANSITION INTO DRAFTING. INFORMAL GROUPS, WHICH WOULD SUPLEMENT THE EXISTING WORKING STRUCTURE, SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN THE "NEXT FEW WEEKS," ACCORDING TO THE ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR. CETERCHI ONCE AGAIN ADVOCATED ELABORATION OF THE NUF COMMITMENT; CONCRETE CSBM'S (A NOTIFICATION REGIME AND OBSERVATION); INFORMATION/COMMUNICATION/CONSULTATION MECHANISM; CONSTRAINTS; AND VERIFICATION APPLIED TO EACH MEASURE. (BEGIN COMMENT: BASED ON CETERCHI'S CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR GOODBY ON SEPTEMBER 17, THE SPEECH CAN BE INTERPRETED AS REFLECTING ROMANIAN CONCERNS OF HOW INFORMAL GROUPS COULD DEVELOP; FOR EXAMPLE, THEY STRESSED THE NEED FOR CONSULTATIONS, WHICH ARE NOT PART OF THE DESCRIPTIVE CLUSTERS OF THE POSSIBLE INFORMAL STRUCTURE. IN ADDITION, CETERCHI STRESSED THAT ANNUAL CALENDARS SHOULD BE PART OF THE NOTIFICATION REGIME AND NOT IN THE CONSTRAINTS CLUSTER. END COMMENT.)
HANSEN
END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07421
SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, U.S.-SOVIET WORKING LUNCH, SEPTEMBER 20, 1985

1. CDE VII - 027.

2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. SUMMARY. AT A U.S.-SOVIET WORKING LUNCH ON SEPTEMBER 20, 1985, MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING INTRUSIVE ASPECTS OF THE OBSERVATION PROPOSAL WHICH THE NNA ARE DISCUSSING AMONG THEMSELVES. A SOVIET MILREP, WHO HAD ACCOMPANIED OBSERVERS AT THE RECENT "KAVKAZ 85" EXERCISE, REPORTED THAT THE OBSERVERS HAD EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH THE SOVIET OBSERVATION PROGRAM AND HAD SAID THAT THE EXERCISE WAS NOT THREATENING. THE SOVIETS ALSO REOPENED THE ISSUE OF THE DEFINITION OF THE ZONE. THEY CLAIMED THAT MOSCOW HAD AGREED IN MADRID TO EXPAND THE ZONE EASTWARD TO THE URALS PROVIDED THE WEST TOOK A "CORRESPONDING STEP" TO THE WEST. NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL EXERCISES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA WOULD BE SUCH A STEP, ACCORDING TO THE SOVIETS. THE U.S. DEPUTY REMINDED THEM THAT THIS ISSUE HAD NOT BEEN RESOLVED DURING THREE YEARS OF DEBATE IN MADRID AND THAT CONSENSUS HAD BEEN REACHED ON THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE, AN APPROACH WHICH CALLS FOR NOTIFICATION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE A PART OF ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE. END SUMMARY

4. PARTICIPANTS

U.S.	USSR
LYNN HANSEN, DEPUTY HEAD	I. S. ROZANOV
GENERAL JONAS BLANK, JCS	GENERAL TATARNIKOV
HARLAN STRAUSS, OSD	COLONEL SOLOMENKO
CHRYSS GALASSI, STATE	VLADIMIR DOUDKINE

5. OBSERVATION: ROZANOV SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION OBJECTS TO OBSERVERS USING OBSERVATION OF EXERCISES AS AN OPPORTUNITY "TO LOOK INTO BOXES, SUPPLY STORAGE AREAS, ETC.," IN ORDER TO "GO DOWN OTHER ROADS OF OBSERVATION." IN RESPONSE TO A U.S. COMMENT THAT ONE OF THE MOST USEFUL ASPECTS OF OBSERVATION IS THE OPPORTUNITY FOR OBSERVERS TO TALK WITH COMMANDERS, TATARNIKOV SAID THAT IN THE RECENTLY CONDUCTED "KAVKAZ 85" EXERCISE OBSERVERS HAD BEEN ABLE TO TALK TO THE MILITARY DISTRICT COMMANDER WHO HAD GIVEN THEM DAILY BRIEFINGS ON THE COURSE OF THE EXERCISE, SHOWING THEM CHARTS, DESCRIBING PLANS OF ACTION, ETC. HE ALSO STRESSED THAT THE AREA OF THE EXERCISE, WHICH WAS MOUNTAINOUS, HAD ENABLED THE OBSERVERS TO WATCH ONE-FOURTH OF THE TROOPS CONDUCTING THE EXERCISE AT ONE TIME. HAVING ATTENDED THE EXERCISE WITh THE OBSERVERS, SOLOMENKO SAID THAT ALL OF THEM HAD EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH THE PROGRAM AND THAT THEY ALL (EVEN

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THE TURKS) HAD SAID THAT THE EXERCISE WAS NOT THREATENING. ROZANOV EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT NNA IDEAS ABOUT PROVIDING OBSERVERS WITH THE RIGHT VIRTUALLY TO COMMANDEER HELICOPTERS AND TELL THE PILOTS TO TAKE THEM WHEREVER THEY WANTED TO GO. BOTH ROZANOV AND TATARNIKOV SAID THAT THIS WOULD BE EXTREMELY DANGEROUS, THE LATTER POINTING OUT THAT DURING EXERCISES, HELICOPTERS OFTEN FLY AT LOW ALTITUDES TO AVOID MORTAR FIRE AND THAT SOMETIMES HELICOPTERS ARE HIT BY THEIR OWN SIDE'S MORTAR FIRE.

6. HANSEN AGREED THAT OBSERVERS SHOULD BE UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF THE HOST COUNTRY, AND POINTED OUT THE CLEAR DISTINCTION IN THE WESTERN PACKAGE BETWEEN OBSERVERS WHO WOULD BE GUIDED, AND INSPECTORS, WHO WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY HOST COUNTRY REPS, NOT GUIDED. HE NOTED THAT THE NNA WANT MORE AND MORE INTRUSIVE OBSERVATION IN

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ORDER TO SUBSTITUTE OBSERVATION FOR VERIFICATION AND THAT THE U.S. HAD PROBLEMS WITH THIS APPROACH. HANSEN EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT THE SOVIET POSITION IN THE FUTURE WOULD PROVIDE FOR MORE OBSERVERS (FROM MORE STATES) TO BE INVITED MORE FREQUENTLY.

7. NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL EXERCISES: TATARNIKOV LAUNCHED INTO A LONG ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF NOTIFYING INDEPENDENT NAVAL EXERCISES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA. HE ARGUED THAT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF NATO NAVAL EXERCISES WHICH ARE FUNCTIONALLY LINKED TO GROUND FORCE EXERCISES AND, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE NOTIFIED. FOR EXAMPLE, "OCEAN SAFARI" HE CLAIMED, IS FUNCTIONALLY LINKED TO THE "AUTUMN FORGE" SERIES OF EXERCISES IN EUROPE AS PART OF A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR EUROPE AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE NOTIFIED. BLANK TOOK ISSUE WITH THE SOVIET INTERPRETATION, ARGUING THAT "OCEAN SAFARI" IS NOT FUNCTIONALLY LINKED TO GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES. TATARNIKOV INSISTED THAT ALL OF THE "AUTUMN FORGE" EXERCISES ARE CONDUCTED UNDER A SINGLE STRATEGIC DESIGN (ZAMYCEL), E.G., "DISPLAY DETERMINATION," (REINFORCEMENT OF FORCES ON THE SOUTHERN FLANK), "REFORGER" (TRANSFERS), "OCEAN SAFARI" (SEA COMBAT). HE SAID THAT SC.1 INTERPRETS THE "FUNCTIONAL APPROACH" IN TACTICAL TERMS AND INSISTED THAT THERE WAS A NEED TO THINK IN STRATEGIC TERMS, I.E., AIRCRAFT CARRIER AVIATION IS STRATEGICALLY FUNCTIONALLY LINKED TO GROUND FORCES EXERCISES IN EUROPE AND SHOULD BE NOTIFIED.

8. HANSEN POINTED OUT THAT TATARNIKOV WAS TALKING ABOUT A STRATEGIC VIEW OF A STATE'S ANNUAL TRAINING

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REQUIREMENTS, NOTING THAT THE USSR UNDOUBTEDLY HAD A SIMILAR VIEW OF ITS TRAINING REQUIREMENTS. THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE DIFFERENT TRAINING NEEDS IN THAT THE U.S. HAS TO BRING ITS TROOPS TO EUROPE FOR NATO EXERCISES. BY DISCUSSING STRATEGIC ISSUES, HANSEN WARNED, TATARNIKOV WAS INTRODUCING INTO THE DISCUSSION SOVIET ROCKET FORCES, WHICH AT THE OPERATIONAL-STRATEGIC LEVEL OF SOVIET MILITARY ART THREATEN EUROPE ALL THE TIME AND, THUS, AFFECT SECURITY IN EUROPE. IN THE CDE CONTEXT, THERE ARE CERTAIN THINGS THAT CAN BE ACHIEVED; THOSE IN THE GENERAL STRATEGIC REALM ARE NOT AMONG THEM; THE NUCLEAR ASPECT IS A BILATERAL ISSUE INAPPROPRIATE FOR DISCUSSION IN STOCKHOLM.

9. TATARNIKOV THEN TALKED ABOUT GROUPS OF SHIPS CONDUCTING EXERCISES IN THE ZONE AND CRITICIZED THE WEST'S LIMITING NOTIFICATION ONLY TO GROUND FORCES. HE NOTED THAT HE WAS TALKING ONLY ABOUT SHIPS EXERCISING IN THE ZONE WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS THE ADJOINING SEA AREA. HE SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE IS SOMEHOW DIFFERENT FROM THE HIGH SEAS WHICH HE SAID WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN NOTIFICATIONS. HE NOTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION, AS WELL AS NATO, CONDUCTED NAVAL EXERCISES IN THE ZONE, I.E., IN THE NORTH, BALTIC, NORWEGIAN, AND BARENTS SEAS. ROZANOV ADDED THAT SUCH NOTIFICATIONS WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND CALLED "SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS" OF THE "IOWA" (AFTER "OCEAN SAFARI" HAD ENDED) IN THE BALTIC SEA AN EXAMPLE OF A NAVAL ACTIVITY WHICH SHOULD BE NOTIFIED. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE "IOWA" IS EQUIPPED WITH TOMAHAWK SHIP-TO-SHORE MISSILES AND THAT IT WOULD BE JUSTIFIED FROM A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING POINT OF VIEW TO NOTIFY EXERCISES BY SUCH TOMAHAWK-CARRYING SHIPS WHEN THEY ENTERED AN AREA FROM WHICH THEY COULD STRIKE SOVIET TERRITORY. HE NOTED THAT SUCH A "BORDER" OF THE ZONE (WHERE NOTIFICATION OF NAVAL EXERCISES WOULD BE REQUIRED) WOULD BE "CONDITIONAL" AND WOULD INCREASE OVER TIME, GIVEN CONSTANTLY IMPROVING TECHNOLOGIES AND CAPABILITIES.

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10. HANSEN NOTED THAT ROZANOV'S CRITERION FOR NOTIFICATION OF NAVAL SHIPS (WHENEVER ITS MISSILES/AIRCRAFT COULD STRIKE SOVIET TERRITORY) WAS ONE-SIDED; TO BE FAIR IT WOULD HAVE TO APPLY TO EVERY SOVIET SHIP ALL THE TIME WHENEVER IT WAS IN RANGE OF WEST EUROPEAN TERRITORY. IRRITATED BY ROZANOV'S CLUMSINESS, TATARNIKOV EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS NOT TALKING

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ABOUT SPECIFIC SHIPS, BUT ABOUT EXERCISES WHICH TRIGGERED THE WARSAW PACT PARAMETERS (30 SHIPS/100 AIRCRAFT) FOR NOTIFICATION OF NAVAL EXERCISES.

11. HANSEN NOTED THAT FOR THREE YEARS IN MADRID THE EAST HAD ATTEMPTED TO WIN CONSENSUS FOR THEIR VIEWS ON THE ZONE. THERE HAD BEEN NO CONSENSUS IN MADRID ON THE QUESTION OF DEFINING THE LIMITS OF THE ADJOINING SEA AREA BY NUMBER OF KILOMETERS OR MILES OR GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES AND THAT THE LANGUAGE IN THE MANDATE REPRESENTED THE CONSENSUS ON THIS SUBJECT, I.E., THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA WHERE BOTH CRITERIA MUST BE MET.

12. ROZANOV INSISTED THAT DEPLOYING A SHIP WHICH COULD CARRY 32 TOMAHAWK MISSILES IN THE "OCEAN SAFARI" EXERCISE IS LIKE TAKING AIM ("PRITSEL") FOR A STRIKE ON THE SOVIET UNION. THE INCLUSION OF AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER WITH AIRCRAFT CAPABLE OF STRIKING TARGETS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION, ACCORDING TO ROZANOV, IS THE SAME SORT OF AIMING FOR A STRIKE. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE CONFERENCE CONSIDER A PROPOSAL NOT TO INCLUDE IN EXERCISES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA SHIPS EQUIPPED WITH SHIP-TO-SHORE MISSILES OR AIRCRAFT CAPABLE OF STRIKING SOVIET TERRITORY. SUCH EXERCISES, HE CONTENDED, ARE MORE THREATENING THAN TWO DIVISIONS CONDUCTING EXERCISES IN THE CAUCASUS.

13. HANSEN SAID THAT SUCH LOGIC WAS ONE-SIDED BECAUSE IT ASSUMES THAT EACH TIME THE CAPABILITY TO STRIKE SOVIET TERRITORY IS CREATED, THIS IS THREATENING. THE USSR CONSTANTLY HAS THE CAPABILITY TO STRIKE WEST EUROPEAN TERRITORY, HE TOLD HIS SOVIET COUNTERPARTS. HE AGREED THAT TWO DIVISIONS IN THE CAUCASUS ARE NOT IN THEMSELVES THREATENING EVEN TO TURKEY, BUT ARGUED THAT BUILDING COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIPS IS A TASK WHICH IS AS IMPORTANT AS THAT OF DETERMINING WHETHER EXERCISES ARE THREATENING. HANSEN CONCLUDED THAT THERE NEEDS TO BE A BALANCE BETWEEN SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE IN OUR WORK AT STOCKHOLM.

14. ROZANOV ASKED THE AMERICANS PRESENT TO UNDERSTAND THE SECURITY INTERESTS, THE BALANCE OF FORCES, AND THE "PRESTIGE" OF THE SOVIET UNION. SOLOMENKO AT THAT POINT REMINDED THEM THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD AGREED IN MADRID TO EXPAND THE ZONE EASTWARD TO THE URALS PROVIDED "A CORRESPONDING STEP" WAS TAKEN BY THE WEST. HANSEN RESPONDED THAT THE ISSUE HAD BEEN RESOLVED AT MADRID AND CONTINUED ARGUMENTS ON THE ZONE WOULD LEAD NOWHERE.

15. INFORMATION: NOT TO BE SIDETRACKED, TATARNIKOV RETURNED TO HIS PET ISSUE, ARGUING THAT AS A MILITARY OFFICER HE IS TROUBLED BY A SITUATION IN WHICH GROUND FORCE EXERCISES, GARRISONS AND TROOPS IN EUROPE ALL THE WAY TO THE URALS WOULD BE COVERED AND NOT NAVAL EXERCISES. HE PROPOSED INCLUDING NOTIFICATION OF NAVAL

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ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AS WELL. NOTING THAT THE U.S. CANNOT AGREE TO NOTIFICATION OF NAVAL EXERCISES, HE SAID THIS GIVES RISE TO SUSPICION. HE POINTED OUT THAT HE WAS NOT JUST TALKING ABOUT NOTIFICATION OF EXERCISES BY THE U.S. AND SOVIET FLEETS, BUT THAT OTHER NATO ALLIES ALSO HAD POWERFUL FLEETS, E.G., THE UK, FRG, AND FRANCE. ALL OF THESE COUNTRIES HAVE SYSTEMS AT SEA AND IN THE AIR WHICH HAVE MISSIONS;
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
GENEVA FOR NST DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, U.S.-SOVIET
THEY DON'T SIMPLY EXIST. WE HAVE TO CONFRONT THEM WITH OUR OWN SYSTEMS, THE SOVIET GENERAL INSISTED. HE THEN SUGGESTED EXCHANGING INFORMATION ON THESE SYSTEMS AND SAID THAT THIS PROPOSAL WOULD BE BROADER IN SCOPE THAN THE NATO INFORMATION PROPOSAL; REAL "TRANSPARENCY" WOULD INVOLVE NOTIFICATIONS OF GROUPS OF SHIPS CONDUCTING EXERCISES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA.

16. HANSEN POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIETS DENY THE USEFULNESS OF PROVIDING INFORMATION ON GROUND FORCES EVEN AT A LEVEL WHICH IS INSIGNIFICANT FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND THE U.S. THE KIND OF INFORMATION WHICH THE WEST PROPOSES EXCHANGING IS WELL KNOWN TO BOTH COUNTRIES. U.S. PRESS RELEASES, FOR EXAMPLE, PROVIDED INFORMATION ON THE TYPE OF SHIPS, THE NUMBERS OF SUBMARINES, OF "OCEAN SAFARI." THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY INFORMATION AT ALL ON ITS NAVAL EXERCISES. THE SOVIET SUGGESTION WITH REGARD TO INFORMATION ON NAVAL FORCES IS JUST NOT CREDIBLE.

17. MADRID MANDATE: SOLOMENKO NOTED THAT THE MANDATE DEFINES EUROPE AND THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AS WELL AS THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY IN EUROPE; THE SOVIET UNION IS ASKING FOR NOTIFICATION OF NAVAL EXERCISES WHICH POSE A DANGER TO SECURITY IN EUROPE. ROZANOV SAID THAT THIS WAS A QUESTION OF PRESTIGE AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT INTEND TO INFRINGE ON THE RIGHTS OF THE FLEETS OF THE U.S., UK, FRANCE, ETC., CONDUCTING LEGITIMATE ACTIVITIES GLOBALLY, BUT THAT PORT VISITS (ZAKHODY) OF SQUADRONS AND FORMATIONS (SOYEDINENIYA) IN EUROPEAN TERRITORIAL WATERS SHOULD BE NOTIFIED SINCE THEY AFFECT EUROPEAN SECURITY. IN THE ENSUING REHASH OF THE MANDATE NEGOTIATIONS, HANSEN DISCUSSED TWO FATEFUL PARAGRAPHS ON THE ZONE. THE FIRST IDENTIFIED EUROPE AND MENTIONED THE ADJOINING SEA AREA. THE SOVIET POSITION IN MADRID HAD BEEN TO INCLUDE ONLY THAT PARAGRAPH IN THE MANDATE. A SECOND PARAGRAPH DEFINED EXACTLY WHICH MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA WOULD BE NOTIFIED. IT HAD BEEN DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO AGREE ON

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THE SECOND PARAGRAPH, BUT THEY HAD AND THAT SHOULD BE THE END OF IT.

18. SOLOMENKO INTERRUPTED TO SAY THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD AGREED IN MADRID TO EXPAND THE CDE ZONE TO THE URALS ON THE CONDITION THAT A "CORRESPONDING" STEP SHOULD BE TAKEN TO THE WEST. HE THEN LAUNCHED INTO A LONG AND EMOTIONAL DEFENSE OF THE SOVIET INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE: HE INSISTED THAT THE "TACTICAL" FUNCTIONAL APPROACH HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE FINAL ACT BY THE REFERENCE TO THE ADJOINING SEA AREA. THE MANDATE PHRASE, "AFFECT THE SECURITY OF EUROPE," REFERRED TO INDEPENDENT NAVAL EXERCISES AND REPRESENTED THE "CORRESPONDING" EXPANSION TO THE WEST WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAD REQUIRED, ACCORDING TO SOLOMENKO. THE LUNCH ENDED WITH HANSEN NOTING THAT A REHASH OF THE MANDATE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD LEAD NOWHERE.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

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DELEGATION OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC TO THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

STOCKHOLM

Stockholm, September 20, 1985

Dear Colleague,

Permit me to send you herewith for your attention the Text of the Letter by Mr. Lubomír ŠTROUGAL, Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, to Mr. Helmut KOHL, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, on the Establishment of a Chemical-Weapon-Free Zone in Europe.

Sincerely Yours

/Alois Řezník/

To the

Heads of Delegations
to the Conference on Confidence
and Security Building Measures
and Disarmament in Europe

S t o c k h o l m

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THE TEXT OF THE LETTER BY MR. LUBOMÍR ŠTROUGAL, PRIME MINISTER OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC, TO MR. HELMUT KOHL, CHANCELLOR OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CHEMICAL-WEAPON-FREE ZONE IN EUROPE

Desiring to fulfil its responsibility for peace and relaxation of tensions in Central Europe and to meet the security interests of its own people and indeed of all European peoples, the government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic proposes to the government of the Federal Republic of Germany to make a joint contribution to disarmament and arms limitation.

The question of prohibiting and eliminating chemical weapons has long been a subject of international discussion. The states parties to the Warsaw Treaty as well as other states have made proposals to this end.

The governments of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the German Democratic Republic have held consultations on this question and decided to present the following to the government of the Federal Republic of Germany :

"The governments of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the German Democratic Republic hold the view that practical possibilities do exist for the elimination of chemical weapons, particularly for the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe. This could be a way to arrive at the removal of the chemical weapon stocks existing in the region and to ensure that no new, extremely perilous types of such weapons, notably binary weapons, will be deployed on European soil. This has also been reflected in the talks between SED and FDP on the establishment of a zone free of chemical weapons, which climaxed in the presentation of the political initiative known to you.

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Next to nuclear weapons, chemical weapons are the most dangerous means of mass destruction. It is a matter of utmost urgency to prohibit and completly eliminate them. What is needed are resolute efforts both on a global and regional scale. The governments of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the German Democratic Republic take a consistent stand for a comprehensive convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction.

Moreover they are convinced that regional agreements on the establishment of chemical-weapon-free zones would be concrete steps towards confidence-building and towards a worldwide ban on these weapons. In this light the governments of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the German Democratic Republic are prepared to conclude an agreement with the government of the Federal Republic of Germany, which would result in the elimination of chemical weapons on the territories of these countries that are situated right along the dividing line between the two military-political alliances.

In making this proposal they, neighbours of the Federal Republic of Germany, want to encourage in Central Europe arms reductions as concrete action to safeguard peace and security.

We strongly believe, that the proposal submitted by the two governments can lead to a corresponding agreement. Such an accord would be important in strengthening security in Europe and would add to the joint efforts which aim to free Europe of the risks of the use of chemical weapons.

The governments of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the German Democratic Republic invite the government of the Federal Republic of Germany to enter into negotiations on the establishment of a zone free of chemical weapons,

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which should comprise the territories of these three states to begin with. In these negotiations the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the German Democratic Republic are ready to put forward their ideas on the problems involved. It is their understanding that the Federal Republic of Germany for its part will submit specific proposals and reflections of its own, and that the agreement on the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone should be open to all other interested states for accession."

The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic hopes for a positive response from the government of the Federal Republic of Germany and suggests to open negotiations on the matter. The necessary arrangements could be made through diplomatic channels.

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Delegation of the
German Democratic Republic

to the Conference on Confidence and Security Building
Measures and Disarmament in Europe
Stockholm

SECRET

Stockholm, September 20,1985

Dear Colleague,

I take the honour of sending you for your information the text of a letter by Erich Honecker,Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic, to Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, containing the proposal to enter into negotiations on the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Central Europe.

Sincerely Yours,

Günter Bühring

(Dr Günter Bühring)

To the

Heads of Delegations
to the Conference on Confidence
and Security Building Measures
and Disarmament in Europe

Stockholm

SECRET

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Dear Mr.Federal Chancellor,

Desiring to fulfil its responsiblity for peace and relaxation of tensions in Central Europe and to meet the security interests of its own people and indeed of all European peoples, the Government of the German Democratic Republic proposes to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to make a joint contribution to disarmament and arms limitation.

The question of prohibiting and eliminating chemical weapons has long been a subject of international discussion. The states parties to the Warsaw Treaty as well as other states have made proposals to this end.

The Governments of the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic have held consultations on this question and decided to present the following to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany:

"The Governments of the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic hold the view that practical possibilities do exist for the elimination of chemical weapons, particularly for the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe. This could be a way to arrive at the removal of the chemical weapon stocks existing in the region and to ensure that no new, extremely perilous types of such weapons, notably binary weapons, will be deployed on European soil. This has also been reflected in the talks between the SED and the SPD on the establishment of a zone free of chemical weapons, which climaxed in the presentation of the political initiative known to you.

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Next to nuclear weapons, chemical weapons are the most dangerous means of mass destruction. It is a matter of utmost urgency to prohibit and completely eliminate them. What is needed are resolute efforts both on a global and regional scale. The governments of the GDR and Czechoslovakia take a consistent stand for a comprehensive convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction. Moreover, they are convinced that regional agreements on the establishment of chemical-weapon -free zones would be concrete steps towards confidence-building and towards a worldwide ban on these weapons. In this light the governments of the GDR and Czechoslovakia are prepared to conclude an agreement with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, which would result in the elimination of chemical weapons on the territories of these countries that are situated right along the dividing line between the two military-political alliances.

In making this proposal they, neighbours of the FRG, want to encourage in Central Europe arms reductions as concrete action to safeguard peace and security.

We strongly believe that the proposal submitted by the two Governments can lead to a corresponding agreement. Such an accord would be important in strengthening security in Europe and would add to the joint efforts which aim to free Europe of the risks of the use of chemical weapons.

The Governments of the GDR and Czechoslovakia invite the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to enter into negotiations on the establishment of a zone free of chemical weapons, which should comprise the territories of these three states, to begin with.In these negotiations the GDR and Czechoslovakia are ready to put forward their ideas on the problems involved. It is their understanding that the

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FRG for its part will submit specific proposals and reflections of its own, and that the agreement on the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone should be open to all other interested states for accession."

The Government of the GDR hopes for a positive response from the Government of the FRG and suggests to open negotiations on the matter. The necessary arrangements could be made through diplomatic channels.

Yours faithfully

Erich Honecker

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07239
SUBJECT: TEXT OF OPTIONS ON "NON-PAPER"
REF: STOCKHOLM 7076
1. CDE VII - 020
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A PAPER WHICH THE DUTCH DELEGATION DISTRIBUTED TO NATO DELEGATIONS TODAY (09/23) DESCRIBING VARIOUS OPTIONS SUGGESTED IN THE CAUCUS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF THE "NON-PAPER" DISTRIBUTED 09/17/85. THE DUTCH LABELLED TEXT "SECRET." WE ARE TREATING IT AS CONFIDENTIAL.
4. BEGIN TEXT:
(L.) THE EXISTING WORKING STRUCTURE WILL BE USED AS A MEANS OF UNDERTAKING AN INFORMAL EXPLORATION OF TOPICS WHICH MIGHT FIGURE IN THE PROCESS OF DRAFTING ((AGREED)) LANGUAGE FOR POSSIBLE INCLUSION ((IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE)) IN A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT ((OR: IN A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S)).
((THIS PROCESS SHOULD START EITHER: AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
OR: -WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANT
- -IN DUE COURSE
- -IN DUE TIME
- -WHEN CONDITIONS ARE RIPE
- -AS SOON AS ALL PARTICIPANTS ARE READY FOR IT
- -AS SOON AS WARRANTED
- -AT THE LATEST DURING THE EIGHTH SESSION))
(2.) IN INFORMAL MEETINGS OF THE WORKING GROUPS THE FOLLOWING TOPICS WILL BE TAKEN UP:
WORKING GROUP A
- TUESDAY NON-USE OF FORCE
- ((OR: REAFFIRMATION OF THE NON-USE
- OF FORCE PRINCIPLE IN THE CONTEXT
- OF A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY
- CSBM'S))
- WEDNESDAY EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION,
- COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION AND
- DEVELOPMENT OF MEANS OF COMMUNI-
- CATION, EITHER: IN RELATION TO
- NOTIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS
- OR:- IN THE CONTEXT OF A NOTIFI-
- CATION REGIME
- - IN THE CONTEXT OF A NOTIFI-
- CATION SYSTEM
- - IN THE CONTEXT OF A SET OF
- MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S
- - IN THE CONTEXT OF NOTIFI-
- CATION AS PART OF A SET OF
- MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S
- - IN THE CONTEXT OF A NOTI-
- FICATION REGIME/SYSTEM AS PART
- OF A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLE-

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- MENTARY CSBM'S.
- THURSDAY CONSTRAINING MEASURES; ANNUAL
- FORECASTS OF ((CERTAIN)) MILI-
- TARY ACTIVITIES/((OR: CONSTRAIN-
- ING ASPECTS OF A SET OF
- ((MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY)) CSBM'S
- INCLUDING ANNUAL FORECASTS))/
- ((OR: ANNUAL FORECASTS AND OTHER
- CONSTRAINING MEASURES))

WORKING GROUP B

- TUESDAY NOTIFICATION OF ((CERTAIN))
- MILITARY ACTIVITIES (OR: NOTI-
- FICATION.))
- THURSDAY OBSERVATION OF ((CERTAIN))
- MILITARY ACTIVITIES ((OR:
- OBSERVATION.))

(3.) DURING THE EXPLORATORY DISCUSSIONS THE INFORMAL MEETINGS OF THE WORKING GROUPS WILL BE CHAIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXISTING PROCEDURES; ((AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BUT AT THE LATEST)) DURING THE PROCESS OF

FROM USDEL CDE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, PREL, CSCE, CDE

SUBJECT: TEXT OF OPTIONS ON "NON-PAPER"

DRAFTING ((AND AT A TIME AND IN A MANNER TO BE AGREED)) THE INFORMAL MEETINGS WILL BE CHAIRED BY COORDINATORS DRAWN FROM THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES.

(4.) BOTH IN THE EXPLORATION OF THE TOPICS MENTIONED ABOVE AND IN SUBSEQUENT DRAFTING OF LANGUAGE FOR A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT ALL WORK ((AND ALL DRAFT TEXTS)) WILL BE CONSIDERED PRELIMINARY ((OR: PROVISIONAL)) AND WILL NOT IMPLY ((OR: PREJUDICE)) FINAL AGREEMENT ON ALL THE ELEMENTS DISCUSSED.

((5.) IT IS RECALLED THAT EACH MEASURE IN BOTH WORKING GROUPS WILL INCLUDE ADEQUATE VERIFICATION CORRESPONDING TO ITS CONTENT.))

NOTE L. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE FORMAL WORKING ARRANGEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE DECISION OF THE THIRD OF DECEMBER L984 WILL BE EXTENDED FOR THE EIGHTH SESSION BY A DECISION OF THE PLENARY TO BE REGISTERED IN THE JOURNAL.

NOTE 2.

((THE QUESTION OF WHEN THE PROCESSES DESCRIBED ABOVE SHOULD COMMENCE IS LEFT OPEN BUT IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY SHOULD BEGIN AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME.))

((OR: IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE INFORMAL EXPLORATION WILL START AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER AGREEMENT ON THE ABOVE HAS BEEN REACHED AND THAT THE STARTING DATE WILL BE PART OF THE AGREEMENT.))

END TEXT.

HANSEN

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S t a t e m e n t

by the Head of the GDR Delegation to the Stockholm Conference, Ambassador Dr Günter Bühring, on September 25,1984

Mr Chairman,

The distinguished delegate of the Netherlands, Ambassador Buwalda, finished his statement on September 20,1984,with the following sentences:
"I hope to have convinced you that the mandate is alive and well and that SC 1 is its quite legitimate offspring. If the authors of SC 4 believe they can make the same claim for their brainchild I should be most interested to hear it."
I resist the temptation to take up the irony of these sentences and to compare this irony with the declaration to negotiate seriously on the proposals contained in SC 4. I will, however, follow the invitation of Ambassador Buwalda and explain the views of my Delegation on some points, proving that our "brainchild" fulfills the Madrid mandate. In particular I want to deal once again with the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons and the establishment of nuclear-free zones in Europe. First of all let me once again state that I fully support the remarks made on this issue by the Head of the Soviet Delegation, Ambassador Grinevsky, on September 11,1984 and by the Soviet Delegation on September 21,1984. This relevant comment on my part makes it easier to confine myself to furnishing proof that the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons is a genuine

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confidence-building measure in the sense of the Madrid mandate and its four criteria, i.e.:

1. The criterion "military significance"

In the present situation hardly any other measure of this nature is conceivable which would be of greater military significance. The renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons by the USA, Great Britain and France would be tantamount to a renunciation of those military doctrines based on the striking of a first nuclear blow, which take into account "nuclear warning shots" and which do not exclude the dangerous illusion of a limited nuclear war that can be won. The practical military significance and credibility of this renunciation by the four nuclear powers taking part in the Stockholm Conference could even be heightened, if it were combined with the implementation of the proposal on the setting-up of a corridor in Central Europe free of nuclear battlefield weapons. With the establishment of such a corridor effect and expression could be given to the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons.

2. The criterion "politically binding"

Commitment in terms of international law is in our view the highest degree of political commitment. This would correspond to the form of a legal agreement, in which the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and France would stipulate the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons against each other as well as against the other

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states participating in the Conference. Political commitment would, however, also be given, if the above mentioned nuclear powers renounced the first use of nuclear weapons in unilateral declarations approved of by the other participating states. This would have the advantage of refuting formal and procedural arguments against the conclusion of a treaty - e.g. lengthiness of the ratification procedure.

3. The criterion "covering the whole of Europe"

The renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons could cover the whole of Europe thus being in compliance with the mandate. This obligation could be assumed by the nuclear powers with the same degree of commitment and effectiveness towards all European non-nuclear states participating in the Conference. This would in our opinion take into account the principle of equal security.

4. The criterion "provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content"

As a representative of a non-nuclear state I want to express my satisfaction - and I want to underline it - that Paragraph I of SC 4 explicitely states: Provision could be made for the nuclear States participating in the Conference to hold urgent consultations, seek clarifications and provide each other with the necessary information in the event of such a danger arising.

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Mr Chairman,

In an article by the Chairman of the GDR State Council, Erich Honecker, published on the occasion of the 35th anniversary of the foundation of the GDR, it is stated:
" In the present situation the proposals for setting up nuclear-free zones in Europe, including the Swedish initiative to establish a corridor free of nuclear battlefield weapons at the dividing line between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, become of an increasing relevance. The GDR continues to support this initiative and remains ready to make her whole territory available for this purpose."

We welcome it that these days the Prime Minister of the host country of our Conference, Olof Palme, renewed his advocacy of a corridor in Central Europe free of nuclear battlefield weapons, calling it a significant confidence-building measure. It would undoubtedly be of great benefit for the lessening of nuclear confrontation in Europe, if the Federal Republic of Germany also reviewed its attitude so that this idea could be translated into practice. We should start negotiations on this point here; for the Stockholm Conference is in our view the competent forum to discuss proposals on the establishment of nuclear-free zones in Europe, because

- no other negotiating forum is dealing with this issue;
- all nuclear and non-nuclear states affected by and interested in this issue are represented at this Conference;
- the zones to be set up are situated in Europe and do not

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go beyond the area covered by the mandate, but meet the security interests of all European states;

- some states participating in our conference have undertaken initiatives for the establishment of such zones for already some time and have worked for a headstart in the international discussion of these questions.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07364
SUBJECT: NATO AGREED TEXT OF PROCEDURAL NON-PAPER
REFS: A. STOCKHOLM 7239, B. STOCKHOLM 7213
C. STOCKHOLM 7076
1. CDE VII -023.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. ON 26 SEPTEMBER, THE NATO CAUCUS ACCEPTED, AD REF, THE FOLLOWING TEXT MODIFYING THE PROCEDURAL NON-PAPER FIRST INTRODUCED INTO THE CAUCUS ON 17 SEPTEMBER BY THE USDEL (REF C).
BEGIN TEXT:
1. THE EXISTING WORKING STRUCTURE WILL BE USED AS A MEANS OF UNDERTAKING AN INFORMAL EXPLORATION OF TOPICS WHICH MIGHT FIGURE IN THE SUBSEQUENT PROCESS OF DRAFTING LANGUAGE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE, ON A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S FOR POSSIBLE INCLUSION IN A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. THIS DRAFTING PROCESS SHOULD START AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
2. IN INFORMAL MEETINGS OF THE WORKING GROUPS THE FOLLOWING TOPICS WILL BE TAKEN UP:
WORKING GROUP A
-- TUESDAY THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE IN THE
- CONTEXT OF A SET OF MUTUALLY
- COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S.
-- WEDNESDAY EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION,
- COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION, AND
- DEVELOPMENT OF MEANS OF COMMUNICATION,
- IN THE CONTEXT OF A NOTIFICATION
- SYSTEM COMPRISING A SET OF MUTUALLY
- COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S.
-- THURSDAY ANNUAL FORECASTS OF CERTAIN MILITARY
- ACTIVITIES AND OTHER CONSTRAINING
- MEASURES.
WORKING GROUP B
-- TUESDAY NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY
- ACTIVITIES.
-- THURSDAY OBSERVATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY
- ACTIVITIES.
3. BOTH IN THE EXPLORATION OF THE TOPICS MENTIONED ABOVE AND IN SUBSEQUENT DRAFTING OF LANGUAGE FOR A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT ALL WORK AND ALL DRAFT TEXTS WILL BE CONSIDERED PRELIMINARY AND PROVISIONAL AND WILL NEITHER IMPLY NOR PREJUDICE FINAL AGREEMENT ON ANY OF THE ELEMENTS DISCUSSED.
4. IT IS RECALLED THAT THE CSBM'S TO BE ADOPTED WILL BE PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION WHICH CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTENT.
END TEXT.
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07363
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS SESSIONS, SEPTEMBER 24-26, 1985
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 7239, B) STOCKHOLM 7076,
C) STOCKHOLM 7213
1. CDE VII - 022
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
-
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE NATO CAUCUS MET SEPTEMBER 24-26 TO DISCUSS AN OPTIONS PAPER COMPILED BY THE DUTCH (REF A) ON IMPROVEMENTS TO THE NON-PAPER PREVIOUSLY INTRODUCED BY AMBASSADOR GOODY ON INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE (REF B) BASED ON AMENDMENTS OFFERED DURING THE SEPTEMBER 16-20 CAUCUS MEETINGS (SEE REF C). AS OF SEPTEMBER 26, THE CAUCUS HAD REACHED AD REF AGREEMENT ON THE TEXT OF THE DUTCH PAPER AS REPORTED BELOW. HOWEVER, EDES (UK) CONTINUED TO TAKE THE MOST CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO THE WHOLE EXERCISE AND EMPHASIZED THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO SUBMIT THE WHOLE AMENDED TEXT TO LONDON FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION. TO ALLOW TIME FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH CAPITALS THE CAUCUS AGREED NOT TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE AGAIN UNTIL ITS REGULAR OCTOBER 1 MEETING. END SUMMARY.
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4. CONTACT: SEPTEMBER 24 NATO CAUCUS SESSION OPENED WITH REPORTS ON CONTACTS WITH EASTERN AND NNA AMBASSADORS. GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) REPORTED THAT GRINEVSKY HAD SOUGHT HIS VIEW ON A DATE FOR THE START OF THE DRAFTING PERIOD, TO WHICH GASCHIGNARD HAD REPLIED (ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM PARIS) THAT FRANCE COULD ACCEPT LANGUAGE IN AN AGREEMENT "WITH A VIEW TO DRAFTING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE." GRINEVSKY HAD AGREED WITH GASCHIGNARD'S OBSERVATION THAT ANY AGREEMENT ON INFORMAL STRUCTURE SHOULD APPEAR TO BE AN NNA INITIATIVE AND NOT "AN EAST-WEST PLOT" AND HAD INDICATED THAT FINNISH AMBASSADOR KAHILUOTO WAS THE RIGHT PERSON TO APPROACH. GRINEVSKY CONTINUED TO APPEAR TO BE IN A HURRY TO REACH AN AGREEMENT AND, BASED ON THIS OBSERVATION, GASCHIGNARD ADVISED THE CAUCUS THAT WE ALSO NEED TO HURRY IN OUR RESPONSE OR THE INITIATIVE WILL PASS TO THE WARSAW PACT. GASCHIGNARD, UNDER QUESTION FROM EDES (UK) CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO GRINEVSKY THAT HE WAS SPEAKING ONLY IN HIS NATIONAL CAPACITY AND WAS NOT REPRESENTING NATO VIEWS. HOWEVER, THE CAUCUS WAS CLEARLY UNEASY ABOUT GASCHIGNARD'S CONVERSATION WITH GRINEVSKY. CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL) ASKED, RHETORICALLY, WHY WE WERE BOTHERING TO MEET IN CAUCUS AT ALL IF WE WERE ALL GOING TO TELL OUR NATIONAL POSITIONS TO GRINEVSKY. BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) RECOGNIZED GASCHIGNARD'S RIGHT TO DISCUSS FRENCH VIEWS, BUT OBSERVED THAT THE CAUCUS SHOULD BE INFORMED FIRST OF IMPORTANT CHANGES IN NATIONAL POSITIONS. GASCHIGNARD, IN RESPONSE, OFFERED NO COMMITMENT ON THIS SCORE AND

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ONLY COMMENTED THAT HE HAD INFORMED THE CAUCUS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER HIS DISCUSSION WITH GRINEVSKY. GASCHIGNARD FINISHED HIS REPORT NOTING THAT HE HAD EXPRESSED TO GRINEVSKY HIS "NATIONAL POSITION" THAT THE WEST SHOULD NOT PASS A COMPLETE PAPER TO KAHILUOTO, BUT SHOULD ONLY GIVE HIM A PAPER LISTING "HEADINGS" WHILE BRIEFING HIM ON PROCEDURES ORALLY. (COMMENT: THE CAUCUS SHOWED LITTLE INTEREST AT THIS POINT AND GASCHIGNARD NEVER EXPLAINED EXACTLY WHAT THE FRENCH HAVE IN MIND. END COMMENT.) DELWORTH (CANADA) HAD ALSO SPOKEN TO GRINEVSKY WHO

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SEEMED TO HAVE DROPPED THE REQUIREMENT OF A FIXED DATE FOR DRAFTING, BUT WOULD WANT TO BE "WELL INTO DRAFTING BY THE EIGHTH SESSION." HE IS ALSO PREPARED TO ACCEPT A SINGLE DOCUMENT AS THE RESULT OF THE CONFERENCE, ACCORDING TO DELWORTH. GRINEVSKY HAD ALSO NOTED TO DELWORTH THE SOVIET VIEW THAT CDE WAS THE ONLY EAST-WEST NEGOTIATION THAT COULD PRODUCE A RESULT AND THAT IT WOULD BE TRAGIC TO LOSE THE OPPORTUNITY. DELWORTH FURTHER REPORTED THAT AMBASSADOR BUHRING (GDR) HAD EXPLICITLY ACKNOWLEDGED TO HIM THAT THE EAST'S

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NON-STARTERS HAD BEEN ABANDONED AND THAT GRINEVSKY HAD PRESENTED THIS FACT TO A WARSAW PACT MEETING IN BERLIN AS A CLEAR DECISION TAKEN BY MOSCOW. ON THIS LAST POINT, OZGUL (TURKEY) HAD RECEIVED CONFLICTING INFORMATION THROUGH THE YUGOSLAVS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SOVIETS MAY BE RESERVING THE OPTION OF RESURRECTING THE NON-STARTERS FOR INCORPORATION IN THE PREAMBLE OF A POTENTIAL CONCLUDING DOCUMENT.

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5. GREECE, NORWAY, ITALY, AND BELGIUM REPORTED ON CONTACTS WITH THE NNA. THE SWISS CLEARLY INDICATED TO BOTH AMBASSADORS PAPADAKIS (GREECE) AND STANDAERT (BELGIUM) THAT THEY WERE INSISTING IN THE NNA CAUCUS, AND WOULD INSIST IN DRAFTING, ON A LINK BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND NUF. SCHENK (SWITZERLAND) HAD ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO COORDINATORS BEING FROM THE NNA IN ANY AGREEMENT ON STRUCTURE, BECAUSE IT WOULD MAKE THE DIVISION OF THE CONFERENCE INTO BLOCS TOO OBVIOUS . HE HAD ACCEPTED THE FACT, OF COURSE, THAT COORDINATORS WOULD BE FROM THE NNA'S. MEVIK (NORWAY) TOLD THE CAUCUS THAT THE SWEDES HAD INDICATED AT AN INFORMAL NORDIC MEETING THAT THE NNA HAD AGREED: 1) ON AN EARLY EXPLORATORY PHASE WITH ROTATING CHAIRMANSHIPS; 2) THAT EXPLORATORY GROUPS WOULD

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MEET FOR TWO WEEKS IN THE CURRENT SESSION; AND 3) THAT THE GROUPS WOULD MEET IN THE PRESENT FIVE CLUSTERS WITH "CONSULTATIONS" BEING ADDED TO THE INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/COMMUNICATIONS GROUP. LIDGARD (SWEDEN) HAD ALSO INDICATED THAT THEY WERE CONSIDERING INCLUDING A STATEMENT IN THE AGREEMENT "WITH A VIEW TO AN EARLY PASSAGE TO A STAGE OF DRAFTING." LIDGARD HAD ALSO INDICATED THAT THE NNA WERE PREPARED TO PLAY THE SAME ROLE THEY HAD IN BRINGING TOGETHER THE DECEMBER 1984 AGREEMENT ON WORKING ARRANGEMENTS. IN THIS REGARD, CIARRAPICO (ITALY)) REPORTED THAT KAHILUOTO (FINLAND) WAS ALSO READY TO ACT AS A MEDIATOR. KAHILUOTO HAD ALSO VOICED HIS EXPECTATION THAT THE EXPLORATORY PHASE WOULD ACHIEVE NO PROGRESS, WOULD LAST ONLY 2-3 WEEKS, AND SHOULD MAKE WAY FOR DRAFTING NO LATER THAN THE MIDDLE OF THE NEXT ROUND. IN CONTRAST, STANDAERT (BELGIUM), CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY, CLOSED THE DISCUSSION ON CONTACTS BY OBSERVING THAT SWISS AMBASSADOR SCHENK HAD TOLD HIM THERE WAS NO NNA POSITION ON DRAFTING AND THAT SWITZERLAND ITSELF WAS AGAINST EARLY INFORMAL MEETINGS AND EARLY DRAFTING.

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6. CAUCUS DISCUSSION TURNED TO A PAPER PREPARED BY THE NETHERLANDS (REF A) WHICH REFLECTED THE VARIOUS CHANGES PROPOSED AS IMPROVEMENTS TO THE INITIAL U.S. NON-PAPER. EDES (UK) OPENED WITH THE GENERAL COMMENT THAT "WE SHOULD ACHIEVE MAXIMUM AGREEMENT AMONG OURSELVES AND THE MAXIMUM BARGAINING POSITION." AD REF AGREEMENT WAS ACHIEVED ON A TEXT OF PARA 1 TO READ AS FOLLOWS.

QUOTE:

THE EXISTING WORKING STRUCTURE WILL BE USED AS MEANS OF UNDERTAKING AN INFORMAL EXPLORATION OF TOPICS WHICH MIGHT FIGURE IN THE SUBSEQUENT PROCESS OF DRAFTING LANGUAGE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE, FOR A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLIMENTARY CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES, FOR POSSIBLE INCLUSION IN A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. THIS DRAFTING PROCESS SHOULD START AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

END QUOTE.

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7. TURNING TO PARA 2, THE CAUCUS FIRST FOCUSED ON GROUP A (TUESDAY). CITRON (FRG) OBJECTED TO THE OPTION OF "REAFFIRMATION OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE IN THE CONTEXT OF A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S." HE ARGUED THAT THIS WAS A MAXIMUM POSITION WHICH COULD NOT WIN SOVIET APPROVAL AND THAT WE SHOULD NOT MAKE

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GRINEVSKY TAKE A PUBLIC BEATING NOW BY FORCING IT INTO AN AGREEMENT. FRANCE AND TURKEY ARGUED THAT NOT ONLY GRINEVSKY BUT ALSO THE NNA WOULDN'T BUY THIS FORMULATION. DELWORTH (CANADA) SAID THAT THIS ALTERNATIVE WAS FINE IF WE WANT A LONG PERIOD OF BARGAINING, BUT WHAT WE REALLY SHOULD DO IS "PUT FORWARD SOMETHING REASONABLE WHICH IS LIKELY TO STAND A CHANCE OF EARNING CONSENSUS." EDES (UK) COUNTERED THAT IF THE SOVIETS WERE INSISTING ON QUALIFYING THE VERIFICATION/INFORMATION GROUP BY RELATING IT TO NOTIFICATION WE SHOULD TRY THE SAME THING AS OUR OPENING POSITION ON NUF. HE ALSO EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE DOUBT THAT THE EAST WOULD NOT TRY TO RESURRECT THEIR NON-STARTERS LATER UNDER THE GENERAL "NUF" RUBRIC IF WE LET IT STAND ALONE AS A CLUSTER DESCRIPTION. THE U.S. POINTED OUT THAT THE MENTION OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE COULD BE USEFUL IN COUNTERING FURTHER EASTERN EFFORTS FOR A TREATY AND SUGGESTED THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE: "THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE IN THE CONTEXT OF A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S." THIS WAS ACCEPTED BY THE CAUCUS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF EDES WHO INDICATED HE WOULD REPORT THIS LANGUAGE TO LONDON, BUT WOULD HAVE TO RESERVE ON AGREEMENT.

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8. DISCUSSION OF PARA 2, WORKING GROUP A (WEDNESDAY) BEGAN ON THE 24TH AND WAS CONCLUDED ON THE 26TH. ALL AGREED THAT THIS WAS THE MOST CRITICAL POINT OF THE PAPER AND WERE CONCERNED TO PROTECT OUR POSITION. DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON THE LAST OPTION OF THE DUTCH PAPER, BECAUSE IT JOINED GRINEVSKY'S BOTTOM LINE REQUIREMENT FOR RECOGNITION OF A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFORMATION/VERIFICATION AND NOTIFICATION, WITH OUR OBJECTIVE OF PROTECTING THE ENTIRE NATO CSBM PACKAGE. AT THE SEPTEMBER 24 MEETING HANSEN (U.S.) PROPOSED CHANGING THE OPTION TO " . . . A NOTIFICATION SYSTEM COMPRISING A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLIMENTARY CSBM'S." THIS, HANSEN INDICATED, WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE NOTIFICATION SYSTEM WE WERE REFERRING TO WAS OUR COMPLETE PACKAGE OF MEASURES 1 - 6, NOT JUST MEASURE 5. ON THE OTHER HAND THE LANGUAGE, "AS PART OF A SET OF CSBM'S," COULD ALLOW THE SOVIETS TO ARGUE THAT NATO COULD NOT RAISE SOME OF OUR MEASURES (E.G., "STATIC" INFORMATION). DELWORTH (CANADA) EXPRESSED HIS INITIAL VIEW THAT HE HAD ALWAYS FELT THAT OUR CSBM'S WERE MORE THAN JUST A NOTIFICATION REGIME, BUT HE LATER SUPPORTED THE U.S. FORMULATION AS AN OPENING POSITION. EDES (UK) ALSO FELT THAT OUR PACKAGE WAS MORE THAN A NOTIFICATION REGIME. HE SUGGESTED OUR BEST OPENING POSITION WOULD BE OPTION 3 OF THE DUTCH PAPER WHICH ONLY SAYS " . . . IN THE CONTEXT OF A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S" WITHOUT ANY REFERENCE TO A NOTIFICATION SYSTEM. AT THE

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SESSION ON THE 25TH, HANSEN (U.S.) RETURNED TO THIS POINT AND REITERATED THAT AMBASSADOR GOODBY HAD IMPRESSED ON GRINEVSKY IN MOSCOW THE POINT THAT A NOTIFICATION REGIME/SYSTEM INCLUDED ALL THE NATO MEASURES, AND THAT OUR FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE IN THIS EXERCISE MUST BE NOT TO GIVE UP MEASURES 1 OR 5 OR AMALGAMATE THEM INTO MEASURE 3. AGREEMENT COALESCED AROUND HANSEN'S ORIGINAL PROPOSAL OF "COMPRISING" TO BE USED AS AN OPENING POSITION. IT WAS ALSO AGREED TO USE THE PHRASE "NOTIFICATION SYSTEM" INSTEAD OF "NOTIFICATION REGIME" BECAUSE OF THE BROADER MEANING OF
-
SYSTEM. THE NEW DESCRIPTION OF GROUP A (WEDNESDAY) WOULD READ:
QUOTE:
EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION, COMPLIANCE, AND VERIFICATION, AND DEVELOPMENT OF MEANS OF COMMUNICATION, IN THE CONTEXT OF A NOTIFICATION SYSTEM COMPRISING A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S.
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END QUOTE.
EDES AGAIN EMPHASIZED THAT HE WOULD PUT THIS SUGGESTED LANGUAGE TO LONDON.
9. DISCUSSION OF GROUP A (THURSDAY) ALSO OVERLAPPED TWO SESSIONS. ON THE 24TH, HANSEN (U.S.) PROPOSED A MODIFIED VERSION OF OPTION 3 OF THE DUTCH PAPER, "ANNUAL FORECASTS; OTHER CONSTRAINING MEASURES" IN ORDER TO CLARIFY THAT ANNUAL FORECASTS IS A CONSTRAINING MEASURE. DELWORTH (CANADA) COMMENTED THAT THIS PROPOSAL WAS "RIDICULOUS" AND WOULD BE "LAUGHED OUT OF COURT" BY THE NNA. HANSEN RESPONDED STRONGLY TO THE EFFECT THAT OUR EFFORT HERE SHOULD BE TO GET OUR MAXIMUM POSITION AND TO DO IT "IN ANY WAY WE CAN." SENSING THE MOOD OF THE CAUCUS U.S. DEPUTY THEN STATED THAT THE ORIGINAL FORMULA AS STATED IN THE GOODBY NON-PAPER WAS ACCEPTABLE, IF THE CAUCUS COULD NOW AGREE ON IT. AS THERE WAS NO DISSENT TO THIS PROPOSITION THE GROUP A (THURSDAY) DESCRIPTION WAS AGREED UPON AS:
"CONSTRAINING MEASURES; ANNUAL FORECASTS OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES."
10. ON THE 25TH, RAPID AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON DESCRIPTIONS FOR WORKING GROUP B (TUESDAY AND THURSDAY). THESE ARE:
-
(TUESDAY)
"NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES."
(THURSDAY)

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"OBSERVATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES."
TURNING TO PARA 3 OF THE DUTCH PAPER, DISCUSSION BECAME MORE DRAWN OUT. IN LIGHT OF A STRONG NNA VIEW EXPRESSED BY SWISS AMBASSADOR SCHENK, IT WAS AGREED TO DROP THE EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO NNA COORDINATORS. HANSEN (U.S.) ARGUED FOR NO REFERENCE TO COORDINATORS AT ALL IN THIS DOCUMENT, BECAUSE IT MIGHT PREJUDICE THE NUMBER OF COORDINATORS TO BE USED IN ANY DRAFTING PROCESS. HE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT TWO COORDINATORS FOR DRAFTING (ONE EACH FOR GROUPS A AND B) WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO FIVE (ONE FOR EACH CLUSTER) BECAUSE ONE COORDINATOR IN EACH WORKING GROUP COULD MOVE THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE SUBJECTS OF THE DIFFERENT CLUSTERS NOT LOCKING US INTO A CLUSTER DEVOTED ENTIRELY TO NUF OR TO CONSTRAINTS. AS AN ALTERNATIVE HANSEN SUGGESTED ONE SENTENCE, "THE INFORMAL MEETINGS OF THE WORKING GROUPS WILL BE CHAIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH NORMAL (OR EXISTING) PRACTICE." THIS WOULD NOT ONLY REMOVE THE REFERENCE TO COORDINATORS, BUT ALSO ANY REFERENCE TO DRAFTING FROM THE PARAGRAPH AND EXPAND THE "FIREBREAK" BETWEEN THE EXPLORATORY AND DRAFTING PHASES. AN INCONCLUSIVE THEOLOGICAL DISCUSSION ENSUED AS TO WHETHER THERE WERE EXISTING CSCE PROCEDURES THAT NECESSITATE NNA COORDINATORS FOR DRAFTING. PORTUGAL SUGGESTED DELETING THE ENTIRE PARAGRAPH AS UNNECESSARY. THE U.S. AGREED THIS MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE. OTHERS SOUGHT TO RETAIN A REFERENCE TO COORDINATORS SO CAVEATED AS NOT TO PREJUDICE THE NUMBER TO BE USED IN DRAFTING.
11. CAUCUS RECONVENED ON SEPTEMBER 26 TO COMPLETE ITS CONSIDERATION OF THE DUTCH NON-PAPER. RETURNING TO THE QUESTION OF PARA 3, BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) SUGGESTED THAT IT BE DELETED AND THAT IN THE COURSE OF OUR PRESENTATION OF THE PAPER TO KAHILUOTO (FINLAND) THE NATO SPOKESMAN COULD ORALLY PRESENT OUR VIEWS ON PROCEDURE. AFTER BRIEF DISCUSSION THIS PROPOSAL WAS ACCEPTED AND THE PARA WAS DELETED WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IN PRESENTING THE NATO PAPER TO KAHILUOTO WE WOULD ORALLY INDICATE THAT 1) THERE SHOULD BE A ROTATING CHAIRMANSHIP IN THE EXPLORATORY PHASE; AND 2) THE NNA SHOULD SUGGEST WHEN
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AND IN WHAT MANNER NNA COORDINATORS WOULD TAKE OVER. HOWEVER, WE WOULD INDICATE THAT IT WAS NATO'S VIEW THAT THERE SHOULD ONLY BE TWO COORDINATORS IN THE DRAFTING PHASE. TURNING TO PARA 4, THE CAUCUS AGREED TO A CANADIAN SUGGESTION TO TAKE A MAXIMALIST APPROACH AND INCORPORATE ALL THE BRACKETED LANGUAGE. THE NEW AD REF TEXT READS:

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QUOTE:
BOTH IN THE EXPLORATION OF THE TOPICS MENTIONED ABOVE AND IN THE SUBSEQUENT DRAFTING OF LANGUAGE FOR A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, ALL WORK AND ALL DRAFT TEXTS WILL BE CONSIDERED PRELIMINARY AND PROVISIONAL AND WILL NEITHER IMPLY NOR PREJUDICE FINAL AGREEMENT ON ANY OF THE ELEMENTS DISCUSSED.
END QUOTE.

12. THE CAUCUS AGREED TO REPHRASE PARA 5 OF THE DUTCH PAPER TO BRING IT INTO STRICT CONFORMITY WITH THE VERIFICATION LANGUAGE OF THE MANDATE. THE AD REF TEXT READS:
QUOTE:
IT IS RECALLED THAT THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES TO BE ADOPTED WILL BE PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION WHICH CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTENT.
END QUOTE.

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WITH REGARD TO NOTES 1 AND 2 OF THE DUTCH PAPER, BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) EXPLAINED THAT THESE ARE NOT INTENDED TO APPEAR IN ANY TEXT, BUT WOULD BE MADE ORALLY BY NATO SPOKESMEN IN INFORMAL CONTACTS WITH KAHILUOTO (FINLAND). ON THIS UNDERSTANDING THE CAUCUS ACCEPTED NOTE 1 AS DRAFTED, AND THE SECOND OPTION OF NOTE 2.

13. EDES (UK) REOPENED DISCUSSION OF THE DESCRIPTION FOR GROUP A (THURSDAY). HE EXPRESSED HIS CONTINUED CONCERN THAT WE NOT ACCEPT A FORMULATION THAT WOULD FORCE US TO DRAFT ON "CONSTRAINTS" WHEN NATO DOESN'T HAVE A CONSTRAINTS PROPOSAL. HE FURTHER INDICATED THAT THE FORMULA AGREED TO BY THE CAUCUS ON THE 25TH, "CONSTRAINING MEASURES; ANNUAL FORECASTS OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES," WOULD NOT FLY WITH LONDON. HE SUGGESTED AS AN ALTERNATIVE, "ANNUAL FORECASTS AND OTHER CONSTRAINING ASPECTS OF A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S," IN ORDER TO GIVE PRIMACY TO THE CONSTRAINTS ASPECTS OF OUR ANNUAL FORECASTS MEASURE. THE NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, AND ITALY OFFERED IMMEDIATE NEGATIVE REACTION TO THIS NEW FORMULATION. BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) OBSERVED THAT THIS WOULD BE VIEWED AS A MOVE AGAINST THE NEUTRALS, WHO WE NEED TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH AS WE MOVE TO AN INFORMAL STRUCTURE. GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) SAID HE DID NOT SHARE THE UK'S CONCERN BECAUSE NO COMMITMENT WAS BEING MADE TO DRAFT ON ANY OF THE TOPICS IN THIS PAPER. HANSEN (U.S.) OBSERVED THAT EDES HAD HIT ON A KEY ISSUE, NOTING THAT WE COULD NOT DRAFT ON CONSTRAINTS UNTIL WE HAVE A CONSTRAINTS MEASURE, AND, THEREFORE, HAD TO ATTEMPT TO DIRECT THE THRUST OF OUR DRAFTING EFFORTS TOWARD "ANNUAL FORECASTS." BEARING IN MIND SEVERAL SUGGESTIONS BROUGHT TO THE FLOOR, THE CHAIR (DENMARK) SOUGHT AND OBTAINED AD

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REF AGREEMENT TO A NEW FORMULATION GIVING THE FIRST POSITIONS TO ANNUAL FORECASTS.

QUOTE:
ANNUAL FORECASTS OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND OTHER CONSTRAINING MEASURES.
END QUOTE.
WHILE APPARENTLY JOINING IN AD REF AGREEMENT, EDES ALSO INDICATED THAT HE WOULD REPORT THE OTHER FORMULATIONS FROM USDEL CDE
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TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS SESSIONS, SEPTEMBER 24-26, 1985 (AS DISCUSSED ABOVE) TO LONDON ALONG WITH THE CAUCUS' AGREED LANGUAGE.
14. FULL AD REF TEXT IS BEING REPORTED SEPTEL. IN ORDER TO PERMIT TIME FOR CONSULTATION WITH CAPITALS THE CAUCUS AGREED NOT TO ADDRESS THIS MATTER FURTHER UNTIL ITS REGULAR TUESDAY SESSION OCTOBER 2.
15. COMMENT: THE CAUCUS' INITIAL ENTHUSIASM FOR A RAPID RESPONSE TO THE GRINEVSKY PROPOSAL HAS DIMINISHED CONSIDERABLY THIS WEEK AS THE DETAILS OF THE PROCEDURAL PAPER HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED AND MODIFICATIONS MADE. CANADA, NORWAY, AND THE FRG ARE NO LONGER SEEKING A PAPER THAT WILL INSTANTANEOUSLY MEET ALL OF GRINEVSKY'S REQUIREMENTS. IN PARTICULAR, DELWORTH (CANADA), WHO HAD LED THE CHARGE ON THE 24TH FOR A COUNTERPROPOSAL THAT COULD "EARN CONSENSUS," SEEMED MUCH MORE WILLING TO CONSIDER HOW BEST TO PROMOTE NATO'S OBJECTIVES ON THE 25TH. MEVIK (NORWAY) AND BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) HAVE ALSO TAKEN A MORE SERIOUS VIEW THIS WEEK OF THE RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE POSSIBLE AGREEMENT. MOST DELEGATIONS NOW SEEM RESIGNED TO MAKING AN INITIAL EFFORT TO OBTAIN OUR OPTIMUM POSITION, BUT ARE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE MODIFIED PAPER BEING THE VEHICLE FOR A PROCEDURAL UNDERSTANDING. MUCH RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS SOBER VIEW BEING TAKEN BY THE CAUCUS GOES NOT ONLY TO THE UK BUT ALSO TO PORTUGUESE AMBASSADOR CUTILEIRO WHO IN SHORT BUT EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS HAS CONTINUOUSLY ASKED WHY WE CANNOT USE GRINEVSKY'S DESIRE FOR HASTE TO OUR ADVANTAGE. THE MORE SOBER VIEW HAS, HOWEVER, NOT DIMINISHED THE ENTHUSIASM OF THE CAUCUS FOR MOVING RAPIDLY INTO AN INFORMAL WORKING MODE WHICH IS SEEN AS THE FIRST STEP TO DRAFTING. THE UK AND PORTUGAL REMAIN THE MAIN HOLDOUTS. THE USDEL HAS ADOPTED A POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD CHANGING THE WORKING MODE AND SUPPORTED THE MOVE TO DRAFTING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. END COMMENT.
HANSEN
END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07415
SUBJECT: CDE: THE CURRENT STATUS OF NNA WORKING PAPERS
1. CDE VII - 024
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. DURING AMBASSADORIAL CONSULTATIONS IN BRIONI IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THIS ROUND, THE NNA AGREED TO TABLE THEIR FIVE WORKING PAPERS AS A PACKAGE AND TO FLESH OUT VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN THEIR SKELETAL SC.3. THEIR PAPERS FOCUS ON 1) NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF), 2) NOTIFICATION, 3) OBSERVATION, 4) CONSULTATIONS AND 5) CONSTRAINTS. UNABLE SO FAR TO MOVE CLOSER TO CONSENSUS DURING INTENSIVE WORKING LEVEL MEETINGS THIS ROUND IN STOCKHOLM, ONE NNA MEMBER FEELS THAT THE TIME HAS COME FOR NNA AMBASSADORS TO GET INVOLVED TO "MAKE THE NECESSARY POLITICAL DECISIONS." ON OBSERVATION/VERIFICATION, THE NNA HAVE WORKED OUT IMPROVED, STANDARDIZED CONDITIONS FOR OBSERVERS, INCLUDING SOME MEASURES WHICH ARE MORE INTRUSIVE THAN THE NATO MEASURES. THEY HAVE WORKED OUT THE OUTLINES OF A MULTI-CEILINGED CONSTRAINTS MEASURE BASED ON A STRUCTURAL PARAMETER (THE DIVISION). WHILE THEY HAVE DEVELOPED A NOTIFICATION FORMAT, THEY HAVE NOT REACHED AGREEMENT ON WHAT TO NOTIFY AND ARE BOGGED DOWN IN A QUAGMIRE OF DEFINITIONAL DIFFERENCES. THE NNA DO NOT SUPPORT NATO'S MEASURE ONE (EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION); THEY PREFER AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WHICH WOULD BE LINKED TO NOTIFICATIONS. NON-USE OF FORCE HAS PROVEN TO BE THE MOST CONTENTIOUS SUBJECT AND IT APPEARS THAT THE NNA WILL BE ABLE TO AGREE ONLY ON THE GENERAL ELEMENTS OF A NUF COMMITMENT. NNA ESTIMATES ON WHEN THEY WILL BE READY TO TABLE THEIR PAPERS NOW RANGE FROM THE END OF THIS ROUND (FINLAND) TO AFTER THE GENEVA SUMMIT (SWITZERLAND). A READ-OUT OF THE CURRENT STATUS OF INTRA-NNA NEGOTIATIONS ON THEIR SET OF WORKING PAPERS FOLLOWS. END SUMMARY.
BRIONI MEETING
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4. DURING THE AMBASSADORIAL CONSULTATIONS AT BRIONI IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE START OF THIS (SEVENTH) ROUND, THE NNA AGREED TO TABLE THEIR FIVE WORKING PAPERS AS A PACKAGE, RATHER THAN INDIVIDUALLY. DESPITE EXPRESSIONS OF OPTIMISM, THIS DECISION GUARANTEED THAT THE TABLING OF THE PAPERS WOULD BE FURTHER DELAYED SINCE THE NNA HAD NOT COME CLOSE TO CONSENSUS ON NON-USE OF FORCE OR ON SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF THE CSBM'S PROPOSALS. IN THESE PAPERS, THE NNA HAVE AGREED TO FLESH OUT ALL OF THE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN THEIR SKELETAL PROPOSAL, SC.3, EXCEPT THEIR CONSTRAINTS ON THE DEPLOYMENT IN CERTAIN AREAS OF MILITARY UNITS AND/OR EQUIPMENT NEEDED FOR SUSTAINED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS (PARA G 12). (IT APPARENTLY WAS DECIDED IN BRIONI THAT IT WAS UNREALISTIC

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TO EXPECT TO REACH CONSENSUS ON THE LATTER ITEM, FIRST PROPOSED BY YUGOSLAVIA, AND THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO POSTPONE FURTHER WORK ON THIS TOPIC FOR A FUTURE STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE.) NNA PAPERS FOCUS ON (1) NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF), (2) NOTIFICATION, (3) OBSERVATION, (4) CONSULTATIONS AND (5) CONSTRAINTS. FOLLOWING THE BRIONI DECISION, A CORE OF WORKING LEVEL CONTACTS GATHERED IN STOCKHOLM ONE WEEK BEFORE THE CURRENT SESSION CONVENED TO TRY TO RESOLVE REMAINING DIFFERENCES. UNABLE SO FAR TO MOVE CLOSER TO CONSENSUS DURING INTERMINABLE MEETINGS AT THE WORKING LEVEL, ONE NNA MEMBER FEELS THAT THE TIME HAS COME FOR NNA AMBASSADORS TO GET INVOLVED TO "MAKE THE NECESSARY POLITICAL DECISIONS." NNA ESTIMATES AS TO WHEN THEY WILL BE READY TO TABLE THEIR PAPERS RANGED FROM 2-3 WEEKS AFTER THE START OF THIS SESSION (SWEDEN), WHICH IS NOW CLEARLY IMPOSSIBLE, TO AFTER THE U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT, A POSITION FAVORED BY SWITZERLAND. (ACCORDING TO A BULGARIAN SOURCE (PROTECT), AN NNA DELEGATE GAVE SOVIET
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GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
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AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY THE LATTER TIME FRAME, USING THE SUMMIT AS A COVER FOR NNA INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES.) SOME (INCLUDING FINLAND), HOWEVER, CONTINUE TO PREDICT THAT THE PAPERS WILL BE SUBMITTED BY THE END OF THIS SESSION.
OBSERVATION/VERIFICATION
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5. THE NNA HAVE WORKED OUT IMPROVED, STANDARDIZED CONDITIONS FOR OBSERVERS. THE NNA OBSERVATION MEASURE CONTAINS ASPECTS WHICH ARE MORE INTRUSIVE THAN NATO'S OBSERVATION MEASURE, E.G., A PROVISION WHICH WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR OBSERVERS TO AN EXERCISE TO COMMANDEER A HELICOPTER AND TELL THE PILOT TO FLY THEM WHEREVER THEY WISH TO GO. IN AN APPARENT ATTEMPT TO ACCOMMODATE THE SOVIET UNION'S AVERSION TO NATO'S ON-SITE INSPECTION MEASURE, THE SWEDES HAVE INTRODUCED A NEW CONCEPT, "OBSERVATION ON REQUEST," WHICH, THEY CLAIM, STILL WOULD PROVIDE STATES THE OPPORTUNITY TO REQUEST THE OBSERVATION OF UNNOTIFIED MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THE SWEDES ARE PUSHING FOR THIS "OBSERVATION ON REQUEST" REGIME TO DEPEND ON A CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM -- IN A BOW TO THE SWISS THEY SUGGEST A "SALON DES AMBASSADEURS" -- WHICH WOULD BE CONVENED TO SCREEN OBSERVATION REQUESTS. THIS ISSUE HAS NOT BEEN RESOLVED: VIEWS RANGE FROM THE DESIRE OF THE YUGOSLAVS TO REPLACE INSPECTION COMPLETELY WITH CONSULTATION TO THE CONCERN OF OTHERS THAT SUCH A CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM NOI BECOME AN OBSTACLE TO THE

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TIMELY IMPLEMENTATION OF OBSERVATION REQUESTS TO A RELUCTANCE BY SOME TO ACCEPT ANY CONSULTATION MECHANISM.

6. IN A RECENT VERIFICATION SYMPOSIUM SPONSORED BY THE SWEDES, A MEMBER OF THE SWEDISH DELEGATION (TUNBERGER) DELIVERED A PAPER IN WHICH HE CALLED FOR VERIFICATION USING NTM'S AND CONSULTATION/OBSERVATION ON REQUEST. TUNBERGER MADE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN URGENT AND NON-URGENT SITUATIONS, NOTING THAT IN THE FORMER CASE CONSULTATIONS MIGHT BE BYPASSED; IN LESS URGENT CASES HE ENVISAGED QUICK CONSULTATIONS FOLLOWED, IF NECESSARY, BY ON-SITE INSPECTION. THIS APPROACH, HOWEVER, HAS NOT BEEN REFLECTED IN STATEMENTS BY THE SWEDISH DELEGATION AT THE CONFERENCE.

CONSTRAINTS

7. WHILE DEBATE CONTINUES BETWEEN THE NNA ON THE PARAMETERS OF THEIR MULTI-CEILINGED CONSTRAINTS PROPOSAL (SEE STOCKHOLM 6957), SUCH A PROPOSAL PROBABLY WOULD:

1) BAN EXERCISES INVOLVING MORE THAN A CERTAIN NUMBER (FIVE OR SIX) OF DIVISIONS;

2) NOT PERMIT MORE THAN A CERTAIN ANNUAL TOTAL (FIVE OR SIX) FOR MANEUVERS WHICH EXCEED TWO DIVISIONS;

3) NOT LIMIT THE NUMBER OF MANEUVERS PER YEAR INVOLVING FEWER THAN TWO DIVISIONS IF THEY ARE PRENOTIFIED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR;

4) LIMIT TO FIVE MANEUVERS PER YEAR THOSE MANEUVERS INVOLVING FEWER THAN TWO DIVISIONS IF THEY ARE NOT PRENOTIFIED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR (COMMENT: THIS PROVISION REPORTEDLY IS DESIGNED TO COVER NATO'S REQUIREMENT FOR ALERT ACTIVITIES. END COMMENT.)

8. THE UNTABLED NNA CONSTRAINTS PROPOSAL IS BASED ON A STRUCTURAL PARAMETER, THE DIVISION. ACCORDING TO A NUMBER OF NNA SOURCES, THEIR GROUP IS HAVING A GREAT DEAL OF TROUBLING DETERMINING EXACTLY WHAT CONSTITUTES A DIVISION; THE SWEDES HAVE ATTEMPTED TO DEVELOP A COMPLICATED DEFINITION WHICH ENTAILS A LIST OF ALTERNATE

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CRITERIA THEY REFER TO AS "COUNTING RULES". A SWISS SOURCE (PROTECT) HAS INDICATED THAT HIS DELEGATION'S POSITION ON CONSTRAINTS MUST ENABLE TWO ARMY CORPS TO BE INVOLVED IN A MANEUVER AT THE SAME TIME. HE SAID THAT HIS DELEGATION COULD ACCEPT A CEILING OF FIVE 20,000-MAN DIVISIONS, OR A TOTAL OF 100,000 MEN. HE ADDED THAT HIS DELEGATION WOULD REJECT AN NNA CONSTRAINT BASED ON A SMALLER DIVISION, E.G., A 12,000-MAN DIVISION MODEL. THE SWISS REP, HOWEVER, APPEARS TO BE FIGHTING THIS

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BATTLE ALONE; HE SAID WITH SOME BITTERNESS THAT HE HAD SUCCESSFULLY FORESTALLED SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF CONSTRAINTS WITHIN THE NNA UNTIL THE GROUP CAUGHT WIND OF THE BRITISH PROPOSAL (WHICH SURFACED AT THE OSLO BRAINSTORMING SESSION BETWEEN SESSIONS 5 AND 6) WHICH COMPLETELY UNDERMINED HIS FOOTDRAGGING EFFORTS. HE NOTED WITH SOME SATISFACTION THAT HE THUS FAR HAD MANAGED TO LIMIT THE APPLICATION OF CONSTRAINTS TO MANEUVERS (EXCLUDING MOVEMENTS), A FAVOR FOR WHICH HE FELT WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL. NNA PROPONENTS OF CONSTRAINTS HAVE TRIED TO INFLUENCE NATO'S RECEPTION OF THEIR CONSTRAINT BY TELLING US THAT THE STRUCTURAL PARAMETER OF TWO DIVISIONS WOULD AFFECT EASTERN, AS WELL AS NATO, MANEUVERS. AS FAR AS NATO EXERCISES ARE CONCERNED, WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THE ENTIRE "AUTUMN FORGE" SERIES WOULD NOT BE CAPTURED AS AN ENTITY, BECAUSE NATO COULD NOTIFY THIS FALL SERIES OF EXERCISES SEPARATELY.

NOTIFICATION

9. WHILE THE NNA HAVE DEVELOPED A NOTIFICATION FORMAT, THEY HAVE NOT REACHED AGREEMENT ON WHAT TO NOTIFY. THEIR DECISION TO LIST NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES INSTEAD OF USING NATO'S OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT HAS BOGGED THEM DOWN IN A QUAGMIRE OF DEFINITIONAL DIFFERENCES, E.G., MANEUVERS VERSUS MOVEMENTS. THE NNA APPEAR TO HAVE REJECTED THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT BECAUSE IT WOULD REVEAL SECRET NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS. LINKED WITH THIS IS THE REJECTION OUT OF HAND BY SEVERAL NNA DELEGATIONS OF NATO'S MOBILIZATION PROVISION. THE SWISS, YUGOSLAVS AND SWEDES CONDUCT MOBILIZATION EXERCISES IN WHICH RESERVISTS GATHER IN THEIR ACTUAL DEFENSE POSITIONS WITHOUT GOING FIRST TO GARRISONS AND THEY ARE CATEGORICAL IN THEIR REFUSAL TO PERMIT OBSERVATION OF THE MOBILIZATION ITSELF.

INFORMATION

10. THE NNA DO NOT SUPPORT NATO'S MEASURE ONE EXCHANGE OF "STATIC" INFORMATION; THEY PREFER AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WHICH IS LINKED TO NOTIFICATIONS. THEY DO, HOWEVER, WISH TO BE ABLE TO CATCH UNNOTIFIED ACTIVITIES, BUT APPEAR NOT TO SEE A MORE COMPREHENSIVE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AS THE WAY TO DO IT; THEY STRESS THAT THEIR "OBSERVATION ON REQUEST" PROPOSAL WOULD CAPTURE UNNOTIFIED ACTIVITIES WITHOUT ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF HOW A STATE WOULD BE ABLE INITIALLY TO DETERMINE, WITHOUT A BASELINE OF STRUCTURAL INFORMATION ON THE NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATION OF FORCES IN THE ZONE, THAT AN UNNOTIFIED ACTIVITY SHOULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED.

NON-USE OF FORCE

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11. NON-USE OF FORCE HAS PROVEN TO BE THE MOST CONTENTIOUS SUBJECT FOR THE NNA. IT APPEARS THAT THE NNA WILL BE ABLE TO AGREE ONLY ON THE GENERAL ELEMENTS OF A NUF COMMITMENT. ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM BERN, THE SWISS, IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE OTTAWA HUMAN RIGHTS
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BARRY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07543
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 23-27, 1985
1. CDE VII - 026.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. NATO CONTINUES TO PROMOTE SC.1/AMPLIFIED BY CLARIFICATION AND THROUGH HIGHLIGHTING THE FLAWS IN THE EAST'S APPROACH. THE EAST MAINTAINED THE BUSINESSLIKE APPROACH, LARGELY DEVOID OF POLEMICS THAT HAS CHARACTERIZED ITS APPROACH SINCE THE OUTSET OF THIS ROUND. THE EAST CONTINUED TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND ARGUED THAT NATO'S PROPOSALS, SUCH AS THE STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD OR THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT, WOULD "VIOLATE THE LOGIC AND LETTER" OF THE FINAL ACT. THE NNA, LARGELY SILENT THE FIRST TWO WEEKS OF THE ROUND, SLOWLY CAME TO LIFE. WHILE MOST NNA INTERVENTIONS HAVE BEEN PRIMARILY REACTIVE IN NATURE, BOTH SWEDEN AND SWITZERLAND MADE PREPARED STATEMENTS ON CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE NOTIFICATION REGIME IN WORKING GROUPS THIS WEEK. END SUMMARY.
4. WORKING GROUP AB -- SEPTEMBER 23, 1985.
AN EXCHANGE OF COMPETING EASTERN AND WESTERN VIEWS ON VERIFICATION HIGHLIGHTED THE WORKING GROUP AB MEETING. U.S. (HANSEN) OUTLINED THE TOOLS WHICH SHOULD COMPRISE THE BASIS OF A VERIFICATION REGIME, INCUDING AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, INSPECTIONS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. HE STRESSED THAT NTM'S ALONE WOULD BE INSUFFICIENT TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE BECAUSE NOT ALL STATES HAVE EQUAL ACCESS TO NTM'S. HE DREW A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION AND EMPHASIZED ON-SITE INSPECTION AS A VERIFICATION TOOL. HANSEN ALSO CRITICIZED THE ROMANIAN AIDE MEMOIRE'S CALL FOR A SYSTEM OF VERIFICATION BASED SOLELY ON INFORMATION/COMMUNICATIONS/CONSULTATIONS COMBINED WITH NTMS. FINALLY, HANSEN CHALLENGED THE EAST TO EXPLAIN HOW A NUMERICAL THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION WOULD BE VERIFIED.
IN RESPONSE, EASTERN DELEGATES STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF NTM AND ATTACKED THE STRUCTURAL PARAMETER FOR NOTIFICATION. GEORGI (GDR) AND TATARNIKOV (USSR) BOTH MAINTAINED THAT ONE CANNOT SAY NTM'S CONSTITUTE AN INSUFFICIENT BASIS FOR VERIFICATION UNTIL THE CONTENTS OF AN AGREEMENT ARE NEGOTIATED. TATARNIKOV SAID HE WOULD EXPLAIN HOW NUMERICAL THRESHOLDS COULD BE VERIFIED IF HANSEN WOULD EXPLAIN HOW A STRUCTURAL PARAMETER WOULD BE VERIFIED.
HANSEN RESPONDED, USING THE U.S. NOTIFICATION OF "CENTRAL GUARDIAN" TO SHOW HOW STRUCTURAL INFORMATION REGARDING PARTICIPATING FORCES WOULD FACILITATE

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VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE. TATARNIKOV THEN OFFERED A RAMBLING RETORT TO THE EFFECT THAT HE WAS STILL NOT CONVINCED.
OTHER PREPARED EASTERN STATEMENTS (HUNGARY, BULGARIA) ATTACKED THE HEART OF SC.1'S APPROACH ON A POINT BY POINT BASIS. SZIGETI (HUNGARY) CRITICIZED THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT, IN PARTICULAR USDEL'S ATTEMPT TO DEFINE A "GARRISON". HE ENDORSED THE NUMERICAL PARAMETER OVER THE STRUCTURAL PARAMETER FOR NOTIFICATION, AND ASKED THE WEST TO EXPLAIN HOW A STRUCTURAL PARAMETER CAN BE RECONCILED WITH "DIFFERENCES IN THE SIZE OF IDENTICAL STRUCTURES". SZIGETI, LIKE TODOROV (BULGARIA), DEFENDED THE EAST'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN MOVEMENTS AND MANEUVERS AS WELL AS ITS DEVELOPMENT OF MEASURES FOR NOTIFYING INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS. THEY ARGUED THAT THE DETAILS OF VERIFICATION CANNOT BE NEGOTIATED BEFORE THE CONTENT OF THE MEASURES ARE AGREED UPON. IN SZIGETI'S VIEW, AN "ADVANCED OBSERVATION REGIME" AND "RELEVANT INFORMATION
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TO BE EXCHANGED IN THE FRAMEWORK OF CONCRETE MEASURES" COULD CONSTITUTE A PART OF THE VERIFICATION REGIME.
5. WORKING GROUP B: NOTIFICATION -- SEPTEMBER 24, 1985.
STATEMENTS BY THE NETHERLANDS, ITALY, GDR, HUNGARY, SWEDEN AND THE UK PROMPTED RESPONSES FROM THE U.S., USSR AND YUGOSLAVIA.
NETHERLANDS (VAN DER GRAAF) SAID THAT BECAUSE WE ARE DEVELOPING OBLIGATORY RATHER THAN VOLUNTARY CSBM'S PRECISE DEFINITIONS OF WHAT IS TO BE NOTIFIED AND OBSERVED ARE REQUIRED TO FACILITATE IMPLEMENTATION AND VERIFICATION. THE MANY DIFFERENT KINDS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES TO BE COVERED ARE DIFFICULT TO DEFINE; THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT COVERS THEM ALL.
ITALY (DI GIOVANNI) SAID THE USSR EXPLANATION LAST WEEK OF HOW THE WTO HAD DECIDED ON A 20,000 NUMERICAL PARAMETER COULD BE APPLIED BETTER TO THE STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD. TATARNIKOV USED STRUCTURAL TERMS IN HIS EXPLANATION. THE ITALIAN WAS SKEPTICAL OF TATARNIKOV'S ASSERTION THAT A SOVIET ARMORED DIVISION WOULD REQUIRE SUPPORT TO BE COMBAT CAPABLE. AS FOR HAVING TO NOTIFY A DIVISION OUT-OF-GARRISON FOR ALL TRAINING ACTIVITIES, WHICH THE USSR INFERRED WOULD BE BURDENSOMELY OFTEN, DI GIOVANNI NOTED THAT IT IS RARE THAT A DIVISION MOVES AT FULL STRENGTH FOR TRAINING PURPOSES.
GDR STRESSED THE VALUE OF THE WTO PROPOSALS WHICH CALL FOR NOTIFICATION OF ACTIVITIES RECOGNIZED AS

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THREATENING -- MOVEMENTS AND MANEUVERS -- AND COVER ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF IMPORTANCE TO EUROPEAN STATES. SC.1/AMPLIFIED IS NOT COMPREHENSIVE; IT WOULD NOT COVER USA TRANSERS THROUGH EUROPE TO AREAS OUTSIDE OF EUROPE, WHICH WOULD REPRESENT A CHANGE IN MILITARY FORCES AND WOULD BE RELEVANT.
HUNGARY FOCUSED ON TERMS FOR INCLUSION IN THE NOTIFICATION REGIME, ASSERTING THAT THE OLD TERMS OF THE FINAL ACT (SUCH AS MANEUVERS AND MOVEMENTS) HAD MET THE REQUIREMENTS. NEW CONCEPTS ARE USEFUL IF MORE SPECIFIC AND CONCRETE; THE OOG CONCEPT, HOWEVER, IS LESS SPECIFIC AND CONCRETE. A HUNGARIAN GARRISON INCLUDES NOT ONLY THE BUILDINGS AND PLACES REFERRED IN THE U.S. DEFINITION, BUT ALSO SMALL VILLAGES, LARGE TERRITORIES, FIELDS, WOODS, AND PASTURE LANDS. MANEUVERS EXCEEDING THE THRESHOLD COULD BE CONDUCTED IN SUCH A GARRISON, HE NOTED, AND UNDER THE OOG APPROACH, WOULD NEVER HAVE TO BE NOTIFIED. SORTIES OUTSIDE OF GARRISON WHICH MIGHT NOT BE THREATENING HOWEVER, SUCH AS TO COPE WITH NATURAL DISASTERS, WOULD REQUIRE NOTIFICATION UNDER THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT.
SWEDEN (LUNDIN) AGREED THAT OUR MANDATE PROVIDED FOR IMPROVING CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES, BUT SAID WE MUST ALSO CONSIDER WHETHER NEW CONCEPTS, SUCH AS OUT-OF-GARRISON, FULFILL NEW NEEDS AND TO WHAT EXTENT SUCH CONCEPTS CREATE NEW PROBLEMS. SWEDEN SUGGESTED THAT WE TAKE A "PRAGMATIC" RATHER THAN PURELY "CONCEPTUAL" APPROACH. NOTIFICATIONS SHOULD BE OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE, AND REQUIRE LOWER AND MORE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT PARAMETERS. AIR ACTIVITIES COULD POSE AN "ENORMOUS THREAT" AND SHOULD "IN PRINCIPLE" BE COVERED BY THE REGIME. BUT NOTIFICATION OF AN INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITY "IN AND OF ITSELF" WOULD NOT SEEM TO BE MEANINGFUL, HE SAID, IF IT CONCERNS AN ACTIVITY WHICH IN ITS ENTIRETY WITH A FEW MINUTES NOTICE COULD BE TRANSFERRED TO AN AREA FAR AWAY FROM THE NOTIFIED AREA OF ACTIVITIES. THIS PROBLEM WOULD BE REDUCED IN THE CASE OF AIR ACTIVITIES COMBINED WITH LAND FORCE ACTIVITIES. BUT SUCH A NOTIFICATION
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SHOULD ALSO BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE -- A PROBLEM IN THE CASE OF COMBINED AIR AND LAND MANEUVERS. THUS, HE NOTED, THE OBSERVATION STANDARD FOR AIR ACTIVITIES MUST, IN COMBINED ACTIVITIES, BE SET SOMEWHAT LOWER THAN IN THE CASE OF LAND ACTIVITIES. LUNDIN CONCLUDED THAT BECAUSE THE CRITERION OF ADEQUATE VERIFICATION IS A VITAL INSTRUMENT IN LIMITING THE REGIME TO MANAGEABLE

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PROPORTIONS, WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE AT THIS STAGE ON THE NOTIFICATION OF ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD BE SUBJECT TO MANDATORY OBSERVATION.

YUGOSLAVIA (MIHAILOVIC) RESPONSED TO THE DUTCH STATEMENT. ALTHOUGH THE NETHERLANDS SAID USE OF THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT WAS REQUIRED TO TAKE CARE OF THE DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS, THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT DOES NOT, IN FACT, MAKE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN ANY MILITARY ACTIVITIES. WHETHER SUCH A DISTINCTION IS NECESSARY OR NOT, HE ASSERTED, THE OOG CONCEPT IS INADEQUATE.

USA (HANSEN) SAID THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO ARGUE THAT THE FINAL ACT TERMS HAVE PROVED THEMSELVES OVER THE PAST TEN YEARS WHEN THEY HAVEN'T BEEN IMPLEMENTED. ONLY ONE "MOVEMENT", FOR EXAMPLE, HAS BEEN NOTIFIED DURING THAT PERIOD BY THE U.S. THE OOG CONCEPT COVERS ALL ACTIVITIES, WHICH INDIVIDUALLY WOULD BE HARD TO DEFINE. EVEN THE DEFINITION OF MANEUVER, GENERALLY AGREED TO BE "AN OPPOSED FORCE EXERCISE," IS NOT ADEQUATE BECAUSE ACTIVITIES CAN BE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT EVEN IF NOT "OPPOSED FORCE" EXERCISES. HANSEN SAID THAT THE HUNGARIAN REP HAD CONFUSED THE SOVIET DEFINITION OF "GARNIZON" -- WHICH COVERS A WIDE TERRITORY -- WITH THE U.S. DEFINITION OF "GARRISON", WHICH COVERS A MUCH MORE LIMITED TERRITORY.

UK (BACK) SAID THAT ON THE BASIS OF SOVIET AND CZECH EXPLANATIONS GIVEN AT THE LAST MEETING ON HOW THE WTO NUMERICAL PARAMETER WAS DECIDED, IT IS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND HOW THE WTO COULD LIMIT THE THRESHOLD TO JUST ONE FACTOR -- THE NUMBER OF MEN. WHAT MATTERS, BACK SAID, IS THAT A DIVISION -- WTO, NATO OR NNA -- IS A TEAM. WHEN THE USSR REP (TATARNIKOV), SAID THAT THE "IOWA" WAS MORE DANGEROUS THAN TEN DIVISIONS, HE DIDN'T TALK IN TERMS OF NUMBERS OF MEN. THE MILITARY THINKS IN TERMS OF UNITS, NOT NUMBERS.

USSR (TATARNIKOV) ASSERTED THAT THE UK REP HAD CONTRADICTED HIMSELF. WHILE BACK HAD EMPHASIZED THE USE OF STRUCTURAL, NOT NUMERICAL, PARAMETERS TATARNIKOV POINTED OUT THAT SC.1 CONTAINS BOTH NUMERICAL AND STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS. IN AN INFORMAL AND "OFF-THE-RECORD" REMARK, U.S. REP (HANSEN) SAID THAT IF THE NUMBERS IN SC.1 POSE LOGICAL DIFFICULTIES TO THE USSR, WE COULD CONSIDER REPLACING THEM WITH A STRUCTURAL CONCEPT, BEARING IN MIND THAT THE NUMERICAL FIGURES ARE OF A SECONDARY OR TERTIARY NATURE DESIGNED TO CLOSE LOOPHOLES.

6. WORKING GROUP A: POLITICAL -- SEPTEMBER 24, 1985. SPEAKERS INCLUDED ITALY, USSR, BULGARIA, NETHERLANDS, CYPRUS, AND ROMANIA.

NATO DEPUTIES HAD AGREED THAT SEVERAL CONTINGENCY STATEMENTS ON NON-USE OF FORCE WOULD BE PREPARED, BUT

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THAT NATO WOULD NOT INITIATE THE DISCUSSION.
NONETHELESS, ITALIAN DEPUTY (DE BERNARDIN) (WHO WAS NOT AT THE DEPUTIES' MEETING) LAUNCHED THE NUF DISCUSSION. RESPONDING TO A BULGARIAN COMMENT AT A PREVIOUS MEETING THAT WEAPONS AND THE POLICIES OF STATES AFFECT SECURITY IN EUROPE, THE ITALIAN RECALLED THAT NATO GOVERNMENTS REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT NOT TO USE ANY OF THEIR WEAPONS EXCEPT IN RESPONSE TO AGGRESSION EVERY YEAR.
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR NST DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, CSCE, PREL, CDE
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF
HE POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIET NUF TREATY PROPOSAL (SC.6) DID NOT CORRESPOND TO THE MANDATE: (1) SC.6. TREATS CONCRETE CSBM'S ONLY AS SECONDARY TO A NUF TREATY; (2) IT CALLS FOR A TREATY FOR ONE OF THE HENSINKI FINAL ACT PRINCIPLES WHILE IN OTTAWA IT WAS NOT EVEN POSSIBLE TO AGREE ON A COMMUNIQUE ON HUMAN RIGHTS; AND (3) IT VIOLATES THE CSCE PRINCIPLE THAT ALL PARTICIPATING STATES ARE SOVEREIGN EQUALS.
RESPONDING, THE USSR (RAKHMANINOV) ASKED THE ITALIAN REP WHETHER HE AGREED THAT THE CDE SHOULD INCLUDE NATO DECLARATIONS, SUCH AS THE BONN DECLARATION, AS SUBJECTS FOR CONSIDERATION, AND WHETHER HE RECOGNIZED THE MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY NATURE OF THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE.
BULGARIA (RADOUKOV) DEFENDED SC.6 ALONG ORTHODOX LINES: THE TERM "MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY" CSBM'S IN THE MADRID MANDATE REFERS TO MILITARY AND POLITICAL MEASURES AS REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF A CDE AGREEMENT. THUS, THE CDE IS MANDATED TO DISCUSS AND ADOPT AN "EXTENDED AGREEMENT ON THE NUF PRINCIPLE, E.G., SC.6. A SIMPLE REPETITION OF PAST INTERNATIONAL LEGAL COMMITMENTS WOULD NOT SATISFY THE DEMANDS OF THE MADRID MANDATE.
DRAWING LARGELY ON USDEL TALKING POINTS TO ADDRESS ROMANIAN SUGGESTIONS ON NUF, THE DUTCH DEPUTY (SIZOO) SAID: 1) THE CONTENTS OF A NUF REAFFIRMATION SHOULD CONFORM WITH THE UN CHARTER AND THE FINAL ACT; 2) THEY SHOULD DEAL WITH THE THREAT OF FORCE; 3) THEY SHOULD APPLY TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, NOT JUST TO MUTUAL RELATIONS; 4) THAT UN OBLIGATIONS WOULD PREVAIL OVER A NUF COMMITMENT, AS WELL AS OVER EXISTING AND FUTURE BILATERAL AGREEMENTS; AND 5) THAT A NUF REAFFIRMATION SHOULD BE CONCISE AND PRECISE.
CYPRUS (PAPADOPOULOS) SAID THE NUF PRINCIPLE SHOULD HAVE A "CDE DIMENSION". CSBM'S WOULD STRENGTHEN THE PRINCIPLE. A THIRD "ASPECT" -- THE MANIFESTATION OF FORCE -- SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE PRINCIPLE. THE ELEMENTS OF ESCALATION IS INHERENT IN THE MANIFESTATION

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OF FORCE, HE SAID, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE AMASSING OF TROOPS NEAR A BORDER READY TO INVADE A NEIGHBORING STATE. (COMMENT: OTHER NNA, WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE STATUS OF THIS "NEW ASPECT" IN THEIR ONGOING DISCUSSIONS, HAVE EXPRESSED IRRITATION WITH THE CYPRIOT'S TENDENCY TO GO PUBLIC WHENEVER ONE OF HIS IDEAS FAILS TO WIN NNA SUPPORT. THEY UNDERSTAND THAT HIS "MANIFESTATION OF FORCE" IS AIMED AT ANKARA AND FEEL SOME SYMPATHY FOR HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION, BUT ARE CONCERNED THAT ADOPTION OF A BAN ON THE "MANIFESTATION OF FORCE" COULD BE APPLIED TO THEIR OWN DEFENSIVE MANEUVERS. THEY EXPECT THE WORD "MANIFESTATION" TO FIGURE IN AN NNA WORKING PAPER ON NUF, BUT DO NOT WANT IT TO APPEAR IN THE TITLE, OR TO APPLY TO THE NUF PRINCIPLE ITSELF. ONE AUSTRIAN SOURCE (PROTECT) NOTED SARCASTICALLY THAT PAPADOPOULOS' REAL MOTIVATION FOR INTRODUCING THIS IDEA INTO THE CONFERENCE IS TO ENHANCE HIS OWN REPUTATION AS AN INTERNATIONAL LAWYER. END COMMENT).
ROMANIA (BUHOARA) EXPRESSED HIS DELEGATION'S "OPTIMISM" THAT THE CONFERENCE WOULD DECIDE TO GO BEYOND RESTATING THE CONTENT OF PAST NUF AGREEMENTS AND WOULD CHOOSE TO ENUMERATE ACTIONS FROM WHICH STATES SHOULD REFRAIN, AS WELL AS POSITIVE ACTIONS BY WHICH STATES COULD CONTRIBUTE TO STRENGTHENING A NUF COMMITMENT.
7. WORKING GROUP A: INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, OBSERVATION -- SEPTEMBER 25, 1985.
SPEAKERS INCLUDED NORWAY, GDR, FRANCE, HUNGARY, NETHERLANDS, USSR, SWITZERLAND AND THE UK.
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR NST DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, CSCE, PREL, CDE
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF
NORWAY SAID THAT BECAUSE NTM'S ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO ALL STATES A VERIFICATION TECHNIQUE GIVING EQUAL BENEFITS TO ALL IS NEEDED. WHILE SOME OBJECT TO SC.1 VERIFICATION PROPOSALS AS TOO INTRUSIVE, GROUND AND AERIAL INSPECTION, IN MANY WAYS, MAY BE LESS INTRUSIVE AND EASIER TO CONTROL THAN NTM'S. VERIFICATION MUST ALSO BE TIMELY.
GDR (GEORGI) CONTENDED THAT THERE WAS A CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE U.S. OPENING PLENARY STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT NTMS CAN'T BE AN ADEQUATE FORM OF VERIFICATION AS THEY ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO ALL, AND SC.1 WHICH PRESCRIBES A ROLE FOR NTM'S IN VERIFICATION.
FRANCE (MERIC) SAID WE SHOULD FOCUS ON WHEN INSPECTIONS WOULD BE APPLICABLE. SOME CONTEND THAT INSPECTION WOULD BE EQUIVALENT TO ESPIONAGE; WE RATHER VIEW INSPECTION AS EQUIVALENT TO STRENGTHENED OBSERVATION, HE SAID.

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IN AN EVASION OF THE QUESTION POSED BY THE U.S. (HANSEN) AT AN EARIER MEETING ON HOW THE WTO WOULD VERIFY A 20,000 MAN THRESHOLD VERSUS A 25,000 MAN THRESHOLD, HUNGARY (KORMENDY) SAID THAT IT CAN JUDGE WHAT SIZE A MANEUVER IS AND WHETHER IT IS COVERED BY THE FINAL ACT AND THUS NOTIFIABLE. HUNGARY ASSUMES THAT THE SAME METHODS IT USES IN VERIFYING HELSINKI-TYPE CBMS ARE USED BY ANY SIMILAR SIZE ALLIED STATE EQUIPPED WITH THE SAME NTM'S.

USSR (ROZANOV) SAID THERE HAS BEEN SOME "VERY PRIMITIVE AND ABRUPT CRITICISM" OF SOCIALIST THINKING ON THE PROBLEM OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND VERIFICATION. THE WTO HAS NEVER USED THE TERM "ESPIONAGE", AS ATTRIBUTED TO THEM, AND HAS PROPOSED ITS OWN CONCEPT OF THE EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION IN A FRAMEWORK TO BE AGREED UPON. FRANCE (MERIC) EXPRESSED DELIGHT THAT THE WTO HAS NEVER USED THE TERM "ESPIONAGE", BUT ASKED IF IT IS NOT CONSIDERED "ESPIONAGE" THEN WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR WTO OPPOSTION TO INSPECTION?

SWITZERLAND (SCHARLI) SAID THAT INDEPENDENT AIR MANEUVERS, ARE NOT NECESSARILY UNVERIFIABILE. THE QUESTION IS RATHER HOW STRINGENT AND INTRUSIVE A REGIME WOULD BE REQUIRED TO DO THE JOB AND WHAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. SCHARLI POSED A SERIES OF QUESTIONS (PRESUMABLY TO THE WTO):

1. ARE YOU PREPARED TO AGREE TO A MONITORING SYSTEM THAT WOULD USE AIR BASE RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE FACILITIES WITH MIXED CREWS -- WTO, NATO, AND NNA -- TO OPERATE THEM?
2. ARE YOU PREPARED TO SHARE RADAR FACILITIES AND MAKE DATA AVAILABLE FOR VERIFICATION PURPOSES?
3. ARE YOU PREPARED TO HELP RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF AUTHENTICATING INFORMATION BY ASSIGNING EXERCISE AIRCRAFT DEDICATED TRANSPONDER CODES?
4. IF NOT, ARE YOU PREPARED TO PROVIDE RAW RADAR DATA FOR THE PURPOSES OF MONITORING?
5. ARE YOU READY TO TACKLE THE LOW ALTITUDE PROBLEM?
6. ARE YOU WILLING TO ALLOW DIRECT COMMUNICATION WITH PILOTS IN ORDER TO ENSURE AGAINST DECEPTION THROUGH THE USE OF SIMULATED RADAR DATA?

8. WORKING GROUP B: OBSERVATIONS -- SEPTEMBER 26, 1985.

FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR NST DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, CSCE, PREL, CDE
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF

BOTH TURKEY (BOLUKBASI) AND ITALY (DI GIOVANNI -- IN VOLUMINOUS DETAIL) FOCUSED ON THE OBSERVATION REGIME DURING THE "KAVKAZ 85" EXERCISE. THEY EMPHASIZED A

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NUMBER OF SHORTCOMINGS COMPARED TO THE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED. BASED ON "KAVKAZ 85", BOTH CONCLUDED, SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED IN THE OBSERVATION REGIME.

SPAIN (RIPOLL) SAID SPAIN DID NOT ACCEPT THE INVITATION TO SEND OBSERVERS TO "KAVKAZ 85" BECAUSE THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH TIME TO ORGANIZE THE TRIP AND FIND A PROPERLY TRAINED OBSERVER. SPAIN ARGUED THAT THE TIME FOR EXTENDING OBSERVER INVITATIONS SHOULD BE ADVANCED TO 45 DAYS PRIOR TO THE EVENT. HE ALSO TOOK ON THOSE WHO HAVE EXPRESSED FEARS THAT THE FINAL ACT PRINCIPLES ARE BEING "VIOLATED," BY INTRODUCTION, FOR EXAMPLE OF NEW CONCEPTS LIKE STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS. WHILE WE ARE MEETING UNDER THE TEN PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT, WE ARE NOT NEGOTIATING THEM AGAIN, HE SAID. IT IS THE MADRID MANDATE WHICH DEMARCATES OUR TASKS HERE AND SC.1/AMPLIFIED IN ITS DETAIL, TRIES TO FOLLOW THE MADRID MANDATE.

POLAND SAID THAT DETAILED QUESTIONS ON AN OBSERVER REGIME CAN BE RESOLVED ONCE A DEFINITION OF ACTIVITIES TO WHICH WE WOULD INVITE OBSERVERS IS RESOLVED. HE ASKED WHY WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO OBSERVE AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES COMBINED WITH LAND ACTIVITIES, AND NOT INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA OR AIR SPACE?

USSR (SOLOMENKO) RESPONDED TO A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC POINTS RAISED BY TURKEY AND ITALY REGARDING THE OBSERVATION REGIME FOR "KAVKAZ 85," EMPHASIZING THAT ALL HAD BEEN IN CONFORMITY WITH THE FINAL ACT AND MENTIONED IN PASSING THAT THE EXERCISE WAS NOT WITHIN THE ZONE.

USSR (TATARNIKOV) ASSERTED THAT INSTEAD OF BUILDING CONFIDENCE, THE RECENT UK EXERCISE, "BRAVE DEFENDER" WAS RATHER DESIGNED TO INCULCATE HATRED AGAINST SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND TO INTIMIDATE THE PUBLIC WITH THE "SO-CALLED MILITARY THREAT." WHAT WAS THE POINT OF INVITING SOVIET OBSERVERS TO THIS ANTI-SOVIET SPECTACLE, HE ASKED, AND WHAT WOULD WE HAVE LEARNED AS OBSERVERS? HOW COULD THIS "FOUL-SMELLING APPROACH" HELP TO FURTHER DEVELOP THE PRACTICE OF OBSERVATION?

CANADIAN REP (NAMIESNIOWSKI), RESPONDING TO TATARNIKOV, SAID THAT WE HAD MOVED BEYOND SUCH GENERAL EXCHANGES WHICH LEAD NOWHERE AND DIVERT US FROM OUR WORK AT HAND. UK (BACK) REGRETTED THE DECISION BY THE WTO TO REFUSE THE ONLY INVITATION EVER EXTENDED BY BRITIAN TO OBSERVE AN EXERCISE.

9. WORKING GROUP A: CONSTRAINTS/ANNUAL FORECASTS -- SEPTEMBER 26, 1985.

SUMMARY. THE UK AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA DELIVERED DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED STATEMENTS, THE FIRST ON ANNUAL FORECASTS, THE SECOND ON CONSTRAINTS. ROMANIA, EVER

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EAGER TO MOVE TO DRAFTING, MISQUOTED THE BRITISH MILREP IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ARGUE THAT THERE WAS COMMON GROUND IN THE TWO (IRRECONCILABLE) POSITIONS. THE SWISS REP TOOK THE CZECH TO TASK FOR HIS SLOPPY ARGUMENTATION, ASKING WHETHER HE WAS TALKING ABOUT 3 DIVISIONS OR 9 DIVISIONS AS INVOLVED IN ACTIVITIES WHICH NEEDED TO BE LIMITED. END SUMMARY.

NOTING THAT ANY SIZE ACTIVITY CAN BE USED TO SERVE POLITICAL PURPOSES UK (FREEMAN) SAID THAT THE SIZE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES IS LESS IMPORTANT THAN THE PROVISION OF TIMELY AND VERIFIABLE INFORMATION REGARDING THAT ACTIVITY. ANNUAL FORECASTS SERVE THIS

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
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SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF

IMMEDIATE PURPOSE, HE NOTED. STRESSING THE POLITICAL FUNCTIONS OF ANNUAL FORECASTS, HE POINTED OUT THAT OMITTING INFORMATION FROM SUCH A FORECAST COULD INCREASE SUSPICION REGARDING THE INTENTION AND PURPOSE OF THAT STATE.

RESTRICTIONS ON THE SIZE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES DO NOT NECESSARILY PROMOTE CONFIDENCE, FREEMAN COUNTERED. NUMEROUS MILITARY ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED CLOSE IN TIME MIGHT BE SEEN AS MORE THREATENING THAN A LARGE MILITARY ACTIVITY DEPENDING ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA (MOHYLA) DEFENDED THE EASTERN "NUMERICAL CEILING" CONSTRAINT BECAUSE "DIFFERENT AND MORE EFFECTIVE" METHODS (THAN NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION) ARE NEEDED TO REDUCE THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE. (COMMENT: AT THE UNGA SHEVARDNADZE CALLED FOR THE NEGOTIATION OF "MORE EFFECTIVE CSBM'S". END COMMENT). NATO MANEUVERS AT THE OPERO-STRATEGIC LEVEL, USING ARMY (GROUND FORCE) CORPS, COMBAT AIRCRAFT OF ALL TYPES AND LARGE NUMBERS OF COMBAT SORTIES, ARE CONDUCTED IN AREAS OF OPERATIONAL IMPORTANCE CLOSE TO EASTERN BORDERS. MOHYLA CLOSED BY SAYING THAT RELUCTANCE TO CONSIDER THE ISSUE OF CONSTRAINTS, AND CEILINGS IN PARTICULAR, WOULD BLOCK PROGRESS IN STOCKHOLM.

ROMANIA (BUHOARA) SAID THAT THE AREA OF DISAGREEMENT (ON THE ISSUE OF CONSTRAINTS/CEILINGS) IS NOT AS LARGE AS HIS DELEGATION HAD THOUGHT. HE AGREED WITH THE UK THAT MORE NUMEROUS MILITARY ACTIVITIES, EVEN IF SMALLER IN SCALE, WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT SECURITY IN EUROPE AND LENT HIS SUPPORT FOR THE NNA'S PROPOSAL (SC.3, PARA 10) FOR LIMITATION OF MANEUVERS CONDUCTED CLOSE IN TIME OR SPACE. HE TOOK ISSUE WITH THE BRITISH MILREP'S STATEMENT THAT THE SIZE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES IS NOT THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR AND SAID HE HAD NO DOUBTS

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THAT THE ISSUE OF THE SIZE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES REPRESENTS COMMON GROUND ON WHICH TO ELABORATE MEASURES. (COMMENT: ROMANIAN EAGERNESS TO MOVE TO DRAFTING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SOMETIMES LEADS THEM TO SUBMIT ABSURD EXAMPLES OF "COMMON GROUND". THE BRITISH MILREP EXPRESSED IRRITATION AFTER THE MEETING AT BEING MISREPRESENTED BY BUHOARA, BUT FELT THE LATTER'S LOONY LOGIC WAS NOT WORTH LEGITIMIZING WITH A REBUTTAL. END COMMENT).
SWITZERLAND (SCHARLI) CALLED ON THE CZECH TO CLARIFY SPECIFIC POINTS HE HAD MADE CONCERNING THE THREATENING NATURE OF LARGE SCALE MANEUVERS CONDUCTED IN SENSITIVE AREAS. THE SWISS REP ASKED THREE QUESTIONS:
1) WAS THE CZECH TALKING ABOUT ONE CORPS (3 DIVISIONS) OR A NUMBER OF CORPS?
2) WAS MOHYLA PREPARED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN ARMY CORPS WHICH ARE COMPOSED OF NON-PERMANENT FORMATIONS OF RESERVISTS (THE SWISS MODEL) AND CORPS MADE UP OF PERMANENT UNITS?
3. REGARDING OPERATIONALLY SIGNIFICANT AREAS OR AREAS NEAR EASTERN BORDERS, COULD THE CZECH MILREP BE MORE SPECIFIC REGARDING THE PROXIMITY TO BORDERS IN TERMS OF KILOMETERS?
(COMMENT: AFTER THE MEETING, SCHARLI EXPRESSED HIS DISGUST THAT THE CZECH REP SHOULD EXPECT TO GET AWAY WITH SUCH AN IMPRECISE INTERVENTION. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE PARAMETERS HE REQUESTED (3 DIVISIONS VERSUS 9 DIVISIONS, THE NUMBER OF KILOMETERS AWAY FROM AN EASTERN BORDER) COULD HAVE REAL EFFECTS ON THE TRAINING PRACTICES OF NEIGHBORING STATES. THE CZECH SEEMS TO BE PICKING UP A MORIBUND NNA PROPOSAL (PARA 12, SC.3) FOR "CONSTRAINTS ON THE DEPLOYMENT IN AREAS TO BE DETERMINED OF MILITARY UNITS AND/OR EQUIPMENT OF VITAL
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
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SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF
IMPORTANCE FOR SUSTAINED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS." THIS IS A PET YUGOSLAV PROPOSAL WHICH HAS NOT ACHIEVED NNA CONSENSUS. CONSEQUENTLY, BY MAKING POSITIVE NOISES ABOUT IT, THE EAST CAN MAKE POINTS WITH THE YUGOSLAVS AND MAKE THE WEST UNCOMFORTABLE, ALL THE WHILE BEING SAFE IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THIS PROPOSAL WILL GO NOWHERE. END COMMENT.)
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

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Groupe A+B

Le 23 septembre 1985

INTERVENTION

de l'Ambassadeur Stephan Todorov,
chef de la délégation de la R.P. de Bulgarie
à la Conférence de Stockholm

Monsieur le Président,

Il y a presque deux mois à Helsinki s'est tenue la réunion au niveau des ministres des Affaires Etrangères des pays participants à la CSCE pour commémorer le dixième anniversaire de la signature de l'Acte final. Tous les participants à la réunion ont déclaré que leurs pays manifestent toujours un grand intérêt pour le processus de la CSCE et ont réaffirmé leur soutien à l'esprit d'Helsinki, leur fidélité aux principes et aux dispositions de l'Acte final, leur détermination d'observer ces principes et ces dispositions dans leurs relations internationales.

En ce qui concerne la Conférence de Stockholm les ministres ont souligné les possibilités réelles qui existent devant la Conférence pour achever ses travaux à temps, c'est à dire avant la réunion de Vienne. Ils ont exprimé la certitude que la Conférence saura s'engager le plus tot possible dans des négociations concretes et parvenir à adopter des mesures efficaces et effectives pour le renforcement de la confiance entre nos Etats et de la sécurité en Europe. En meme temps il a été souligné que les mesures à adopter devraient marquer

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un développement et un élargissement des mesures de confiance qui se trouvent dans l'Acte final. Tout cela était de nature à inspirer un optimisme concernant le progrès dans le travail de la Conférence.

Monsieur le Président,

Notre délégation a suivi avec un grand intéret le déroulement des travaux de la Conférence après la reprise. Nous avons marqué avec satisfaction qu'il y a une compréhension générale que les conditions sont réunies pour que la Conférence s'engage le plus tot possible dans des négociations concrêtes. Ma délégation partage cette compréhension. La discussion générale approfondie, qui a continué déjà plus d'une année et demie, a grandement contribué afin que les délégations voient plus clairement les sujets sur lesquels notre travail concret pourrait se concentrer. Un consensus est en train de se former sur des problèmes de procédure qui permettrait un passage à la rédaction avant même la fin de cette année.

Mais nous voilà approcher la moitié de la session et nous ne sommes pas encore arrivés au résultat recherché. Les différence dans les positions sur les sujets discutés restent essentielles. Il nous reste un long chemin à parcourir. Le temps devient un facteur important et rien ne pourrait justifier un retardement des négociations concretes.

Monsieur le Président,

Les pays de l'Est ont présenté des propositions et ils ont eu la possibilité d'expliquer leur bien fondé. Je n'ai pas l'intention de m'arrêter de nouveau sur les considérations qui prouvent que nos propositions sont tout à fait en accord avec l'objectif de cette Conférence, avec son sujet, avec les principes de l'Acte final et du Document de cloture de Madrid.

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Nous avons eu l'occasion de présenter nos considérations sur l'efficacité des mesures proposées par l'Union Soviétique et d'autres pays socialistes. A présent nous voulons examiner nos propositions dans la lumière des dispositions de l'Acte final, à savoir que les mesures à adopter par la Conférence devraient marquer un développement et un élargissement des mesures qu'on trouve dans l'Acte final.

Prenons, Monsieur le Président, tout d'abord la portée des mesures proposées. Il n'est pas difficile de constater que les propositions des pays de l'Est ont une portée plus étendue que le régime de l'Acte final. A part les mesures militaires, ces propositions contiennent des mesures d'envergure d'ordre politique qui ont une importance majeure pour le renforcement de la confiance et de la sécurité en Europe, ce qui a été souligné à la réunion commémorative d'Helsinki. Les mesures d'ordre politique, qui se trouvent dans le document SC-4, à savoir: développer et réaffirmer le principe de non-recours à la force militaire; à ne pas employer en premier d'armes nucléaires; geler et réduire les dépenses militaires; supprimer les armes chimiques en Europe; encourager la création de zones exemptes d'armes nucléaires dans différentes régions de l'Europe, s'étendent au-delà de la sphère purement militaire et sont de nature à contribuer directement à la diminuation du risque de confrontation militaire sur notre continent. D'ailleurs, ces mesures politiques d'envergure viennent compléter des mesures militaires de confiance, afin de répondre à la conception de l'indivisibilité de la sécurité en Europe" et du "caractère mutuellement complémentaire des aspects politiques et militaires de la sécurité". Nous notons avec satisfaction que certaines de ces propositions des pays de l'Est et en particulier la propositions tendant à l'élaboration et à la réaffirmation du principe de non-recours à la force se trouve parmi les propositions

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des pays neutres et non alignés. Et le nombre des délégations, même parmi celles des pays occidentaux, qui se déclarent en faveur de cette proposition augmente toujours.

Et nous ne pouvons pas passer sous silence le caractère très limité des propositions qui se trouvent dans le document SC-I. Nous sommes tout aussi convaincus qu'avant que les seules mesures de SC-I ne sont pas à meme d'apporter une contribution réelle afin de dissiper la méfiance, restaurer la confiance et renforcer la sécurité. Personne ne saurait nier qu'à la source de la tension internationale ne sont pas seulement les armes, mais avant tout la politique suivie par certains Etats. Voila pourquoi il est tellement nécessaire dans les conditions présentes de la situation internationale tendue que tous les gouvernements participants manifestent une volonté politique et réaffirment le principe de non recours à la force de la manière la plus contraignante possible.

C'est vraiement une telle série de mesures de confiance et de sécurité, composée de mesures d'envergure politiques et militaires se complétant mutuellement, qui pourrait répondre au critère de "truly enhance the present and prospective security situation among our nations".

Monsieur le Président,

Examinons les propositions de l'URSS et d'autres pays socialistes portant sur les mesures militaires.

La notification - une mesure qui se trouve dans l'Acte final. Les propositions des pays de l'Est lui donnent une plus grande portée. Elles s'etendent non seulement sur "les manoeuvres militaire: d'envergure des forces terrestres", comme il est dit dans l'Acte final, mais aussi sur les manoeuvres des formations aériennes et navales conduites indépendamment dans la zone. Les raisons de ces

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propositions ont été largement expliquées à la Conférence. Ces propositions sont tout à fait en accord avec le mandat de la Conférence, où on ne parle plus des activités "terrestres", mais des "activités militaires" des Etats participants, ce qui signifie que les mesures de confiance et de sécurité à adopter devraient s'étendre sur toutes les activités militaires des Etats participants dans la zone.

Nous ne pouvons pas être d'accord avec les affirmations qu'en se concentrant uniquement sur les formations terrestres, même en baissant le seuil jusqu'à un niveau minime, on ferait un progrès dans le développement de la mesure de notification. Un développement de cette mesure devrait nécessairement prévoir l'extension de sa portée sur les activités militaires indépendantes des forces aériennes et navales dans la zone.

Les pays de l'Est proposent aussi que soient notifiés "les mouvements et transfers militaires d'envergure dans la zone couverte par les mesures de confiance, ainsi qu'en direction et en provenance de celle-ci". L'importance pour la sécurité des pays européens d'une pareille mesure a été reconnue. Des mouvements et des transfers militaires d'envergure, surtout en direction de la zone et en provenance de celle-ci, ont des conséquences directes pour la sécurité de tous les Etats en Europe. Une preuve en est la sensibilité des pays européens membres de l'OTAN aux plans des Etats-Unis d'utiliser un certain nombre de leurs troupes basées en Europe occidentale à des objectifs de leur politique hors de la zone couverte par le traité de l'Atlantique Nord.

D'ailleurs cette proposition de l'Union Soviétique et d'autres pays socialistes trouve son fondement dans l'Acte final où il est dit: "les Etats participants à la Conférence sur la sécurité et

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saurait limiter en aucun cas les activités militaires des Etats.

Voila, monsieur le Président, comment sont les choses concernant le développement et l'élargissement des mesures de confiance et de sécurité. Et pour répondre à cet objectif de notre Conférence, il nous faut passer le plus tôt possible aux négociations concrètes sur ces propositions qui répondent mieux aux objectifs et au mandat de la Conférence.

Nous avons devant nous un travail difficile à faire. Et nous pouvons aboutir si nous tous approchons les problèmes avec réalisme et animés par l'esprit constructif. L'idée d'utiliser la structure présente de la Conférence à des fins de discussions non-formelles faciliterait le passage au travail rédactionnel.

"La Conférence de Stockholm dispose d'importantes possibilit potentielles pour le renforcement de la confiance et de la sécurité pour diminuer le risque de confrontation", a dit notre Premier vice-ministre des affaires étrangères à la réunion d'Helsinki. Et il a continué: "Notre désir et notre aspiration sont qu'on aboutisse aux résultats qui pourraient nous permettre de placer Stockholm immédiatement après Helsinki, quand nous parlons de détente en Europe".

Merci de votre attention.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07420
SUBJECT: USDEL VIEWS ON NATO PAPER
REFS: A. STOCKHOLM 7264; B. STOCKHOLM 7076;
C. STATE 737637
1. THIS IS CDE VII - 028
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY. ON THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, THE NATO CAUCUS, AFTER PROTRACTED DISCUSSION, AGREED AD REFERENDUM TO A NON-PAPER ON INFORMAL WORKING ARRANGEMENTS. DELEGATION BELIEVES THIS NATO CAUCUS NON-PAPER, AS AMENDED, ATTEMPTS TO PROTECT AND REFLECT US AND ALLIED POSITIONS. ACCORDINGLY, DELEGATION BELIEVES USG SHOULD JOIN THE CONSENSUS WHICH SEEMS TO BE EMERGING ON THIS PAPER, BEARING IN MIND THAT IT IS EXTREMELY DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE NNA, NO LESS THE EAST, WILL BE ABLE TO ACCEPT THIS NON-PAPER AS AMENDED. IN ANY CASE, WE EXPECT A PERIOD OF EXTENDED WRANGLING ABOUT THE FORM AND THE CONTENT OF THE FUTURE WORKING STRUCTURE WHICH WILL DELAY INITIATION OF INFORMAL MEETINGS AND THUS PUT OFF ANY QUESTION OF DRAFTING UNTIL WELL INTO THE 8TH ROUND AT THE EARLIEST. THIS CABLE OUTLINES DELEGATION VIEW OF THE NATO NON-PAPER AND WHERE WE GO FROM HERE. WASHINGTON GUIDANCE REQUESTED BY COB 30 SEPTEMBER (PARA 10). END SUMMARY.
4. THE QUESTION OF HOW TO MOVE INTO AN INFORMAL SETTING EVENTUALLY LEADING TO DRAFTING HAS BEEN THE FOCUS OF NATO CAUCUS DISCUSSIONS SINCE THE SEVENTH SESSION OPENED ALMOST THREE WEEKS AGO. THE INITIAL NON-PAPER (SEE REFTEL B) EVOLVING OUT OF THE GOODBY/GRINEVSKY EXCHANGES - AND HOW TO RESPOND TO IT - HAVE BEEN THE CORE OF THOSE DISCUSSIONS. AS REPORTED, MANY, PERHAPS MOST, CAUCUS MEMBERS INITIALLY ARGUED FOR A QUICK AND FORTHCOMING RESPONSE WITH MINIMAL CHANGES; SOME OTHERS, NOTABLY THE UK, HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY CHARY ABOUT PREMATURELY ENTERING INTO ANY ARRANGEMENT WHICH WILL PREJUDICE THE STRUCTURE IN WHICH DRAFTING WOULD OCCUR. THE FRENCH MAINTAINED A SOMETIMES CONFUSING AND CONFUSED GALLIC ALOOFNESS AIMED AT PROMOTING THE SO-CALLED FRENCH OPTION, "LA TRANSITION EN DOUCEUR" - THE "SOFT TRANSITION".
5. AFTER NUMEROUS SESSIONS DEVOTED EXCLUSIVELY TO THE WORKING STRUCTURE QUESTION, THE CAUCUS OPINION IS FORMING A CONSENSUS BASED ON THE NATO NON-PAPER; IT IS, IN OUR VIEW, A MAXIMALIST POSITION IN THE CONTEXT OF WHAT COULD BE WORKED OUT WITHIN NATO AND STILL BE PERCEIVED AS A REASONABLE OPENING GAMBIT AND, THEREFORE, MERITS OUR SUPPORT AT THIS STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.
6. DELEGATION POSITION: IN CONSIDERING THIS QUESTION, THE DELEGATION IS OPERATING UNDER WHAT IT BELIEVES TO BE FOUR OVERRIDING CONCERNS: (L) THE NEED TO ENSURE

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THAT OUR SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS ARE NOT PREJUDICED;
(2) THE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE READINESS TO ENTER INTO
INFORMAL EXPLORATORY DISCUSSIONS WHICH COULD PREPARE
THE WAY FOR ACTUAL NEGOTIATION OF A FINAL DOCUMENT
WHILE NOT MOVING WITH UNDUE HASTE. THOSE CONDITIONS
ARE OUTLINED IN OUR MARCH GUIDANCE (REFTEL C); AND (3)
THE NECESSITY TO MAINTAIN ALLIED SOLIDARITY, ESPECIALLY
AS WE ENTER INTO THE CONFERENCE HOMESTRETCH; AND (4)
THE NEED TO ENSURE AN ADEQUATE FIREBREAK BETWEEN
INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS AND THE SUBSEQUENT DRAFTING
PHASE. IN OUR VIEW, THESE FOUR IMPERATIVES ARE NOT
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE.
7. TO ATTAIN THESE GOALS, HOWEVER, THE DELEGATION
BELIEVES IT SHOULD CONTINUE TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN
SHAPING CAUCUS CONSENSUS AND STRATEGY. AS A FIRST
FROM USDEL CDE
STATE FOR PM/TMP:WALKER
GENEVA FOR NST DEL
SECDEF FOR FEITH
E.O. L2356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, CSCE, PREL, CDE
SUBJECT: USDEL VIEWS ON NATO PAPER
STEP, THE CAUCUS NEEDS TO APPROVE A MAXIMALIST
COUNTER-OFFER TO THE SOVIETS WHICH IS, AT THE SAME
TIME, NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE GOODBY/GRINEVSKY
DISCUSSIONS ON THE SUBJECT. FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS,
WE BELIEVE THE NATO CAUCUS NON-PAPER (REFTEL A)
ATTEMPTS TO PROTECT THE U.S. NEGOTIATING POSITION: L.
NO TARGET DATE IS SET FOR DRAFTING AND IT MAKES IT
CLEAR THAT DRAFTING ONLY TAKES PLACE IN A "SUBSEQUENT"
PHASE; 2. CONSTRAINTS ARE PUT IN THE CONTEXT OF ANNUAL
CALENDARS. 3. INFORMATION, VERIFICATION AND
NOTIFICATION REMAIN INDEPENDENT ITEMS WITHIN THE
CONTEXT OF A NOTIFICATION SYSTEM COMPRISING A SET OF
MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S. 4. THE PRINCIPLE OF
NON-USE OF FORCE IS ALSO PUT IN THIS CONTEXT. 5.
CONSISTENCY WITH THE MADRID MANDATE IS A SINE QUO NON
TO DRAFTING ON ANY SUBJECT; AND 6. THE CAUCUS HAS
AGREED TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE NNA THAT IT CAN ONLY
ACCEPT TWO NNA COORDINATORS, I.E., NOT AN NNA
COORDINATOR FOR EACH CLUSTER.
8. DELEGATION WISHES TO FLAG WASHINGTON ATTENTION TO
THE FOLLOWING KEY QUESTIONS:
-- DOES THE CAUCUS NON-PAPER SUFFICIENTLY PROTECT OUR
MEASURES ONE AND FIVE? SPECIFICALLY, DOES IT ALLOW FOR
AN INDEPENDENT EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND ON-SITE
INSPECTION?
-- DOES THE DESCRIPTION OF CONSTRAINTS ADEQUATELY
REFLECT AND PROTECT NATO INTERESTS AND CONCERNS?
-- IS THE FIREBREAK BETWEEN INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS AND
THE SUBSEQUENT DRAFTING PHASE ADEQUATE?

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9. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: DELEGATION BELIEVES WE SHOULD JOIN THE AD REFERENDUM CAUCUS CONSENSUS ON THE CAUCUS NON-PAPER. THE NEXT CAUCUS MEETING TO CONSIDER THE SUBJECT WILL BE TUESDAY, OCTOBER L. ALL CAUCUS MEMBERS, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF THE UK, HAVE INDICATED TO US THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE CAUCUS NON-PAPER. MOST DELEGATIONS CONSIDER THAT THE NON-PAPER REPRESENTS OUR MAXIMALIST DEMANDS; SOME (EG. THE FRG, NORWAY, CANADA) WOULD CLEARLY PREFER TO GO IN WITH A PAPER ALREADY CONCEDING SOME POINTS IN THE HOPES THAT IT WOULD BE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO OTHER CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS, BUT HAVE GONE ALONG WITH THE AMENDMENTS IN THE INTEREST OF ALLIED SOLIDARITY. WE EXPECT THAT THESE COUNTRIES WILL WANT THIS "MAXIMALIST FAT" TO BE TRIMMED DURING THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS. IN ADDITION TO THE SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES LISTED ABOVE, WE BELIEVE THAT THE NON-PAPER CONTAINS SUFFICIENT "FIREBREAKS", SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, PARA 3 OF NON-PAPER) TO PROTECT OUR POSITION BEFORE WE ACTUALLY ENTER INTO A DRAFTING EXERCISE. FOR THE VERY REASONS THIS NON-PAPER IS ACCEPTABLE TO US, IT WILL BE, NEEDLESS TO SAY, UNACCEPTABLE TO THE EAST. WE STRONGLY SUSPECT THAT THEY WILL EITHER COME BACK WITH NUMEROUS CHANGES OR WILL RETURN TO THE ORIGINAL SOVIET PROPOSAL. WE CANNOT, MOREOVER, RULE OUT THAT THE NNA WILL ENTER THE DIALOGUE WITH THEIR OWN THOUGHT E.G., ON CONSTRAINTS, CONSULTATIONS. AT THAT POINT, WASHINGTON WILL WANT TO CONSIDER WHAT APPROACH TO TAKE: (L) TO ACCEPT; (2) TO AMEND FURTHER; (3) TO REJECT; (4) TO EXPLORE OTHER INTERMEDIATE ALTERNATIVES, E.G., THE FRENCH "SOFT TRANSITION."

LO. GUIDANCE REQUESTED: NATO CAUCUS WILL DISCUSS REACTIONS FROM CAPITALS OCT. L. ACCORDINGLY, WE SHOULD BE INFORMED OF WASHINGTON CONCURRENCE OR ANY CHANGES BY COB 30 SEPTEMBER.

FROM USDEL CDE
STATE FOR PM/TMP:WALKER
GENEVA FOR NST DEL
SECDEF FOR FEITH
E.O. L2356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, CSCE, PREL, CDE
SUBJECT: USDEL VIEWS ON NATO PAPER
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07521
SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STATEMENTS, SEPTEMBER 27, 1985
1. CDE VII - 029
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
-
3. SUMMARY: AT THE SEPTEMBER 27 CDE PLENARY SESSION, GDR AMBASSADOR GUHRING IMPLICITLY ACCUSED NATO OF NOT MATCHING WORDS WITH DEEDS BY PLACING CONDITIONS ON THE SPCCIFICS OF ANY DRAFTING ARRANGEMENT WHILE RHETORICALLY SUPPORING AN EARLY MOVE TO CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS. BUHRING'S COMMENTS CAN BE SEEN AS PART OF A GENERAL EASTERN CAMPAIGN TO BUILD PRESSURE ON THE WEST FOR AN EARLY START ON DRAFTING. RESPONDING TO BUHRING, GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) NOTED THAT NOW WAS NOT THE TIME FOR "VAIN POLEMICS," BUT FOR AN ACTIVE AND CALM SEARCH FOR A SUCCESSFUL SOLUTION. AMBASSADOR BARRY (U.S.) MADE A BRIEF STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO THE CHAIR'S WELCOME WHICH IS OEING RCPORTED SEPTEL. END SUMMARY.
4. AMBASSADOR BUHRING (GDR) OPENED THE SEPTEMBER 27 CDE PLENARY SESSION WITH A STATEMENT THAT IMPLICITLY ATTEMPTED TO PAINT THE WEST AS THE VILLAIN FOR DELAY IN MOVING TLE CONFERENCE TO AN INFORMAL STRUCTURE AND "CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS." BUHRING RECALLED THE STATEMENTS OF THE AMBASSADORS OF THE U.S., FRG, AND DENMARK AT THE OPENING PLENARY (SEPTEMBER 10) WHICH HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED TO BEGIN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS AND THE DRAFTING PROCESS "VERY SOON." HOWEVER, BUHRING OBSERVED THAT SOME DELEGATIONS, WHILE WILLING TO REAFFIRM THEIR INTEREST IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL TERMS, PRODUCE MANY "IFS" AND "BUTS" WHEN DISCUSSION TURNS TO THE DETAILS OF HOW TO MOVE TO THE NEXT PHASE. IN CONTRAST, HE CONTENDED, THE WARSAW TREATY STATCS HAD RETURNED TO STOCKHOLM WITH THE "POLITICAL WILL" TO UNDERTAKE CONCRETE ACTIONS AND TO ENTER INTO A MORE INTENSIVE WORK PHASE CONCENTRATING ON THOSC AREAS IN WHICH THE CONFERENCC HAS A CHANCE TO CONCLUDE AGREEMENT BEFORE THE VIENNA MEETING. HE CLAIMED THAT THE NNA STATES ALSO FAVOR SUCH INFORMAL NEGOTIATIONS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EXISTING STRUCTURE. HE INDICATED THAT NATO MUST DEMONSTRATE A WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE ON SC.1, AND NOT PRESENT IT AS A "TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT" PROPOSAL. FOR EXAMPLE, HE NOTED, THE NATO COUNTRIES SOMETIMES SEEM TO INDICATE THAT THEY WANT THE AGREEMENT OF THE CONFERENCE TO THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT AND THE
-
STRUCTURAL PARAMETER BEFORE THEY WILL ENTER INTO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. HE ARGUED THAT DELEGATIONS NEED TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE NOW, AND DEFER SOME OF THE OPTIONS WHICH THEY ARE SEEKING TO ANOTHER TIME.
5. IN AN UNSCHEDULED, BUT OBVIOUSLY PREPARED STATEMENT FRENCH AMBASSADOR GASCHIGNARD EXPRESSED PLEASURE WITH

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THE STATED DESIRE OF MANY TO INTENSIFY THE CONFERENCE'S WORK. HE RECALLED THAT FRANCE HAD STATED FREQUENTLY THAT IT FAVORED A DECISION TO EXTEND THE EXISTING WORKING GROUPS INTO MORE INFORMAL GROUPS IN ORDER TO FACILITATE MORE CONCRETE DISCUSSIONS AND A FASTER MOVE TOWARDS CONVERGENCE. HOWEVER, GACHIGNARD NOTED, SOMEWHAT SARCASTICALLY, "NOTHING SO SIMPLE COULD BE ACCEPTED." SOME WANT TO CODIFY TRANSITION ARRANGEMENTS. ALTHOUGH NOT THE FRENCH PREFERENCE, FRANCE HAS NONETHELESS AGREED WITH THIS APPROACH EVEN THOUGH WORKING OUT SUCH A FORMAL ARRANGEMENT WAS BOUND TO DELAY THE COMMENCEMENT OF INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS. IN RESPONSE TO AMBASSADOR BUHRING'S STATEMENT, GASCHIGNARD EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT THIS DELAY WAS BEING ATTRIBUTED TO ONE OR ANOTHER COUNTRY OR GROUPS OF COUNTRIES AS ALL IN THE CONFERENCE ARE RESPONSIBLE. WITH EFFORTS TO RESOLVE PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS UNDERWAY, HE STATED, NOW IS NOT THE TIME FOR "VAIN POLEMICS." IT IS RATHER A TIME FOR AN ACTIVE AND CALM SEARCH FOR A SUCCESSFUL SOLUTION. (BEGIN COMMENT: FRANCE HAS CLEARLY NOT ABANDONED ITS SO-CALLED "SOFT TRANSITION" FORMULA, WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A DRAFTING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 07521

FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STATEMENTS, SEPTEMBER 27, 1985

PHASE. THIS STATEMENT MAY HAVE BEEN INTENDED TO KEEP THE OPTION ALIVE WLILE DIVERTING BLAME IF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS ON WORKING STRUCTURE SHOULD FAIL. END COMMENT.)

BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07525
SUBJECT: CDE WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, SEPTEMBER 18-30, 1985
REF: STOCKHOLM 7420
1. CDE VII - 031
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
-
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AFTER AGONIZING OVER A "NON-AMERICAN, NON-PAPER, THE CAUCUS FINALLY AGREED TO A WESTERN APPROACH FOR MOVING INTO INFORMAL DISCUSSION AND THE SUBSEQUENT DRAFTING PROCESS. WHILE WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN REACHING CAUCUS CONSENSUS ON AN AMENDED NON-PAPER, IT HAS NOT BEEN WITHOUT COSTS. SOME OF OUR MORE ANXIOUS ALLIES BELIEVE WE HAVE BEEN TOO CLEVER BY HALF. BY AGREEING TO A "MAXIMALIST POSITION," THEY ARGUE, WE HAVE WRITTEN A TICKET TO FURTHER PROCEDURAL WRANGLING WHICH WILL DELAY SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS. IN ANY CASE, WESTERN DOUBTS AND DIFFERENCES ARE NO SECRET TO OTHER CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS. THE EAST, SEEKING TO EXPLOIT THE SITUATION, HAVE INDIRECTLY INDICTED WESTERN INDECISION AND DECLARED THEY ARE READY, WILLING, AND ABLE TO BEGIN DRAFTING. WHILE THE EAST ATTEMPTED TO POSITION ITSELF ON THE SIDE OF THE ANGELS, THE NNA TRIED TO AVOID BEING SEEN AS ONE OF THE FALLEN ANGELS BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO AGREE ON A COMMON PACKAGE OF WORKING DOCUMENTS. AS THE CONFERENCE DELEGATES DELICATELY ENGAGED IN PROCEDURAL FOREPLAY IN PRIVATE, THERE WAS LITTLE ACTION IN THE MORE PUBLIC FORA -- THE PLENARY AND THE WORKING GROUPS. END SUMMARY.
4. WORKING STRUCTURE. TO DRAFT OR NOT TO DRAFT -- AND UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS -- THAT IS THE QUESTION. WHETHER 'TIS NOBLER IN THE MIND TO SUFFER THE SLINGS AND ARROWS OF OUTRAGEOUS EASTERN CALUMNY, OR TO TAKE ARMS BY PROPOSING A WESTERN REJOINDER.
-
5. THE NATO CAUCUS WRESTLED WITH THIS VEXING QUESTION, WITH HAMLET-LIKE AGONIZING, FOR THREE WEEKS. THE PAPER CIRCULATED BY AMBASSADOR GOODBY CONTAINING SOVIET SUGGESTIONS ON WORKING STRUCTURE EVOLVING OUT OF GOODBY'S EXCHANGES WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY -- AND HOW TO RESPOND TO IT -- HAS BEEN AT THE CORE OF THOSE DISCUSSIONS. THC PAPER WAS DUBBED BY THE CAUCUS, NOT INAPPROPRIATELY, THE "NON-AMERICAN NON-PAPER."
6. MOST CAUCUS MEMBERS INITIALLY ARGUED FOR A QUICK AND FORTHCOMING RESPONSE WITH MINIMAL CHANGES; SOME OTHERS, NOTABLY THE UK, WERE EXTREMELY CHARY ABOUT PREMATURELY ENTERING INTO ANY INFORMAL ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD, IN THEIR VIEW, PREJUDICE THE FUTURE DRAFTING STRUCTURE. THE FRENCH MAINTAINED A SOMETIMES CONFUSING AND CONFUSED GALLIC ALOOFNESS AIMED AT PROMOTING THE SO-CALLED FRENCH OPTION, "LA TRANSITION EN DOUCEUR" -- THE "SOFT TRANSITION."

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7. IN ANY CASE, THE FINE PRINT IN EACH CLAUSE OF THE "NON-AMERICAN, NON-PAPER" WAS EXAMINED LIKE A USED CAR GUARANTEE. CAVEAT EMPTOR. THE BRITISH WERE MOST WARY, NOTING, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT AGREEING TO VIRTUALLY ANY CONSTRAINTS FORMULATION MIGHT BE "OPENING A DOOR WE CAN'T GO THROUGH." THE PORTUGUESE AMBASSADOR WORRIED ABOUT THE OPEN-ENDED NUF CLAUSE AND REITERATED HIS CONCERN ABOUT "WHAT'S IN IT FOR THE RUSSIANS." WE, TOO, ARGUED FOR A CLOSE READING OF THE "NON-PAPER," AS WELL AS FOR A POSITION WHICH FULLY PROTECTS WESTERN INTERESTS AND WHICH WOULD BE SEEN, AT THE SAME TIME, AS A GOOD-FAITH COUNTEROFFER TO THE SOVIETS CONSISTENT WITH THE GRINEVSKY PROPOSALS TO AMBASSADOR GOODBY ON THE SUBJECT.

8. AFTER AN EXTENDED DISCUSSION DOMINATING SEVEN MEETINGS, THE CAUCUS AGREED TO AN AMENDED VERSION OF THE "NON-PAPER" (SEE REFTEL). WE BELIEVE THAT IT PROTECTS AND REFLECTS THE U.S. AND ALLIED NEGOTIATING STANCE FOR C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 STOCKHOLM 07525
FROM USDEL CDE
GCNEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OARD
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, SEPTEMBER 18-30, 1985
THE REASONS OUTLINED IN REFTEL, BEARING IN MIND THE OLD CSCE DICTUM: NOTHING IS AGREED UNTIL EVERYTHING IS AGREED. AND IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT THE NNA, NO LESS THAN THE EAST, WILL BE ABLE TO ACCEPT THE NATO NON-PAPER AS AMENDED.

9. WHILE WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN REACHING A CAUCUS CONSENSUS ON AN AMENDED NON-PAPER, IT HAS NOT BEEN WITIOUT COSTS. MANY DELEGATIONS, E.G., THE FRG, THE NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, BELIEVE IT REFLECTS TOO MUCH OF A MAXIMALIST NEGOTIATING POSITION, AND THAT IT CONSEQUENTLY IS A TICKET TO FURTHER PROCEDURAL HAGGLING WHICH WILL DELAY SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS. THE ALLIANCE HAS BEEN, ACCORDING TO SOME, TOO CUTE AND TOO CLEVER. THESE DELEGATIONS ALSO HAVE VOICED THEIR FRUSTRATION AT THE "OBDURATE" POSITION TAKEN BY THE UK AND REMAINED CURIOUS ABOUT THE U.S. POSITION, ESPECIALLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ARRIVAL OF THE NEW AMERICAN AMBASSADOR. WILL AMBASSADOR BARRY'S ARRIVAL PRESAGE MOVEMENT TOWARD DRAFTING, THEY OPENLY WONDER. AND HOW WILL SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE'S MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY SHULTZ AFFECT THE CDE?

10. GIVEN THE LOQUACIOUSNESS OF SOME OF OUR COLLEAGUES, AS WELL AS THE ACTIVE CDE GRAPEVINE, WESTERN DOUBTS AND DIFFERENCES ARE NO SECRET TO OTHER CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS. THE EAST, SEEKING TO EXPLOIT THE

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SITUATION, HAS NOT REMAINED SILENT. WHILE EASTERN SPEAKERS HAVE NOT DIRECTLY CRITICIZED THE WEST, THEIR MESSAGE IS CLEAR: THE EAST IS READY, WILLING AND ABLE TO BEGIN DRAFTING. WHAT ABOUT THE WEST? WHY MUST THE CONFERENCE "MARK TIME," GDR AMBASSADOR BUHRING PLEADED PLAINTIVELY IN PLENARY, WHILE SOME DELEGATIONS "ADD THOUSANDS OF IFS AND BUTS" TO THE PROCEDURAL PROCESS.

11. WHILE THE EAST ATTEMPTED TO POSITION ITSELF ON THE SIDE OF THE ANGELS, THE NNA TRIED TO AVOID BEING SEEN AS ONE OF THE FALLEN ANGELS. THE NNA WORRY, IN PARTICULAR, THAT THEY WILL BE SEEN AS DELAYING A PROCEDURAL SOLUTION BECAUSE THEY HAVE YET TO INTRODUCE THEIR PACKAGE OF WORKING DOCUMENTS. THE TABLING -- OR LACK THEREOF -- OF THE NNA PACKAGE SHOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH PROCEDURAL DISCUSSIONS, THEY ARGUE. IN FACT, FINNISH AMBASSADOR KAHILUOTO HAS QUIETLY YET UNMISTAKABLY OFFERED HIS SECVICES AS A LIAISON BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. (HE PLAYED THIS ROLE EFFECTIVELY DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF WORKING GROUPS LAST YEAR.) WHILE THE NNA ARE EAGER TO PLAY THE ROLE OF HONEST BROKERS, THAT DOESN'T MEAN THEY CONCUR WITH EITHER THE EASTERN OR THE WESTERN POSITIONS ON SUBSTANCE OR PROCEDURE. THERE IS SOME LINGERING RESENTMENT THAT A "DEAL" HAS BEEN BROKERED OVER THE HEADS OF THE HONEST BROKERS. AT THE SAME TIME, SOME OF OUR NNA CONTACTS COMPLAIN, THE NEW NATO NON-PAPER CONTAINS TOO MANY AMENDMENTS AND, THEREFORE, WILL BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE EAST. THE NNA, BY THE WAY, ARE HARDLY IN THE DARK VIS-A-VIS THE NATO NON-PAPER. SEVERAL HAVE ADMITTED THAT THEIR GROUP HAS A CAUCUS WORKING COPY WHICH WAS ORIGINALLY STAMPED SECRET.

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12. WHAT NEXT? THE OCTOBER 1 CAUCUS APPOINTED THREE REPRESENTATIVES (DENMARK, BELGIUM, AND TURKEY) TO PRESENT THE NATO NON-PAPER TO AN NNA REPRESENTATIVE, PRESUMABLY FINNISH AMBASSADOR KAHILUOTO, WHO WILL, IN TURN, PASS THE PAPER TO THE EAST. WE CANNOT, MOREOVER, RULE OUT THAT THE NNA WILL ENTER THE DIALOGUE AT SOME STAGE WITH THEIR OWN THOUGHTS, E.G., ON CONSTRAINTS, CONSULTATIONS, ETC. THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE ALREADY TOLD US THAT THEY CANNOT ACCEPT NATO'S FORMULATION ON CONSTRAINTS AND ANNUAL CALENDARS. IN ANY CASE, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS WILL ACCEPT THE NATO NON-PAPER IN ITS PRESENT FORM. WE SUSPECT THAT THEY WILL EITHER COME BACK WITH NUMEROUS CHANGES OR WILL RETURN TO THE ORIGINAL SOVIET

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 STOCKHOLM 07525

FROM USDEL CDE
GCNEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OARD
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, SEPTEMBER 18-30, 1985

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PROPOSAL (SEE REFTEL). AT THAT POINT, WE WILL FACE VARIOUS OPTIONS: (1) TO ACCEPT; (2) TO REJECT; (3) TO AMEND FURTHER; OR (4) TO EXPLORE OTHER INTERMEDIATE ALTERNATIVES, E.G., THE FRENCH "SOFT TRANSITION." THEREFORE, GIVEN THE NUMEROUS NODAL POINTS CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS MUST FACE BEFORE ACTUALLY ENTERING INTO DRAFTING, WE DOUBT THAT THE DRAFTING PROCESS CAN BEGIN UNTIL WELL INTO NEXT ROUND. IN ADDITION, THERE IS A BUILDING SKEPTICISM THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO CRAFT AN ACCEPTABLE PROCEDURAL SOLUTION TO ENTER INTO EXPLORATORY DISCUSSION UNTIL THE THE END OF THIS ROUND (OCTOBER 18) AT THE EARLIEST.

13. WHILE CONFERENCE DELEGATES DELICATELY ENGAGE IN PROCEDURAL FOREPLAY IN PRIVATE, THERE IS LESS TALK AND LITTLE ACTION IN TE MORE PUBLIC FORA -- THE PLENARY AND THE WORKING GROUPS.

-- NATO: ONE OF THE MINOR UNFORTUNATE SIDE EFFECTS OF THE HEADS OF DELEGATION'S PREOCCUPATION WITH PROCEDURE HAS BEEN TIE QUIESCENCE OF NATO SPEAKERS IN WORKING GROUP AB AND THE PLENARY. DURING THE TWO WEEKS OF CAUCUS DEBATE, FOR EXAMPLE, ONLY THE U.S. AND UK ADDRESSED WORKING GROUP AB. IN PLENARY, THERE WERE NO PREPARCD ALLIANCE STATEMENTS. SOME NATO AMBASSADORS HAVE EVEN MAINTAINED THAT WE HAVE EXHAUSTED THE POSSIBILITIES IN THE WORKING GROUPS FOR SHAPING NNA THINKING ON SOME OF OUR CONCEPTS AND FOR FORCING THE EAST TO ADDRESS THESE ISSUES. WE BEG TO DIFFER. IN THE VARIOUS MEETINGS OF THE WORKING GROUPS, NATO HAS CONTINUED TO PROMOTE SC.1/AMPLIFIED, WITH SOME EFFECT, BY WAY OF EXPLANATION AND CLARIFICATION, WHILE ADDRESSING POINTED QUESTIONS AT THE EAST.

-- THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND THE MADRID MANDATE: WHO IS KEEPING THE FAITH? THE EAST CONTINUES TO PLUG ITS OWN INTERPRETATIONS OF THE HFA AND THE MADRID MANDATE. SOVIET MILREP TATARNIKOV UNREMITTINGLY CONTENDS THAT NATO'S INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES THREATEN THE SECURITY OF EUROPE AND, THUS, ACCORDING TO THE MANDATE,ARE LEGITIMATE TOPICS FOR INCLUSION IN CDE DISCUSSION. OCEAN SAFARI, TATARNIKOV CONTENDS, IS A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF SUCH THREATENING ACTIVITIES. (WE SUSPECT THAT MOSCOW'S ULTIMATE AIM IS TO RENEGOTIATE THE MANDATE RATHER THAN TO PROVE ITS FEALTY TO IT.) THE EAST, MOREOVER, HAS ATTACKED SUCH NATO CONCEPTS AS THE STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD AND THE OUT-OF-GARRISON AS VIOLATING "THE LOGIC AND THE LETTER" OF THE FINAL ACT. (WE NOTE THAT SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE ROZANOV HAS CASUALLY HINTED IN WORKING GROUPS THAT HE DOES NOT EXCLUDE CONSIDERING THESE IDEAS IN THE FUTURE, MUCH TO THE VISIBLE CONSTERNATION OF TATARNIKOV.) DISPLAYING A DEGREE OF CHUTZPAH EVEN UNUSUAL FOR THEM, THE SOVIETS

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SHAMELESSLY CALLED ON THE WEST TO LIVE UP TO THE "LETTER" OF THE FINAL ACT (MESSRS SHCHARANSKY, ORLOV, AND THEIR FELLOW HELSINKI MONITORS IN THE GULAG, NO DOUBT, WILL TAKE LITTLE SOLACE IN MOSCOW'S NEW-FOUND AFFINITY FOR THE LETTER OF THE LAW). WHILE EASTERN PROTESTATIONS ABOUT THE "LETTER" OF THE HFA ARE TAKEN WITH A GRAIN OF SALT BY MOST, SOME OF THEIR ARGUMENTS HAVE FOUND FERTILE GROUND. FOR EXAMPLE, THE FINNS -- THE SELF-PROCLAIMED GUARDIANS OF FINAL ACT DOCTRINAL PURITY -- HAVE REPORTEDLY ARGUED AGAINST THE OOG AND THE STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD CONCEPTS IN NNA MEETINGS.

14. NNA WORKING PAPERS: AFTER ALLOWING THEIR DEPUTIES TO BRING THE BALL UP COURT FOR MUCH OF THE ROUND, THE NNA AMBASSADORS HAVE DECIDED TO ENTER INTO THE GAME. THE HEADS OF DELEGATION ARE IN WHAT ONE NNA DEPUTY DESCRIBES AS A "FULL COURT PRESS" TO RECONCILE EXISTING DIFFERENCES; NEVERTHELESS, THE MAJOR NNA PLAYERS ARE NOT KNOWN FOR THEIR TEAMWORK. THE SWEDES AND THE SWISS, THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 STOCKHOLM 07525

FROM USDEL CDE
GCNEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OARD
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, SEPTEMBER 18-30, 1985

NNA ODD COUPLE, CONTINUE TO FIGHT BOTH IN PRIVATE AND IN PUBLIC. MEANWHILE, THE FINNS, AUSTRIANS, AND YUGOSLAVS, THE REMAINDER OF THE NNA STARTING FIVE, ARE STILL PRESENTING THEIR OWN NATIONAL POINTS OF VIEW. THUS, IT IS INCREASINGLY UNLIKELY THAT THE NNA WILL COME OUT OF THEIR FIVE CORNER OFFENSIVE DURING THIS SESSION; I.E., THEY WILL NOT TABLE THEIR PACKAGE.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07553
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS MEETING OF OCTOBER 1, 1985
REF: A) STATE 301325, B) STOCKHOLM 7363
1. CDE VII - 032
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
-
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE OCTOBER 1 CDE NATO CAUCUS SESSIONS REACHED FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE TEXT OF THE NON-PAPER ON INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE. THE AGREED TEXT CONTAINS THE CHANGE PROPOSED BY WASHINGTON TO PARA 1 (REF A) AS WELL AS A BELGIAN REORDERING OF THE FIRST SENTENCC OF THE SAME PARA (REPORTED BELOW). THE CAUCUS ALSO AGREED THAT THREE NATO SPOKESMEN, STANDAERT (BELGIUM), MELLBIN (DENMARK), AND OZGUL (TURKEY), WOULD PRESENT THE NATO POSITION TO KAHILUOTO (FINLAND) ON OCTOBER 2. AMBASSADOR BARRY (U.S.), IN CONCURRING WITH THE TEXT, STRESSED TLE UNITED STATES' VIEW THAT ALL FIVE MEASURES OF SC.1 MUST BE CONSIDERED INDEPENDENTLY AND THERE COULD BE NO AUTOMATICITY TO ANY MOVE FROM THE EXPLORATORY PHASE TO DRAFTING. SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION ON THIS POINT PRODUCED NO CONSENSUS, AS THE USUAL PLAYERS TOOK THEIR USUAL POSITIONS -- THE U.S., PORTUGAL, AND UK ARGUCD AGAINST ANY UNRESERVED COMMITMENT TO GO TO DRAFTING, WHILE NORWAY AND THE NETHERLANDS INDICATED THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO DRAFT ALMOST IMMEDIATELY. MEVIK (NORWAY) REPORTED ON A CONTACT WITH KAHILUOTO AND PROVIDED TLE CAUCUS WITH TLE TEXT OF A WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL WHICH GRINEVSKY (USSR) HAD DICTATED TO THE FINNISH AMBASSADOR (TEXT REPORTED BELOW). END SUMMARY.
4. CONTACTS: MEVIK (NORWAY) REPORTED ON A CONTACT WITH KAHILUOTO (FINLAND) AND READ THE CAUCUS THE TEXT OF A WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL ON INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE WHICH GRINEVSKY HAD DICTATED TO THE FINNISH AMBASSADOR. ON OCTOBER 2, MELLBIN (DENMARK) DISTRIBUTED THE ACTUAL TEXT TO THE CAUCUS.
-
BEGIN TEXT AS DISTRIBUTED:
(1) RETAINING THE EXISTING WORKING STRUCTURE OF THE CONFERENCE, THE PARTICIPATING STATES HAVE AGREED TO FORESEE THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE OF INFORMAL DISCUSSION AND OF THE SUBSEQUENT DRAFTING:
WORKING GROUP A
- TUESDAY: THE NON-USE OF FORCE
- WEDNESDAY: EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, AND DEVELOPMENT OF MEANS OF COMMUNICATION, IN RELATION TO THE NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES.
- THURSDAY: CONTRAINING MEASURES; ANNUAL FORECASTS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES
WORKING GROUP B:
- TUESDAY: NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES

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- THURSDAY: OBSERVATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES.
(2) INFORMAL DISCUSSION TO TERMINATE, IF POSSIBLE, IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE EIGHTH SESSION WITH THE CONFERENCE MOVING SMOOTHLY INTO DRAFTING BY ABOUT THAT TIME.
(3) THE CHAIR AT INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WILL BE TAKEN IN DAILY ROTATION. DRAFTING WILL BE PROMOTED BY APPROPRIATE COORDINATORS-REPRESENTATIVES OF NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES.
END TEXT.
FROM USDEL
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS MEETING OF OCTOBER 1, 1985
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EDES (UK) ANGRILY REPORTED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR BOZOVIC WHO HAD CLEARLY BEEN SHOWN THE TEXT OF THE CAUCUS AD REF NON-PAPER. EDES CALLED THIS A "SERIOUS AND STUPID" BREACH OF CAUCUS SECURITY AND SAID IT WOULD HAVE REPERCUSSIONS FOR THE UK'S FUTURE COURSE OF ACTION IN THE CAUCUS.
5. DISCUSSION OF THE CAUCUS NON-PAPER WAS OPENED BY AMBASSADOR BARRY (U.S.) WHO EMPHASIZED THAT WASHINGTON WISHED TO SEE THE CONFERENCE MOVE FORWARD EXPEDITIOUSLY, WHILE, AT THE SAME TIME, FULLY PROTECTING NATO'S SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS. ("TO MAKE HASTE CAUTIOUSLY.") HE SAID THAT THE USG WAS PREPARED TO AGREE TO THE CAUCUS NON-PAPER, PROVIDED THAT THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 1 WAS CHANGED TO READ "THIS INFORMAL ARRANGEMENT AND SUBSEQUENT DRAFTING SHOULD BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE." NOTING THAT WHILE WE WERE PREPARED TO MOVE TO THE EXPLORATORY PLASE, IT COULD NOT JE AT THE EXPENSE OF ANY OF OUR INDEPENDENT MEASURES. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT THE U.S. WISHED TO EXCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF UNACCEPTABLE CONTRAINTS MEASURES FROM THIS PHASE. BARRY STRESSED THE UNITED STATES VIEW THAT THERE WAS NO "AUTOMATICITY" TO THE SHIFT FROM THE EXPLORATORY PHASE TO DRAFTING AND INDICATED THAT CONCRETE PROGRESS IN THE INFORMAL PHASE SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO WARRANT A MOVE TO DRAFTING. SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON THE NEW U.S. PROPOSED SENTENCE AND WHETHER OR NOT IT WOULD REQUIRE ANOTHER FORMAL CAUCUS DECISION BEFORE DRAFTING COULD BEGIN. NORWAY AND THE NETHERLANDS WERE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED TO AVOID ANY REQUIREMENT FOR ANOTHER DECISION, AND BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) COMMENTED THAT HE HAD THOUGHT THE CAUCUS HAD ALREADY DECIDED THAT TLIS STEP WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO GO TO DRAFTING. CANADA, FRANCE AND DENMARK COMMENTED THAT THEY COULD ACCEPT THE PROPOSED CHANGE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WOULD NOT NECESSITATE AN ADDITIONAL, FORMAL NATO DECISION. BARRY

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(U.S.) SAID THAT HE BELIEVED IT WAS ALREADY THE POSITION OF THE CAUCUS THAT THERE WAS NO "AUTOMATICITY" TO THE -
MOVE FROM THE EXPLORATORY PHASE TO DRAFTING AND THAT THE U.S. PROPOSED CHANGE DID NOT ALTER THAT POSITION. BARRY NOTED THAT IF IN THE EXPLORATORY PHASE THE SOVIETS ATTEMPTED TO ELIMINATE MEASURES 1 AND 5 AS INDEPENDENT MEASURES, FOR EXAMPLE, WE WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO MOVE TO DRAFTING. THEREFORE WE DO NOT WANT TO BE LOCKED INTO A CERTAIN DATE FOR DRAFTING. BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) AGREED THAT IF THIS WERE TO HAPPEN DRAFTING COULD NOT BEGIN, BUT HE ALSO EXPRESSED HIS VIEW THAT THE EAST WOULD MAKE SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS IN THE EXPLORATORY PHASE. CONSENSUS WAS ACHIEVED TO ACCEPT THE U.S. CHANGE, ALTHOUGH SEVERAL DELEGATIONS DID SO ONLY IN LIGHT OF THE CHAIR'S (FRG) INTERPRETATION THAT THE U.S. LANGUAGE WOULD NOT REQUIRE THAT ANOTHER PROCEDURAL "NODE" BE SURMOUNTED BY THE CAUCUS AS A WHOLE.
6. SEVERAL DELEGATIONS (NETHERLANDS, PORTUGAL, BELGIUM, SPAIN) REPORTED THAT TLEIR CAPITALS IAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE NON-PAPER AND WERE NOT ENTIRELY CONVINCED THAT THE PRESENT FORMULATION ADEQUATELY ESTABLISHED THE INDEPENDENCE OF NATO'S INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION MEASURES. THEY ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THEY HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED NOT TO STAND IN THE WAY OF CONSENSUS. BARRY (U.S.) OBSERVED THAT TLE UNITED STATES SHARED THESE CONCERNS AND THAT THIS MADE IT ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT TO HAVE A DISTINCT EXPLORATORY PHASE TO ASSESS WHERE THE PROCESS WAS HEADED. CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL) SAID LISBON WAS PREPARED TO DROP THIS WHOLE APPROACH AND START AGAIN IF "WE CAN'T GET WHAT WE WANT" ON THIS ISSUE. EDES (UK) WELCOMED THE NOTES OF CAUTION BEING EXPRESSED BY THE CAUCUS WHICH, HC OBSERVED, HE HAD BEEN SOUNDING ALL ALONG. STANDAERT (BELGIUM) INDICATED THAT BRUSSELS ALSO WISHED TO PROCEED WITH GREAT CAUTION AND FELT THE BEST
FROM USDEL
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS MEETING OF OCTOBER 1, 1985
WAY TO DO THIS WAS TO STRESS THAT CSBM'S MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE. TO HIGHLIGHT THIS IN THE NON-PAPER, STANDAERT PROPOSED REORDERING THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARA 1 TO READ "THE EXISTING WORKING STRUCTURE WILL BE USED AS A MEANS OF UNDERTAKING AN -
INFORMAL EXPLORATION OF TOPICS WHICH MIGHT FIGURE IN THE SUBSEQUENT PROCESS OF DRAFTING LANGUAGE ON A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLIMENTARY CSBM'S, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE, FOR POSSIBLE INCLUSION IN A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT." THIS CHANGE WAS ACCEPTED AND CAUCUS

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AGREEMENT WAS CONCLUDED ON THE TEXT OF THE NON-PAPER.
7. THE CHAIR PROPOSED, AND THE CAUCUS ACCEPTED WITHOUT DISCUSSION, AMBASSADORS STANDAERT (BELGIUM), MELLBIN (DENMARK), AND OZGUL (TURKEY) TO ACT AS SPOKESMEN IN PRESENTING THE CAUCUS' POSITION TO KAHILUOTO (FINLAND). EDES (UK) ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED CONFIRMATION THAT THIS TEAM (DUBBED THE "TROIKA" BY BUWALDA) WOULD ONLY PRESENT THE CAUCUS POSITION TO KAHILUOTO, RATHER THAN ENGAGE IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS. THE CAUCUS THEN TURNED TO AN EXTENDED AND SOMETIMES SEMI-LUDICROUS DEBATE OVER WHETHER THE PAPER SHOULD SIMPLY BE GIVEN TO KAHILUOTO TO AVOID ANY CHANCE OF MISUNDERSTANDING (THE MAJORITY VIEW) OR DICTATED TO HIM SLOWLY. GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) REFUSED TO SUPPORT THE GIVING OF ANY PAPER TO KAHILUOTO, ALTHOUGH HE WAS WILLING TO HAVE THE NATO SPOKESMEN GIVE WORD-BY-WORD DICTATION TO THE FINNISH AMBASSADOR (A POSITION BUWALDA CALLED "ABSOLUTELY INCOMPREHENSIBLE" AND "RIDICULOUS" IN A HEATED EXCHANGE WITH GASCHIGNARD). FOLLOWING A FIVE-MINUTE COOLING-OFF BREAK, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE TROIKA WOULD BE LEFT TO DECIDE HOW BEST TO ENSURE THAT KAHILUOTO RECEIVED THE EXACT TEXT WITHOUT ACTUALLY HANDING HIM A PAPER.
8. DISCUSSION NEXT TURNED TO THE ORAL POINTS THE NATO SPOKESMEN WILL MAKE IN THEIR PRESENTATION TO KAHILUOTO. BARRY (U.S.) COMMENTED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE SPOKESMEN CONVEY THE IMPRESSION THAT THE NATO POSITION IS FIRM, AND NOT ONE WE WILL IMMEDIATELY FALL BACK FROM (THIS IN CONTRAST TO A VIEW EXPRESSED LATER BY DELWORTH (CANADA) THAT THE NON-PAPER WAS A "TOMBSTONE" PROPOSAL). HE PROPOSED TWO POINTS FOR THE SPOKESMEN TO BEAR IN MIND: 1) THAT NATO MEASURES 1 AND 5 MUST
-
CONTINUE TO RECCIVE INDEPENDENT CONSIDERATION; AND 2) THAT THERE IS NO AUTOMATIC TRANSITION TO DRAFTING AND THAT A TARGET DATE FOR DRAFTING IS NOT SOMETHING TO WHICH WE ARE PREPARED TO AGREE. WHILE THERE WAS GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE SUBSTANCE OF BARRY'S FIRST POINT, MOST AGREED WITH CITRON'S (FRG) VIEW THAT THE NON-PAPER ALREADY EXPLAINS OUR POSITION "CLEARLY AND STRONGLY," AND THAT THE CAUCUS SHOULD NOT TRY TO WRITE A FULL SCRIPT FOR THE NATO SPOKESMEN. BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) RESPONDED TO BARRY'S SECOND POINT BY INDICATING THAT HE (AND OTHERS) COULD NOT ACCEPT HAVING THE SPOKESMEN EMPHASIZE ANY POINT EXCEPT THAT NATO WAS WILLING TO DRAFT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AS AGREED IN THE NON-PAPER. HE INDICATED THAT THE NETHERLANDS WAS PREPARED TO DRAFT RIGHT AWAY, BECAUSE HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE EXPLORATORY PHASE WOULD ACHIEVE ANYTHING. EDES (UK) AGREED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE UNLIKELY TO GIVE ANYTHING IN AN EXPLORATORY PHASE IF THEY WERE ASSURED THAT DRAFTING WOULD BEGIN SHORTLY, BUT MIGHT OFFER SOMETHING IF THEY WERE NOT SO

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SURE. MEVIK (NORWAY) SUPPORTED BUWALDA'S VIEW AND NOTED THAT CSCE HISTORY SHOWS THAT THE SOVIETS MAKE NO CONCESSIONS UNTIL THE DRAFTING PHASE, WHEN THEY CAN PROVE TO MOSCOW IN WRITTEN FORM WHAT THEY HAVE GOTTEN IN RETURN. IN LIGHT OF THIS DISCUSSION, AGREEMENT WAS REACHED TO INSTRUCT THE SPOKESMEN TO MAKE THE THREE ORAL POINTS AGREED LAST WEEK (REF B). THESE ARE:
1) THE INFORMAL GROUPS WILL AT FIRST BE CHAIRED BY A
FROM USDEL
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS MEETING OF OCTOBER 1, 1985
ROTATING CHAIRMANSHIP. AT SOME TIME, COORDINATORS WILL BE EMPLOYED. NATO BELIEVES THAT THERE SHOULD BE TWO COORDINATORS. THE DETAILS OF THIS ARRANGEMENT WILL BE LEFT TO KAHILUOTO.
2) IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE FORMAL WORKING ARRANGEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE DECISION OF DECEMBER 3, 1984, WILL BE EXTENDED FOR THE EIGHTH SESSION BY A DECISION OF THE PLENARY TO BE REGISTERED IN THE JOURNAL.
-
3) IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT TLE INFORMAL EXPLORATION WILL START AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER AGREEMENT ON THE INFORMAL STRUCTURE HAS BEEN REACHED AND THAT THE STARTING DATE WILL BE PART OF THE AGREEMENT.
9. THE CAUCUS AGREED THAT THE NATO SPOKESMEN SHOULD ARRANGE TO MAKE THEIR PRESENTATION TO KAHILUOTO ON WEDNESDAY MORNING, OCTOBER 2.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07610
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS MEETINGS OF OCTOBER 2-3, 1985
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 7364, B) STOCKHOLM 7553
1. CDE VII - 033
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
-
3. SUMMARY: NATO CAUCUS SPOKESMEN (DENMARK, BELGIUM, AND TURKEY) REPORTED THAT THEY HAD PRESENTED THE NATO PROPOSAL ON INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE TO THE NNA REPRESENTATIVE (FINNISH AMBASSADOR KAHILUOTO) ON OCTOBER 2. KAHILUOTO PROVIDED BOTH THE NNA AND SOVIET INITIAL REACTIONS TO THE PROPOSAL ON OCTOBER 3. GRINEVSKY HAD INDICATED TO KAHILUOTO THAT THE NATO PROPOSAL WAS A CLEAR DEPARTURE FROM THE UNOFFICIAL COMPROMISE HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH AMBASSADOR GOODBY, PARTICULARLY IN THE DESCRIPTIONS FOR WORKING GROUPS A, TUESDAY AND WEDNESDAY. KAHILUOTO SAID THAT THE NNA WANTED TO BEGIN THE INFORMAL STAGE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND PROPOSED AN UNDEFINED "SIMPLE APPROACH" TO REACH THIS END. THE CAUCUS INSTRUCTED THE SPOKESMEN TO MAKE CLEAR TO KAHILUOTO THAT IT WAS GRINEVSKY'S PROPOSAL WHICH HAD FIRST DEPARTED FROM THE UNOFFICIAL GOODBY/GRINEVSKY COMPROMISE, AND TO SEEK CLARIFICATION AS TO WHAT THE NNA MEANT BY A "SIMPLE" APPROACH. END SUMMARY.
4. AT NATO CAUCUS SESSIONS OF OCTOBER 2-3 THE THREE CAUCUS SPOKESMEN REPORTED ON TWO MEETINGS HELD WITH KAHILUOTO (FINLAND), FIRST TO PRESENT THE NATO POSITION (OCTOBER 2), AND SUBSEQUENTLY (OCTOBER 3) TO RECEIVE THE INITIAL REACTIONS OF BOTH THE NNA CAUCUS AND GRINEVSKY (USSR). MELLBIN (DENMARK), REPORTING FOR THE "THREE MUSKETEERS," SAID THAT KAHILUOTO HAD PASSED ON TO THEM GRINEVSKY'S PRELIMINARY VIEW THAT THE NATO PROPOSAL (REF A AS AMENDED BY REF B) WAS A CLEAR DEPARTURE FROM THE UNOFFICIAL COMPROMISE HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH AMBASSADOR GOODBY, PARTICULARLY IN THE DESCRIPTIONS OFFERED FOR WORKING GROUP A, TUESDAY AND WEDNESDAY. GRINEVSKY HAD FURTHER NOTED THAT HE DID NOT REGARD ANNUAL FORECASTS AS A CONSTRAINING MEASURE AND HAD INDICATED THAT NATO WAS TRYING TO IMPOSE ITS POINT OF VIEW IN THE DESCRIPTION FOR THIS GROUP (WORKING GROUP A, THURSDAY). HE HAD ALSO OBSERVED THAT THERE WAS NO CLEAR EXPRESSION IN THE NATO PROPOSAL OF HOW AND WHEN THE TRANSITION TO DRAFTING WOULD OCCUR. MELLBIN TOLD THE CAUCUS THAT KAHILUOTO HAD ALSO ADDRESSED TWO POINTS RAISED IN THE NNA CAUCUS
-
DISCUSSION OF THE NATO PAPER: 1) THAT THE NNA WISHES TO PROCEED TO INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND WISHES TO DO THIS IN THE "SIMPLEST" WAY; AND 2) THAT THE "IDEA HAD BEEN EXPRESSED" IN THE NNA CAUCUS THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD BEGIN INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS NEXT WEEK WHILE DETAILS OF AN ARRANGEMENT FOR THE SUBSEQUENT

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DRAFTING PHASE ARE BEING WORKED OUT. (COMMENT: ALTHOUGH KAHILUOTO DID NOT CONFIRM THIS, THE CAUCUS SUSPECTS THIS LATTER POINT WAS MADE BY SWEDEN. END COMMENT.) THE NATO SPOKESMEN HAD SOUGHT FURTHER CLARIFICATION FROM KAHILUOTO ON WHAT THE NNA SPECIFICALLY MEANT BY A "SIMPLE" APPROACH, BUT HAD RECEIVED NO FURTHER ELABORATION.

5. CAUCUS DISCUSSION FOLLOWING MELLBIN'S REPORT FOCUSED ON POINTS THE "THREE MUSKETEERS" SHOULD MAKE IN THEIR NEXT ENCOUNTER WITH KAHILUOTO. MOST DELEGATIONS AGREED WITH EDES' (UK) OBSERVATION THAT GRINEVSKY'S PROPOSAL (REF B), AND NOT OURS, WAS THE FIRST TO DEPART FROM THE UNOFFICIAL COMPROMISE GRINEVSKY AND GOODBY HAD DISCUSSED. BARRY (U.S.) AGREED AND IDENTIFIED SEVERAL EXAMPLES INCLUDING: THE DESCRIPTION FOR WORKING GROUP A (WEDNESDAY); AN IMPLICATION THAT THERE WOULD BE MORE THAN TWO NNA COORDINATORS; THE DROPPING OF THE SO-CALLED "DISCLAIMER" PARA. (PARA 4 OF THE ORIGINAL "NON-AMERICAN, NON-PAPER"); AND AN IMPLIED DEGREE OF AUTOMATICITY TO THE TRANSITION FROM EXPLORATORY DISCUSSIONS TO DRAFTING WITH WHICH THE U.S., AT LEAST, WOULD HAVE MAJOR PROBLEMS.

FROM USDEL
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS MEETINGS OF OCTOBER 2-3, 1985

THE PROPOSAL, HE OBSERVED, NO LONGER REPRESENTS THE GOODBY/GRINEVSKY DISCUSSIONS. WHILE ALL FELT THAT EDES' POINT SHOULD BE MADE, DELWORTH (CANADA) ASKED THAT IT BE "SOFT PEDALED" SO AS NOT TO FOCUS TOO MUCH ATTENTION ON THE GRINEVSKY PAPER AND/OR GIVE THE APPEARANCE THAT WE ARE TRYING TO SCORE DEBATING POINTS. EDES (UK) RETORTED THAT WE HAD BEEN ACCUSED OF BAD FAITH BY GRINEVSKY AND HAD TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT. THE CAUCUS EVENTUALLY AGREED THAT THE CAUCUS SPOKESMEN WOULD MAKE THIS POINT IN A NON-ARGUMENTATIVE MANNER. ON THE QUESTION OF THE NNA'S DESIRE FOR SIMPLICITY, THE CAUCUS WAS IN AGREEMENT THAT IF THIS MEANT SIMPLY LISTING THE TOPICS TO BE

DISCUSSED WITHOUT CAVEATS (FOR EXAMPLE, GROUP A, WEDNESDAY WOULD BE ONLY "EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION, VERFICATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MEANS OF COMMUNICATION") THE CAUCUS WOULD HAVE TO GIVE IT SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. THE "THREE MUSKETEERS" WERE INSTRUCTED TO PRESS KAHILUOTO FOR MORE INFORMATION ON THIS POINT.

6. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE NATO SPOKESMAN WOULD MAKE TWO POINTS AND RAISE THREE QUESTIONS IN THE NEXT MEETING WITH KAHILUOTO: 1) THEY WOULD POINT OUT THAT THE NATO PROPOSAL WAS FULLY ENUNCIATED AND REQUIRED NO ADDITIONAL ELABORATION (IN CONTRAST TO GRINEVSKY'S PROPOSAL); 2) THEY WOULD NOTE THAT IT WAS GRINEVSKY WHO FIRST DEPARTED FROM THE UNOFFICIAL COMPROMISE HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH

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GOODBY; 3) THEY WOULD SEEK TO OBTAIN FROM KAHILUOTO MORE SPECIFIC SOVIET REACTION TO THE POINTS CONTAINED IN PARAS 3 (DISCLAIMER) AND 4 (VERIFICATION) OF THE NATO PAPER; 4) THEY WOULD SEEK MORE SPECIFICITY ON WHAT THE NNA'S "SIMPLE" APPROACH WOULD MEAN IN CONNECTION WITH BOTH THE CLUSTER DESCRIPTIONS AND PARAS 1, 3, AND 4 OF THE NATO PAPER; AND 5) THEY WOULD SEEK A READOUT FROM KAHILUOTO ON GRINEVSKY'S REACTION TO THE "SIMPLE" APPROACH. THE "THREE MUSKETEERS" WERE SCHEDULED TO MEET WITH KAHILUOTO AGAIN AT 5:00 PM, OCTOBER 3 AND WOULD REPORT TO THE OCTOBER 4, 11:00 A.M. CAUCUS SESSION.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07634
SUBJECT: USDEL PUBLIC COMMENT ON SOVIET STATEMENT ON CDE
1. CDE VII - 34
2. C - IN CDE PLENARY TODAY, SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY SPOKE OF GORBACHEV'S PARIS SPEECH IN WHICH THE SOVIET UNION ACCEPTED THE IDEA OF A QUOTE MUTUAL EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL PLANS OF MILITARY ACTIVITY SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION END QUOTE (REF: FBIS LONDON 031541Z OCT 85). IN RESPONSE TO PRESS QUESTIONS, USDEL HAS COMMENTED:
3. U - THE US DELEGATION WELCOMES THE SOVIET RECOGNITION, EXPRESSED IN MR. GORBACHEV'S PARIS SPEECH AND IN AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY'S REMARKS, THAT ANNUAL FORECASTS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES CAN BE USEFUL INSTRUMENTS FOR INCREASING PREDICTABILITY AND STABILITY IN THE MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE. SUCH A PROPOSAL WAS PART OF THE ORIGINAL NATO POSITION PUT BEFORE THE CONFERENCE IN JANUARY, 1984, AND WE CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE ITS VALUE AS PART OF A COMPREHENSIVE SET OF CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES.
4. C - ON BACKGROUND, WE NOTE THAT, CONTRARY TO WHAT GORBACHEV SAID, THIS WAS NOT AN NNA PROPOSAL. WE ALSO NOTE THAT IN HIS REMARKS IN THE CDE GRINEVSKY EXTENDS THE CONCEPT OF ANNUAL FORECASTS TO INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES WHICH CLEARLY STAND OUTSIDE THE MANDATE OF THIS CONFERENCE.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07709
SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STATEMENTS, OCTOBER 4, 1985
1. CDE VII - 038
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
-
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE OCTOBER 4 PLENARY, SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY OUTLINED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO THE U.S. ON ARMS CONTROL PRESENTED IN GORBACHEV'S OCTOBER 3 SPEECH IN PARIS AND EXPANDED UPON THE CDE-RELATED PORTION OF THE STATEMENT. SPECIFICALLY, HE ADDED A PREDICTABLE SOVIET TWIST TO GORBACHEV'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE IDEA OF ANNUAL FORECASTS. CZECHOSLOVAK DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER JOHANNES PUT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IN THE LARGER CONTEXT OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL EVENTS AND ARMS CONTROL FORA. SZIGETI (HUNGARY) ARGUED THE EAST'S INSISTENCE ON ADOPTION OF COMPLEMENTARY "POLITICAL" AND "MILITARY" MEASURES, AND FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON NON-USE OF FORCE. END SUMMARY.
4. SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY'S STATEMENT FOCUSED ON THE "GORBACHEV INITIATIVE" ON ARMS CONTROL, WHICH WILL BE TAOLED IN GENCVA. HE CITED THE OCTOBER 3 SPEECH MADE BY GORBACHEV TO THE FRENCH PARLIAMENT TO MAKE THE POINT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE OFFERING AN ALTERNATIVE TO "DETERRENCE AND FEAR." GRINEVSKY ALSO STATED THAT AN OUTLINE OF AN AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM SHOULD INCLUDE A NON-USE OF FORCE AGREEMENT; A "SELECTION OF MILITARY CSBM'S;" AND ADOPTION OF AN ANNUAL CALENDAR. HE STRESSED THAT SOVIET READINESS TO CONSIDER AN ANNUAL CALENDAR IS A "MAJOR STEP" TO GET NEGOTIATIONS ON THE MOVE. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR SAID THE ANNUAL CALENDAR SHOULD INCLUDE THE "WHOLE PANORAMA OF MILITARY MANEUVERS," INCLUDING AIR, LAND, NAVAL ACTIVITIES, AND MOVEMENTS/TRANSFERS. HE ALSO ENDORSED A NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE ZONE IN CENTRAL EUROPE AS WELL AS A CHEMICAL WEAPONS-FREE ZONE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. (BEGIN COMMENT: GRINEVSKY'S SUPPORT OF THE ANNUAL CALENDAR WAS QUALIFIED, I.E., HE LINKED IT TO INCLUDING AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. IN DOING SO, HE ADDED A PREDICTABLE AND SELF-SERVING SOVIET TWIST TO GORBACHEV'S ENDORSEMENT OF THE ANNUAL CALENDAR IN PARIS. END COMMENT.)
-
5. CZECHOSLOVAK DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER JAROMIR JOHANNES ASSESSED CDE AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF WHAT HE CALLED MAJOR EVENTS TAKING PLACE WHICH HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS. HE DISCUSSED THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT; THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS; AND THE GORBACHEV SUMMITS WITH PRESIDENTS MITTERAND AND REAGAN. HE SUPPORTED THE "NEW SOVIET PEACE INITIATIVE" RECENTLY OUTLINED BY GORBACHEV. HE ALSO MENTIONED HIS GOVERNMENT'S INITIATIVE TO THE FRG GOVERNMENT CALLING FOR NEGOTIATION OF A TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ON

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A CHEMICAL WEAPONS-FREE CORRIDOR IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE KEY TO SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM, HE STRESSED, IS AGREEMENT ON BOTH THE "POLITICAL" AND "MILITARY" ASPECTS OF SECURITY; A TREATY ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE IS CENTRAL TO THIS EFFORT.

6. AMBASSADOR SZIGETI (HUNGARY) ARGUED FOR COMPLEMENTARY NEGOTIATION OF POLITICAL AND "MILITARY" MEASURES IN STOCKHOLM. THE FOCAL POINT OF THIS CONCEPT, HE SAID, WAS AN "AGREEMENT" ON NON-USE OF FORCE, WHICH WOULD BE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA:

-- NOT WEAKEN THE LEGALLY BINDING AND COMPREHENSIVE NATURE OF NUF;

-- "REAFFIRM THE COMMITMENT IN AN ELABORATED FORM;"

-- BASED ON RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE UN CHARTER AND HFA BUT "WHICH KWOULD GO BEYOND A MERE REPETITION OF THE LANGUAGE OF THOSE DOCUMENTS;"

-- BE PRECISE AND UNAMBIGUOUS;

FROM USDEL
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STATEMENTS, OCTOBER 4, 1985

-- APPLY EQUALLY TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES IN THEIR MUTUAL AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS;

-- INCLUDE SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS TO "TAKE FURTHER ACTION IN THE FIELD OF CSBM'S;"

-

-- ALSO USE "RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS, SUCH AS THE UN DECLARATION ON FRIENDLY RELATIONS, AS A SOURCE OF IDEAS AND DRAFTING AIDS."

IN ADDITION TO ELABORATING HUNGARIAN THOUGHTS ON NUF, SZIGETI SUPPORTED THE CZECH-GDR INITIATIVE FOR A CHEMICAL WEAPONS-FREE CORRIDOR IN CENTRAL EUROPE; SUPPORTED THE GORBACHEV "PEACE INITIATIVE;" AND ARGUED THAT IN ORDER TO MOVE POSITIONS CLOSER TOGETHER, THE CONFERENCE MUST MOVE TO INFORMAL WORKING ARRANGEMENTS AND DRAFTING ASAP.

BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

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Delegation of the Hungarian People's Republic
CSCE - CDE
Stockholm

S T A T E M E N T

by

Ambassador Károly Szigeti

Head of the Hungarian Delegation

to the

Conference on Confidence- and Security-building

Measures and Disarmament in Europe

Stockholm, October 4, 1985

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Mr. Chairman,

From time to time references are being made in this plenary hall to the influence major events and developments on the international scene have on our activities here. The summit meeting of the Secretary-General of the CPSU Mikhail Gorbatchev and President Francois Mitterrand is certainly an event with important implications well beyond the bilateral relations. In keeping with the tradition of Soviet-French ties, an essential element of the fabric of East-West relations, it proves to be a major contribution to the relaxation of tension in Europe and to the search for accomodation and negotiated solutions for political, economic and security issues. Its results will have a beneficial impact on the activities of this conference as well.

Mr. Chairman,

The main theme of my intervention today is the complementary nature of political and military aspects of security. I feel it relevant and timely to illuminate our perception of this underlying concept of the CSCE process. It is closely related to our negotiations and to the content, coherence and internal balance of the agreements we seek to conclude before the Vienna follow-up meeting.

Several important provisions of the Helsinki Final Act testify that our predecessors charged with the enormous task

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of designing the document to serve as a basis for the CSCE process were wise enough to recognize the interaction between the political and military dimension of security. The same recognition is reflected in the language of the mandate of this conference as well inviting us to negotiate and adopt "a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures". The frequently mentioned phrase "to give effect and expression to the duty of states to refrain from the threat or use of force" obviously refers, in the context of the principle of non-use of force, to one of the specific aspects of the interrelationship between political and military sides of security.

The last decade since the signature of the Helsinki Final Act provided a convincing example of this interrelationship. The military confrontation in Europe has become a powerful obstacle to political co-operation and détente. The experience of the 1970-s indicate that political détente cannot be sustained unless it is supported and followed up by agreements for the limitation of arms and restoring confidence. Having developed its own momentum, the military confrontation not only reflects but aggravates basic political differences. It was certainly this recognition that provided the reason d'etre for the CDE.

In the narrower context of this conference, the interrelationship suggests that the military or hardware approach to confidence- and security-building measures in itself

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cannot yield meaningful results. Military measures should be tackled parallel with and due regard to , measures relating the political intentions and assurances about the international conduct of states.

In his statement of June 28 the distinguished representative of Ciprus, Dr. Papadopoulos offered us a penetrating analysis of how these two aspects of security are reflected in the mandate and how should they be tackled.

Mr. Chairman,

The record of our deliberations on the proposal to conclude a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations may not be an example of a resolute and structured discussion. Perhaps too much time has been spent on explaining basic positions.

There have remained differences in our positions on important aspects of the form and content of an agreement on non-use of force. Nevertheless, a common understanding seems to have developed on a number of important issues involved. We have succeeded in developing a shared understanding, in some areas even tacit agreements, which could serve as a basis for the beginning of concrete negotiations and the elaboration of an agreement.

I do not feel competent to define what may be the common denominator of our positions or to draw up a comprehensive

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list of those issues on which a latent consensus appears to evolve or we are already close to that. I would rather refer to some of those issues as examples.

It is, I hope, already generally recognized that the intention of the sponsors of SC/6 was certainly not to weaken the legally binding and comprehensive principle of the non-use of force or to narrow its meaning. It is the common intention to reaffirm the commitment in an elaborated form. The relevant provisions of the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act should be the basis for the agreement which should go beyond a mere repetition of the language of those documents. It should deal with the threat as well the use of force and apply equally to all CSCE participating states in their mutual as well as their international relations. No one of us would challange the proposition that its language should be as precise and unambigous as possible, an objective commonly pursued but rarely attained by drafters of international agreements.

This is probably a less than complete list of those elements which constitute sufficient common ground for beginning the elaboration of an agreement. SC/6 supported by this delegation as well contains those essential provisions we propose to include. The universal and legally binding principle, as enshrined in the UN Charter relates the commitment, in particular, to the prohibition of the use of force as an attack or invasion against the territorial integrity and sovereignity

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of states. It is for these reason that some provisions in SC/6 seek to elaborate further the meaning of the principle with regard to those areas beyond national jurisdiction.

There also seems to be an emerging understanding that the agreement should contain specific commitments to take further action in the field of confidence- and security-building and disarmament.

As we are to begin concrete negotiations we would welcome proposals on possible elements to be included in the agreement. Relevant international documents, such as the UN Declaration on friendly relations, can also be used both as source of ideas and drafting aids.

Mr. Chairman,

This delegation shares the view that the elaboration of a set of balanced military CSBMs that would substantially improve upon the Helsinki type measures both in scope and comprehensiveness is an indispensable part of the agreement to be elaborated. The adoption of such measures would certainly increase the effectiveness and credibility of a reaffirmed commitment to non-use of force.

Similarly to the issue of non-use of force, the potentials of the general discussion on military measures in the appropriate working bodies seem to have been exhausted.

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Apart from important disagreements, the amount of common understanding on this area that has already been outlined by several previous speakers should prove sufficient to enable us to start with a resolute negotiating process.

Calculations on the expected time-frame of negotiations, as we have been witnessing it in the CSCE-process as well, often prove deceptive. If we are to achieve meaningful agreements on a properly wide range of measures, we cannot afford wasting more time with the transition to a more intensive phase of negotiations and drafting.

Mr. Chairman,

Finally, let me recall that in the plenary meeting of September 20 the distinguished representatives of the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic gave account of the proposal of their respective governments about the establishment of a chemical weapon-free zone to include, initially, the territories of the FRG, the GDR and Czechoslovakia. They invited the government of the Federal Republic of Germany to enter into negotiations, outside of the framework of the Stockholm Conference, on the elimination of chemical weapons on their respective territories.

Hungary welcomes this initiative. We consider it a viable, concrete and verifiable first step towards the attainment of the complete elimination of chemical weapons from

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Europe, as proposed for consideration by the CDE by SC/4, designed to facilitate the global prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. We noted, in particular, that the zone would be open for access by other states, an important provision to link the subregional arrangement to broader solutions.

We share the view that the establishment of such a CW free zone along the dividing line of the two alliances would substantially contribute to building confidence and security and to eliminate an important source of risk of military confrontation in Europe.

Persistent difficulties that have arisen at the Geneva negotiations seem to suggest that agreement on a world-wide ban is not yet within easy reach. Considering the complexity of Geneva negotiations, particularly the wide variety of factors to be taken into account, we give credit to the proposition that an attempt to reach regional or subregional CW disarmement could yield earlier results. It is easier to reach agreement between three states than to seek it with a substantially wider participation.

A subregional agreement on the elimination of CW stocks would, in our view, facilitate rather than hinder the attainment of both the European and the global solution. Nations recognizing the risks of military confrontation in their immediate security environment and willing to act to

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lessen those risks should be able to seek negotiated solutions in the subregional or regional framework rather than allow such arrangements to become hostages of global negotiations.

This is, I believe, the underlying concept of some of the proposals contained in SC/4. In the final analysis, it is the basic concept of the CDE as well. This conference reflects a regional approach to security with due regard to its global context. As we proceed with the process of negotiations a shared perception of the European dimension of the security issues facing us will progressively evolve so as to provide a proper framework for our continued search for cooperative patterns of assuring security for all participating states.

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S T A T E M E N T

BY JAROMÍR JOHANES, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE C.S.S.R.

AT THE PLENARY MEETING OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE

Stockholm, October 4, 1985

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Distinguished Comrade Chairman,
Distinguished Delegates,

I am grateful for the opportunity to address this important international forum. I would like to assure everyone that Czechoslovakia attaches important significance to the Stockholm negotiations, the positive outcome of which would be in the vital interests of peoples and confidence building and security in Europe. We are profoundly grateful to the Swedish Government, the Executive Secretary, Mr. Jan af Sillen, and all his associates for ensuring favourable conditions for the work of the Conference.

It is significant that the Stockholm Conference is proceeding against the background of such great events as the fortieth anniversary of the end of World War II, the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations, and the tenth anniversary of the signing of the CSCE Helsinky Final Act. These events have been and continue to be a strong reminder of the vital importance of solving, without delay, the urgent question of the present day: to avert the risk of nuclear war and to ensure peace and security.

We note with satisfaction that the meeting in Helsinky of the ministers of foreign affairs has reaffirmed the viability of the Final Act and the commitment to the continuation of the all-European process to develop and extend detente and to establish a firm foundation of the European and international security. Speaking at the meeting the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the C.S.S.R. B. Chňoupek noted that "by complying strictly with the decisions adopted in Helsinky and with the provisions of the Madrid Concluding Document in its entirety we work actively to extend the policy of detente to the military field as well, especially at the Stockholm Conference."

In its peaceful and policicies of principle, the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic proceeds from the assumption that in the nuclear age there is no reasonable

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alternative to peaceful coexistence in relations among states. It should be the basic motivation of all states in their search for solutions to pressing international problems to eliminate war from human society. It is particularly topical today when the international situation remains complex and tense. The responsibility for this situation rests with the militarist circles which pursue the arms race and event attempt to extend it to outer space.

We give great importance to the Soviet-American talks on space and nuclear weapons in Geneva. In our opinion it is necessary to strive to create a favourable climate for the resumption of the process of the limitation and reduction of arms and to adopt concrete measures and steps in this direction. Therefore we support wholeheartedly the entire range of the Soviet Union's proposals made with the aim of solving the problem of preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and strengthening strategic stability. All peace-loving nations, including our country, expect a positive and constructive response to the new Soviet peace initiatives, which have our full support.

Our country attaches great significance to the current meeting of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Mikhail Gorbachev with the President of the French Republic Francois Mitterand and to the upcoming Soviet-American November summit meeting in Geneva. We express the hope that the results of these meetings will contribute to reducing international tensions and creating favourable conditions for reaching substantive results in disarmament and in preventing the war threat.

We are convinced, that at the present time all of states must contribute for the improvement of international situation. The C.S.S.R. Government, for its part, does all in its power to help strengthen peace in Europe and in the entire world. To this end,as it is known, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the German Democratic Republic have recently undertook a new initiative. They proposed to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to enter into negotiations on the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Central Europe.

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We hope, that these steps will lead us to the positive and concrete results.

Comrade Chairman,

The Stockholm Conference, too, is to contribute to restoring confidence among states and to solving the key issues of the European security. This is the purpose of the socialist countries' proposals which constitute a set of political and military measures. We are satisfied that the joint large-scale initiatives of the socialist countries have determined the broad approach to the work of the Conference, its main direction and organizational forms. The socialist countries put forward a number of major confidence-building measures in the political field the implementation of which would mean great progress in strengthening security in Europe.

Would not the conclusion of a treaty on the non-use of force and the maintenance of peaceful relations contribute to making this fundamental principle the true law of international life? We believe that a high degree of understanding has already been reached on non-use of force although certain delegations still make various reservations which in no way facilitate progress.

The socialist countries also put forward in Stockholm major military measures designed to strengthen confidence and security in Europe. They include, among others, proposals co-sponsored by our country on prior notification of major manoeuvres of land forces and on prior notification of major movements and transfers of troops. These measures constitute the practical development of the Helsinky Final Act in important directions. Their purpose is to promote the reduction of the risk of military conflict, misunderstanding or misinterpretation of a military activity which could cause apprehensions, to promote mutual understanding and confidence building, stability and security.

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We believe that the key to success in Stockholm is in moving along the road of confidence building both in the political and military fields. Agreements, as it follows from the mandate of the Conference, should be so balanced that no state or group of states have any unilateral advantages or damage be done to the security of any country. In general it is our opinion, and the other participants in the Conference, apparently, share it, that certain prerequisites have been created in Stockholm to move over to concrete negotiations on those issues where a rapprochement or concurrence of the sides' positions have emerged. This would fully satisfy the requirement of undertaking, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament which implies the accomplishment of first agreements at the Conference. Czechoslovakia, for its part, is prepared to act in this direction and favours the speediest transition to concrete and substantive negotiations.

As we understand it, practical steps are currently being undertaken to ensure this transition. We appreciate that neutral and non-aligned countries play, as they have done more than once in the all-European process, a positive role in this respect.

As the debate in Stockholm so far demonstrates, the Conference, despite all the difficulties and complexities it is faced with, has the potential for progress and can achieve mutually acceptable accords. Czechoslovakia pursues strictly the line at reaching substantive results in Stockholm and believes that all the participants in the Conference are equally interested in its success.

Distinguished Comrade Chairman,

I am confident that the Stockholm Conference will succeed in carrying out the task assigned to it: it will make

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a substantial contribution to strengthening confidence and security in Europe, living up thereby to the expectations of our peoples. Czechoslovakia will continue to actively assist in the speediest achievement of those goals.

Thank You, Comrade Chairman.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07637
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, OCTOBER 4, 1985
REF: STOCKHOLM 7076
1. CDE VII - 035
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
-
3. SUMMARY: THE CDE NATO CAUCUS SESSION OF OCTOBER 4 EXAMINED A COMPROMISE PROPOSAL FROM THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED (NNA) COUNTRIES ON INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE. PRELIMINARY CAUCUS REACTIONS WERE GENERALLY NEGATIVE, AND SEVERAL DELEGATION EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE ORIGINAL "NON-AMERICAN, NON-PAPER" (REFTEL) WAS SUPERIOR TO THE NNA PROPOSAL. END SUMMARY.
4. THE CDE NATO CAUCUS HELD A BRIEF MEETING ON OCTOBER
4. THE MAIN AGENDA ITEM WAS AN NNA COMPROMISE PROPOSAL ON INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE WHICH THE NNA COORDINATOR, KAHILUOTO (FINLAND), HAD PASSED TO THE NATO SPOKESMEN (DENMARK, BELGIUM, AND TURKEY).
BEGIN TEXT OF NNA PROPOSAL:
WGA
TUESDAY : NON-USE OF FORCE
WEDNESDAY: INFORMATION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF NOTIFICATION; VERIFICATION, COMMUNICATION, CONSULTATION AND RAPID EXCHANGE OF VIEWS
THURSDAY : CONSTRAINTS; ANNUAL FORECASTS
WGB
TUESDAY : NOTIFICATION
THURSDAY : OBSERVATION
- INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS SHOULD START DURING THE SEVENTH SESSION WITH A VIEW TO FACILITATING AN EARLY TRANSITION TO THE DRAFTING STAGE.
NOTIFICATION BEING UNDERSTOOD AS COMPRISING PRIOR NOTIFICATION, NOTIFICATION AND ANNUAL CALENDARS
-
END TEXT.
WITH REGARD TO THE SO-CALLED "DISCLAIMER" (PARA 3 OF THE NATO PROPOSAL), MELLBIN (DENMARK) NOTED THAT IT WAS KAHILUOTO'S VIEW THAT IT WAS ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN THE DECEMBER 1984 AGREEMENT ON WORKING STRUCTURE WHICH WOULD BE EXTENDED FOR THIS ARRANGEMENT. KAHILUOTO ALSO HAD INDICATED THAT THE NNA HAS NOT YET TAKEN A POSITION ON THE NATO VERIFICATION PARAGRAPH (PARA 4 OF THE NATO PROPOSAL), BUT HE DID NOT FORESEE THIS TO BE A PROBLEM. KAHILUOTO HAD URGED THE NATO SPOKESMEN TO GIVE THE NNA PROPOSAL FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION BECAUSE ANY SIGNIFICANT EASTERN OR WESTERN CHANGES WOULD THROW-OFF A DELICATE BALANCE ON THIS ISSUE WHICH HAD BEEN ACHIEVED IN THE NNA CAUCUS.
4. PRELIMINARY CAUCUS REACTION TO THE NNA PROPOSAL WAS GENERALLY NEGATIVE, FOCUSING PRIMARILY ON THE DESCRIP-TION FOR WORKING GROUP A (WEDNESDAY). IN THIS REGARD,

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AMBASSADOR BARRY (U.S.) SAID THAT HE DOUBTED THAT WASHINGTON WOULD FIND THE NNA'S POSITION ON VERIFICATION AND INFORMATION (WEDNESDAY) ACCEPTABLE; FROM WHAT HE KNEW OF THE SOVIET POSITION THEY PROBABLY WOULD NOT EITHER. HE ALSO REPORTED ON A COURTESY CALL HE HAD MADE ON GRINEVSKY (USSR) OCTOBER 3. BARRY STRESSED TO THE CAUCUS THAT HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO GRINEVSKY THAT HE WAS NOT RESTARTING THE GOODBY-GRINEVSKY DIALOGUE ON INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE, WHICH SHOULD NOW BE DISCUSSED

FROM USDEL
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
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SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, OCTOBER 4, 1985

VIA THE APPROPRIATE MECHANISM. GRINEVSKY NONETHELESS, HAD ADDRESSED THE PROCEDURAL ISSUE, BARRY SAID, AND IT WAS BARRY'S IMPRESSION FROM THE CONVERSATION THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE SO-CALLED "SIMPLICITY APPROACH" FAVORED BY MANY (I.E., MOVING TO THE EXPLORATORY PHASE WITHOUT ANY "NON-PAPERS" AT ALL). BARRY ASKED THE CAUCUS TO PONDER, HOWEVER, WHETHER A SIMPLE NATO POSITION SUPPORTING A MOVE TO THE EXPLORATORY PHASE USING THE PRESENT STRUCTURE, WITHOUT ANY FURTHER WRITTEN AGREEMENT, MAY NOT BE IN THE WEST'S INTEREST. GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) MUSED, NOT WITHOUT A

-

NOTE OF IRONY, THAT IT MAY BE TOO LATE FOR THIS "FRENCH SOLUTION." THE FRG, NORWAY, AND FRANCE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE ORIGINAL "NON-AMERICAN, NON-PAPER" (REFTEL) REFLECTING THE UNOFFICIAL GOODBY-GRINEVSKY COMPROMISE WAS, IN CITRON'S (FRG) WORDS, "TEN TIMES BETTER THAN THE NNA PAPER," AND WONDERED IF WE COULD NOT MOVE BACK TO IT. THE CAUCUS AGREED TO GIVE IN-DEPTH CONSIDERATION TO THE NNA PROPOSAL OVER THE WEEKEND AND WILL RESUME THE DISCUSSION AT THE NEXT SESSION, OCTOBER 8.

5. ACTION REQUESTED: ANY WASHINGTON AGENCY REACTION TO THE NNA PAPER SHOULD BE IN OUR HANDS OCTOBER 8; OTHERWISE WE WILL OPPOSE IT ON THE GROUNDS THAT WE FIND THE MIXTURE OF VERIFICATION AND CONSULTATION/RAPID EXCHANGE OF VIEWS UNACCEPTABLE.

BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07811
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF 30 SEPTEMBER - 4 OCTOBER, 1985
REFS: A) STOCKHOLM 07134 B) STOCKHOLM 07257
1. CDE VII - 043.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. WORKING GROUP ACTIVITY CONTINUES APACE AS NATO AND WTO POSITION THEMSELVES IN PREPARATION FOR A MORE INFORMAL PHASE OF WORK. U.S. DEL SPOKE IN ALL MEETINGS OF WORKING GROUP A (POLITICAL - GUNDERSEN; VERIFICATION - HANSEN; CONSTRAINTS, ANNUAL FORECASTS - STRAUSS) AND IN WORKING GROUP B (NOTIFICATION - HANSEN). WTO, WHILE ACTIVE ON MOST FRONTS, WAS NOTICABLY SILENT THIS WEEK IN WORKING GROUP A ON VERIFICATION. AND THE NNA, STILL STRUGGLING BEHIND THE SCENES TO DEVELOP ITS PACKAGE, HAS RETREATED AGAIN, ONLY TAKING THE FLOOR TO RESPOND TO STATEMENTS OF OTHERS. END SUMMARY.
4. WORKING GROUP AB -- SEPTEMBER 30, 1985.
UK (EDES) RESUMED HIS PROBING ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PROPOSAL FOR NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE MANEUVERS, IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE THE ARBITARARY NATURE OF ITS 20,000 MAN THRESHOLD AS WELL AS THE SUPERIORITY OF THE STRUCTURAL PARAMETER.
USSR (GRINEVSKY) DIRECTLY ATTACKED THE "AMERICAN DELEGATION", REFERRING TO U.S. REP STRAUSS' JULY 4 STATEMENT ON CONSTRAINTS. HE POINTEDLY ASKED: TO WHAT LEVEL (NUMBER OF TROOPS) WOULD THE WEST ACCEPT A LIMIT ON MILITARY MANEUVERS?; CAN THE WEST ACCEPT ANY LIMITATION OF MANEUVERS CLOSE TOGETHER IN SPACE AND TIME?; AND WILL NATO AGREE TO NEGOTIATE A LIMITATION MEASURE?
FRG (SCHMIDBAUER) AND USSR (TATARNIKOV) TRADED BLOWS ON THE MERITS OF THE STRUCTURAL PARAMETER VS. NUMERICAL PARAMETER FOR NOTIFICATION. SCHMIDBAUER CITED FIGURES COMPARING THE "TOOTH" STRENGTH OF FRG AND SOVIET DIVISIONS IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE THE RELATIVE EQUALITY IN COMBAT POWER OF MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS IN THE SOVIET MRD AND FRG DIVISIONS. TATARNIKOV WOULD NOT ACCEPT SCHMIDBAUER'S PREMISE THAT FRG AND SOVIET DIVISIONS ARE COMPARABLE IN COMBAT STRENGTH. NOTING THAT FRG DIVISIONS ARE ALMOST TWICE THE SIZE OF SOVIET DIVISIONS AND CAN "DEPLOY RAPIDLY AND MAKE TWO DIVISIONS FROM ONE", HE CONCLUDED THAT THE NUMERICAL PARAMETER IS THE ONLY ONE WHICH WILL EQUALIZE SUCH DIFFERENCES.
(COMMENT: IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT HE ASSUMES NATO PRACTICES ARE THE MIRROR-IMAGE OF WTO PRACTICES, I.E. SOVIET PLANS IN CERTAIN SCENARIOS CALL FOR DIVISIONS TO SPLIT. END COMMENT.) EDES CONCLUDED BY OBSERVING THAT TATARNIKOV HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THE NEED FOR PRECISE DATA IN HIS DISCUSSION OF NOTIFICATION.

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5. WORKING GROUP B: NOTIFICATION -- OCTOBER 1, 1985. SUMMARY. SPEAKERS INCLUDED FRANCE (STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD), NORWAY (OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT), ROMANIA (PRIOR NOTIFICATION PERIODS), POLAND (THE LEVEL OF ITS MILITARY ACTIVITIES), USA ("DRUZHBA 85" AS AN EXAMPLE OF WHY A STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD IS NECESSARY), AND THE USSR (NUMERICAL PARAMETERS). THE NNA WERE MUTE. END SUMMARY.
FRANCE (MERIC) POINTED OUT THAT DESPITE STRUCTURAL, NUMERICAL, AND EQUIPMENT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FRENCH AND SOVIET DIVISIONS, THE FACT THAT THEY ARE DIVISIONS MAKES THEM THREATENING. HE ASKED FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF WTO STATEMENTS THAT COMMON GROUND CONCERNING STRUCTURE MIGHT BE POSSIBLE IF THE INEQUALITY BETWEEN DIVISIONS COULD BE RESOLVED.
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR NST DEL ALSO US CD DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, CSCE, PREL, CDE
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF
ROMANIA (BUHOARA) HAPPILY ASSERTED THAT THERE WAS SOME COMMON GROUND ON THE FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF A NOTIFICATION REGIME, ALTHOUGH HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT "SOME CONCEPTUAL AND PRACTICAL ISSUES STILL NEED TO BE SETTLED." HE FOCUSED ON THE LENGTH OF THE NOTIFICATION PERIOD, STATING THAT DIFFERENCES SHOULD NOT PREVENT CONSENSUS ON A FUTURE NOTIFICATION REGIME. THE NUMBER OF DAYS COULD BE PRECEDED BY THE WORDS "AT LEAST." ACTIVITIES TO BE EXCEPTED FROM THE TIMEFRAME FOR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION, SUCH AS MOBILIZATION, ALSO NEED TO BE RESOLVED.
NORWAY SUPPORTED THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT, WHICH FINESSES THE PROBLEM OF TRYING TO DEFINE MANEUVERS AND MOVEMENTS. THE PROBLEM WITH THESE TERMS, HE SAID, ARE THE ACTIVITIES THAT ARE NOT COVERED. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE CONFERENCE FOCUS ON DEFINING "GARRISON" AND DRAWING UP A LIST OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES THAT WOULD NOT READILY FIT INTO CATEGORIES OF MOVEMENTS AND MANEUVERS.
POLAND, RESPONDING TO AN EARLIER FRG STATEMENT, SAID IT HAS NO REGRETS OVER ITS LOW LEVEL OF MILITARY ACTIVITY DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS. REGARDING THE FRG STATEMENT THAT APPROXIMATELY 250 ACTIVITIES WOULD BE NOTIFIED UNDER NATO'S PROPOSALS, BUT FAR FEWER WOULD BE NOTIFIED UNDER WTO PROPOSALS, HE ASSERTED THAT CONFIDENCE IS ENHANCED BY A LOWER LEVEL OF ACTIVITIES RATHER THAN BY AN INCREASING NUMBER OF NOTIFICATONS OF ACTIVITIES. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION POSED EARLIER BY FRANCE, HE REPEATED THAT THE PAST PRACTICE OF VOLUNTARILY NOTIFYING SMALLER SCALE ACTIVITIES, WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO CONFIDENCE-BUILDING, SHOULDN'T BE EXCLUDED IN THE FUTURE.

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USA (HANSEN) ASKED POLAND IF "DRUZHBA 85", WOULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED UNDER THE PROPOSED WTO PARAMETER. PRESS ACCOUNTS OF THE EXERCISE INDICATED THAT UNITS AND SUB-UNITS OF SOVIET, GDR, AND POLISH FORCES, AS WELL AS COMMAND AND STAFFS, PARTICIPATED. WE MIGHT ASSUME THAT UNITS, SUB-UNITS, AS WELL AS AIR-FORCE, REAR-SERVICE, AND COMMAND UNITS ALSO PARTICIPATED IF ONE USED THE EARLIER USSR (TATARNIKOV) DESCRIPTION OF WHAT IS INCLUDED IN AN EXERCISE. (REF B) ON THE BASIS OF PRESS ACCOUNTS INDICATING THAT UNITS AND SUB-UNITS PARTICIPATED AND ON THE SOVIET DESCRIPTION OF WHAT MAKES UP AN EXERCISE, WE MIGHT SURMISE THAT 30-40,000 TROOPS WERE INVOLVED. BASED UPON THE SOVIET DESCRIPTION OF HOW AN EXERCISE IS PUT TOGETHER, THE STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD WOULD PROVIDE US A BETTER BASIS FOR JUDGING WHAT KIND OF AN EXERCISE IT WAS THAN MERELY NUMBERS. POLAND RESPONDED THAT "DRUZHBA 85" WAS A COMMAND AND STAFF EXERCISE WITH A SMALL NUMBER OF TROOPS AT A LEVEL BELOW 20,000. HANSEN'S SUBSEQUENT QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER A COMMAND STAFF EXERCISE WAS A MANEUVER WENT UNANSWERED. SIDE-STEPPING A DIRECT RESPONSE, USSR (TATARNIKOV) SAID THAT A COMMAND AND STAFF EXERCISE OF 20,000 MEN WOULD BE NOTIFIABLE UNDER THE WTO PROPOSAL. THIS FACT, HE ASSERTED, INDICATES THE VIABILITY OF THE NUMERICAL THRESHOLD: THERE MAY NOT BE DIVISIONS OR REGIMENTS PARTICIPATING IN SUCH AN EXERCISE. ONLY A CERTAIN NUMBER OF SMALL UNITS MAY BE INVOLVED, AND COMBAT UNITS MAY ONLY BE BROUGHT IN LATER.

6. WORKING GROUP A: POLITICAL -- OCTOBER 1, 1985.

SUMMARY. POLAND COMMENTED ON A RECENT U.S. STATEMENT, USING OLD ARGUMENTS TO WHICH THE U.S. RESPONDED IN KIND. OTHERS RESTATED KNOWN POSITIONS. OF SOME INTEREST WAS THE BRIEF CZECH STATEMENT WHICH 1) TRIED TO CONVINCE THE WORKING GROUP THAT THERE WAS AN "OVERALL DESIRE" TO MOVE TO CONCRETE WORK, I.E., DRAFTING, ON NUF AND 2) REFERRED TO THE CYPRIOT

FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR NST DEL ALSO US CD DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, CSCE, PREL, CDE
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF

APPROACH TO NUF AS PROMISING. THE USSR CONTINUED TO PUSH THE FRG ON NUF, REFERRING TO YEAR-OLD NUF COMMENTS BY GENSCHER IN A MEETING WITH GROMYKO WHICH THE FRG HAS SINCE TRIED TO DOWNPLAY; THE FRG SUPPORTED A MINIMALIST APPROACH TO NUF. THE LAST COUPLE OF MEETINGS OF THIS GROUP HAVE NOT FORGED ANY NEW GROUND ON NUF AND THE EAST HAS BEEN UNABLE TO ENGAGE THE NNA. IN ADDITION, THE ALLIES ARE STICKING SO FAR TO OUR VERY CONTROLLED SCRIPT. END SUMMARY.

POLAND (OPALSKI) COMMENTED ON TWO POINTS OF THE U.S.

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9/17 STATEMENT (REF A):
HE TOOK ISSUE WITH U.S. INSISTENCE ON A BALANCED TREATMENT OF THE TEN HELSINKI FINAL ACT (HFA) PRINCIPLES, ASSERTING THAT NUF HAS A SPECIAL PLACE IN CDE AND THAT EVEN THE FINAL ACT HAD SINGLED OUT NUF AND THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES (PSD). IN RESPONSE, U.S. (GUNDERSEN) NOTED THAT THE OVERRIDING AND OPERATIVE DICTUM OF THE HFA CALLS FOR BALANCE. SECOND, WITH REGARD TO USDEL'S REFERENCE ON SEPT. 17 TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION'S FIRST AMENDMENT, OPALSKI ARGUED THAT THE CONSTITUTION WAS AMENDED OUT OF NECESSITY TO REFLECT CHANGING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REALITIES IN THE U.S. (COMMENT: OPALSKI CLEARLY IMPLIED THAT THE WTO WAS NOT AIMING TO UNDERMINE THE NUF PRINCIPLE BUT RATHER TO BETTER REFLECT THE CURRENT SITUATION IN EUROPE -- BY "AMENDING" NUF IN THE CDE (EUROPEAN) CONTEXT. END COMMENT.)
IN RESPONSE, U.S. REP STRESSED THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE UN CHARTER AND POINTED OUT THAT A CONFERENCE WITH LESS THAN UNIVERSAL PARTICIPATION, SUCH AS CDE, SHOULD APPROACH CAUTIOUSLY THE ELABORATION OF UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES E.G., ARTICLE 2(4) OF THE UN CHARTER. HE NOTED THAT THE FIRST AMENDMENT IS CONSIDERED AN INTRINSIC PART OF THE CONSTITUTION, AS PART OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS; FURTHERMORE, IT HAS NOT BEEN AMENDED NOR HAS ITS UNIVERSAL CHARACTER EVER BEEN QUESTIONED. IN A DEFENSIVE RIGHT OF REPLY OPALSKI EXPLAINED THAT HIS REFERENCE TO THE WORD "AMENDMENT" HAD BEEN INTENDED AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE CONTINUOUS PROCESS OF AMENDMENT WHICH LAWS -- BOTH NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL -- UNDERGO. OPALSKI TRIED TO BUTTRESS HIS ARGUMENT BY CITING ARTICLE 13 OF THE UN CHARTER ENCOURAGING PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS CODIFICATION. THIS, HE MAINTAINED, WOULD NEITHER UNDERMINE THE STATUS OF THE UN CHARTER AS "JUS COGENS" NOR THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.
IN RESPONSE, THE U.S. POINTED OUT THE OPERATIVE FIRST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 13 WHICH STATES THAT IT IS THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY (NOT THE CDE) THAT WILL INITIATE STUDIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
THE FRG DEPUTY (DREHER) NOTED THAT THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE IS THE BASIS OF HIS COUNTRY'S FOREIGN POLICY AND IS THE CORNERSTONE OF ITS BILATERAL TREATIES WITH THE USSR, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, POLAND AND THE GDR. THE FRG'S MAIN CONCERN, HE SAID, IS THAT RESPECT OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE BE DEMONSTRATED IN THE PRACTICE OF STATES. HE REITERATED THAT CONCRETE CSBMS WOULD RENDER EXISTING NUF COMMITMENTS MORE CREDIBLE, EFFECTIVE, AND VERIFIABLE. IN ADDITION, HE ARGUED THAT THE EXISTING NUF OBLIGATION IS UNIVERSALLY VALID, AND REPRESENTS A TOTAL PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE WHICH EXCLUDES

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THE USE OF EVERY TYPE OF FORCE, WEAPON OR THREAT.
THE USSR (RAKHMANINOV) PRAISED THE FRG REFERENCE TO THE EXCLUSION OF ALL TYPES OF FORCE AS A "CONCRETIZATION OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE" AND NOTED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER HAS EXPRESSED FRG SUPPORT FOR THE CONCRETIZATION OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE AND THE ADOPTION OF
FROM USDEL CDE
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, CSCE, PREL, CDE
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF
MILITARY MEASURES. GENSCHER, HE CLAIMED, HAD NOTED ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS THAT THE TWO ASPECTS (POLITICAL AND MILITARY) OF SECURITY SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED AND THAT NEITHER COULD REPLACE THE OTHER. RAKHMANINOV CLOSED BY AGREEING THAT THE UNGA HAS BEEN ENTRUSTED WITH THE CODIFICATION OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE, BUT THEN, IN ONE OF HIS FREQUENT NON-SEQUITURS, INSISTED THAT UN EXPERTS HAVE "TRIED TO CONVINCE US THAT CSBM'S MUST BE IN BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY FIELDS."
AUSTRIA (LOIBL) SUPPORTED ADHERENCE TO ALL 10 PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT AS A VERY IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO STRENGTHENING NUF.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA (BUCHLOVSKY) STRESSED THE "OVERALL DESIRE" TO MOVE TO CONCRETE WORK AND SOUGHT TO DOWNPLAY "INDIVIDUAL STATEMENTS" WHICH INTERPRET BALANCE IN DIFFERENT WAYS; HE MAINTAINED THAT ITALY'S ASSERTION THAT WORK ON THE BASIS OF SC.6, WOULD REPRESENT A "STEP BACKWARD," WAS NOT CREDIBLE, AND PRAISED THE CYPRIOT APPROACH AS ONE THAT WOULD ENABLE THE CONFERENCE TO MOVE SMOOTHLY TO CONCRETE WORK. HE URGED THE CONFERENCE TO FOCUS ON ISSUES WHERE POSITIONS ARE CLOSE AND ASKED WHICH SC.6 ELEMENTS COULD BE TAKEN UP TO START CONCRETE WORK. IN RESPONSE, ITALY INSISTED THAT CONCRETE WORK HAS TO BE BASED ON CONSIDERATION OF CONCRETE CSBM'S.
7. WORKING GROUP A: INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, COMMUNICATION -- OCTOBER 2, 1985.
WTO COUNTRIES WERE NOTICABLY QUIET DURING THIS MEETING. PORTUGAL (PINTO GUEDES) SAID THAT TWO DIFFERENT APPROACHES WERE APPARENT -- TO THE CONFERENCE GENERALLY AND TO VERIFICATION SPECIFICALLY. OF THESE TWO APPROACHES, HE SAID, ONLY THAT OF NATO WOULD FULFILL THE MANDATE. AN APPROACH TO VERIFICATION SUCH AS THAT OF THE WTO, THAT RELIES SOLELY ON NTM'S AND CONSULTATIONS, WOULD NOT FULFILL THE MANDATE'S OBJECTIVE OF ENSURING THAT MEASURES WERE ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE. IT ALSO WOULD DISREGARD THE NEED FOR QUICK ACTION REQUIRED TO IMPROVE CONFIDENCE. WITHOUT ADEQUATE VERIFICATION, AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE OF LITTLE VALUE AND WOULD CREATE THE AMBIGUITIES AND MISTRUST WE

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ARE TRYING TO AVOID, HE CONCLUDED.
FRG (METSCHER) RESPONDED TO WTO ARGUMENTS THAT VERIFICATION CAN NOT BE DISCUSSED UNTIL IT IS CLEAR WHAT SPECIFIC NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE VERIFIED. YOU COULD AS EASILY ARGUE, HE SAID, THAT YOU HAVE TO FIRST DETERMINE WHAT KINDS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES WOULD BE VERIFIABLE BEFORE YOU COULD DECIDE TO INCLUDE THOSE ACTIVITIES. SC.1/AMPLIFIED CONTAINS MEASURES THAT WOULD ENABLE ADEQUATE VERIFICATION IN PROPORTION TO WHAT IS REQUIRED BY CSBM'S AND ALSO PROTECTS THE STATE TO BE INSPECTED. RATHER THAN GENERALLY REFUSING TO CONSIDER INSPECTIONS, HE SAID, WE SHOULD FOCUS ON WHAT THE SPECIFIC MODALITIES FOR VERIFICATION SHOULD BE.
YUGOSLAVIA (BOZOVIC) NOTED THAT MANY HAVE SAID THAT NTM'S ALONE WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT FOR VERIFICATION BECAUSE NOT ALL STATES HAVE THEM AND THUS USE OF NTM'S ALONE WOULD NOT ENSURE EQUALITY BETWEEN STATES. HOW, HE ASKED, DO STATES MAKING THIS ARGUMENT WOULD TRANSLATE IT INTO PROPOSALS AND MECHANISMS THAT WOULD ENSURE SUCH EQUALITY? ON-SITE INSPECTION, HE ASSERTED, WOULD DOUBLE THE INEQUALITY, INASMUCH AS NOT ALL STATES WOULD HAVE THE SAME ACCESS TO INFORMATION CONTRIBUTING TO SUSPICIONS, OR HAVE THE SAME ABILITIES TO CONDUCT SUCH INSPECTIONS, AND DO NOT HAVE THE SAME ACCESS TO EQUIPMENT FOR CONDUCTING SUCH INSPECTIONS.
USA (HANSEN) RECALLED THAT HUNGARY, AT AN EARLIER MEETING, HAD NOT ANSWERED HIS QUESTION ABOUT HOW A
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, CSCE, PREL, CDE
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF
20,000 MAN THRESHOLD WOULD BE VERIFIED. AS THE MANDATE CALLS FOR ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION, HE POINTED OUT, WHEN A MEASURE IS PROPOSED, IT SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY PROPOSALS ON HOW TO VERIFY IT. TURNING TO THE QUESTION OF NTM'S, HANSEN NOTED THAT SC.1 ONLY REFERS TO "AVAILABLE" NTM'S. IT DOES NOT ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN WHAT NTM'S ARE. NO COUNTRY, HE ASSERTED, WOULD CONSENT TO IDENTIFYING ITS OWN NTM'S, BUT IT MAY BE NOTED THAT THEY ARE NOT LIMITED TO SATELLITES. HE EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT ANY COUNTRY WOULD WANT TO SHARE THE RESULTS OF INFORMATION GAINED THROUGH USE OF NTM'S WITH OTHERS, EVEN IN THE CONTEXT OF A CDE AGREEMENT. HE ARGUED THAT USE OF NTM'S ALONE WOULD NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE MANDATE. TURNING TO THE QUES?TION OF EQUALITY RAISED BY YUGOSLAVIA, HE OBSERVED THAT THERE ARE THREE PRIMARY MEANS OF OBTAINING INFORMATION ABOUT AN UNNOTIFIED MILITARY ACTIVITY: NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, SUCH AS MILITARY

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ATTACHES, AND THROUGH THE MEDIA. IF INFORMATION FROM ANY OF THESE SOURCES CAUSES SIGNIFICANT SUSPICIONS, STATES COULD THEN DECIDE TO CONDUCT AN INSPECTION. THE EQUALITY TO WHICH THE YUGOSLAVIAN REFERRED DOES NOT RELATE TO EQUAL SIZE, ETC., BUT TO THE EQUAL POLITICAL RIGHTS INHERENT IN SOVEREIGN EQUALITY -- ALL STATES HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS TO OPERATE ON A SUSPICION AND REQUEST AN INSPECTION. INSPECTION THUS ALLOWS FOR EQUALITY OF RIGHTS. IN DISCUSSING VERIFICATION AND INSPECTION, HANSEN CONCLUDED, WE MUST KEEP IN MIND EQUALITY OF RIGHTS, TIMILINESS, AND ADEQUACY.

YUGOSLAVIA (BOZAVIC) SAID THAT, IN ITS RESPONSE, THE U.S. HAD EVADED THE KEY QUESTION -- IF THE POSSESSION OF NTM'S AND THEIR USE DETERMINE GROUNDS FOR INSPECTION DID NOT CREATE A DOUBLE INEQUALITY. WITHOUT TAKING A STAND ON SC.1'S INSPECTION PROPROSAL, BOZAVIC SAID, HE WAS TRYING TO FIND OTHER WAYS TO CORRECT INEQUITY WITHOUT INCREASING IT. HE ASKED IF THE U.S. HAD SAID IN ITS RESPONSE THAT STATES WOULD NOT SHARE INFORMATION OBTAINED BY NTM'S AND, IF SO, SAID THIS NEEDS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. U.S. (HANSEN) RESPONSED THAT HE HAD DOUBTED THAT ANY STATE WOULD BE WILLING TO SHARE INFORMATION OBTAINED BY ITS NTM'S.

(COMMENT. THE WTO DID NOT TAKE THE FLOOR DURING SUBSTANTIVE EXCHANGE AT THIS MEETING. SWISS DEPUTY (PROTECT) SURMISED THAT THE WTO WAS PURPOSEFULLY MAINTAINING SILENCE IN THIS GROUP, SO AS NOT TO LEND CREDIBILITY TO CONSIDERATION OF INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, AND COMMUNICATION AS SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT MEASURES, PARTICULARLY DURING THE ON-GOING INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS ON HOW TO STRUCTURE THE CDE'S WORK FROM THIS POINT. USDEL ALSO NOTES THAT REGARDING NTM'S, THE USSR IS LETTING THE U.S. TAKE THE HEAT. THE U.S. DOUBT'S ABOUT THE SHARING OF NTM INFORMATION ALSO RAISED A NUMBER OF EYEBROWS, INCLUDING THOSE OF A FEW OF OUR ALLIES SUCH AS THE DUTCH. END COMMENT.)

8. WORKING GROUP B: OBSERVATIONS -- OCTOBER 3, 1985. SUMMARY. PREPARED STATEMENTS BY BULGARIA AND THE FRG PROMPTED A RESPONSE FROM FRANCE. LITTLE OF NOTE TRANSPIRED. END SUMMARY.

BULGARIA (STOYANOV) SAID THAT AN OBSERVER TO AN EXERCISE MUST BE ABLE TO SEE ENOUGH TO CONVINCE HIMSELF OF THE NON-THREATENING NATURE OF THE ACTIVITY AND THAT THE ACTIVITY CONFORMS WITH THE NOTIFICATION GIVEN. HE AGREED THAT OBSERVATION WAS NOT VERIFICATION. AS MILITARY EXPERTS, HE OBSERVED, WE ALL KNOW THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR AN OBSERVER TO SEE EVERY ASPECT OF THE EXERCISE PERSONALLY. IT IS POSSIBLE, HE CONCLUDED, TO ELABORATE A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE OBSERVATION REGIME WHICH WILL BECOME CLEARER AS WE CONCRETIZE OUR GENERAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE NOTIFICATION MEASURES.

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, CSCE, PREL, CDE
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF
FRG (SCHMIDBAUER) REPORTED IN SOME DETAIL ON THE OBSERVATION REGIME EMPLOYED AT THE FRG EXERCISE "TRUTSZIGE SACHSEN" IN WHICH HE PARTICIPATED.
FRANCE (MERIC), RESPONDING TO THE BULGARIAN, SAID THAT WHILE HE AGREED THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO SEE EVERYTHING DURING AN EXERCISE, THE HOST COUNTRY SHOULD MAKE THE MAXIMUM EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT AS MUCH AS COULD BE SEEN WOULD BE SEEN. HE ASKED FOR BULGARIA'S THOUGHTS ABOUT THE PROVISION OF MAPS TO OBSERVERS, SAYING THAT THIS WAS A KEY ISSUE. FURTHERMORE, HE POINTED OUT, TO ENHANCE CONFIDENCE, OBSERVERS SHOULD BE ABLE TO VIEW THE EXERCISE FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE END, THUS WITNESSING THE RETURN OF TROOPS TO THEIR PEACETIME LOCATIONS.
9. WORKING GROUP A: CONSTRAINTS/ANNUAL FORECASTS -- OCTOBER 3, 1985.
SUMMARY. THE GDR AND HUNGARY TOOK THE WTO LEAD IN A WELL-COORDINATED OFFENSIVE IN SUPPORT OF THEIR PROPOSAL FOR MANPOWER CEILING ON MANEUVERS. THE WEST -- ITALY, THE NETHERLANDS AND THE U.S. -- STRESSED THE VALUE OF AN ANNUAL FORECAST MEASURE WHICH WOULD INCREASE PREDICTABILITY AND HAVE A CONSTRAINING EFFECT. THE FRG SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON SEVERAL WESTERN PROPOSALS INTRODUCED IN THE PAST AT MBFR IN RESPONSE TO A PREVIOUS SOVIET STATEMENT. END SUMMARY.
GDR (GRACZYNSKI), RESPONDING TO EARLIER U.S. AND THE U.K. STATEMENTS, ASKED WHICH TYPES OF SMALLER SCALE MILITARY ACTIVITIES COULD BE MORE THREATENING THAN LARGE SCALE EXERCISES. "DAILY, ROUTINE" SMALLER SCALE ACTITIVITES ARE NOT NECESSARILY THREATENING, HE ASSERTED, WHEREAS LARGE SCALE MILITARY MANEUVERS INCLUDING GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL FORCES IN THE IMMEDIATE PROXIMITY OF EAST-WEST BORDERS REPRESENT A SPECIAL THREAT. WHILE NATO HAS ACCEPTED CONSTRAINTS IN PRINCIPLE, HE SAID, IT HAS NOT INDICATED WHAT PARAMETER WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE, I.E., WOULD MEET ITS LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS. NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION ALONE CANNOT DEMONSTRATE THE PEACEFUL NATURE OF MILITARY MANEUVERS. GRACZYNSKI ALSO INSISTED THAT A SET OF CSBM'S MUST NOT BE A "BLANK CHECK" FOR CONTINUING INCREASES IN THE SCALE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES; AN ACCEPTABLE MEASURE LIMITING THE SCALE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES MUST BE FOUND.
ITALY (BLAIS) NOTED THAT THE MAJORITY OF CONSTRAINTS PROPOSALS TO DATE HAVE NOT SPECIFIED PARAMETERS; THIS HE SURMISED, REFLECTS THE DIFFICULTY OF DEVISING

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MEASURES WITH EQUALLY CONSTRAINING EFFECTS ON ALL STATES. THE WESTERN ALLIANCE, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS BEEN UNABLE TO DEVELOP A MEASURE WHICH HAS THE SAME "OPERATIVE AND GEOSTRATEGIC REPERCUSSIONS" FOR ALL STATES AND WHICH IS VERIFIABLE. STATES HAVE DIFFERENT VIEWS OF THEIR SECURITY NEEDS DUE, IN PART, TO THE DIFFERENT CULTURAL, POLITICAL, IDEOLOGICAL (ETC) ORIGINS OF EACH STATE. PREVENTING THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENSE STRUCTURES -- UNIQUE TO EACH STATE -- WOULD UNDERMINE SECURITY.

HUNGARY (IMRE), BUILDING ON THE GDR STATEMENT, ARGUED THAT PERCEPTIONS OF A MANEUVER ARE BASED ON THE SCALE, NUMBER OF FORCES, AND THE EQUALITY AND QUANTITY OF MILITARY HARDWARE INVOLVED; IN A NORMAL INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, ROUTINE MILITARY ACTIVITIES (5-6000 MEN OR REGIMENTS/BRIGADES) CANNOT BE A SOURCE OF MISUNDERSTANDING; HOWEVER, MANEUVERS EXCEEDING 40,000-50,000 TROOPS WITH 2-3 DIVISIONS, CAN EVOKE FEARS, DEPENDING ON THEIR NATURE. HE ASSERTED THAT LARGE-SCALE MANEUVERS, E.G., AUTUMN FORGE, PROVIDE THE BEST CONDITIONS FOR STARTING COMBAT ACTIONS AGAINST OTHER COUNTRIES. OUT OF ALL OF THE CONSTRAINTS

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SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF

PROPOSALS AT THE CDE, ACCORDING TO IMRE, A LIMITATION ON THE SCALE OF MANEUVERS HAS THE BEST CHANCE OF ATTAINING AGREEMENT. HUNGARY COULD ACCEPT A 40,000-MAN PARAMETER; THIS WOULD ALLOW THE HUNGARIAN ARMY TO PARTICIPATE IN NATIONAL AND ALLIED COMBAT TRAINING, I.E., TO EXERCISE USING 2-3 DIVISIONS AND ONE STAFF OF A HIGHER LEVEL. HE DISMISSED NATO ARGUMENTS THAT IT NEEDED TO CONDUCT LARGER SCALE MANEUVERS THAN THE WTO, NOTING THAT TRAINING OF UNITS COULD BE CARRIED OUT AT THE BATTALION LEVEL, STAFFS AT DIFFERENT LEVELS COULD PARTICIPATE WITHOUT THEIR CORRESPONDING FULL TROOP COMPLEMENTS, AND THE SCALE OF MILITARY MANEUVERS COULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED IF FORMATIONS WERE REPRESENTED BY THEIR STAFFS. IN CONCLUSION ECHOING HIS GDR ALLY, IMRE PRESSED NATO TO INDICATE WHAT AN ACCEPTABLE CEILING WOULD BE.

FRG (SCHMIDBAUER) RESPONDED TO REMARKS MADE BY SOVIET GENERAL TATARNIKOV IN WORKING GROUP AB ON SEPTEMBER 30 ABOUT A NATO PROPOSAL FOR A LIMITATION ON MANPOWER AT MBFR. TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT, HE NOTED THAT 12 YEARS AGO THE WEST HAD PROPOSED THAT THE USSR WITHDRAW 65,000 SOLDIERS FROM THE GDR. ANOTHER WESTERN PROPOSAL -- TO LIMIT SOVIET AND U.S. GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE -- HAD BEEN REJECTED BY USSR ON GROUNDS THAT IT

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HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. SINCE THE INTRODUCTION OF THESE TWO WESTERN PROPOSALS, THE IMBALANCE BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES IN THE MBFR AREA (BENELUX, FRG V.S. GDR, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, POLAND) HAS INCREASED, HE NOTED.
ROMANIA (BUHOARA), CLUTCHING AT STRAWS IN ITS CONSTANT SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND, NOTED THAT SOME INTERVENTIONS "BY DELEGATES WITHOUT A CONSTRAINTS PROPOSAL" SEEM TO INDICATE HALF A STEP FORWARD INASMUCH AS THEY NO LONGER SIMPLY RESTATE THEIR READINESS TO CONSIDER CONSTRAINTS. BUHOARA SAID THAT WHILE ROMANIA SEES A NUMERICAL LIMITATION AS THE MOST PROMISING CONSTRAINT, THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE OTHER CONSTRAINTS IN SC.2 WERE "SECOND RANK MEASURES." HE URGED THE CONFERENCE TO BEGIN EXPLORING IDEAS AND APPROACHES WHICH WOULD LEAD TO AGREEMENT ON CONSTRAINTS AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF A STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT.
NETHERLANDS (VAN GORP) FOCUSED ON TWO IMPORTANT FUNCTIONS OF ANNUAL FORECASTS: 1) TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF THE ROUTINE CHARACTER OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES; AND 2) TO PROVIDE A CONSTRAINING EFFECT ON CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THE FACT THAT ANNUAL FORECASTS HAVE A CONSTRAINING EFFECT DOESN'T MEAN THAT ANNUAL FORECASTS ARE A LIMITATION MEASURE, HE NOTED; THEY DEAL WITH INTENTIONS, NOT WITH MILITARY POTENTIAL OR PREPAREDNESS. HE COUNTERED EASTERN ASSERTIONS THAT NATO HAS PROPOSED ANNUAL FORECASTS TO JUSTIFY ITS LARGE SCALE AUTUMN EXERCISES, NOTING THAT SUCH FORECASTS WOULD ENHANCE CONFIDENCE BY DEMONSTRATING THAT MILITARY ACTIVITIES ANNOUNCED FAR IN ADVANCE ARE ROUTINE AND NOT THREATENING.
AUSTRIA (LIKO) INSISTED THAT IT WAS NOT A QUESTION OF AGREEING ON A CONSTRAINTS MEASURE AT ANY PRICE, BUT OF FINDING A WELL BALANCED AND VERIFIABLE CONSTRAINT.
THE U.S. (STRAUSS) DELIVERED A PREPARED STATEMENT, POINTING OUT THAT MOST DELEGATIONS ACCEPT, IN PRINCIPLE, THE CONCEPT OF ANNUAL FORECASTS. THEY WOULD PROVIDE AN ELEMENT OF PREDICTABILITY AS WELL AS CONSTRAINING EFFECT. A MILITARY ACTIVITY DESIGNED AND TIMED TO INTIMIDATE WOULD DEVIATE FROM AN ANNUAL FORECAST; CONSEQUENTLY A STATE INTENT ON CONDUCTING SUCH ACTIVITIES, "AS WAS THE CASE WITH ZAPAD 81, WOULD SUBJECT ITSELF TO THE SUSPICIONS OF ALL PARTICIPATING STATES AND PROBABLY INSPECTION BY SEVERAL."
FROM USDEL CDE
GENEVA FOR NST DEL ALSO US CD DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, CSCE, PREL, CDE
SUBJECT: CDE: WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES, WEEK OF
BULGARIA (KOEDJIKOV) ASKED THE NETHERLANDS HOW LARGER AND LARGER SCALE MILITARY ACTIVITIES ANNOUNCED EACH

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YEAR IN ANNUAL FORCASTS COULD BE INTERPRETED AS PURELY ROUTINE; HOW COULD THE INTENTIONS OF THESE STATES BE INTERPRETED?
THE USSR (TATARNIKOV), CHARGING THAT THE LEVEL OF NATO TRAINING IS TWO AND A HALF TIMES THAT OF THE WTO, ASKED WHAT THE WEST EXPECTED OF OTHERS WHEN ONE SIDE INCREASES ITS LEVEL OF ACTIVITIES. TATARNIKOV SAID, IN RESPONSE TO THE FRG, THAT HE HAD NOT REFERRED TO FORCE LEVEL REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE, BUT ONLY TO A REDUCTION IN THE SCALE OF MANEUVERS.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07654
SUBJECT: CDE WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS:
SEPTEMBER 30 - OCTOBER 4, 1985
REF: STOCKHOLM 7634
1. CDE VII - 036
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: THE PROCEDURAL IMPASSE DEEPENED AS THE NNA JOINED THE WORKING STRUCTURE FRAY. GIVEN THE TROUBLING DIRECTION IN WHICH THE NNA SEEM TO BE HEADING, MANY WITHIN THE NATO CAUCUS BELIEVE THAT THE ORIGINAL UNOFFICIAL GOODBY-GRINEVSKY COMPROMISE OFFERED A BETTER WAY OUT THAN THE NNA FORMULATION. MEANWHILE THE SOVIETS SEIZED THE PR SPOTLIGHT BY ELABORATING ON GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV'S PARIS COMMENTS ON THE CDE. IN THE WORKING GROUPS NATO AND THE WTO WERE BUSY HOLDING THEIR GROUND TO POSITION THEMSELVES FOR THE INFORMAL WORK TO COME. THE NNA, WHO HAVE YET TO REACH AN AGREED POSITION ON THEIR WORKING PAPERS, ARE, BY AND LARGE, MAINTAINING THEIR SILENCE. END SUMMARY.
4. WORKING STRUCTURE: THE NATO CAUCUS CONTINUES TO BE OBSESSED WITH PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS. AFTER PROTRACTED AND AT TIMES BITTER DISCUSSION, THE CAUCUS EARLY THIS WEEK FINALLY APPOINTED "THREE MUSKETEERS" -- THE DANISH, BELGIAN AND TURKISH AMBASSADORS -- TO READ TO FINNISH AMBASSADOR KAHILUOTO THE NATO CAUCUS'S NON-PAPER. JUST BEFORE THE CAUCUS PRESENTED ITS PAPER TO KAHILUOTO (FINLAND), GRINEVSKY HAD DICTATED AN EASTERN WORKING STRUCTURE NON-PAPER TO KAHILUOTO. NATO THEN WAITED FOR WORD FROM THE NNA AND FROM THE EAST ON ITS PAPER. IT WAS NOT LONG IN COMING: GRINEVSKY ACCUSED THE CAUCUS OF HAVING "DEPARTED" FROM THE COMPROMISE HE CLAIMED TO HAVE WORKED OUT WITH FORMER U.S. HEAD OF DELEGATION GOODBY. THE CAUCUS SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT BY REMINDING KAHILUOTO THAT GRINEVSKY HAD BEEN THE FIRST TO "DEPART" FROM THE ORIGINAL NON-PAPER. THE NNA ALSO REJECTED THE CAUCUS NON-PAPER AND FURTHER COMPLICATED THE PROCESS BY INTRODUCING AN NNA NON-PAPER ON FRIDAY MORNING WHICH REPRESENTED A DELICATE COMPROMISE WITHIN THEIR OWN GROUP. KAHILUOTO STATED THAT WHILE THE NNA WILL NOT FIGHT FOR THEIR COMPROMISE, THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT THE NATO NON-PAPER. (KAHILUOTO TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT HIS GROUP HAD MORE SYMPATHY FOR THE SOVIET THAN THE NATO NON-PAPER. THEY COULD, ACCORDING TO KAHILUOTO, FALL BACK TO THE ORIGINAL GOODBY-GRINEVSKY COMPROMISE.)
5. A SWISS DELEGATE (PROTECT), REACTING WITH SOME IRRITATION TO NEGATIVE U.S. COMMENTS ON THE NEW NNA FORMULATION FOR THE WORKING GROUP HEADING FOR INFORMATION, VERIFICATION AND COMMUNICATION, INSISTED THAT THE WORDING REPRESENTED THE BEST PROTECTION OF THE WESTERN POSITION THAT THE NNA COULD OFFER -- GIVEN YUGOSLAVIA'S ADAMANT OPPOSITION TO THE NATO CAUCUS TERM

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"NOTIFICATION SYSTEM." THE SWISS DEPUTY WARNED THAT THE NNA WOULD NOT TOLERATE A U.S.-SOVIET CONDOMINIUM WHICH WOULD NOT TAKE NNA CONCERNS INTO CONSIDERATION; IF SUCH A SUPERPOWER DEAL WERE COOKED, THE NNA COULD BE COUNTED ON TO "PULL A SALIBA" -- A REFERENCE TO FOOTDRAGGING TACTICS PRACTICED IN THE PAST BY THE OBSTREPEROUS FORMER MALTESE AMBASSADOR WHO HELD UP THE MADRID REVIEW MEETING FOR MONTHS UNTIL HIS DEMANDS FOR A SECTION ON THE MEDITERRANEAN WERE ADDRESSED. THE SWISS DELEGATE ADDED THAT THE SWISS AND SEVERAL OTHER NNA DELEGATIONS WOULD NOT FALL ON THEIR SWORDS OVER THEIR COMPROMISE FORMULATION; HE SAID HIS DELEGATION COULD LIVE WITH THE LONGSTANDING FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR A "SOFT TRANSITION" (ACCORDING TO WHICH THE CONFERENCE WOULD MOVE INTO INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS AND EVENTUALLY ON INTO DRAFTING WITHOUT ANY AGREEMENT ON TOPICS TO BE DISCUSSED).

6. IN A HASTY PRELIMINARY DEBATE OF THE NNA OFFERING ON FRIDAY, A NUMBER OF NATO ALLIES (THE FRG, FRANCE,

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS:

NETHERLANDS), WHO HAD OPPOSED THE MAXIMALIST CAUCUS NON-PAPER AS A NON-STARTER, COULD NOT RESIST POINTED "I TOLD YOU SO'S." THE FRENCH HAVE NOT BEEN ENAMORED WITH THE NATO NON-PAPER AND, IN FACT, HAVE SAID THAT THEY PREFER THE LATEST SOVIET NON-PAPER TO THE NATO POSITION. ACCORDINGLY, THEY TAKE CERTAIN SMUG SATISFACTION IN THE PROLIFERATION OF NON-PAPERS. THIS DEVELOPMENT, THEY BELIEVE, WILL ULTIMATELY LEAD OTHERS TO SEE THE EFFICACY OF THE "FRENCH SOLUTION." AFTER AMBASSADOR CITRON (FRG) RECOMMENDED THAT THE NATO GROUP NOT RUSH BACK TO THE NNA WITH ITS ANSWER, BUT RATHER "LET THEM LOSE SOME SLEEP OVER THE WEEKEND," THE WESTERN ALLIES AGREED MERELY TO HINT IN THEIR WEEKEND CONTACTS THAT THE NNA FORMULATION CAUSED US SOME PROBLEMS AND TO WORK OUT AN OFFICIAL ALLIED POSITION NEXT WEEK.

7. THIS FRENCH FORMULA HAS RUN INTO SOME OBSTACLES WHICH MAY PROVE TO BE INSURMOUNTABLE: THE SOVIETS, FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE TOLD AMBASSADOR BARRY THAT THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY "SOFT" COMPROMISE. EVEN SOME OF OUR NATO COLLEAGUES HAVE LOST THEIR ENTHUSIASM FOR THE "SOFT TRANSITION" AS AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH, WITNESS THE DECIDED LACK OF ENTHUSIASM IN THE CAUCUS, EVEN BY THE FRENCH, WHEN BARRY FLOATED THE POSSIBILITY OF FALLING BACK TO THE ORIGINAL FRENCH FORMULA.

8. NATO: NATO'S EMBARRASSING SILENCE IN THE PLENARY CONTINUED TO RAISE CONCERN IN THE CAUCUS, BUT NO VOLUNTEERS; WHEN IT WAS NOTED THAT FOR THE SECOND WEEK IN A ROW THERE WERE NO SCHEDULED NATO SPEAKERS, THE

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ICELANDIC CAUCUS CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY QUIPPED THAT WHILE ALL THE ALLIES ARE EQUAL, "SOME ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS WHEN IT COMES TO SPEECHES." AFTER JOKING THAT THOSE WHO HAVEN'T SPOKEN SO FAR THIS ROUND SHOULD DRAW LOTS, THE SUBJECT WAS QUICKLY DELEGATED TO THE DEPUTIES. OUTSIDE THE PLENARY THE ALLIANCE HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN EXPLAINING THE ADVANTAGES OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS IN THE WORKING GROUPS, WITH THE U.S. SPEAKING IN FOUR OUT OF SIX WORKING GROUP MEETINGS AND OTHER ALLIES HOLDING THEIR OWN.

9. THE EAST: THE EAST DOMINATED THE PLENARY ON FRIDAY, OCTOBER 4: A STANDARD POLITICAL SPEECH BY THE CZECH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER (JOHANES) WAS GIVEN PRIDE OF PLACE, BUT THE EAST'S REAL NEWSMAKER WAS CLEARLY CONTAINED IN THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR'S SPEECH BUILDING ON GORBACHEV'S ADDRESS TO THE FRENCH PARLIAMENT, WHICH INCLUDED ACCEPTANCE OF THE NNA ANNUAL FORECAST OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY MANEUVERS. "THE QUESTION HAS TO BE ASKED," NOTED FRG AMBASSADOR CITRON, "WHETHER THE OFFER THAT SOUNDED GOOD IN PARIS" WOULD LOSE ITS APPEAL AFTER IT IS "QUALIFIED AND TURNED AROUND IN STOCKHOLM." CITRON WAS CORRECT. AS USUAL WITH SOVIET PROPOSALS, IN STOCKHOLM THIS ATTRACTIVE BAIT COVERED A LARGE HOOK: NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES, ACCORDING TO SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY, WOULD INCLUDE LARGE SCALE MILITARY MANEUVERS BY GROUND, NAVAL AND AIR FORCES, AS WELL AS MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS. IN OTHER WORDS, THE SOVIETS HAVE TRANSLATED A SEEMING CONCESSION EXPLICITLY OFFERED BY GORBACHEV IN PARIS INTO TERMS THAT SUPPORT THE UNACCEPTABLE SOVIET POSITION IN STOCKHOLM. GRINEVSKY'S QUALIFIER REPRESENTS THE LATEST OFFENSIVE IN THE EAST'S EFFORTS TO ATTAIN ITS MAIN -- POLITICAL -- OBJECTIVE AT STOCKHOLM: TO WIN BACK WHAT IT LOST IN MADRID BY PUSHING THE MADRID MANDATE'S DEFINITION OF THE ZONE WESTWARD INTO THE ATLANTIC AND, THEREBY, TO DEFINE EUROPE IN STRATEGIC, RATHER THAN GEOGRAPHIC, TERMS. WE HAVE TAKEN THE LINE (REF) THAT WE WELCOME THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE FINALLY EXPLICITLY ACCEPTED THE IDEA OF ANNUAL FORECASTS; IT IS A CONCEPT THAT THE WEST HAS FAVORED FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFERENCE AND WE ARE PLEASED THAT THE SOVIETS RECOGNIZE THAT ANNUAL FORECASTS, HANDLED PROPERLY, WOULD IMPROVE SECURITY AND

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STABILITY IN EUROPE. UNFORTUNATELY, SOVIET QUALIFICATIONS ARE NOT CONSISTENT EITHER WITH THE LETTER OF THE MANDATE OF THIS CONFERENCE OR WITH THE SPIRIT OF OTHER ANNUAL FORECAST PROPOSALS. IN THE WORKING GROUPS,

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THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN POUNDING AWAY AT KEY WESTERN CONCEPTS AND HAVE BEEN PUSHING THE WEST TO DECLARE ITSELF ON CONSTRAINTS AND NON-USE OF FORCE, TWO AREAS WHERE THE WEST IS NOT ABOUT TO BE FORTHCOMING AT THIS STAGE. THE ROMANIAN HAS BEEN LOOKING UNDER EVERY ROCK FOR EVIDENCE OF CONVERGING POSITIONS.

10. THE NNA: WHILE THE NNA ARE STILL TOILING AWAY AT THEIR GROUP PAPERS, THE FOCUS OF THEIR ACTIVITIES IN THE CONFERENCE HAS SHIFTED TO THEIR ROLE AS GO-BETWEEN IN THE PROCEDURAL HAGGLING. EVEN HERE, THEIR BEHAVIOR HAS BEEN BASED MORE ON PROTECTING THEIR PERCEIVED SELF-INTERESTS THAN IN ACTING AS A DISINTERESTED HONEST BROKER. THEIR INITIAL COMPROMISE PROPOSAL, WHICH ENSURES THAT THEIR OWN INTERESTS ARE FACTORED INTO THE PROCESS, AT FIRST BLUSH, APPEARS UNACCEPTABLE TO BOTH EAST AND WEST. WITH ALL OF THEIR EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES, LIKE PREOCCUPIED SCHOOLBOYS, THEY HAVE BEEN PRESENT IN CLASS IN BODY BUT NOT SPIRIT; THEY HAVE REACTED TO SPECIFIC POINTS RAISED BY OTHERS, BUT, APPARENTLY PENDING THE TABLING OF THEIR PAPERS, THEY HAVE AGREED -- WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE CYPRIOT ON NUF AND THE YUGOSLAV ON VERIFICATION -- NOT TO MUDDY THE WATERS BY EXPRESSING NATIONAL POSITIONS IN THE WORKING GROUPS.

11. RUSSIAN LANGUAGE ABUSES: AS WE HAVE NOTED EARLIER, THE SOVIET MFA PROVIDES RUSSIAN LANGUAGE SPECIALISTS TO THE CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT. THE OTHER LANGUAGE SPECIALISTS ARE INDEPENDENT FREELANCERS HIRED ON THE BASIS OF THEIR MERITS, NOT THEIR NATIONALITY. WE HAVE BEEN TROUBLED BY SOVIET ABUSES OF THE RUSSIAN INTERPRETING BOOTH AND TRANSLATION SERVICES AT STOCKHOLM. WHILE IRKSOME NOW, SOVIET CONTROL OF THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE SPECIALISTS COULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR NATO WHEN AN ENGLISH TEXT HAS BEEN AGREED AND TRANSLATIONS NEED TO BE MADE INTO THE OTHER LANGUAGES. WE CAN EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO USE THEIR RUSSIAN LANGUAGE PERSONNEL TO WIN BACK IN THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION POINTS THEY LOST DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. THERE ALREADY HAVE BEEN EXAMPLES OF OUTRAGEOUS SOVIET ABUSES: THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR'S INTERPRETER LAST ROUND KICKED THE SECRETARIAT INTERPRETER OUT OF THE RUSSIAN BOOTH TO DELIVER A SARCASTIC RENDITION OF A U.S. SPEECH; MISTRANSLATIONS OF KEY PASSAGES OF THE NATO PACKAGE BY MOSCOW-SUPPLIED TRANSLATERS LAST FEBRUARY PLAYED TOO DIRECTLY INTO SOVIET HANDS TO BE DISMISSED AS INCOMPETENCE.

12. THE U.S. DELEGATION HAS PROTESTED THESE CASES TO THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT AND HAS REQUESTED THAT THERE BE EQUAL TREATMENT IN THE RECRUITMENT OF INTERPRETERS/TRANSLATORS FOR ALL SIX OFFICIAL CSCE LANGUAGES. IN JULY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT AGREED TO

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EXAMINE APPLICATIONS BY FREELANCE CANDIDATES RATHER THAN SETTLE FOR WHATEVER THE SOVIET MFA CHOSE TO SEND THEM. HOWEVER, WHEN A GENEVA-BASED INDEPENDENT INTERPRETER DID EXPRESS AN INTEREST, HER APPLICATION WAS REJECTED BY THE HEAD OF LANGUAGE SERVICES WITH THE EXPLANATION THAT THE SECRETARIAT WAS HAPPY WITH THE EXISTING ARRANGEMENT. WHEN WE LEARNED THIS WE REMINDED SECRETARIAT PERSONNEL OF OUR PAST CONVERSATIONS AND WERE PROMISED THAT THE ISSUE WOULD BE CONSIDERED AGAIN BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY. WHILE THE SECRETARIAT AND MOST CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS SYMPATHIZE WITH OUR POSITION IN PRINCIPLE, SOME HAVE QUIETLY TOLD US NOT TO ROCK THE BOAT, ESPECIALLY SINCE IT CARRIES A TEMPERAMENTAL BEAR. WE INTEND TO MAKE SOME WAVES, ARGUING THAT IT IS NOT THE WEST THAT IS CREATING PROBLEMS, BUT THE SOVIETS, BY DEMANDING SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR THEIR PERSONNEL. WHILE

FROM USDEL
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS:

ULTIMATELY WE MAY NOT SUCCEED IN CHANGING THE UNFORTUNATE CSCE PRECEDENT WHICH HAS ALLOWED THE SOVIETS A DROIT DE REGARD OVER THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE BOOTH, WE HOPE THIS CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING EXERCISE WILL ALERT OTHER PARTICIPANTS TO THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF THE LANGUAGE PERSONNEL AT FUTURE MEETINGS, E.G., AT THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07674
SUBJECT: THE DYNAMICS OF CDE
1. CDE VII - 037
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
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3. BEGIN SUMMARY: I PROMISED WASHINGTON AGENCIES MY PERSONAL VIEW OF THE "STATE OF CDE" AS SOON AS I FORMED ONE. AFTER A WEEK, I'M NO EXPERT, BUT I'VE ALREADY DEVELOPED BIASES. IN BRIEF, THOSE WHO FEAR THAT WE'RE ALREADY ON A SLIPPERY SLOPE CAN RELAX; IT'S ALL UPHILL FROM HERE. NATO IS WORKING WELL TOGETHER, BUT WHEN THE CRUNCH COMES NEXT SPRING OR SUMMER THE STRAINS BETWEEN THE "WETS" AND THE "DRYS" WILL BE DIFFICULT TO MANAGE. WHILE THE NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED HAVE MORE IN COMMON WITH THE WEST THAN THE EAST, ASPECTS OF THEIR EMERGING PACKAGE WILL GIVE THE U.S. REAL PROBLEMS, ESPECIALLY ON CONSTRAINTS. AS FOR THE WARSAW PACT, THEY DISPLAY NO FLEXIBILITY ON THE TWO MEASURES CENTRAL TO OUR PACKAGE: INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION. IN THE SHORT RUN, A CONSENSUS IS DEVELOPING AMONG ALL GROUPS THAT WE SHOULD MOVE TO AN INFORMAL EXPLORATORY PHASE IN THIS ROUND; THERE IS A DEVELOPING CONSENSUS THAT IT CAN ONLY BE DONE BY THE SO-CALLED GOODBY-GRINEVSKY COMPROMISE WITH SLIGHT MODIFICATIONS. AN INFORMAL EXPLORATORY PHASE WOULD PRESERVE EVERYBODY'S POSITION BUT ALSO WOULD MEAN THAT SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES WOULD SIMPLY REEMERGE IN THE NEXT ROUND. NO ONE BELIEVES THAT REAL PROGRESS TOWARDS AN AGREEMENT WILL BEGIN UNTIL WELL INTO THE DRAFTING PHASE WHICH WILL PROBABLY NOT BEGIN UNTIL NEXT YEAR. THEN, THERE IS REAL CONCERN -- ESPECIALLY AMONG THE "DRYS" -- THAT THERE IS NOT ENOUGH FAT IN THE NATO POSITION. END SUMMARY.
4. ALTHOUGH THIS CABLE DOES NOT REPRESENT A CLEARED DELEGATION POSITION, IT HAS BEEN SEEN BY THE DELEGATION AND SOME OF THEIR COMMENTS HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.
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5. THOSE WHO FEAR WE ARE GOING TO GET DOWN TO BUSINESS TOO EARLY CAN RELAX. EVERYTHING HERE MOVES AT A SNAIL'S PACE. DESPITE THEIR EAGERNESS, THE NNA WILL PROBABLY NOT BE ABLE TO TABLE THEIR MEASURES DURING THIS ROUND; NATO HAS SPENT THE ENTIRE SEVENTH SESSION ON PROCEDURE, STRENGTHENING THE GOODBY-GRINEVSKY NON-PAPER IN THE REALIZATION THAT IT HAS BECOME NON-NEGOTIABLE, EVEN WITH THE NNA. OPTIMISTS TALK ABOUT THE FIRST COHERENT TEXTS EMERGING IN MAY, PESSIMISTS SUGGEST LATE SUMMER. I HAVE COME TO THE VIEW THAT EARLY DRAFTING WILL HELP DEFEND AGAINST PRESSURE FOR A MINIPACKAGE, BUT ALSO THAT EARLY DRAFTING IS UNLIKELY.
6. THE NATO CAUCUS IS STILL WORKING WELL TOGETHER PUBLICLY, BUT THE "WETS" AND THE "DRYS" ARE CONTINUING TO SNIPE AT EACH OTHER IN PRIVATE. WHEN THE TIME FOR

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SUBSTANTIVE TRADEOFFS COMES, THERE WILL BE REAL INTRA-ALLIANCE STRAINS. SINCE ALLIANCE COHESION IS THE MAIN U.S. GOAL AT CDE, WE NEED TO LOOK AT WAYS OF MINIMIZING THESE STRAINS. PERHAPS USNATO HAS SOME THOUGHTS ON THIS.

7. THE STRAINS WITHIN THE NNA ARE MUCH GREATER; THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THEY HAVE TRIED TO FORM COMMON POSITIONS ON SECURITY ISSUES, AND IT HURTS. THEY WANT TO HAVE THEIR SAY IN STOCKHOLM BUT CAN'T FIND A CONSENSUS ON THE ISSUES. THEIR PROPOSALS WILL PROBABLY SURFACE IN THE NEXT ROUND. WHILE THEY WILL BUTTRESS OUR POSITIONS ON MANY ISSUES, IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT THEIR INPUT WILL BE A NET PLUS. REGARDING THE WORKING STRUCTURE, FOR EXAMPLE, WE UNDERSTAND THEY WANT THINGS WHICH CREATE REAL PROBLEMS FOR US, SUCH AS IN THE AREA OF CONSULTATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS.

8. THE EAST -- NOT UNLIKE THE U.S. -- WANTS PROCEDURAL PROGRESS BUT NOT AT THE PRICE OF ANY OF ITS SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS. GRINEVSKY IS CATEGORICAL ABOUT INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION; "WE WILL NEVER AGREE TO THESE AS

FROM USDEL
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: THE DYNAMICS OF CDE

INDEPENDENT MEASURES, OR EVEN DISCUSS THEM AS SUCH" -- THOUGH THEY WON'T TRY TO BLOCK OUR DISCUSSING THEM. WE WILL, OF COURSE, MAINTAIN OUR SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS THROUGH THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS, REALIZING THAT THE TOUGHEST NEGOTIATING WILL MOST LIKELY BE ON INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION.

9. EVERYONE IS SICK OF TWO YEARS OF SPEECHMAKING AND WANTS TO PASS SOME SYMBOLIC THRESHOLD AND, THEREFORE, WANTS TO SEE THE INFORMAL EXPLORATORY PHASE BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE CLUMSY NEGOTIATING PROCESS INVOLVING THE NATO AND NNA CAUCUSES AND THE EASTERN MONOLITH IS NOT PRODUCING A TEXT WHICH WILL GET US THERE. MANY, INCLUDING MYSELF, WOULD PREFER THAT WE MOVE TO THE NEXT PHASE WITH NO TEXT DEFINING THE SUBJECTS TO BE DISCUSSED, BUT EVEN THE FRENCH PARENTS OF THE IDEA THINK THE TIME HAS PASSED FOR THAT. THEREFORE MANY BELIEVE WE OUGHT TO GO BACK TO THE GOODBY-GRINEVSKY COMPROMISE, SLIGHTLY MODIFIED. BARGAINING OVER THIS HAS BEEN THE SOLE PREOCCUPATION OF THE CONFERENCE FOR THIS ROUND; AS A RESULT IT IS CLEAR THAT NEITHER EAST NOR WEST HAS GIVEN UP ANYTHING OF SUBSTANCE. THIS MEANS THAT ALL THESE DIFFERENCES WILL REEMERGE IN THE EXPLORATORY PHASE.

10. THE QUESTION IS WHAT ARE WE TO EXPECT OF THE NEXT PHASE. NO ONE HERE BELIEVES THAT REAL COMPROMISES WILL EMERGE UNTIL WELL INTO THE DRAFTING PHASE, WHICH WILL

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PROBABLY NOT BEGIN UNTIL NEXT YEAR. SO, EVEN THE HARDLINERS BELIEVE THAT THE EXPLORATORY PHASE OUGHT TO BE USED TO BE SURE THE EAST IS NOT GOING TO TRY TO PREVENT DISCUSSION OF INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION OR TRY TO AVOID COMING TO TERMS WITH CSBM'S WHILE PRESSING AHEAD ON NUF. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THEY WILL USE LATERAL LINKAGES TO TRY TO WIN CONCESSIONS ON NUF; BUT IN THE END I BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL PERMIT PROGRESS ON CSBM'S AS THE PRICE OF CONTINUING THE CONFERENCE. THIS ARGUES FOR AN EARLY START TO DRAFTING -- I.E., EARLY NEXT YEAR -- BUT IT DOESN'T PROMISE AN EARLY FINISH.
BARRY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07721
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS MEETINGS, OCTOBER 8, 1985
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 7076; B) STOCKHOLM 7364
1. CDE VII - 039
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
-
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: DURING TWO SESSIONS ON OCTOBER 8 THE NATO CAUCUS FOCUSED ON CONTINUING DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEGOTIATION OF AN INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE. AFTER HEARING IN THE MORNING ABOUT A FAIRLY POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM KAHILUOTO ON HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH KORNASKI (POLAND), THE AFTERNOON CAUCUS SESSION RECEIVED WORD FROM THE NATO SPOKESMEN THAT GRINEVSKY (USSR) HAD RETURNED TO THE EASTERN DEMAND FOR REFERENCE TO A TARGET DATE FOR DRAFTING IN THE AGREEMENT AND A RETURN TO THE GROUP A, WEDNESDAY FORMULATION AS CONTAINED IN THE ORIGINAL "NON-AMERICAN, NON-PAPER" (REF A), I.E., "NOTIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS." IN ADDITION, ACCEPTANCE OF PARA 4 OF THE NATO PROPOSAL (VERIFICATION) WOULD BE CONTINGENT ON WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF GRINEVSKY'S WEDNESDAY LANGUAGE. THE CAUCUS AGREED TO TAKE A FIRM POSITION ON BOTH THE GROUP A, WEDNESDAY FORMULATION AND THE RETENTION OF PARA 4. IT WAS ALSO AGREED (IN LIGHT OF STRONG U.S. RESERVATIONS) THAT FOR THE TIME BEING GRINEVSKY'S TIME FRAME FOR DRAFTING WOULD ALSO BE REJECTED, BUT THERE IS SIGNIFICANT SENTIMENT IN THE CAUCUS TO ACCEPT GRINEVSKY'S POSITION, PERHAPS AS PART OF A TRADE-OFF FOR OUR WEDNESDAY FORMULATION. END SUMMARY.
-
4. THE OCTOBER 8 MORNING SESSION OF THE NATO CAUCUS OPENED WITH A REPORT FROM THE NATO SPOKESMEN ON RECENT CONTACTS WITH KAHILUOTO (FINLAND) ON INFORMAL WORKING STRUCTURE. KAHILUOTO HAD TOLD THE SPOKESMEN THAT KONARSKI (POLAND) HAD INDICATED THAT THE EAST COULD ACCEPT A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE NATO PROPOSAL (REF B), INCLUDING NATO'S PARA 4 ON VERIFICATION, AND PARA 3 (THE SO-CALLED "DISCLAIMER"), WITH THE EXCEPTION THAT NATO SHOULD CHOOSE EITHER THE WORD "PROVISIONAL" OR "PRELIMINARY" RATHER THAN USING BOTH. TURNING TO THE SPECIFIC WORKING GROUPS, KONARSKI HAD OBSERVED THAT THE EAST WANTED WORKING GROUP A, TUESDAY DESCRIBED SIMPLY AS "NON-USE OF FORCE," BUT THAT THEY COULD ACCEPT THE NATO FORMULATION FOR WEDNESDAY PROVIDED THAT THE FINAL PHRASE "COMPRISING A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S" WAS DROPPED. ON CONTRAINTS, KONARSKI HAD SAID THEY COULD ACCEPT THE NNA FORMULATION "CONTRAINTS; ANNUAL FORECASTS." KONARSKI HAD ALSO CONTINUED TO PUSH FOR A REFERENCE TO A SPECIFIC DATE OR TIME PERIOD IN WHICH TO BEGIN DRAFTING, BUT HAD HINTED THAT THE EAST COULD ACCEPT THE NNA FORMULATION "AT THE END OF THE DAY."

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KONARSKI HAD BEEN EAGER TO OPEN THE EXPLORATORY PHASE NEXT WEEK (OCTOBER 14-18) AND HAD SUGGESTED DIRECT TRICORNERED MEETINGS AMONG NATO, THE WTO AND THE NNA TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT. KAHILUOTO HAD RESISTED THESE SUGGESTIONS POINTING TO PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AND INDICATING THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY FOR ANY TRIPARTITE MEETINGS. AS FOR THE NNA, KAHILUOTO HAD TOLD THE NATO SPOKESMEN THAT, IN LIGHT OF THE SURPRISINGLY POSITIVE RESPONSE OF THE EAST, THEY NOW BELIEVED THAT THEIR PROPOSAL MAY HAVE BEEN TOO HASTY. HE NOW BELIEVED WE WERE CLOSE TO AN AGREEMENT, BUT NOTED TWO REMAINING PROBLEMS FROM THE NNA PERSPECTIVE: 1) THE QUESTION OF HOW TO REFER TO THE TIMING OF START OF DRAFTING; 2) HOW TO DEAL WITH SOME NNA COUNTRIES INSISTENCE THAT CONSULTATION/RAPID EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BE INCLUDED IN THE GROUP A, WEDNESDAY DESCRIPTION.

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5. FOLLOWING THIS REPORT, THE CAUCUS CONSIDERED HOW TO REACT TO KONARSKI'S POINTS IN THE CONTEXT OF POSSIBLE CHANGES TO THE NATO PAPER. AD REF AGREEMENT WAS ACHIEVED ON A FEW MINOR CHANGES, BUT THE GENERAL SENSE OF THE CAUCUS WAS THAT THIS IS NOT THE TIME TO MAKE ANY

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GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS MEETINGS, OCTOBER 8, 1985

CHANGES TO OUR CENTRAL POINTS. THE CAUCUS AGREED TO GIVE THE NATO SPOKESMEN FLEXIBILITY TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE FOR PARA 1 OF THE NATO PAPER THAT WOULD ANSWER AN EASTERN OBJECTION TO THE TERM, ". . . A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT." ON THE TIMING OF DRAFTING, IT WAS FURTHER AGREED THAT THE CAUCUS COULD ACCEPT THE LANGUAGE OF THE NNA PROPOSAL (I.E., "INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS SHOULD START DURING THE SEVENTH SESSION WITH A VIEW TO FACILITATING AN EARLY TRANSITION TO THE DRAFTING PHASE"); HOWEVER, AMBASSADOR BARRY (U.S.) STRESSED THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT NOW PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANY REFERENCE TO A SPECIFIC DATE OR TIME PERIOD IN WHICH DRAFTING SHOULD BEGIN. THERE ALSO WAS AD REF AGREEMENT (EXCEPTING THE UK) TO ACCEPT THE DESCRIPTION FOR GROUP A, TUESDAY OF "NON-USE OF FORCE." A MUCH WIDER RANGE OF OPINIONS WAS EXPRESSED REGARDING GROUP A, WEDNESDAY. NORWAY AND THE NETHERLANDS JOINED THE U.S., UK, PORTUGAL AND THE FRG IN OPPOSING CHANGING THE NATO POSITION AT THIS TIME (ALTHOUGH NORWAY COULD NOT SEE ANY SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEM WITH DROPPING "COMPRISING A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S"). BARRY (U.S.) ARGUED THAT WE SHOULD NEITHER DROP OUR PRESENT FORMULATION NOR EVEN CONSIDER DROPPING THIS ESSENTIAL POINT, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF COMMENTS EARLIER HEARD FROM EASTERN DELEGATES THAT WE HAVE TRADED

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OFF MEASURES 1 AND 5 FOR THE EASTERN POLITICAL NON-STARTERS. CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL) ALSO ARGUED THAT IT WAS UNWISE EVEN TO HINT AT FLEXIBILITY ON THIS POINT, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE EAST ALREADY SEEMS TO BE MOVING IN OUR DIRECTION. OTHERS (CANADA, FRANCE) WERE MORE PREPARED TO MAKE AN ACCOMMODATION HERE BY ACCEPTING KONARSKI'S PROPOSAL. DELWORTH (CANADA) SAID HE HAD NEVER REALLY BEEN HAPPY WITH THE PRESENT FORMULATION, WHILE GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) ARGUED THAT WE SHOULD DROP THE "COMPRISING" PHRASE IN ORDER TO "CONTRACT" THE NEGOTIATIONS. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY CONSENSUS FOR CHANGE, THE CAUCUS AGREED TO RETAIN OUR PRESENT POSITION ON THIS POINT AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING. ON THE QUESTION OF "CONSULTATIONS/RAPID EXCHANGE OF VIEWS," IT WAS THE SENSE OF THE CAUCUS THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE NNA PROPOSAL TO INCORPORATE CONSULTATIONS INTO THE GROUP A, WEDNESDAY DESCRIPTION, BUT THERE WAS NO CLEAR VIEW ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM. POSSIBLE OPTIONS INCLUDED UNILATERAL STATEMENTS FROM THE NNA (AND ROMANIA) THAT THEY UNDERSTOOD "DEVELOPMENT OF MEANS OF COMMUNICATION" TO MEAN THAT THEY COULD DISCUSS CONSULTATIONS IN THE WEDNESDAY GROUP (SUGGESTED BY THE NETHERLANDS AND CANADA) OR A POSSIBLE ORAL UNDERSTANDING TO THE SAME EFFECT (SUGGESTED BY THE FRG AND DENMARK). CAUCUS DISCUSSION ON THIS POINT WAS INCONCLUSIVE. THE CAUCUS (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE UK) WAS PREPARED TO AGREE TO THE CONSTRAINTS FORMULATION CONTAINED IN THE ORIGINAL NON-PAPER DISTRIBUTED BY AMBASSADOR GOODBY, "CONSTRAINING MEASURES; ANNUAL FORECASTS OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES." IN LIGHT OF EDES' (UK) RESERVATION, HOWEVER, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE SPOKESMEN WOULD ONLY ASK KAHILUOTO TO CANVAS NNA VIEWS ON THIS FORMULATION WITHOUT EXPRESSING ANY WESTERN COMMITMENT. THE CAUCUS AGREED TO MAINTAIN ITS CURRENT FORMULATIONS, FOR BOTH SEGMENTS OF WORKING GROUP B, AND NO CHANGES WERE MADE TO PARAS 3-4 WITH THE EXCEPTION THAT THE WORD "PRELIMINARY" WAS DROPPED FROM PARA 3.

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6. AMBASSADOR BARRY (U.S.) TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE AGAIN THE POSSIBILITY OF RETURNING TO THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR MOVING TO THE EXPLORATORY PHASE BY SIMPLY USING THE EXISTING STRUCTURE WITHOUT ANY FURTHER AGREEMENT. HE INDICATED THAT THIS MAY, IN FACT, BE THE BEST WAY TO GO IF EVERYONE IS ANXIOUS TO MOVE AHEAD QUICKLY. HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO SUPPORT IN THE CAUCUS FOR RETURNING TO IT AT THIS TIME. GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) REITERATED HIS POSITION THAT IT WAS TOO LATE FOR THE FRENCH APPROACH, WHICH HE NOW FEARED COULD FORCE US INTO

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TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS MEETINGS, OCTOBER 8, 1985

DRAFTING WITH INADEQUATE PREPARATION. SEVERAL OTHERS SPOKE UP IN SUPPORT OF GASCHIGNARD. THE GENERAL CONSENSUS WAS THAT, ALTHOUGH THIS IDEA MAY HAVE TO BE RETURNED TO IF THE PRESENT APPROACH FAILS, IT MUST BE PUT ASIDE FOR THE TIME BEING.

7. FRENCH AMBASSADOR GASCHIGNARD CAME TO SEE AMBASSADOR BARRY AFTER THE A.M. CAUCUS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS. HE SAID THAT PARIS WAS CONCERNED THAT THE U.S. WAS RETREATING FROM THE ORIGINAL "NON-U.S. NON-PAPER" AFTER FRANCE HAD SWALLOWED HER OBJECTIONS TO IT. IN PARTICULAR HE EMPHASIZED THE VIEW THAT THE ORIGINAL FORMULATION ON A-2 WAS BETTER THAN THAT WHICH THE NATO CAUCUS HAD COME UP WITH BECAUSE THE NATO FORUMULATION COULD BE INTERPRETED AS APPLYING VERIFICATION TO NUF. HE ALSO SAID THE QUAI WAS PUZZLED ABOUT THE U.S. POSITION ON DRAFTING; THE FRENCH NOW ACCEPTED THE IDEA THAT SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS WOULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE ONCE DRAFTING HAD BEGUN, BUT NOW THE U.S. SEEMED TO BE BACKING AWAY FROM THAT POSITION.

8. THE CAUCUS RECONVENED IN THE LATE AFTERNOON TO HEAR THE SPOKESMEN REPORT ON A FURTHER MEETING WITH KAHILUOTO. KAHILUOTO TOLD THEM THAT GRINEVSKY (USSR) HAD CHANGED THE EASTERN POSITION FROM THAT PRESENTED EARLIER BY KONARSKI (POLAND) ON TWO MAIN POINTS: 1) HE WOULD ADD TO THE END OF THE NNA LANGUAGE ON DRAFTING ". . . IF POSSIBLE DURING THE EIGHTH SESSION;" AND 2) THE EAST WOULD ONLY AGREE TO NATO'S PARA 4 (VERIFICATION) IF NATO AGREED TO A GROUP A, WEDNESDAY FORMULATION OF INFORMATION/VERIFICATION "IN THE CONTEXT OF NOTIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS." KAHILUOTO HAD ALSO INDICATED TO THE NATO SPOKESMEN THAT HE HAD DRAFTED AN ORAL UNDERSTANDING FOR NNA CAUCUS CONSIDERATION WHICH WOULD KEEP CONSULTATIONS OUT OF ANY WRITTEN AGREEMENT. THE KAHILUOTO PROPOSAL WOULD READ, "IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPING MEANS OF COMMUNICATION, CONSULTATIONS/RAPID EXHANGE OF VIEWS CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CSBM'S MAY ALSO BE DISCUSSED."

9. THE CAUCUS QUICKLY REACHED CONSENSUS TO STAND FIRM ON OUR LANGUAGE FOR WORKING GROUP A, WEDNESDAY. THE UK, U.S., TURKEY AND FRG ALL REPORTED THAT IN RECENT CONTACTS BUHRING (GDR) HAD INDICATED THAT THE EAST COULD ACCEPT THE NATO FORMULATION, AND THEY SUSPECTED THAT GRINEVSKY'S NEW POSITION WAS A NEGOTIATING TACTIC. MOST DELEGATIONS WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT GRINEVSKY'S PROPOSED REFERENCE TO DRAFTING "IF POSSIBLE DURING THE EIGHTH SESSION," ALTHOUGH SOME (UK AND NETHERLANDS) HOPED TO TRADE IT OFF FOR MORE SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS ELSEWHERE IN THE TEXT. MELLBIN (DENMARK) SUGGESTED THAT WE ASK KAHILUOTO TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF RETAINING OUR LANGUAGE ON GROUP A, WEDNESDAY IN RETURN FOR GRINEVSKY'S LANGUAGE ON

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DRAFTING. MELLBIN ALSO COMMENTED THAT HE FELT THE GRINEVSKY LANGUAGE ACTUALLY HELPED THOSE WHO WERE MORE RELUCTANT ABOUT EARLY DRAFTING BECAUSE IT IMPLIES THAT DRAFTING MAY, IN FACT, NOT BEGIN UNTIL THE NINTH SESSION OR EVEN LATER. HANSEN (U.S.) NOTED THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE U.S. TO AGREE TO THIS FORMULATION, BECAUSE IT SET A TARGET DATE FOR DRAFTING WHICH MIGHT BE USED AGAINST US IN THE FUTURE NO MATTER HOW CAVEATED.
-
HE SUGGESTED THAT WE NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF EXPLORING A POSSIBLE ACCOMMODATION ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED BY MELLBIN, BUT THAT WE WAIT TO SEE HOW THE SITUATION DEVELOPS, AND HAVE A CHANCE TO CONSULT WITH CAPITALS. CITRON (FRG) AGREED THAT THIS WAS SOMETHING TO BE CONSIDERED "DOWN THE ROAD." THE CAUCUS INSTRUCTED THE NATO SPOKESMEN TO TELL KAHILUOTO IN THEIR NEXT ENCOUNTER (SCHEDULED IMMEDIATELY TO FOLLOW THE MEETING) THAT NATO RETAINED ITS DEMAND FOR THE FULL NATO FORMULA FOR GROUP A, WEDNESDAY, AS WELL AS FOR PARA 4 OF THE NATO PAPER, AND COULD NOT ACCEPT GRINEVSKY'S PROPOSED CHANGE TO THE NNA LANGUAGE ON THE TIMING OF DRAFTING. EDES (UK) CLOSED THE MEETING BY OBSERVING THAT IT MIGHT
FROM USDEL
GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CDE, CSCE, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS MEETINGS, OCTOBER 8, 1985
BE IN NATO'S INTEREST TO SLOW THE PACE OF NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO ALLOW DELEGATIONS TIME TO CONSULT WITH CAPITALS.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

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25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07731
SUBJECT: U.S. DELEGATION CDE VIEW ON REINFORCED CDE
- COUNCIL MEETING
REF: USNATO 5603
1. CDE VII - 040
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BARRING UNFORESEEN DEVELOPMENTS IN STOCKHOLM, U.S. DELEGATION SEES NO REASON TO HOLD A PRE-ROUND VIII NAC MEETING. AS NOTED REFTEL, THE PRECEDENT OF A PRE-ROUND NAC IS NOT IMMUTABLE; A MEETING SHOULD DEPEND ON DEVELOPMENTS AT THE CDE AND THE SENSE OF THE CAUCUS IN STOCKHOLM. AT THIS POINT, MANY CAUCUS MEMBERS SEE NO NEED FOR A NAC SESSION PRIOR TO ROUND VIII. WHILE WE HAVE KEPT A LOW PROFILE ON THE ISSUE, WE CONCUR WITH THIS DEVELOPING CONSENSUS.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

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